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PROCEEDINGS 


OF  THE 


NATIONAL 
SECURITY  CONGRESS 

UNDER  THE  AUSPICES  OF  THE 

NATIONAL  SECURITY  LEAGUE 

WASHINGTON 
January  20-22    1916. 


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PUBLISHED  BY 

THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  LEAGUE,  Inc. 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

31   PINE  STREET 

NEW  YORK  CITY 


GIFT   OF 


PROCEEDINGS 


OF  THE 


NATIONAL 
SECURITY  CONGRESS 

UNDER  THE  AUSPICES  OF  THE      ' 

NATIONAL  SECURITY  LEAGUE 


WASHINGTON 
•I?ini^ry'20-22  1916. 


NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
". LEAGUE    • 


^^^^ 


PUBLISHED  BY 

THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  LEAGUE,  Inc. 

NATIONAL   HEADQUARTERS 

31  PINE  STREET 

NEW  YORK  CITY 


US  Hs 


PREFACE 

The  Congress  of  the  National  Security  League  held  at  Washington 
on  January  20,  21  and  22,  1916,  was  intended  as  an  open  forum  in 
which  there  might  be  presented  the  views  of  many  minds  and  where 
the  many  aspects  of  our  needs  in  the  matter  of  national  defense  might 
be  presented.  It  was  the  purpose  that  this  Congress  should  be  en- 
tirely non-political  and  non-partisan,  drawing  its  information  and  de- 
riving its  strength  from  men  of  all  parties  united  on  a  common  plat- 
form of  patriotism  and  intent  upon  a  purpose  in  which  no  party  lines 
should  be  known. 

Inevitably  with  such  a  gathering  and  among  so  many  persons 
addressing  the  Congress,  some  in  person  and  some  by  letter,  divergen- 
cies of  opinion  would  be  found;  and  the  views  of  some,  as  well  as  the 
expression  of  such  views,  may  not  be  favorably  received  by  all;  but 
however  this  may  be,  all  were  animated  by  the  common  interest  in  the 
one  supreme  object. 

In  publishing  the  addresses  and  communications  read  at  the  Con- 
gress, the  Executive  Committee  of  the  National  Security  League  feels 
it  proper  to  state  that  each  speaker  and  writer  was  left  wholly  free  to 
express  his  own  views  and  was  in  no  sense  an  authorized  spokesman 
for  the  National  Security  League.  The  function  of  the  Congress  was 
to  secure  the  widest  possible  information  and  then  itself  to  formulate 
the  views  of  the  National  Security  League. 

With  this  object,  a  Committee  on  Resolutions  was  appointed  at  the 
first  session,  to  whom  all  proposed  resolutions  were  to  be  delivered, 
and  this  Committee,  after  many  hours  of  earnest  consideration,  formu- 
lated a  draft  of  resolutions  which  were  submitted  to  and  with  some 
modifications  adopted  by  the  Congress  on  the  afternoon  of  January  22. 
These  resolutions,  representing  officially  the  views  and  conclusions 
reached  by  the  Congress,  are  set  out  on  the  following  page. 

We  believe  that  the  work  of  the  Congress  was  of  distinct  value 
to  the  cause  of-  Preparedness  and  that  those  who  participated  per- 
formed a  patriotic  service  of  the  highest  character. 

HERBERT   BARRY,  GEORGE    T.    BUCKINGHAM, 

New  York  Chicago 

CHARLES  BIDDLE,  GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  HARRIES, 

Philadelphia  Omaha 

GENERAL  CHARLES  H.  COLE,  WILLET    M.    SPOONER, 

Boston  Milwaukee 

S.    STANWOOD    MENKEN.  J.    MAYHEW    WAINWRIGHT, 

New  York  New  York 

CHARLES    B.    WARREN,  ERIC    FISHER    WOOD, 

Detroit  New  York 

HENRY    A.    WISE    WOOD,  HENRY   WOODHOUSE, 

New  York  New  York 

Committee   on   Scope   of   the   Congress, 

New  York,   February,    1916. 


35841 


♦J 


RESOLUTIONS 

Adopted  at  The  National  Security  Congress,  under  the  auspices 

of  The  National  Security  League,  Inc.,  held  at 

Washington,  January  20-22,  1916. 

PRESENTED  BY  RESOLUTIONS  COMMITTEE 

Be  It  Resolved  by  the  National  Security  League  that  the  defense  of  the 
United  States  must  depend  upon  an  adequate  navy  and  a  national  army 
founded  upon  a  system  of  universal  obligatory  military  training  and  service. 
This  system  must  be  WHOLLY  under  the  discipline  and  control  of  the 
National  authorities.  We  deprecate  all  steps  which  tend  to  obstruct  or  post- 
pone the  adoption  of  such  a  vmiversal  system. 

Be  It  Further  Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the 
efforts  of  Secretary  Garrison  to  obtain  an  increase  in  the  regular  Army,  the 
correction  of  our  faulty  enlistment  law,  the  establishment  of  an  adequate 
Regular  Army  Reserve  and  the  accumulation  of  an  adequate  supply  of 
ammunition,  artillery,  and  material,  but  we  believe  that  in  addition  to  the 
proposed  quota  of  coast  artillery  and  auxiliary  troops,  the  mobile  Regular 
Army  within  the  United  States  should  comprise  at  least  four  complete  Infantry 
divisions  as  recommended  by  the  War  College  Report  of  1915. 

Be  It  Further  Resolved  by  the  National  Security  League  that  it  recom- 
mends the  authorization  by  Congress  of  a  Council  of  National  Defense  as  set 
forth  in  House  Resolution  No.  1833  of  the  first  session  of  the"  63rd  Congress, 
(!ommonly  known  as  the  Hobson  Bill,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  more  har- 
monious co-operation  between  the  Executive  and  Legislative  branches  of  the 
Government  \vlth  respect  to  the  national  defenses. 

Be  It  Further  Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  recommends 
the  establishment  of  a  navy  adequate  to  conserve  the  national  interests  in 
conformity   with    the   following    recommendations: 

That  the  personnel  of  the  Navy  be  increased  in  conformity  with  the 
requirements  of  the  Fleet  as  interpreted  by  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy; 

That  there  be  established  for  the  Navy  a  General  Staff,  similar  to  the 
General  Staff  of  the  Army,  as  is  customary  in  all  other  navies  of  the  world: 

That  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the  Program  of  July  30,  1915, 
of   the   General   Board  of  the  Navy,   and  urges   its   immediate   adoption  by 
Congress. 
GEN    LUKE  E.  WKIGHT,  Ex-Secretary  L.  T.  GOLDING,  St.  Joseph,  Missouri. 

of 'War,  Memphis.  Chairman.  GEN.  CHARLES  H.  COLE,  Boston. 

HENRY    L.    STTMSON,    Ex-Secretary    of  ERIC  FISHER  WOOD,   Secretary  of  the 

War,  New  York.  Congress,  New  I'ork. 

ROBERT  BACON,  Ex-Secretary  of  State.  S.   STANWOOD  MENKEN,   President 

New  Y'ork.  National  Security  League. 

WILLET  M.  SPOONER,  Milwaukee.  HERBERT  BARRY,    Secretary    National 

CHARLES  F.  MAC  LEAN,  Albany.  Security  League. 

S.  M.  BALLOU,  Hawaii.  HENRY  A.     WISE     WOOD,     Chairman 

F.  M.  JENCKS,  Baltimore.  Conference  Committee. 

WILLIAM  S.  MOORIIEAD,  Pittsburgh.  JUDGE      RANDALL      J.      LE     BOEUF, 

CHARLES  B.  WARREN,  Detroit.  Albany. 

GEN.  MAXWELL  VAN  ZANDT  WOOD-  C.  WILLING  HARE,  Philadelphia. 

HULL,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington.  GEN.  GEORGE  H.  HARRIES,  Omaha. 

FRANKLIN  Q.  BROWN,  New  York.  Committee   on    Resolutions 

PRESENTED  BY  BERNARD  J.  ROTHWELL  OF  THE  BOSTON  CHAMBER 

OF  COMMERCE 

Whereas,  The  misfortune  of  war  would  demand  from  the  young  manhood 
of  the  Nation  the  supreme  offering  of  life  itself;  therefore  be  it 

Resolved,  That  a  fundamental  factor  in  the  problem  of  preparedness 
would  be  such  intensive  mobilization  of  the  productive,  industrial  and  com- 
mercial forces  of  the  United  States  as  would  insure  in  time  of  war  the  con- 
tribution of  their  fullest  resources  at  a  restricted  profit,  to  be  regulated  by 
the  Government. 

PRESENTED   BY   C.   WILLING   HARE,   OF   PHILADELPHIA 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  great  interest  in  National  Defense  throughout 
the  country  has  created  a  number  of  local  and  national  organizations  aiming 
to  increase  the  efficiency  of  our  military  and  naval  service ; 

Be  It  Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  immediately  endeavor 
to  avoid  the  overlapping  of  the  efforts  and  energy  of  these  organizations  by 
seeking  effective  means  of  unifying  and  co-ordinating  fheir  activities. 


SCOPE  OF  CONGRESS 


The  National  Security  Congress  was  planned  upon  the  theory — 

(1)  That  National  unity  and  general  devotion  to  and  appreciation 
of  the  needs  of  the  country,  is  the  basis  of  any  nation's  defense. 

(2)  That  to  determine  what  defense  the  country  needs  we  should 
find  the  nation's  position  as  a  world  power. 

(3)  That  to  measure  means  of  defense  there  must  be  full  under- 
standing, (a)  of  the  individual's  obligation  to  the  State  and  the  State's 
ability  to  avail  thereof;   (b)  the  industrial  resources  of  the  country. 

(4)  That  with  knowledge  of  conditions  affecting  the  above  ques- 
tions, we  can  properly  discuss  the  application  of  individual  and  indus- 
trial resources  into  armed  force  available  for  our  defense  on  land  and 
sea. 


NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

First  Session 
January  20,  1916,  2:30  o'clock  p.  m. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  National  Security  Congress  was  called  to 
order  in  the  large  ballroom  on  the  tenth  floor  of  the  New  Willard  Hotel 
at  2 :30  o'clock  p.  m.,  by  S.  Stanwood  Menken,  President  of  the  National 
Security  League. 

OPENING  ADDRESS 

S.  Stanwood  Menken,  President  National  Security  League 

Mr.  Menken — It  is  a  privilege  to  bid  you  welcome  in  the  name 
of  the  National  Security  League  which  has  called  this  Congress,  and 
to  express  on  behalf  of  the  League  and  its  two  hundred  branches  and 
committees  and  forty  thousand  members,  appreciation  for  your  dis- 
tinguished presence. 

The  League  began  life  by  asking  for  knowledge  on  a  subject  of 
vital  import  to  every  patriot.  It  undertook  to  determine  whether 
Congressman  Gardner  was  correct  in  his  startling  expose  of  army  and 
navy  affairs,  notwithstanding  our  heavy  expenditures,  and,  having 
found  that  he  was  correct,  the  League  proceeded  to  develop  the  facts 
and  publish  its  own  reports  as  to  conditions  and  needs,  so  that  knowl- 
edge might  be  readily  acquired  by  the  people.  In  our  work  of  educa- 
tion we  have  distributed  a  vast  amount  of  literature;  in  fact,  several 
millions  of  pieces,  and  we  have  covered  every  section  of  the  countn'. 

We  have  been  fair  in  our  statements.  We  have  been  non-partisan 
in  a  political  sense  and  have  tried  to  be  absolutely  neutral  in  regard 
to  international  conditions. 

We  have  recognized  that  our  country's  first  line  of  defense  was  a 
united  people ;  that  a  country  divided  within  itself  must  fall,  and  that 
no  plan  of  preparedness  can  succeed  unless  we  have  behind  it  a  vigilant, 


determined  and  patriotic  nation  with  like  general  purpose  and  who 
properly  value  international  rights  and  institutions  and  who  demand 
national  defense,  knowing  that  their  own  existence  and  all  they  cherish 
depend  upon  it,  and  that  failure  or  inefficiency  will  imperil  the  liber- 
ties of  America  and  of  the  institutions.     (Applause.) 

From  the  first,  we  have  insisted  that  the  solution  of  the  question 
was  a  matter  for  the  scientific  man  trained  in  arms,  guided  by  those 
who  had  full  understanding  of  the  spirit  of  our  people. 

In  a  word,  the  country's  call  was  for  the  highest  ability  and  per- 
sonal service  of  its  most  practical  minds.  Our  attitude,  non-partisan 
throughout,  is  the  only  one  to  adopt  in  view  of  the  gravity  of  the 
issue.  We  could  not  and  can  not  be  otherwise.  There  is  no  more  room 
for  the  petty  differentiations  of  party  politics  or  personal  ambitions 
in  regard  to  the  defense  of  this  country  today  than  there  is  in  Eng- 
land, France  or  Germany.  We  are  talking  in  terms  of  national  exist- 
ence and  for  world  civilization. 

Such  being  our  attitude,  what  is  the  situation  as  to  national  de- 
fense at  the  present  moment.  The  President,  who  at  first  felt  that 
there  was  no  necessity  to  involve  the  United  States  in  the  many-sided 
problems  and  burdens  of  broad  military  preparedness,  has,  with  a 
remarkable  breadth  of  mind  borne  of  patriotism,  entirely  changed 
his  viewpoint  and  is  now  an  uncompromising  advocate  of  National 
Defense ;  and  it  is  but  fair  at  this  time  to  pay  tribute  to  his  acceptance 
of  the  burdens  of  the  fight  for  Preparedness,  even  though  it  has  been 
at  the  expense  of  severed  ties  and  associations  of  great  personal  im- 
portance to  himself.  And  whether  or  not  we  agree  with  or  hold  the 
same  political  faith  as  Mr.  Wilson  on  other  matters,  we  are  grateful 
that  he  has  had  the  strength  and  the  moral  courage  to  announce  that 
he  is  prepared  to  fight  for  his  convictions,  no  matter  what  the  cost. 

He  has  as  an  aid  in  this  great  work  a  Secretary  of  War  who  is  a 
man  of  high  power  and  noble  impulse,  who  has  with  intelligence 
studied  the  situation  and  made  recommendations,  most  of  which  we 
heartily  approve,  though  many  wish  he  had  gone  further  and  advo- 
cated universal  training,  the  benefits  of  which  will  no  doubt  be  dis- 
cussed by  you  at  length. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  also  broadened  his  program  as  to 
our  necessities,  but  the  recommendations  made  by  him  are  not  ap- 
proved by  the  official  experts  or  our  own  Navy  Committee.    We  have 

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felt  that  his  plans  do  not  go  sufficiently  far,  and  that  the  only  safe 
course  for  the  United  States  is  to  have  a  navy  v^^hich  vi^ill  be  at  least 
second,  if  not  first,  in  strength  in  the  vv^orld.  Mr.  Daniels  has  indi- 
cated that  he  would  have  made  a  larger  request  of  Congress  by  way  of 
ships  and  equipment  had  he  felt  that  there  were  the  means  of  pro- 
ducing the  same  within  a  reasonable  time.  His  program,  as  proposed, 
is  weak  and  insufficient  for  the  needs  of  the  country,  and  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  even  the  navy  he  recommends  will  not  be  built 
under  his  plan  until  the  expiration  of  ten  years. 

We  who  meet  here  can  not  be  expected  to  be  satisfied  with  any 
program  which  means  ten  years  of  doubt  and  uncertainty  as  to 
whether  this  country  is  to  be  safe  if  attacked,  and  free  until  then  from 
all  the  horrors  and  evils  which  would  follow  successful  invasion. 

If  we  need  a  navy  at  all,  we  need  it  now,  and  any  program  which 
leaves  to  the  chance  of  events  for  a  period  of  ten  years  under  present 
war  conditions  the  securing  of  such  a  navy  is  radically  wrong.  It 
must  be  strengthened  in  order  to  meet  the  country's  need.  We  regard 
reasonable  preparedness  against  war  as  insurance,  and  want  that  in- 
surance at  once,  not  five  years  from  now  or  at  any  other  long  deferred 
period.     (Applause.) 

If.  as  Mr.  Daniels  contends,  there  is  inability  on  the  part  of  this 
country  to  produce  more  ships  (^nd  this  is  a  matter  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed at  length  in  this  Congress)  it  is  respectfully  submitted  that  we 
should  urge  upon  him  and  upon  our  legislators  the  wisdom  of  creating 
great  federally  controlled  and  operated  shipyards,  wisely  located,  which 
will  be  of  such  extent  as  to  enable  the  country  to  build  and  equip  its 
own  vessels  with  a  maximum  speed.  It  may  be  true  that  such  ship- 
yards could  not  be  built  and  equipped  for  the  construction  of  vessels 
of  the  modern  type  within  a  period  of  two  years,  and  that  it  would  be 
a  matter  of  three  or  four  years  thereafter  before  ships  could  be  built, 
but  it  is  an  absolute  pre-essential  to  any  plans  of  defense  that  we  have 
the  means  of  constructing  whatever  equipment  future  Secretaries  of 
the  Navy  may  deem  necessary,  and  that  if  private  yards  and  those 
now  owned  by  the  government  can  not  furnish  what  the  country  re- 
quires, we  should  lay  the  base  of  our  future  defenses  by  equipping  our 
own  yards  promptly,  on  design  and  of  size  approved  by  the  best  en- 
gineering authority. 


\ 


There  is  one  more  point  to  which  I  would  call  your  attention,  and 
that  is  the  menace  arising  from  the  location  of  munition  plants  in  a 
restricted  exposed  area  of  our  country,  and  I  would  ask  you  to  con- 
sider advocating  the  erection,  under  Federal  control  and  support,  of 
other  munition  plants  of  large  size  in  sections  of  the  country  remote 
from  the  sea  coast,  preferably  where  the  necessary  raw  material  is 
readily  available. 

In  making  these  two  recommendations  to  you,  I  do  so  most  ad- 
visedly, and  take  the  occasion  to  say  that  I  trust  that  those  gentlemen 
who  have  been  proclaiming  that  defense  movements  are  to  be  opposed 
solely  because  of  the  interest  of  the  manufacturers  of  munition,  will 
feel  that  they  can  at  least  support  these  measures  for  government 
ownership,  and  perhaps  find  some  ground  to  aid  us  in  securing  at  least 
part  of  the  relief  which  we  are  seeking. 

Our  coast  defenses  and  our  volunteer  forces  should  also  be  dealt 
with  and  plans  laid  to  co-ordinate  our  forces  under  the  direction  of  a 
general  defense  board  operating  under  a  budget  system — a  plan  which 
means  co-ordination  with  added  strength  and  efficiency  with  economy. 
Any  system  of  defense  is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link. 

The  present  Congressional  situation  is  particularly  menacing, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  majority  leader  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  is  opposed  to  the  recommendations  of  the  Chief  Mag- 
istrate and  finds  support  in  the  position  taken  by  Mr.  William  Jen- 
nings Bryan. 

Mr.  Bryan's  view  is,  according  to  his  supporters,  based  upon  sen- 
timent. To  my  own  mind,  it  is  merely  another  proof  of  his  notorious 
inability  for  direct  or  hard  thinking  on  any  grave  matter.  This  has 
been  shown  before  in  his  advocacy  of  fiat  money  under  attractive  dis- 
guise, his  lack  of  recognition  of  the  stern  dignity  of  the  United  States 
while  Secretary  of  State,  and  by  his  general  tendency  to  pander  to 
popular  demands. 

Men  of  this  type  always  attract  a  public  following  either  in  politics 
or  on  the  lecture  platform,  because  of  the  failure  of  many  people  to 
differentiate  between  soft  promises  and  hard  principles,  and  in  our 
campaign  we  have  to  determine  how  to  deal  with  such  opposition,  and 
you  should  take  upon  yourselves  the  appointment  of  a  vigorous  cam- 
paign committee  with  the  objective  of  securing  the  co-operation  of  all 
those  who  advocate  National  Defense.     They  must  impress  on  Con- 

10 


gress  and  the  people  with  grim  determination  that  partial  defense  is 
no  defense  and  that  the  American  people  want  full  and  complete  pro- 
tection, or  none  at  all.     (Applause.) 

The  forces  opposed  to,  like  all  other  groups  of  opportunists,  have 
nothing  to  lose  and  everything  to  gain  by  defeating  the  Administra- 
tion's plans,  and  we  should  make  this  matter  clear,  as  they  are  on  the 
outs  politically  without  credit  even  in  their  own  party  and  they  will 
not  scruple  to  indulge  in  the  treasonable  practice  of  endangering  the 
country  if  by  so  doing  they  can  advance  their  own  fortunes. 

This  is  not  a  time  to  mince  words,  but  to  clearly  and  coldly  state 
the  facts  so  as  to  let  the  country  know  who  are  for  the  country  first 
in  contradistinction  to  those  who  are  for  themselves  and  their  own 
selfish  advancement. 

In  speaking  so  strongly  I  do  not  wish  to  reflect  upon  certain  other 
men  who  by  temperament  and  training  have  a  conviction  that  our  pro- 
gram is  ill-advised ;  with  them  we  can  reason,  and  show  them  the  error 
of  their  ways.  We  should  tell  them  that  we  recognize,  as  they  do, 
that  the  greatest  glory  of  the  United  States  is  not  in  winning  wars, 
but  in  preventing  war,  and  that  we  know  that  the  measures  for  which 
we  stand  are  the  best  preventive  of  the  evil  which  they  fear,  and  that 
they  need  not  for  a  moment  doubt  that  all  of  us  recognize  to  the  fullest 
extent  that  all  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States  are  for  peace  and 
that  none  of  the  right-thinking  citizens  in  our  country  wish  to  see  any 
attack  made  upon  any  other  free  people;  and  we  should  point  out  to 
them  that  the  course  of  this  country  in  Cuba,  Mexico,  San  Domingo 
and  elsewhere  indicates  that  the  spirit  of  the  people  and  its  moral 
sense  is  such  as  to  make  war  on  our  part  for  conquest  inconceivable. 

In  order  that  this  Congress  may  add  to  the  general  knowledge  on 
this  subject,  we  have  framed  the  discussion  on  certain  definite  lines, 
and  while  the  engagements  of  many  of  the  distinguished  speakers 
have  made  it  impossible  to  concentrate  the  discussion  of  a  given  sub- 
ject in  a  single  day,  we  desire  you  to  understand  that  the  scheme  of 
the  Congress  is  as  follows: 

To  estimate  national  defense  needs  we  must  understand  our 
country's  position  in  world  politics.  This  will  be  dealt  with  by  several 
speakers. 

Finding  the  needs,  we  must  look  to  the  means.  We  will  therefore 
discuss  the  national  assets  in  men  and  in  resourcesj  and  lastly,  learn 

11 


how,  in  the  opinion  of  the  expert,  these  resources  should  be  used  iii 
armed  forces. 

As  the  legal  protection  of  these  forces  is  of  moment,  and  as  our 
legislators  have  with  a  trustful  innocence  disregarded  the  necessity  of 
proper  espionage  laws,  this  matter  will  also  be  taken  up.  It  is  the 
hope  of  the  committee  who  have  labored  hard  to  give  you  a  program 
which  will  be  instructive  and  inspiring  that  you  will  realize  how  much 
depends  on  the  issue  before  us — be  ready  to  aid  in  advancing  the 
cause.  This  is  a  forum  open  to  all  who  believe  in  the  principles  of  the 
National  Securitj^  League  and  all  delegates  should  join  in  the  dis- 
cussion and  give  their  best  as  a  matter  of  national  service. 

Above  all,  in  taking  up  our  work,  let  us  enter  into  the  discussions 
with  a  sober  sense  of  our  responsibility.  Let  us  endeavor  to  be  mod- 
erate in  our  expressions,  direct  in  our  recommendations,  and  to  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  subject  the  solution  of  which 
is  dependent  upon  Congressional  action;  and  while  demanding  an  end 
to  the  delay,  with  insistence  upon  a  direct  leadership  to  the  program 
of  Preparedness,  let  us  do  so  in  a  way  to  create  supporters  for  our 
cause  throughout  the  country.  The  issue  is  so  great  and  our  position 
so  thoroughly  sound  that  a  plain,  unimpassioned  presentment  of  the 
national  situation  is  the  best  guaranty  of  legislative  remedy.  (Great 
applause.) 

The  Chairman — The  first  order  of  business  is  the  report  of  the 
Committee  on  Rules,  which  Mr.  Herbert  Barry,  the  General  Secretary 
of  the  League,  will  now  read. 

Mr.  Barky — The  report  of  the  Committee  on  Rules  is  as  follows: 

COMMITTEE  ON  RULES 

The  Committee  beg  to  report  the  following  rules  to  cover  the  con- 
duct of  this  Congress : 

I.  All  resolutions  introduced  in  the  Congress  shall  be  referred 
to  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  without  reading  or  debate.  Cush- 
ing's  Manual  shall  cover  proceedings. 

IL  A  Committee  on  Resolutions  shall  be  appointed  upon  proper 
motion  being  made  therefor. 

IIL  All  speakers  not  specifically  invited  to  the  Congress  shall  be 
limited  to  five  minutes'  discussion  and  shall  not  be  allowed  to  speak  a 
second  time  except  by  unanimous  consent  of  the  Congress. 

12 


IV.  A  motion  to  close  the  discussion  shall  not  be  debatable. 
These  rules  may  be  amended  at  any  time  by  the  Committee  on 

Scope  of  Work. 

Votes 

V.  Every  duly  accredited  delegate  shall  have  one  vote  and  only 
persons  wearing  the  official  delegate's  badge  will  be  counted  unless 
known  to  the  chair  to  be  duly  accredited  delegate. 

The  matter  of  whether  there  shall  be  a  roll  call  can  only  be  decided 
by  a  majority  vote.    Such  a  motion  shall  be  submitted  without  debate. 

The  Chairman — The  reference  to  the  limitation  of  any  one 
speaker  to  five  minutes  in  the  discussion  is  to  five  minutes  at  any  one 
session. 

It  was  moved  and  seconded  that  the  report  be  adopted,  and  the 
question  being  taken  the  motion  was  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Evan  Hollister  of  Buffalo,  N.  Y. — Mr.  Chairman,  I  move 
you  that  the  Chair  appoint  a  Committee  on  Resolutions  to  consist  of 
fifteen  members. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken  the  motion 
was  agreed  to. 

(At  this  point  a  photograph  was  taken  of  the  audience  by  the 
official  photographer.) 

The  Chairman — It  is  matter  of  congratulation  and  also  a  great 
privilege  to  me  to  be  able  to  introduce  as  the  first  speaker  one  of  the 
men  of  America  of  whom  every  American  has  a  distinctive  right  to  be 
particularly  proud.  He  is  a  man  who  knows  from  the  actual  workings 
of  the  State  Department  in  Europe  as  well  as  this  country  of  the  inter- 
national conditions.  I  beg  to  introduce  to  you  Mr.  Frederic  R.  Coudert, 
of  the  New  York  Bar, 

THE  GENERAL  NEED  OF  PREPAREDNESS 
Frederic   R.  Coudert,  New  York 

Mr.  Coudert — Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  Having 
proved  ourselves  naturally  valiant  under  the  physical  fire  of  the  photog- 
rapher, we  will  now  have  to  undertake  the  much  more  difficult  task  of 
showing  how  we  may  be  able  to  withstand  the  intellectual  volleys  of 
wisdom,  protected  and  buttressed  by  the  report  of  the  Committee  on 
Rules.  I  understand,  however,  that  we  are  fairly  safe,  because  those 
who  undertake  to  interrupt  us  will  be  limited  to  five  minutes,  and  ap- 

13 


parently  we  are  almost  unlimited.  I  say  "almost  unlimited,"  because 
your  Chairman,  who,  in  addition  to  that  marvelous  efficiency  about 
which  you  know,  is  also  a  great  humanitarian,  instructed  everybody 
to  prepare  a  paper,  not,  I  believe,  so  much  for  publication,  but,  with 
that  acuteness  which  is  characteristic  of  him,  he  realized  at  least  that 
a  paper  must  have  limitations  in  length,  and  that  if  these  papers  were 
read,  the  speakers  would  at  least  be  tied  down  to  some  limitation  of 
time.  Unfortunately,  he  has  deprived  me  of  my  only  paper,  for  some 
reason  that  I  do  not  know,  and  I  am  turned  loose  upon  this  great  meet- 
ing with  nothing  to  warn  me  of  the  time  to  stop  save  your  kindly  and 
charitable  disapproval. 

It  is  really  a  great  satisfaction  to  find  that  we  have  here 
at  the  opening  of  our  congress  so  many  of  the  real  molders 
of  public  opinion.  I  say  it  in  no  facetious,  but  rather  in 
the  literal,  absolute  sense.  I  think  it  was  a  great  Jesuit 
educator,  if  I  remember  rightly,  who  said,  "Give  me  the  youth  until 
he  is  ten  years  old,  and  the  rest  of  you  can  do  what  you  like  with  him," 
and  in  that  there  is  doubtless  a  tremendous,  irresistible  pyschologic 
truth.  It  is  those  who  mold  the  home,  regardless  of  the  fact  whether 
they  wield  the  ballot  or  the  musket,  who  are  the  great,  the  dominant, 
the  ultimate  power  in  any  land  where  public  opinion,  as  we  understand 
public  opinion,  prevails ;  and  therefore  it  is  always  better  when  we  see 
the  women  turning  out  than  when  we  see  the  men,  because  to  the  men 
war  may  be  an  incident,  but  to  the  women  it  is  surely  the  most  serious 
thing  in  life.  It  was  that  old,  wise  and  cynical  but  kindly  poet,  Horace, 
who  spoke  of  war  as  hateful  to  mothers,  and,  surely,  he  never  said  a 
truer  word;  and  it  is  because  war  is  necessarily  hateful  to  mothers, 
as  it  is  to  wives  and  sisters,  because  it  may  deprive  them  of  all  that  is 
dearest  to  them,  that  the  American  women  of  today  are  infinitely 
needed  in  this  movement,  whose  true  object  is  not  mainly  the  prepara- 
tion for  war,  but  primarily  the  safety  of  the  Nation.     (Applause.) 

We  are  witnessing  an  apparent  revolution  in  opinion.  I  can  not 
help  calling  to  mind  the  first  meeting  of  our  Security  League,  when 
under  the  guidance  of  our  efficient  President,  who  had  the  idea  of 
calling  it  together,  we  met,  I  think  some  thirty,  or  perhaps  to  put  it 
strongly,  some  fifty,  in  a  back  room — back,  perhaps,  because  we  did  not 
have  the  funds  to  pay  for  the  front  room — at  some  hotel,  and  devised 
together  how  we  few  men  might  influence  fundamentally  public  opin- 

14 


ion  in  the  United  States,  and,  now,  amazing  to  say,  mirabile  dictu,  in- 
stead of  thirty  or  fifty  or  one  hundred  members,  we  number  what? 

The  Chairman — Forty-five  thousand.     (Applause.) 

Mr.  Coudert — I  say  that  not  in  a  sense  of  pride,  and  I  realize  it 
was  not  wholly  due  to  the  efforts  of  the  League,  although  of  course 
our  officers  are  entitled  to  a  large  share  of  credit  for  bringing  about 
that  extraordinary  change  in  public  opinion.  But,  nevertheless,  and 
apparently  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  this  land,  contrary  to 
inherited  and  fixed  prejudice,  there  has  been  a  change  of  public  opin- 
ion, more  marked  certainly  than  any  that  I  have  seen  in  the  brief 
space  in  which  I  have  been  more  or  less  concerned  with  public  affairs. 
I  think  it  was  John  Bright  who  said,  "When  you  effect  a  change  in 
public  opinion  you  do  the  greatest  thing  that  can  be  done."  It  is  not 
like  giving  a  beggar  six  pence  and  getting  rid  of  him,  it  is  doing  some- 
thing that  has  a  fundamental  action  not  only  upon  the  rich,  the  power- 
ful and  the  great,  but  extends  to  every  cottage,  every  hamlet,  through- 
out the  land.  And  of  course  we  know  that  until  you  are  able  to  effect 
fundamental  changes  in  opinion,  no  great  movement  is  of  the  slightest 
benefit. 

A  few  men  can  get  together  at  any  time  and  endeavor  to  start  a 
great  movement  of  opinion;  but  unless  that  movement  is  founded 
somewhere  in  some  fundamental  need  and  some  ultimate  and  absolute 
truth,  difficult  as  it  may  be  to  discern,  the  efforts  will  pass  off  as  those 
of  well-meaning  people  possibly  bordering  on  crankdom,  and  I  confess 
that  when  we  began  this  movement  many  people  told  us  that  it  was 
the  product  partly  of  amiable  and  inefficient  enthusiasts  whose  or- 
ganic, logical,  imitative  faculties  had  gone  mad  because  they  were 
reverting  to  primitive  instincts  under  the  influence  of  the  European 
conflict,  and  of  others,  who,  forsooth,  were  interested  in  armament 
and  munitions.  It  therefore  came  to  us  with  a  force  of  something 
more  than  bombs  when  the  great  leaders  of  opinion  in  this  country 
realized  that  the  National  Security  League  was  right,  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  in  no  uncertain  words  informed  Congress 
that  the  United  States  must  be  prepared,  by  increase  of  efficient, 
proper  armament,  to  fulfill  the  role  in  the  world  of  nations  which  she 
>aight  be  called  upon  to  fulfill  at  any  time.     (Applause.) 

16 


It  would  be  easy,  of  course,  to  rest  somewhat  upon  our  laurels, 
and  to  believe  that  the  revolution  of  opinion  has  gone  sufficiently  far, 
and  that  having  initiated  the  movement  we  might  gracefully  retire, 
pleased  with  what  had  already  been  done. 

No,  my  friends,  the  critical  moment  has  just  arrived.  The  revo- 
lution of  opinion  is  more  superficial  than  we  can  realize,  because  away, 
deep  down  in  the  American  common  consciousness  rests  the  funda- 
mental belief  that  somehow  or  other  America  is  safe,  and  that  some- 
how or  other  she  will  muddle  through  without  great  danger,  as  she 
always  has.  and  that  after  all  we  can  perhaps  get  along  with  a  certain 
number  of  fiery  speeches  in  Congress,  a  few  resolutions,  a  dollar  a 
year  to  the  Security  League,  and  practically  no  particular  self-sacrifice. 
Now,  make  no  mistake  about  it;  I  am  convinced,  even  if  it  sounds 
pessimistic,  that,  roughly  speaking,  that  represents  about  the  average 
mentality  that  you  will  find  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  this 
land  (applause),  and  it  will  continue  to  represent  it  despite  fine 
phrases  from  on  high,  and  from  whatever  source,  until  the  men  and 
the  women  who  are  interested  in  the  movement  carry  the  question 
right  straight  home  into  every  small  village  and  town  (applause),  and 
explain  to  our  people  that  every  one  is  completely  and  absolutely  and 
wholly  interested  in  this  to  the  practical  exclusion  of  everything  else. 

Gentlemen,  if  there  has  been  something  of  a  revolution  of  opinion 
it  has  not  been  due  so  much  to  any  of  us  as  to  the  fact  that  there  are 
enough  people  in  these  United  States  to  profit  and  to  learn  some- 
thing from  the  experience  of  other  nations  (applause)  ;  as  men 
may  roughly  be  divided  into  two  classes,  those  who  learn  from  the 
experience  of  others  and  those  who  learn  only  from  their  own,  so 
there  have  been  nations  who  have  never  learned  from  the  experience  of 
others,  and  there  have  been  perhaps  a  few  who  have  taken  some  profit 
from  the  undoubted  lessons  of  history.  I  confess  that  as  an  average 
American  citizen,  endowed,  I  take,  with  the  avferage  mentality  de- 
rived from  the  circumambient  atmosphere  in  which  we  live,  I  have 
stood  on  the  platform  and  listened  to  some  of  our  friends  advocate 
what  I  believed  in  and  still  believe  in,  general  arbitration.  Of  course, 
we  believe  in  arbitration.  In  the  first  place,  we  are  reaching  the  stage 
where  we  stand  excused  from  striving  after  war;  and  in  the  second 
place,  arbitration  will  not  be  wholly  devoid  of  interest  for  us  of  the 
profession.     (Laughter.) 

16 


But  when  in  August,  1914,  I  stood  by  the  St.  Quentin  in  North 
France  and  saw  great  droves  of  men,  old,  haggard  and  broken,  and 
young  children,  and  babies,  some  alive  and  some  dead,  carried  by  their 
wretched  mothers,  streaming  down  the  roads,  I  then  realized  that  there 
was  something  that  arbitration  and  fine  phrases  were  unable  to  effect, 
and  that  a  nation  which  did  not  protect  its  integrity  and  dignity  and 
honor,  its  very  existence,  by  the  latent  forces  that  were  in  it,  mobilized 
to  the  highest  point,  could  not  expect  to  survive  in  the  day  of  travail 
by  the  phrases  and  talk  of  lawyers,  and  the  statistics  of  statement. 
I  believe  that  the  lesson  has  gone  pretty  well  home  to  most  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  who  take  the  trouble  to  think  sequently, 
or  have  been  brought  closely  in  contact  with  affairs  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Atlantic.     (Applause.) 

In  the  words  of  Dr.  Johnson,  "Let  us  rid  ourselves  of  cant."  It  is 
rather  a  shock  to  the  great,  powerful,  self-complacent  American  people 
to  realize  that  the  life  of  an  American  in  the  land  directly  to  the  south 
of  us  is  not  really  so  sacrosanct  as  that  of  the  useful  if  numerous 
turkey  buzzard,  or  that  upon  the  high  seas  he  can  not  expect  that  con- 
sideration which  is  accorded  to  the  Mother  Carey's  chickens  and  the 
graceful  gull,  and  he  realizes  that  arbitration  has  not  saved  him  from 
contumely  and  contempt  in  various  parts  of  the  world,  and  that  the 
dignity  of  our  citizens  abroad  is  in  exact  arithmetical  proportion  to 
our  government's  ability  and  determination  to  protect  them,  and  to 
nothing  else  at  all.     (Great  applause.) 

I  am  not  dealing  with  theory.  The  other  theory  has  been  tried. 
I  have  yet  to  learn  that  in  that  wonderful  and  ancient  land  of  Con- 
fucius, with  its  extraordinary  thought  and  splendid  and  artistic  civil- 
ization, which  we  admire,  the  theories  of  those  pacificist  gentlemen 
having  been  put  into  effect,  the  results  are  so*  splendid  as  to  en- 
courage us  to  imitate  them.  It  may  be  that  there  are  people  in  the 
United  States  who  would  go  to  the  extreme  length  of  Chinafying  this 
country.  I  believe  that  they  are  so  few  in  number  as  to  be  quite 
negligible,  and  we  would  be  safe,  on  the  whole,  in  leaving  them  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  the  alienists.  I  can  imagine  few  sadder  things. 
(Applause.) 

We  have  been  dominated  in  the  past  not  only  by  our  belief  in 
arbitration,  but  by  our  general  sentiments  regarding  these  matters. 
These  sentiments  have  merely  echoed  prejudices  founded,  indeed,  upon 

17 


a  misinterpretation  of  certain  facts.  The  American  has  believed  that 
he  was  unique;  not  only  unique  in  his  intelligence,  not  only  unique  in 
his  energy,  not  alone  unique  in  his  good  manners  and  his  respect  for 
the  fairer  sex,  but  unique  in  the  fact  that  he  was  practically  immune 
from  attack  and  could  live  in  his  own  land  safe  from  the  ills  that  had 
tried  the  ancient  world  of  Europe.  Now,  when  you  find  a  deep-rooted 
feeling,  firmly  rooted,  almost  ineradicable  prejudice,  you  may  be  sure 
that  at  the  bottom  of  that  there  is  some  fundamental  truth;  and  so 
there  is  here.  Men  usually  think  accurately  enough,  but  the  difficulty 
is  that  they  think  in  terms  of  their  ancestors'  opinions.  In  other 
words,  the  opinion  of  the  day  is  formed  upon  the  facts  of  a  generation 
ago;  and  as  situations  in  the  kaleidoscopic  lens  of  national  history 
change  very  greatly  in  a  generation  or  so,  the  popular  thinking  of 
the  day  is  almost  certain  to  be  erroneous,  although  it  may  have  been 
ultimately  founded  upon  a  situation  in  which  the  ideas  engendered 
were  perfectly  proper  and  perfectly  legitimate. 

And  then  again,  as  that  great  physiologist,  perhaps  the  greatest 
in  the  world,  now  up  at  the  front  in  France  looking  after  hospitals, 
once  told  me,  he  said,  "Of  course,  Coudert,  we  must  realize  that  the 
ordinary  individual  mind  crystalizes  somewhere  under  twenty-five,  and 
that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  get  any  ideas  into  the  male  head 
after  that  age."  .(Laughter.)  Now,  what  was  this  fiction  that  we 
were  unattackable  founded  upon?  And  that  is  the  thing,  gentlemen, 
that  we  must  go  at  and  uproot  by  a  campaign  of  education.  Otherwise, 
you  can  talk  all  you  want  about  preparedness,  you  will  be  shouting  in 
the  wilderness,  because  all  the  space  in  the  head  of  the  ordinary 
American  will  have  been  taken  up  with  antagonistic  beliefs,  and  you 
can  not  get  into  it  the  real  truth,  that  is,  the  truth  in  favor  of  the 
preservation  of  our  integrity  through  the  mobilization  of  our  re- 
sources. 

Three  things  have  been  at  the  bottom  of  that  difficulty;  first,  the 
great  underlying  idea  that  we  were  protected  by  the  sea,  3,000  miles  of 
deep  blue  Atlantic,  which  isolated  us  from  the  world  of  nations  and 
made  us  immune  from  war.  True,  we  have  had  great  wars  in  the  past, 
but  one  was  a  civil  war,  and  that  perhaps  will  not  count ;  and  the  others 
were  local  affairs;  and  somehow  or  other  we  muddled  through,  and 
during  the  Revolution  the  French  fleet  and  Lafayette  arrived  at  the 
critical  time,  and  Providence  was  with  us,  and  during  the  War  of 

18 


1812,  if  we  won  no  victories  on  land,  and  the  Capital  was  valiantly 
defended  by  the  loss  of  seven  lives  and  then  burned,  nevertheless  we 
had  some  naval  victories ;  and  that  is  a  long  time  ago. 

Then,  somehow  we  did  conquer  Mexico — with  the  loss  of  a  good 
many  men  uselessly;  but  their  relatives  are  all  dead  now  and  they  do 
not  talk  about  it  any  more. 

True,  if  we  had  had  a  trained  soldiery  to  follow  up  the  victory,  the 
Civil  War  might  have  been  ended  two  years  sooner,  and  a  million  lives 
saved;  but  that,  too,  is  becoming  ancient  history,  and  people  think 
that  is  hypothetical;  and  after  all,  if  Europe  is  in  trouble  we  are  3,000 
miles  away,  yet  of  course  you  gentlemen  and  you  ladies  who  know 
something  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  greater  and  wider  world  realize 
that  the  sea,  which  was  once  the  great  protection,  is  now  an  easy  ave- 
nue of  approach  by  the  great  modern  leviathans,  laden  with  troops 
able  to  land  on  almost  any  shore  or  rocky  coast,  who  may  at  any  time 
invade  any  nation  not  so  completely  protected  by  its  navy  as  to  prevent 
their  getting  anywhere  near. 

The  great  British  public  for  several  centuries  rested  absolutely 
secure  in  the  sense  of  the  immunity  furnished  by  30  miles  of  water. 
Are  we  then  surprised  that  we  have  rested  secure  in  the  greater  im- 
munity furnished  by  3,000  miles  of  water?  And  yet  the  demonstration 
is  suflficiently  made  to  enable  us  to  know,  and  teach  the  public,  that  that 
great  defensive  waste  of  water  is  now  merely  an  easy  mode  of  attack 
by  which  nations,  from  the  Atlantic  side  or  the  Pacific  side,  or  nations 
on  both  sides  combined  in  some  new  alliance,  would  find  an  easy  way 
of  passing  over,  and  we  would  have  no  protection,  practically,  save  our 
Navy.  And  so  the  myth — I  will  not  say  the  myth,  because  at  that  time 
it  was  true,  but  the  superstition,  because  it  has  now  become  so  be- 
cause it  has  lost  its  foundation — and  we  now  know  that  the  sea  fur- 
nishes no  defense  save  the  defense  that  we  ourselves  may  be  able  to 
put  upon  it. 

And  then  there  is  the  idea,  "But  we  are  neutral;  we  have  always 
been  neutral;  we  take  no  interest  in  European  wars  one  way  or  the 
other."  Empires  may  come  and  fall,  and  autocracy  may  succeed  dem- 
ocracy, and  millions  of  men  may  be  slaughtered,  but  we  may  live  upon 
our  farms  and  in  our  cities  like  lotus-eaters,  careless  of  mankind! 
Well,  I  admit  that  the  dream  is  not  the  noblest  in  the  world.  I  sup- 
pose we  are  all  glad  that  it  did  not  happen  to  Lafayette,  Rochambeau 

19 


and  Louis  XVI;  but  then  they  lived  in  the  old,  chivalrous  age;  and 
perhaps  after  all  they  were  unwise  in  destroying  their  treasury  and 
their  royalty,  and  bankrupting  themselves  to  help  a  people  far  over 
the  seas ;  and  they  were  a  sentimental  people  and  they  did  not  under- 
stand the  true  value  of  great  commercial  interests.  (Laughter.)  But 
neutrality  does  not  protect  us.  Of  the  two  foreign  wars  that  we 
waged,  one  when  we  were  one  of  the  smallest  nations  in  the  world, 
had  to  be  waged  to  protect  our  neutrality.  Neutrality  may  be  mind- 
ing our  own  business.  Neutrality  is  only  the  jargon  in  which  we 
lawyers  put  that  more  homely  phrase;  for  neutrality,  while  it  means 
a  bundle  of  rights,  also  imports  a  bundle  of  duties  (applause)  ;  and  a 
neutral  nation  unable  or  unwilling,  or  both,  to  maintain  those  duties, 
will  naturally  and  easily  find  itself  completely  shorn  of  its  rights. 
(Applause.) 

Neutrality  means  an  effort.  Neutrality  means  effort  to  protect 
ourselves  against  the  aggressions  of  others,  because  the  interests  of 
the  neutral  and  the  interests  of  the  belligerent  are  necessarily  and 
absolutely  antagonistic,  and  the  result  is  a  compromise  whether  the 
neutral  is  strong  enough  to  protect  its  rights  and  the  belligerent  not 
so  strong  as  to  be  able  to  trespass  upon  the  neutral,  or  vice  versa;  and 
therefore  the  superstition  as  to  neutrality  in  these  recent  days  has 
been  sadly  shattered,  because  neutrality  does  not  protect  American 
rights  or  American  property  on  the  high  seas,  or  anywhere  else;  and 
will  not,  until  those  rights  have  behind  them  the  proper,  adequate, 
national  force  which  may  be  called  out  when  it  becomes  necessary  to 
maintain  the  duties  and  the  rights  which  are  inextricably  interwoven ; 
indeed  it  is  not  an  attractive  or  edifying  spectacle  to  find  a  neutral 
whining  about  his  rights  under  the  law  of  nations  when  he  can  not 
or  will  not  enforce  those  duties.     (Great  applause.) 

So  that  neutrality  no  longer  protects  us.  What  have  we  left?  Is 
it  international  law?  Oh,  international  law,  like  Providence,  only 
helps  him  who  helps  himself.  Has  it  no  use?  Oh,  yes;  great  use.  It 
defines  and  limits  the  rights  which  a  neutral  may  claim,  and  the  rights 
which  the  belligerent  may  claim;  but  it  puts  no  arm  in  the  hand  of  a 
feeble  or  anaemic  neutral  in  order  that  he  may  claim  those  rights.  It 
tells  him  what  those  rights  are,  and  if  he  has  the  courage  and  deter- 
mination, knowing  those  rights,  to  enforce  them,  he  may  do  so;  but 

20 


he  can  not  enforce  them,  unfortunately,  bj-^  the  proclamation  or  even  by 
the  fiat  of  the  National  Security  League. 

And  then — and  in  a  few  minutes  I  will  finish,  because  I  recognize 
that  the  admonishing  eye  of  the  Chairman  is  upon  me — then  we  are 
protected  by  that  power  which  we  hear  it  said  so  often  has  saved 
China  from  complete  dismemberment,  the  "balance  of  power";  the 
equipoise  in  Europe  of  one  nation  played  off  against  another  so  skil- 
fully and  ably  that  it  has  been  possible  to  maintain  peace  in  Europe 
until  that  which  was  the  cornerstone,  the  keystone,  what  Mr.  Gladstone 
forty  years  ago  called  the  foundation,  of  public  law  in  Europe,  namely, 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  had  been  destroyed.  With  that  went  the 
balance  of  power,  if  successful,  and  with  that  went  all  of  international 
law  (applause)  ;  thus  the  United  States  is  confronted  with  a  new 
situation.  If  some  great  nation  in  Europe  which  was  not  satisfied 
with  international  law — which  deals  only  with  the  status  quo,  but  with 
a  new  meaning  which  would  give  it  something  that  the  status  quo  did 
not  give  it — was  successful  in  overthrowing  the  balance  of  power,  then 
the  United  States,  even  with  the  desire  to  do  so,  cannot  possibly 
divorce  herself  from  world  politics.  She  is  inevitably  inextricably, 
by  law  of  nature,  connected  with  these  world  politics;  and  as  that 
wisest  and  greatest  and  best  of  our  teachers,  respected  all  over  the 
world,  and  l&dmired  everywhere,  abroad  even  more  than  in  America, 
Admiral  Mahan,  said  in  1914  before  the  impending  conflict:  "The 
balance  of  power  would  be  threatened  and  perhaps  destroyed  by  those 
who  were  not  satisfied  with  the  status  quo  in  Europe,  to  whom  no 
rights  under  international  law  will  be  sufficient,  and  who  will  seek  a 
new  and  different  place  in  the  sun,  a  place  belonging  to  somebody  else ; 
and  he  said,  "All  neutrals  must  for  their  protection,  and  especially  the 
United  States,  be  vitally  interested  in  the  efficiency  of  the  British 
Navy." 

"Should  the  latter  (the  British  navy)  retain  its  full 
present  predominance,  this,  coupled  with  the  situation  of  the 
British  Islands,  constitutes  a  check  upon  Germany;  but  that 
check  removed,  none  approaching  it  remains.  It  follows  that 
the  condition  and  strength  of  Great  Britain  is  a  matter  of 
national  interest  to  every  other  community.  With  her  far 
more  liberal  institutions  and  consequent  weaker  organization 

21 


of  force,  replete  to  satiety  with  colonial  possessions,  she  has 
no  adequate  stimulus  to  aggression,  least  of  all  against  the 
United  States;  nor  has  she  in  these  days  of  organization  the 
national  efficiency,  of  which  Germany  is  at  present  the  con- 
summate and  unrivaled  example." 

■  My  friends,  that  prognostication  of  Admiral  Mahan  is  verified  by 
events ;  but  while  it  would  be  a  little  more  costly,  it  would  be  infinitely 
more  respectable,  for  America  to  place  its  reliance  in  the  efficiency  of 
its  own  navy  (applause)  ;  and  while  we  would  feel — we  might  indeed 
feel — that  we  had  committed  an  extravagance,  certainly  we  would  not 
feel  so  cheap  (applause). 

And  then  a  word  in  closing.  The  logic  of  events  is  stronger  than 
that  of  Aristotle — and  no  one  respects  Aristotle  more  than  I;  you  can 
prove  many  things  with  the  logic  of  Aristotle,  but  the  logic  of  events  is 
irresistible.  Again,  let  us  rid  ourselves  of  cant.  The  last  professional 
army,  I  think,  in  the  world,  is  the  American  Army,  splendid  little 
army  that  it  is;  trained  police  of  100,000  men  to  protect  100,000,000. 
Ideal  condition  for  general  ease  and  comfort,  were  we  alone  in  the 
world.  ,      'jjM'^IM 

There  was  another  professional  army.  It  disappeared  in  August, 
and  September,  1914,  fighting  perhaps  as  well  as  if  not  better  than 
any  men  had  ever  fought  before.  When  it  went,  it  'sounded  the  death 
knell  of  military  professionalism  in  democracies.  I  saw  some  of  it  in 
the  month  of  August,  1914,  that  valiant  little  army,  coming  over  the 
English  Channel.  There  they  were,  the  aristocracy  of  Great  Britain; 
the  people  who  for  centuries  had  governed  the  country,  and  in  return 
freely  and  gladly  and  willingly  gave  their  lives  when  the  hour  came. 
And  then  the  great  gap  in  the  social  ladder,  and  the  poorer  fellows, 
more  or  less  the  outcasts  of  society,  who  were  serving  for  pay.  Arriv- 
ing in  the  French  towns,  they  have  a  good  time,  they  eat  and  drink 
and  are  merry,  and  then  they  go  out  to  die,  carelessly  and  blithely. 
That  was  the  last  of  the  professional  armies;  and  the  England  of  the 
present  time  is  to  some  extent  typical  of  ourselves.  But  Great  Britain 
has  faced  a  critical  situation,  and  her  professional  army  is  at  an 
end.  She  has  realized  that  since  the  French  Revolution,  as  those  wise 
men  who  presided  over  the  destinies  of  the  great  nation  realized  at 

22 


that  time,  democracy  and  universal  military  service  are  absolutely 
inseparable.     (Great  applause.) 

The  British  public  have  realized  that  they  can  no  longer  rely 
wholly  upon  the  valor  of  a  merely  hereditary  aristocracy,  nor  upon 
the  service  of  the  few  hundreds  of  thousands  who  are  willing  to 
enlist  in  the  army  for  pay.  She  has  realized  that  if  a  great  democ- 
racy in  the  hour  of  great  trial,  where  national  existence  is  threatened, 
is  to  save  itself,  it  can  only  save  itself  democraticalfy.  In  the  most 
just,  the  most  honorable,  and  the  only  proper  way  in  which  a  nation 
can  defend  itself,  namely,  by  manhood  service,  those  who  vote  also 
taking  the  musket.  (Applause.)  That  lesson  they  have  learned — 
perhaps  a  little  late.  Had  Lord  Roberts'  warning  been  understood, 
they  might  have  saved  the  nation  without  such  a  death  struggle.  Let 
us  try  to  learn  in  time.  The  mediaeval  theory  was  that  the  sovereign 
should  defend  the  nation,  and  that  all  the  subject  had  to  do  was  to  pay 
his  taxes.  The  sovereign  could  hire  men  to  do  the  rest.  The  theory 
was  perfect ;  but  translated  into  terms  of  democracy,  it  has  a  different 
result.  The  people  are  the  sovereign,  and  if  the  sovereign  refuses 
to  help  himself,  who  will  help  him?     (Applause.) 

And,  in  conclusion,  my  friends,  and  in  thanking  you  for  your  kind 
attention,  I  find  that  after  all,  these  are  days  when  we  must  come  down 
to  the  hard  pan  of  principle.  Certain  immediate  measures  are  neces- 
sary for  the  army.  Two  hundred  thousand  professional  soldiers  may 
be  required  for  possible  emergencies.  But  back  of  all  that  must  be, 
as  our  President  aptly  well  said,  the  underlying  thought  which  Nelson 
expressed,  when  he  told  his  men  that  the  eyes  of  England  were  upon 
them,  and  every  man  is  relied  upon  to  do  his  duty.  So,  every  man  who 
believes  in  American  democracy  must  be  relied  upon  to  make  the 
sovereign  protect  itself  by  that  just  and  fair  and  equal  method,  the 
general  training  for  every  American.     (Great  applause.) 

The  Chairman — rl  believe  that  the  Security  League  has  the 
approval  of  those  delegates  who  are  here  in  its  decision  that  Mr. 
Coudert  was  the  best  and  fittest  of  its  members  to  sound  the  keynote 
of  this  congress.     (Applause.) 

I  want  to  make  one  or  two  very  brief  announcements  before  intro- 
ducing the  next  speaker.  After  Mr.  Stanchfield  speaks,  Mrs.  John 
Hays  Hammond  will  say  a  few  words,  and  resolutions  will  be  received 
from  delegates  and  others.    Tonight  we  are  to  have  the  benefit  of  an 

23 


address  by  Professor  Emery  of  Yale  University,  in  addition  to  the 
numbers  already  printed  on  the  program. 

It  is  now  a  great  pleasure  and  privilege  to  be  able  to  introduce 
to  you  a  gentleman  who  will  tell  us  what  greatness  and  position  is  in 
world  politics,  and  so  I  take  pleasure  in  presenting  the  Honorable 
David  Jayne  Hill,  late  Ambassador  to  Germany.     (Applause.) 

WORLD  POLITICS  AS  AFFECTING  THE  UNITED  STATES 

Dr.  David  Jayne  Hill 

Former  Ambassador  to  Germany 

Dr.  Hill — Mr.  President,  delegates  to  the  congress,  and  ladies 
and  gentlemen:  I  should  be  utterly  discouraged  in  the  attempt  to 
speak  to  you  of  such  an  abstract  subject  as  world  politics  if  you  had 
not  already  for  half  an  hour  listened  with  enthusiasm  to  the  discussion 
of  that  subject,  without  knowing,  perhaps,  that  it  was  world  politics; 
and  yet  the  medicine  was  administered  with  such  a  delicate  and  skill- 
ful hand  and  in  such  a  sugar-coated  form  that  you  may  well  have 
been  ignorant  that  you  were  being  instructed  upon  so  abstruse  a  thing. 

In  a  congress  of  American  citizens  convoked  to  consider  the 
national  security,  a  merely  academic  discussion  of  international  rela- 
tions would  be  out  of  place.  That  which  should  receive  our  attention 
at  this  time  is  the  fact  that  the  whole  international  superstructure  of 
previously  accepted  law,  as  embodied  in  treaties  and  conventions  and 
the  consensus  of  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  has  been  shaken  to  its 
foundations;  and  we  are  confronted  with  the  question,  Upon  what 
does  out  national  security  depend? 

Our  first  thought  naturally  is,  that  it  depends  upon  our  resolute 
determination  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  war.  But  is  it  true  that 
exemption  from  war  may  be  secured  by  a  firm  resolution  to  avoid  it? 
At  the  present  moment  all  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  and  several 
of  the  smaller  ones,  are  engaged  in  a  terrific  struggle  which  all  of 
them  claim  not  to  have  desired,  and  in  which  they  profess  to  be  unwill- 
ingly engaged.  The  necessary  inference  is,  that,  in  the  present  politi- 
cal organization  of  the  world,  war  may  be  suddenly  thrust  upon  any 
peace-loving  country,  in  spite  of  its  sincere  and  earnest  desire  to  avoid 
it.     Unless  it  is  disposed  to  sacrifice  every  interest,  to  forego  every 

24 


privilege,  and  to  renounce  every  right — which  a  nation  incapable  of 
defending  itself  may  be  compelled  to  do — it  must  not  only  resist  the 
beginnings  of  aggression,  but  must  be  prepared  to  do  so  with  success. 

Such  preparation  is  opposed  by  those  who  dislike  the  idea  of 
armed  defense,  on  the  ground  that  it  tends  toward  the  further  develop- 
ment of  "militarism,"  which  is  repugnant  to  them.  But  what  is  it  in 
"militarism"  that  is  repugnant,  if  it  is  not  the  arbitrary  domination  of 
others,  and  the  augmentation  of  force  for  this  purpose?  When,  on  ths 
other  hand,  the  purpose  is  to  resist  such  domination,  and  to  establisn 
and  maintain  a  reign  of  law,  in  opposition  to  a  reign  of  terror,  does 
not  the  opprobrium  which  the  word  "militarism"  is  intended  to  convey 
wholly  disappear?  or  shall  we  carr>'  the  sentiment  of  non-resistance 
to  such  an  extreme  as  to  condemn  altogether  the  armed  defense  of  the 
great  principles  of  equity  and  humanity  against  arbitrary  force  and 
ruthless  aggression? 

It  is  not  desirable,  and  happily  it  is  not  necessary,  to  attempt 
an  analysis  of  the  motives  and  policies  of  the  different  governments 
now  engaged  in  deadly  conflict.  Such  an  attempt  would  inevitably 
lead  to  controversy  at  a  moment  when  our  supreme  need  is  a  statement 
of  facts  and  principles  that  is  incontrovertible.  If  we  are  not  to  be 
weakened  by  division,  we  must  all  unite  in  taking  our  stand  upon  a 
foundation  so  solid  that  it  cannot  be  shaken,  so  broad  that  it  will  afford 
room  for  every  true  American  to  stand  upon  it,  and  so  high  that  it 
will  lift  us  all  above  race  sympathies,  sectional  advantages,  personal 
interests,  and  all  the  mephitic  fogs  and  mists  of  mutual  suspicion  and 
distrust. 

If  we  are  to  be  influential  at  the  council  board  of  nations,  it  is 
necessary  that  we  should  be  strong;  and  if  we  are  to  be  strong,  it  is 
essential  that  we  should  be  united.  Unless  we  are  ignobly  disposed 
to  shrink  from  our  duty  to  make  our  words  and  our  rights  respected 
in  the  world,  we  must  all,  without  distinction  of  race  sympathies  or 
party  attachments,  ask  ourselves  what  it  is  necessary  to  do,  to  main- 
tain our  rights  as  a  nation,  on  land  and  sea,  and  to  secure  the  perma- 
nent safety  of  our  free  institutions. 

Eliminating  from  discussion,  therefore,  all  that  does  not  concern 
us  as  a  nation,  let  us  confine  our  attention  to  that  which  is  vital  to  our 
national  existence. 

25 


There  are  certain  fundamental  principles  which  all  thoughtful 
American  citizens  unite  in  accepting.  Among  these  are  the  proposi- 
tions, that  government  should  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  governed;  that 
a  just  government  is  based  upon  the  equal  rights  of  all  the  people  to 
life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness;  that,  in  consequence,  govern- 
ments, in  their  relation  to  one  another,  should  recognize  these  rights; 
and  that  all  governments,  with  due  respect  for  the  principles  of 
humanity,  should  regulate  their  conduct  by  just  laws,  freely  accepted 
and  faithfully  observed. 

This  simple  creed  needs  no  enlargement,  and  no  argumentative 
justification.  It  is  a  platform  of  world  politics  upon  which  all  Ameri- 
can citizens,  irrespective  of  their  ancestral  origin  or  their  partisan 
performance,  may  unite.  These  doctrines  are  at  once  our  birthright 
and  a  sacred  trust.  They  are  the  lodestone  that  has  attracted  the 
oppressed  of  all  nations  to  these  shores.  They  have  made  us  a  great, 
a  prosperous,  and  a  mighty  people.  No  true  American  wishes  to  with- 
draw allegiance  to  them,  or  would  hesitate  to  shed  the  last  drop  of  his 
blood  in  defense  of  them,  if  they  were  menaced  with  destruction. 

It  has  been  our  custom,  as  a  people,  to  give  to  these  principles  all 
possible  support  upon  all  occasions.  We  have  done  so  in  China,  in 
Cuba,  and  in  the  Philippines ;  where  we  have  taken  in  tutelage  a  popu- 
lation in  its  political  childhood,  and  conscientiously  striven  to  lay  the 
foundations  for  its  future  self-government.  We  have  stood  for  these 
principles,  and  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  international  differences, 
in  the  two  general  conferences  at  The  Hague.  We  have  from  the 
beginning  favored  the  exemption  from  capture  of  all  innocent  private 
property  at  sea,  even  the  private  property  of  persons  belonging  to  a 
belligerent  nation.  Equity  and  humanity  have  been  the  watchwords 
of  our  diplomacy,  and  upon  every  opportunity  we  have  pleaded  for 
them. 

But  we  have  been  as  a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness.  On  one 
point  or  another,  nearly  the  whole  world  has  been  against  us;  and 
there  is  every  prospect  that  it  will  continue  to  be  against  us  in  our 
endeavor  to  carry  out  our  entire  program  of  neutral  rights. 

When  we  descend  from  the  realm  of  ideals  to  the  arena  of  reality, 
we  find  that  the  rights  of  peoples  have  nowhere  been  respected,  except 
where  they  were  defended  by  force  of  arms,  that  solemn  compacts  are 
everywhere  imperiled  by  the  lust  for  conquest;  that  weakness  and 

26 


wealth  are  everywhere  the  designated  prey  of  depredation;  that  evert 
alleged  democracies  are  sometimes  inspired  by  predatory  instincts; 
that  whole  empires  have  been  built  up  of  territorial  loot;  and  that 
"government  of  the  people,  for  the  people,  and  by  the  people"  exists 
only  where  it  is  well  defended.  The  one  active,  aggressive  principle 
in  world  politics  is  the  spirit  of  Imperialism.  It  has  raised  its  flag 
upon  every  island  of  every  sea  and  ocean.  It  has  partitioned  Africa 
and  converted  it  into  a  patchwork  of  European  colonies.  It  has  pre- 
pared new  maps  of  Asia,  and  only  withholds  them  from  publication 
until  the  troops  shall  have  taken  possession.  Its  watchword  is  "do- 
minion"— dominion  by  whatever  means  may  be  needed  to  make  it 
possible.  Its  tentacles  are  battleships  and  expeditionary  forces  that 
seize  the  prey,  which  forts  and  garrisons  afterward  render  digestible. 

Before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  world  conflict,  it  was  difficult 
to  make  honest  men  in  America  believe  this,  even  in  the  face  of  the 
palpable  evidence.  Even  now  our  pacifist  friends  accept  with  reluct- 
ance the  unpalatable  truth.  But  they  are  at  last  beginning  to  realize 
that  the  appetite  for  dominion  and  the  ideal  of  justice  are  still  in 
conflict;  and  that,  in  the  presence  of  42-centimetre  cannon,  machine 
guns,  entrenched  riflemen,  and  the  tempest  of  deadly  gases,  their  rea- 
soning, however  logical,  is  ineffectual.  The  most  earnest  among  them 
have  come  to  the  unexpected  conclusion  that,  if  peace  is  to  prevail  upon 
the  earth,  arbitrary  resort  to  violence  must  be  restrained  by  organized 
armed  resistance. 

The  present  phase  of  pacifist  evolution  is  embodied  in  the  "League 
to  Enforce  Peace" ;  that  is,  to  impose  and  compel  it  by  force  of  arms. 
Its  logic  is  perfect,  but  its  effectiveness  is  illusory.  It  is  illusory,  for 
the  reason  that  no  nation,  not  even  this  nation,  will  enter  into  a  com- 
pact to  engage  in  future  wars  without  knowing  beforehand  what  they 
are  about,  much  less  to  surrender  their  means  of  self -protection  and 
agree  to  abide  by  the  will  of  others.  It  is  illusory,  because  universal 
peace  is  an  abstarct  idea  that  has  no  moral  value  apart  from  concrete 
questions  of  right  and  wrong,  which  this  proposal  admits  cannot  in 
every  instance  be  settled  without  preponderent  force.  What  nation 
can  be  expected  to  set  up  as  its  highest  ideal  the  mere  negative  notion 
of  universal  peace,  until  its  lJt)erty  is  achieved,  until  it  no  longer 
needs  to  be  defended,  or  while  the  rights  of  humanity  are  anywhere 

27 


trampled  in  the  dust?  Such  a  decision  would  leave  the  world  a  victim 
to  every  outrage,  and  mark  the  abject  degeneration  of  mankind. 

No,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  universal  peace  until  there  is 
universal  justice  in  the  world;  and  there  ought  not  to  be. 

What  we  American  citizens  need  to  be  thinking  about  is,  not  how 
to  pacify  the  world — which  will  go  on  fighting  as  long  as  there  is 
something  wrong  to  fight  about — but  how  to  show  the  world  that  there 
is  at  least  one  country  where  the  ideal  of  human  rights  is  placed  above 
passive  acquiescence  in  the  demands  of  brute  force,  and  that  there  is 
one  citizenship  that  carries  with  it  a  national  protection  that  must 
be  reckoned  with. 

It  is  not  invasion  that  we  have  to  fear  the  most — God  forbid  that 
we  should  ever  become  so  supine  as  to  wait  for  that — it  is  our  right 
of  innocent  passage  and  of  innocent  commerce  on  a  free  ocean,  and  the 
invisible  bulwarks  of  liberty  and  self-government  on  this  continent, 
that  should  engage  our  thought.  From  the  foundation  of  our  govern- 
ment we  have  always  in  the  past,  and  sometimes  under  great  dif- 
ficulties, defended  these  rights  and  these  bulwarks.  We  have  not 
waited  to  be  invaded,  we  have  aimed  at  making  invasion  a  dangerous 
enterprise.  In  the  great  emergencies  our  fathers,  usually  without  due 
preparation  for  meeting  them,  have  fearlessly  responded  to  the  demands 
of  national  duty.  When,  in  our  weakness,  the  so-called  "Holy  Alliance" 
was  preparing  to  reduce  to  colonial  dependence  the  American  republics 
that  had  thrown  off  the  yoke  of  Spain,  their  voice  was  lifted  up  in 
protest,  and  the  protest  was  heard  and  heeded.  When  Louis  Napoleon 
sent  an  Austrian  Archduke  to  establish  an  empire  upon  our  borders 
in  Mexico,  the  voice  of  protest  was  again  uttered,  and  the  undis- 
banded  army  that  had  saved  the  Union  was  ready,  if  necessary,  to 
march  for  the  defense  of  our  neighbor  against  imperial  subjugation. 

No  true  American  desires  "militarism"  in  the  United  States;  and 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  shall  never  become  its  victim.  It  is  not  in 
the  character  and  temper  of  our  people  to  permit  it,  either  from  with- 
out or  from  within.  But  it  is  in  no  respect  a  drift  toward  "militar- 
ism" to  say  that  every  able  bodied  young  man  in  our  country  should 
first  be  well  instructed  in  the  meaning  and  value  of  our  free  institu- 
tions, and  taught  a  wholesome  respect  for  civil  authority,  and  then  be 
impressed  with  the  privilege  and  obligation  of  a  full  preparation  of 
mind  and  body  to  defend  them      A  resolute  determination  to  do  this 


28 


would  not  only  cause  any  power  to  reflect  long  before  it  would  dis- 
regard the  rights  of  American  citizens,  but  it  would  elevate  and 
ennoble  the  tone  of  the  present  and  the  coming  generations  of  Ameri- 
can youth.  Wholly  apart  from  any  dangers,  on  land  or  sea,  we  need  the 
ethical  influence  of  an  enlightened  patriotism.  The  contemplation  of 
our  great  national  interests,  the  better  comprehension  of  the  meaning 
of  government,  the  recognition  of  our  rightful  place  in  the  counsels 
of  the  nations,  the  hygiene  and  the  discipline  of  the  training  camp, 
and  the  contact  of  the  high  and  the  low  in  the  artificial  stratification  of 
our  population  could  be  so  combined  as  to  quicken  the  intelligence, 
invigorate  the  life,  and  enlarge  the  sympathies  of  those  to  whom  the 
destines  of  America  will  be  committed.  Once  properly  apprehended, 
the  inspiration  of  national  security  and  American  defense  would  act 
like  a  tonic  upon  our  whole  people.  For  years  we  have  been  preaching 
the  necessity  of  performing  the  dull  duties  of  voting  and  paying  taxes, 
with  the  result  that  we  have  found  little  exhilaration  in  either  oi 
them.  But  why  not  make  every  young  man  feel  that  he  is,  in  truth, 
a  part  of  the  country,  and  leave  with  him  the  sweet  memory  that  he 
has  really  served  it,  by  fitting  himself  to  be  its  defender?  Does  any 
old  soldier  who  really  helped  to  save  the  Union  not  feel  an  inspiration 
when  he  sees  the  flag  go  by?  I,  who  could  not  serve,  because  the 
recruiting  officers  would  not  take  so  young  a  boy,  have  felt  my  heart 
beat  fast  and  the  tears  run  down  my  face,  as  I  have  seen  the  weather- 
beaten  ranks  file  by  with  tattered  banners  proudly  held  aloft.  Yes, 
there  is  something  more  in  all  of  us  than  the  wish  to  be  well  fed  and 
clothed,  and  to  have  an  easy  place  in  life.  We  feel,  and  we  know, 
that  there  is  something  greater,  infinitely  larger  than  ourselves.  To 
feel  that  we  are  a  part  of  that,  that  it  has  a  right  to  command  us,  that 
we  are  most  ourselves  when  we  obey  it — it  is  that  that  makes  us  really 
men.  ^ 

Yes,  let  us  take  for  our  motto,  "America  first" ;  not  with  the  mean- 
ing of  a  dominating  primacy  over  others,  but  in  the  sense  of  leader- 
ship in  making  human  life  safer,  human  endeavor  loftier,  human  suf- 
fering less  cruel,  human  toil  more  equitably  rewarded,  and  human 
fraternity  more  real,  more  noble,  and  more  sincere.  We  have  a  part 
to  play  in  the  redemption  of  humanity  and  the  better  organization  of 
the  world.  Let  us  play  it  without  being  too  proud  for  the  performance 
of  any  duty,  and  above  all  let  us  play  it  without  fear. 

29 


WOMAN'S  DUTY  TO  PREPAREDNESS 

^By  Mrs.   Lindon  W.   Bates 

Read  by  Miss  Maude  Wetmore 

Chairman,   Woman's   Branch   National    Civic    Federation 

Miss  Wetmore — Mr.  President,  ladies  and  gentlemen  (reading) : 

"From  the  beginning  of  time  among  every  people,  woman  has 
stood  as  the  supreme  symbol  of  what,  being  dependent,  must  be  pro- 
tected and,  being  mother  of  the  race,  must  be  conserved. 

"In  man's  upward  struggle,  he  has  fought  one  intermittent,  never- 
ending  fight.  His  life  has  been  forever  in  pawn  to  what  he  held  more 
sacred  than  life.  War,  in  its  elemental  strife,  arouses  the  lowest  forces 
of  the  human  animal,  but  it  releases  too  his  highest  expression  of  sur- 
render and  of  sacrifice.  Self-preservation  is  the  primal,  intense  in- 
stinct at  the  core  of  every  heart,  yet  man  defies  each  form  of  agony 
with  simple  readiness  in  defense  of  what  lies  deeper  than  self-preser- 
vation. What  is  it,  whom  is  it  in  whose  defense  he  thus  lays  down 
his  life?  It  is  woman — ^woman  and  her  children — the  home.  The 
temples  of  his  gods  and  the  hearthstone  of  his  family — these  are  the 
last  words  of  sacredness  to  every  man,  and  both  in  his  soul  are  one. 
What  the  heartstone  is  to  the  individual  the  country  is  to  the  collective 
unit,  for  the  country  is  the  collective  home,  the  collective  refuge.  Its 
emblem  is  the  flag,  since  the  flag  is  the  very  warp  and  woof  of  pro- 
tection. The  flag  and  the  woman  are  inseparable.  When  man  will  not 
or  cannot  defend  the  flag  the  collective  home  is  lost.  We  have  it  in 
half  Europe,  this  spectacle  of  nations  whose  sons  were  unequal  to  their 
own  defense.  The  fate  of  the  women  of  Poland,  Serbia  and  Armenia 
point  a  story  whose  lesson  we  well  may  heed. 

"With  all  that  is  involved  for  women  in  war,  with  all  the  forfeit 
man  must  pay  for  her  safety,  what  is  her  duty  in  home  guardianship 
and  home  protection?  In  her  place  of  privilege,  what  are  her  respon- 
sibilities and  how  is  she  meeting  them?  The  first  duty  is  to  help  by 
every  power  within  her  to  ward  off  war  and  its  atrocities.  Peace, 
security,  international  harmony  and  good  will — these  are  conditions 
so  invaluable  that  they  must  be  built  now  upon  such  inviolability  of 

SO 


national  honor,  and  such  guarantees  of  good  faith  as  can  enable  them 
to  endure.  Women  are  the  high  priestesses  of  peace,  and  the  danger 
is  lest  they  sacrifice  to  it  what  is  higher  than  peace — righteousness. 
There  are  worse  things  than  war  and  woman  must  not  warp  standards, 
make  man  a  coward  to  duty  or,  worse,  betray  him  in  principles  and 
ideals  vastly  more  precious  than  his  life. 

"If  woman  is  to  be  safe  at  any  and  every  ultimate  cost,  she  must 
be  worth  what  she  costs.  No  woman  who  brings  up  her  son  on  the 
policy  that  she  did  not  raise  her  boy  to  be  a  soldier  has  a  right  to  the 
defense  of  another  woman's  son. 

"Considering  only  the  duties  of  earnest  women,  where  do  their 
responsibilities  lie?  The  very  first  lives  sacrificed  in  war  are  the  lives 
of  the  best,  the  finest,  the  most  efficient.  The  young,  the  brave,  the 
unselfish,  the  flower  of  each  country  are  the  first  fruits  of  sacrifice. 
The  measure  is  set  there  to  all  women  in  balancing  values  and  meeting 
responsibilities,  of  returning  to  mankind  what  mankind's  finest  pays 
for  her.  Is  not  this  a  lining  up  which  well  may  make  even  the  most 
earnest  woman  ponder?  With  humanity's  best  at  stake  in  possible  war 
how  large  a  chance  is  woman  warranted  in  asking  for  defenselessness? 
Is  it  not  primary  justice  that  while  peace  problems  and  international 
movements  are  making  trial  of  their  hope  the  country  shall  not  mean- 
while be  left  imperiled?  Shall  we  on  blind  faith  and  trust,  hazard 
what  we  are  impotent  to  restore,  and  gamble  the  safety  of  all  that 
man  has  wrought?  How  today,  with  the  spectacle  of  Europe  holding 
us  spellbound,  with  Lusitanias  and  Anconas  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea, 
shall  women  dare  to  bid  America  stand  unafraid?  When  a  nation 
can  no  longer  defend  its  own  blood,  when  the  flag  is  no  longer  a  shield 
to  citizenship  then  there  is  no  country,  and  the  world  is  headed  back 
to  chaos.  Man's  responsibility  and  woman's  are  today  alike  in  demand- 
ing that  America  be  provided  safety  until  the  world  be  organized  anew 
into  order ;  in  demanding  that  America  be  strong  enough  in  her  courage 
and  in  her  equipment  to  defend  in  every  land  and  on  every  sea  her 
own  citizens.  Money  is  too  slight  a  thing  to  be  weighed  against  what 
money  could  never  restore,  regret  is  too  hot  a  flame  to  be  buried  for- 
ever in  a  nation's  heart. 

"We  have  come  here — The  Woman's  Section  of  the  Movement  for 
National  Preparedness — to  help  gather  for  our  country  the  energies, 
the  ardor  and  the  devotion  of  united  womanhood.     Patriotism  is  not 

31 


the  fabled  fountain  defying  all  our  quest;  it  is  not  thle  Grail,  which 
one  alone  may  see.  It  is  the  spring  eternal  locked  in  the  heights  of 
man's  capacities.  Open  the  heart  and  set  it  free,  it-flows  through  a 
million  rills  into  the  waiting  vales  and  fertilizes  all  the  way.  Our 
Section  has  come  to  help  water  a  land  growing  arid  to  its  own  need. 
We  will  work  to  make  it  blossom  into  the  knowledge  and  fruit  into  the 
provision  of  adequate  defense.  What  this  adequate  defense  shall  be 
we  will  not  idly  say.  They  who  must  defend  us — the  army  and  navy 
and  the  best  specialists — these  alone  can  speak  with  authority.  The 
great  organized  bodies  of  men  with  whom  we  are  aligned  are  setting 
forth  this  equipment  side.  Their  literature  goes  through  our  channels 
to  tell  this  story.  Our  woman's  message  is  for  the  training  of  the 
young,  for  the  spirit  of  the  home,  for  quickening  the  national  life,  for 
unifying  women.  Five  weeks  we  have  been  at  our  task — we  who  were 
the  Board  of  the  Woman's  Section  of  the  Commission  for  Relief  in 
Belgium.  We  are  asking  all  those  who  stood  with  us  to  rescue  Belgium 
to  come  again  and  help  protect  America.  Today  we  have  standing 
with  us  the  leaders  of  nine  national  and  one  State  organization;  the 
National  Council  of  Women;  the  Daughters  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion; Ladies  of  the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic  (the  National  and 
Empire  State)  ;  Daughters  of  the  Confederacy ;  National  Civic  Federa- 
tion; Association  Opposed  to  Woman  Suffrage;  Congress  of  Mothers; 
Woman's  Rivers  and  Harbors  Congress,  and  United  States  Daughters 
of  1812.  We  have  thirteen  states  under  state  chairmen — Alabama, 
New  York,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Vermont, 
Virginia,  Massachusetts,  North  Carolina,  Texas,  Nebraska  and  Ohio. 
Most  of  these  states  are  under  the  Old  Guard,  the  veterans  who  carried 
the  banners  with  us  for  stricken  Belgium.  We  stand  all  together  for 
a  safe  America.  The  duty  of  defense  goes  with  the  privilege  of  citizen- 
ship. Equality  of  service  is  linked  to  equality  of  protection — to  woman 
must  lie  the  sacrifices  which  both  include. 

"This  call  for  national  safety  and  efficiency  is  woman's  immediate 
duty  to  this  country.  What  is  her  abiding  duty  to  the  world?  Man- 
kind in  its  upward  battling  has  won  some  things  which  have  been 
purchased  through  the  blood  of  clans  and  peoples,  races  and  civiliza- 
tions. These  trophies  of  victory  are  a  human  treasury  which  we  the 
latest  heirs  must  consecrate  and  maintain.  They  must  be  prized  in 
growing,  not  in  lessening,  loyalty.     These  treasures  are  represented 

32 


not  in  material  things- — in  wealth  or  monuments,  cities  or  empires — 
these  have  passed  leaving  no  vestige  behind.  What  survives  has 
become  woven  into  language  itself,  in  a  living  soul  borne  in  a  living 
speech  from  age  to  growing  age — honor,  courage,  liberty,  equality. 
The  cumulative  duty  of  woman  is  at  the  summit  of  attainment  to  stand 
guardian  of  these  spiritual  forces.  If  the  mother  teach  not  her  child 
that  he  owes  fealty  to  these  at  the  price  of  life  she  has  not  made  him 
worthy  of  life.  If  she  teach  not  her  children,  girls  and  boys,  that 
they  owe  personal  service  and  sacrifice  to  ideals,  she  is  not  worthy  of 
the  race  heritage.  If  she  teach  them  not  that  Democracy  is  the 
supreme  asset  of  mankind,  the  highest,  the  most  sacred  expression  of 
collective  right,  she  is  not  worthy  of  freedom;  she  has  no  part  in 
expanding  destiny.  Democracy  in  Europe  is  in  its  death-grapple  with 
militarism.  Woman  will  not  fail.  In  America  she  shall  feel  the  pulse 
beating  down  three  centuries  of  national  life.  Her  influence  shall 
carry  to  the  alien  the  soul  of  her  country.  From  her  eyes  has  not  gone 
the  vision.  In  her  spirit  still  dwells  the  dream.  In  this  land  of  the 
world's  great  hope  she  will  breathe  a  fresh  inspiration  and  prophecy. 
She  will  be  strong  for  the  triumph  of  Democracy.  She  will  be  worthy 
of  defense,  since  in  the  chalice  of  her  heart  she  will  cover  and  guard 
the  pledges  of  the  divine.    'For  God  is  marching  on.'  " 

Miss  Wetmore — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  want  to  tell  you  that 
I  have  not  written  this  paper.  It  was  written  by  Mrs.  Lindon  W. 
Bates,  who  was  unable  to  be  present  here  today.  ^Applause.)  I  do 
not  want  you  to  think  I  have  done  a  thing  which  I  have  not,  because  I 
think  it  is  particularly  fine.    Thank  you.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — The  Security  League  has  a  debt  of  gratitude  to 
two  ladies  instead  of  one,  and  I  think  it  is  a  very  great  debt  that  we 
owe  both  of  them. 

One  of  the  most  disturbing  things  that  most  of  us  have  felt  in 
connection  with  the  work  of  defense  is  the  fact  that  under  our  laws  the 
little  we  had  was  not  subject  to  the  careful  protection  that  prudent 
nations  provide  for  their  secrets  of  war  and  for  their  state  affairs. 
We  feel  that  the  condition  calls  for  a  remedy,  and  we  have  asked  a 
gentleman  who  is  of  most  distinguished  position,  a  leader  of  the  Bar  of 
the  City  and  the  State  of  New  York,  one  who  has  held  high  office,  to 
give  us  the  benefit  of  his  view  of  the  evil  and  of  the  cure,  and  I  want 

33 


to  introduce  to  you  Mr.  John  B.  Stanchfield  of  the  New  York  Bar. 
(Applause.) 

SOME  SUGGESTIONS  ON  THE  PERILS  OF  ESPIONAGE 

John  B.  Stanchfield 

Of  the  New  York  Bar 

Mr.  Stanchfield — Mr.  President  and  ladies  and  gentlemen:  I 
am  a  great  deal  embarrassed  at  the  outset  by  the  introduction  of  your 
President.  Whether  or  not  there  be  anyone  in  this  room  who  recog- 
nizes the  picture,  I  certainly  do  not.  I  have  one  regret.  When  I  was 
asked  to  appear  before  this  convention,  my  appearance  was  conditioned 
upon  the  presentation  of  a  paper,  and  not  the  making  of  an  address. 
I  am  about  to  read  you  a  paper  upon  the  subject  of  espionage.  It 
makes  no  appeal  to  your  enthusiasm  or  your  sentiment. 

In  stimulating  and  assisting  our  nation  to  examine  and  appraise 
its  ability  to  resist  armed  aggression,  and  in  prescribing  a  policy 
designed  to  supply  adequate  means  of  national  defense — ^which,  I  take 
it,  are,  succinctly  stated,  the  functions  of  this  patriotic  assemblage — 
we  are  apt,  while  providing  against  the  danger  of  open  frontal  on- 
slaught, to  ignore  the  peril,  at  least  equally  ominous,  of  surreptitious 
attack  from  within.  Passive  physical  preparedness  may  be  sufficient 
protection  against  openly  hostile  force,  but  vigorous  and  affirmative 
measures  are  at  all  times  essential  to  checkmate  the  insidious  activities 
of  espionage;  for  the  spy  performs  his  task  in  times  of  peace  as  well 
as  in  time  of  war. 

It  is  a  narrow,  though  commonly  accepted  conception  of  the  spy 
which  portrays  him  as  an  erratic  adventurer  setting  forth  in  war  to 
discover  the  military  moves  and  plans  of  the  enemy.  Indeed,  it  may 
be  doubted  that  such  a  description  was  ever  sufficiently  comprehensive, 
since  the  spy  has  in  all  periods  of  history  operated  in  times  of  peace 
and  his  machinations  have  been  employed  in  diplomatic,  political  and 
civil  life.  At  all  events,  the  work  of  the  secret  service  agent  of  today 
is  not  melodramatic.  It  is  rather  a  prosaic  and  intensely  systematic, 
businesslike  occupation.  Romance  has  been  eliminated  from  espionage, 
as  it  has  from  war  by  science  and  military  organization. 

Ultimately  the  most  sanguine  must  realize  that  the  foreign  spy  is 
in  our  midst,  that  he  is  part  of  a  thoroughly  trained  and  organized 

34 


army,  that  even  in  comfortable  times  of  blissful  peace  he  is  preparing 
for  the  successful  prosecution  of  a  destructive  war  against  us,  and, 
that  through  his  subterranean  operations  he  is  attempting  to  under- 
mine the  machinery  of  our  diplomatic  activities. 

To  deny  these  facts  is  to  ignore  the  records  and  teachings  of 
history  from  the  earliest  times.  Even  the  Old  Testament  mentions  the 
spy.  The  story  of  Joshua,  the  leader  of  Israel's  hosts,  and  of  the 
excellent  organization  of  informers  which  he  controlled,  lingers  in 
the  mind  of  the  most  casual  reader  of  the  Bible.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered how  the  warlike  successor  of  Moses  was  assisted  in  the  capture 
of  the  walled  city  of  Jericho  by  two  spies,  who  entered  the  city  in 
advance  and  were  concealed  and  protected  in  their  activities  by  inhabi- 
tants whose  services  they  had  enlisted.  David  and  Absalom,  too, 
employed  the  spy,  and  many  will  recall  that  passage  in  Genesis  in 
which  Joseph's  brothers,  when  he  accused  them  of  having  come  to 
Egypt  to  spy  upon  the  land,  answered  him,  saying:  "We  are  .true 
men,  thy  servants  are  not  spies."  In  the  New  Testament,  also,  we 
read  of  the  spy,  when  the  high  priests,  having  Christ  under  suspicion, 
sent  forth  spies  who  should  feign  friendship  with  him  for  the  purpose 
of  eliciting  information. 

Moreover,  those  who  have  read  the  classical  writers  will  remem- 
ber that  leaders  like  Alexander,  Mithridates,  Scipio,  Hannibal,  Pompey 
and  Caesar  laid  the  foundations  for  successful  campaigns  and  for 
political  achievements  upon  information  previously  supplied  them  by 
commissioned  spies.  And,  turning  from  the  world  of  war  to  the 
industry  and  politics  of  peace,  we  are  told  that  Crassus  owed  his 
wealth  and  power  to  the  army  of  spies  which  he  controlled. 

One  of  the  most  formidable  spirits  of  antiquity,  Mithridates, 
King  of  Pontus,  was  himself  the  chief  spy  of  his  army,  and  as  Pliny 
tells  us,  for  the  purpose  of  his  work,  made  himself  the  master  of  some 
twenty-five  languages  and  dialects,  by  means  of  which,  together  with 
fitting  disguises,  he  was  able  to  penetrate  every  region  of  Asia  Minor. 
It  is  said  that  he  spent  seven  years  wandering  through  and  spying 
out  the  countries  which  he  eventually  conquered  and  for  the  possession 
which  he  waged  a  lifelong  war  against  the  power  of  Rome. 

The  scope,  character  and  utility  of  the  activities  of  espionage, 
among  the  ancients,  are  authoritatively  established  by  the  Greek  his- 
torian, Polyaenus,  who  has  furnished  posterity  with  a  compilation  of 

35 


some  nine  hundred  strategems  which  were  available  in  civil  and 
political  life,  as  well  as  in  warfare. 

Hannibal  could  never  have  performed  his  amazing  march  across 
the  Alps,  had  it  not  been  for  an  organization  of  spies  who  prepared 
the  way  by  ruse  and  diplomacy  for  the  advance  of  his  hordes.  Of 
him,  Polybius  writes: 

"For  years  before  he  undertook  his  campaign  against  Rome  he  had 
sent  his  agents  into  Italy  and  they  were  observing  everyone  and 
everything.  He  charged  them  with  transmitting  to  him  exact  and 
positive  information  regarding  the  fertility  of  the  Trans-Alpine  plains 
and  the  Valley  of  the  Po;  their  populations;  their  military  spirit  and 
preparations  and,  above  all,  their  disposition  toward  the  Government 
of  Rome." 

The  real  founder  of  the  system  of  organized  spies  in  modern  times 
was  Frederick  the  Great.  He  was  wont  to  boast  that  his  spies  exceeded 
his  cooks  in  the  proportion  of  one  hundred  to  one.  Under  Frederick 
the  Great  the  secret  police  became,  not  an  auxiliary  of  the  army,  but 
an  organized,  modernized,  specialized  force,  having  its  own  autonomy 
and  its  own.  chief. 

In  general,  every  one  will  concede  the  advantage  derived  by  a 
foreign  enemy  from  advance  information  regarding  the  strength  of  the 
various  units  of  our  national  defense  and  the  method  and  facility  of 
their  operation.  But  it  is  only  after  examination  and  study  of  the 
intricacies  and  efficiency  of  the  highly  developed  spy  systems  of  the 
Great  Powers  that  there  follows  a  full  realization  of  the  colossal  force 
which  may  be  wielded  through  the  clandestine  discovery  of  informa- 
tion regarding  the  nation  attacked  and  through  the  surreptitious 
co-operation  from  within  of  spies  in  direct  contact  with  the  internal 
machinery  of  defense. 

It  is  said,  for  example,  that  the  Prussian  invasion  of  Austria 
and  the  defeat  of  Sadowa  were  planned  two  years  in  advance  by  Stieber, 
the  famous  chief  of  the  German  secret  service.  He  himself,  dis- 
guised as  a  peddler,  and  his  agents,  both  male  and  female,  by  every 
conceivable  ingenious  device,  traversed  the  country,  made  the  most 
careful  topographical  plans  of  the  entire  region  and  prepared  the  way, 
in  the  minutest  detail,  for  the  contemplated  invasion.  Similarly,  in 
1868,  it  is  said,  Stieber  penetrated  the  confines  of  France  with  an 
army  of  spies  numbering  in  excess  of  thirty  thousand.    Thousands  of 

36 


these  agents  were  placed  at  fixed  posts  throughout  the  country, .and 
were  subject  to  periodical  inspection  and  supervision  by  intinerant 
secret  service  agents.  Their  discipline  was  equal  to  that  of  a  regular 
military  force.  This  myriad  of  spies,  in  size  equal  to  an  army  corps, 
not  only  prepared  the  way,  but  two  years  later,  by  active,  though 
secret,  co-operation,  actually  assisted  in  the  successful  incursion  into 
France  which  resulted  in  the  capitulation  of  Paris.  Stieber  loved  to 
boast  that  his  achievements  had  saved  thousands  of  German  lives  and 
had  assured  Prussian  victory.  Indeed,  one  cannot  read  the  story  of 
that  arch  spy's  exploits  without  being  convinced  that  Stieber,  rather 
than  Von  Moltke  won  those  strategic  victories  of  1866  and  1870, 
which  founded  the  modern  German  Empire. 

So  minute  was  the  system  which  he  adopted  that  he  is  said  to  have 
had  a  card  index  of  every  officer  of  the  French  army,  a  complete  his- 
tory of  the  man,  his  temperament,  disposition  and  characteristics,  his 
vices  and  weaknesses,  his  possible  venality  and  his  relationships,  if 
any,  with  the  underworld. 

The  ordinary  layman  does  not  appreciate  the  value  of  advance 
intelligence  of  the  personnel  of  the  commanding  officers  of  an  opposing 
army.  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  relied  in  great  part  upon  informa- 
tion of  the  personal  characteristics  of  the  officers  commanding  the 
forces  with  which  he  had  to  contend.  The  style  of  attack  and  the 
theory  of  campaign  adopted  by  him  were  always  formulated  with  a 
view  to  meeting  the  particular  type  of  mentality  with  which  he  was 
compelled  to  join  battle.  And  this  information  was  supplied  to  him 
by  his  spies. 

That  it  is  fallacious  to  consider  the  spy's  activities  as  limited  to 
the  single  act  of  spying  is  demonstrated  by  the  services  rendered  to 
Napoleon  by  Schulmeister,  the  Corsican's  principal  secret  agent. 
Schulmeister  was  a  genius  in  his  way.  If  there  was  a  nobleman  whose 
political  aspirations  ran  counter  to  the  ambition  of  Schulmeister's 
master,  the  famous  spy  was  able  to  stage  a  human  drama,  enmesh  his 
victim  in  a  web  of  incriminating  circumstances,  and  lead  him  quite 
involuntarily  into  the  commission  of  acts  justifying  his  summary  exe- 
cution as  a  traitor.  It  was  Schulmeister  himself,  who,  under  the  guise 
of  a  patriotic  Austrian,  insinuated  himself  into  the  good  graces  and 
won  the  confidence  of  the  Austrian  commander.  Mack,  and  actually 
led  him  to  believe  that  he,  Schulmeister,  had  organized  throughout 

37 


France  an  army  of  secret  service  agents  who  were  spying  upon  that 
country  for  the  benefit  of  Austria;  whereas,  in  fact,  the  agents  to 
whom  Schulmeister  referred  were,  hke  Schulmeister  himself,  the  loyal 
secret  service  of  the  French  Government.  Schulmeister  caused  to  be 
printed  what  purported  to  be  French  newspapers  recording  supposed 
insurrections  against  Napoleon's  regime  and  alleged  defections  in  the 
French  army.  By  means  of  this  and  other  devices  he  led  General  Mack 
to  believe  that  Napoleon  had,  in  order  to  protect  himself  at  home, 
withdrawn  to  the  capitol  of  France  the  major  portion  of  the  forces 
which  had  theretofore  been  in  touch  with  the  Austrian  army.  Mack 
seized  upon  this  information  and  rushed  forth  to  destroy  what  he 
believed  to  be  the  small  remaining  remnant  of  the  Emperor's  army, 
only  to  find  himself  suddenly  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a  wall  of  steel. 
This  was  the  prologue  of  the  battle  of  Austerlitz.  Suspicion  centered 
upon  Schulmeister,  but  he  did  not  waver.  Even  after  the  defeat  of 
Mack  he  had  the  temerity  to  enter  into  a  council  of  war  held  by  the 
leading  officers  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  to  suggest  and  effect  the 
adoption  of  new  plans  supposedly  designed  to  retrieve  Mack's  defeat, 
but,  which,  in  fact,  merely  led  the  Austrians  blindly  into  the  disaster  at 
Austerlitz. 

The  momentous  consequences  involved  in  the  work  of  the  spy 
in  times  of  peace  and  the  power  of  the  secret  service  agent  to  alter 
the  course  of  international  diplomatic  events  are  strikingly  illus- 
trated by  Stieber's  achievement  on  the  event  of  the  visit  of  the  Czar 
of  Russia  to  Napoleon  III  in  France,  some  years  before  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War.  It  was  Napoleon's  plan  to  bring  about  an  alliance 
between  Russia  and  France.  Had  this  been  effected,  there  probably 
would  never  have  been  a  Franco-Prussian  war.  And  Bismarck  knew 
it.  Accordingly,  it  was  arranged  for  the  King  of  Prussia  with  Bis- 
marck to  visit  Napoleon  III  at  the  same  time.  While  they  were  in 
Paris,  Stieber  discovered  and  reported  to  Bismarck  that  a  young  Pole 
had  planned  the  assassination  of  the  Czar  in  the  course  of  his  pro- 
cession along  the  streets  of  that  city.  Instead  of  ordering  the  arrest 
of  the  assassin,  Bismarck,  according  to  the  story,  directed  Stieber  to 
watch  the  Pole  and  to  permit  him  to  fire  his  pistol,  but  to  deflect  the 
bullet  so  that  the  Czar  would  come  to  no  harm.  This  program  was 
carried  out ;  the  assassination  was  attempted  but  failed.  The  Russian 
Monarch,  terrified  at  the  incident,  was  aroused  against  the  French 

38 


Government  because  of  its  supposed  laxity  in  protecting  him  when 
a  visitor.  Furthermore  the  jury  which  tried  the  would-be  assassin 
permitted  him  to  escape  with  but  a  light  punishment.  All  of  which 
widened  the  gap  between  Russia  and  France,  and,  as  Bismarck  foresaw, 
checkmated  any  attempt  on  Napoleon's  part  to  bring  the  two  nations 
together. 

And  these  activities  of  Stieber  were  not  merely  the  work  of  an 
opportunist.  It  was  an  integral  part  of  his  system  to  attempt  to  under- 
mine the  industrial  and  financial  foundations  of  his  country's  rivals^ 
to  create  unrest,  to  foment  industrial  disorders  and  to  promote  class 
antipathies  through  political  and  industrial  agitation.  It  was  he  who 
devised  the  scheme  of  attaining  these  results,  by  the  use  of  literary 
propaganda,  which  it  is  claimed  are  so  extensively  used  by  the  great 
secret  service  systems  of  our  time.  In  1893  Count  Caprivi  signed  an 
appropriation  amounting  to  about  twenty  thousand  dollars  "for  pro- 
viding foreign  pamphlets  and  publications  useful  to  the  policy  of  the 
Empire."  This  amount  was  later  increased  to  one  hundred  thousand 
dollars.  It  is  claimed  that  the  recent  epidemic  of  industrial  strikes  in 
France,  Russia  and  England  was  fomented  by  paid  agitators,  work- 
ing in  behalf  of  the  German  authorities.  It  is  an  established  fact, 
moreover,  that  during  industrial  strikes  in  France  before  the  war, 
funds  to  support  the  families  of  the  strikers  were  received  in  large 
amounts  from  foreign  countries. 

Turning  now  to  our  own  country,  we  hear  many  stories  of  the 
ease  with  which  Confederate  secret  service  men  obtained  important 
information  from  the  various  Federal  Departments  in  the  Civil  War. 
As  to  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  it  is  said  that  a  certain  Mrs.  Greenhow 
procured  from  a  Northern  politician  news  of  the  advance  of  the 
Federal  troops.  Female  spies  overran  the  departmental  offices  taking 
advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  learn  secret  intelligence  or  to  steal 
maps  and  plans.  Several  of  them  set  up  their  homes  close  to  the 
War  Office,  and  there  entertained  young  departmental  secretaries. 
Belle  Boyd  was  the  most  famous  of  these  Confederate  spies.  Perley 
Moore,  in  The  Chautauquan  of  1887,  says : 

"They  smuggled  the  information  they  obtained  in  the  linings  of 
honest  looking  coats  and  hid  army  secrets  in  the  mysteries  of  inno- 
cent looking  bustles;  they  burned  signal  lights  from  garret  windows 
and  crossed  the  Potomac  below  Alexandria  at  dead  of  night  and  with 

39 


muflled  oars.  At  one  time  the  Government  had  caught  and  hived  over 
a  dozen  of  these  busy  Confederate  bees  in  a  house  at  Washington, 
where,  in  a  few  days,  they  beguiled  the  young  officers  charged  with 
guarding  them  and  carried  on  their  vocations  as  before." 

These  historical  facts  and  many  more  of  great  interest  are  enter- 
tainingly narrated  in  a  recent  work  by  Hamil  Grant,  entitled  "Spies 
and  Secret  Service." 

Naturally,  any  estimate  of  the  extent  to  which  foreign  espionage 
is  actually  carried  on  in  our  country  today  must  be,  at  least  for  us 
laymen,  a  matter  of  mere  conjecture.  The  consciousness  of  danger 
from  this  source  varies  with  the  temperament  of  the  individual. 
Some  there  are  who  think  the  peril  is  negligible,  just  as  these  same 
persons  insist  that  military  and  naval  resources  are  unnecessary  to 
insure  the  integrity  of  our  territory  and  the  vindication  of  our  national 
rights  and  honor.  Others  accept  with  credulity  extravagant  reports  oi 
the  existence  within  our  boundaries  of  organized  alien  forces  ready, 
at  a  word  from  a  foreign  chancellery,  to  spring  to  arms  and  capture 
our  leading  cities. 

The  sane  view,  I  believe,  takes  a  middle  ground  and  assumes 
the  presence  here  of  secret  service  agents  of  the  Great  Powers, 
agents  organized  and  directed  with  more  or  less  system  toward  the  dis- 
covery of  all  important  facts  relating  to  the  political,  industrial,  navaJ 
and  military  conditions  of  the  country.*  From  time  to  time  our  daily 
papers  tell  us  of  the  apprehension  here  or  there  of  a  foreigner  having 
in  his  possession  plans  of  some  fortification,  or  of  the  mysterious  dis- 
appearance from  the  Bureau  of  Naval  Construction  at  Washington  of 
the  wiring  or  other  plans  connected  with  the  construction  of  a  great 
battleship.  And  how  many  of  such  incidents  fail  to  reach  the  light 
of  publicity? 

There  results,  therefore,  a  deepening  conviction  that  this  condition 
must  be  met  by  something  in  the  natare  of  investigation  and  correction. 
But  how  far  in  this  direction  shall  we  go?  In  the  first  place,  whether 
or  not  we  espouse  the  cause  of  the  pacifists  or  of  the  exponents  of  pre- 
paredness, it  would  seem  to  be  a  fundamental  truth  that,  unless  we 


*  "Spies  and  Secret  Service :  the  Story  of  Espionage,  Its  Main  Systems 
and  Cliief  Exponents,"  by  Hamil  Grant.  (London,  G.  Richards,  Ltd.,  1915.) 
See  also  "The  German  Spy  in  France,"  translated  from  the  French  by  an 
English  officer.     (London,  Mills  &  Boon,  Ltd.,  1914.) 

40 


adopt  a  policy  of  complete  disarmament,  we  must  safeguard  the  present 
existing  defenses  of  the  country  against  the  covert  aggression  of 
espionage.  Further,  even  the  advocates  of  disarmament  will  not  ques- 
tion the  urgency  of  veiling  from  the  scrutiny  of  the  outside  world  the 
secret  operations  of  our  Government,  particularly  those  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Besides  preventing  the  discovery  of  data  con- 
cerning military  affairs  and  state  secrets,  we  must  prepare  to  meet 
the  danger  of  the  actual  destruction  by  spies  of  the  instrumentalities 
of  our  Government  and  of  their  actual  interference  with  every  kind  of 
internal  measure  designed  for  national  protection.  We  must  not  only 
protect  our  fortresses  and  our  battleships  against  mysterious  destruc- 
tion by  fire  or  high  explosives;  we  must  not  only  watch  jealously  over 
the  secrets  of  state;  we  must  also  safeguard  our  national  highways 
and  means  of  communication — our  railroads,  telegraph  and  telephone 
systems,  and  our  wireless  apparatus.  We  must  also  protect  all  plants, 
factories,  mills  and  mines  engaged  in  or  available  for  the  production  of 
military  or  naval  ordance,  ammunition,  stores  or  supplies  of  any  kind 
and  those,  as  well,  which  in  time  of  war  may  be  indirectly  connected 
with  the  military  efficiency  of  the  nation.  In  other  words,  our  system 
of  defense  against  espionage  must  embrace  three  broad  departments: 

1.  The  protection  of  the  instrumentalities  and  operations  of  the 
Government  itself,  its  navy  and  army,  its  forts,  arsenals  and  navy 
yards,  military,  naval  and  state  secrets. 

2.  The  protection  of  all  plants  and  factories  not  owned  by  the 
Government  and  directly  engaged  in  the  manufacture  or  production 
for  the  Government  of  ammunition,  arms,  explosives  and  other  articles 
used  in  the  conduct  of  warfare. 

3.  The  protection  of  agencies  and  instrumentalities,  the  integrity 
of  which  in  time  of  war  would  become  of  vital  importance  to  the  coun- 
try. This  class  includes  all  factories,  plants,  mines,  mills  and  other 
agencies  in  which  any  materials  are  or  could  be  produced  which  would 
be  necessary  in  time  of  war,  such  as  clothing,  foodstuffs  and  steel  rails, 
and  also  includes  all  instrumentalities  for  transporting  troops  and  war 
supplies  and  for  transmitting  information,  such  as  railroads,  telegraph 
and  telephone  lines  and  wireless  apparatus. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  has  himself  recently  directed 
attention  to  the  importance  of  incorporating  and  amalgamating  our 

41 


privately  owned  industries  into  the  machinery  of  national  defense  and 
of  making  them  an  integral  part  of  that  system  by  requesting  the 
heads  of  the  various  national  engineering  and  scientific  societies  to 
undertake  the  work  of  "collecting  data  for  use  in  organizing  the  manu- 
facturing resources  of  the  country  for  the  public  service  in  case  of 
emergency."  It  is  said  that  in  the  State  of  New  Jersey  alone  there  are 
eight  hundred  factories,  shops  and  mills  which  produce  articles  that 
would  be  needed  by  the  Government  in  the  event  of  war.  This  pro- 
jected systematization  of  our  industries  will  make  it  possible  rapidly  to 
mobilize  these  vitally  necessary  auxiliaries  of  the  national  defense. 

Constant  maintenance  of  the  maximum  potential  value  of  these 
elements  of  defense  requires  assiduous  protection  against  espionage. 
The  guarding  of  these  plants  and  factories  involves  the  prevention  not 
only  of  actual  physical  destruction,  but  involves  also  the  duty  of 
securing  them  against  paralysis  produced  by  the  fomenting  of  labor 
strikes  and  the  enticement  of  workmen. 

Some  four  or  five  years  before  the  present  great  European  war 
a  Frenchman,  Paul  Lanoir,  wrote  a  book  warning  his  countrymen 
against  the  German  spy  system.  He  claimed  that  there  were  then  over 
thirty  thousand  trained  German  spies  within  the  confines  of  France 
and  that  it  was  the  design  of  this  organization  not  only  to  ferret  out 
and  report  state  secrets  and  the  details  of  the  military  establishments 
of  France,  but  also  completely  to  cripple  French  industries  through 
the  production  of  strikes  and  labor  troubles.  It  was  claimed  that  the 
German  spy  system  planned  to  cripple  the  railroad  and  manufacturing 
industries  of  France.  That  such  a  plan  was  not  actually  consummated 
in  the  present  war  is  some  proof  that  Lanoir's  statements  were  exag- 
gerated, but  it  is  also  possible  that  the  attempt  was  made  and  failed 
because  of  the  spontaneous  patriotism  of  the  French  people.  Such  an 
attempt  might,  however,  have  greater  prospect  of  success  in  this  coun- 
try because  of  our  lack  of  a  homogeneous  native  population.  It  would, 
therefore,  not  seem  to  be  an  excess  of  caution  for  us  to  consider  the 
adoption  of  methods  for  the  prevention  or  abortion  of  activities  of  this 
nature. 

It  was  my  initial  purpose  when  I  commenced  the  preparation  of 
this  paper  to  devote  myself  almost  entirely  to  a  consideration  of  the 
legislative  measures  which  should  be  adopted  to  bring  about  the  results 
which  I  have  outlined.    But  the  more  seriously  I  consider  the  subject 

42 


the  more  forcibly  are  there  brought  to  my  mind  the  comparative  futility 
and  impotency  of  punitive  legislation  as  compared  w^ith  administrative 
measures  looking  toward  the  prevention  of  the  activities  of  espionage. 
The  spy  enters  upon  his  undertaking  with  full  notice  of  the  hazards  of 
his  venture.  He  accepts  the  risks,  whatever  they  are.  He  is  willing, 
if  need  be,  to  pay  the  penalty  of  death.  He  is  not  deterred,  in  peace, 
by  provisions  of  penal  law  any  more  than  he  is  restrained,  in  war,  by 
the  danger  of  summary  execution.  Therefore,  besides  punishing  the 
ojffense,  let  us  make  it,  as  far  as  may  be,  impossible  of  commission. 

How,  then,  are  we  to  meet  the  problem?  By  three  remedies:  (1) 
The  adoption  of  a  policy  of  greater  secrecy  in  connection  with  matters 
of  national  defense  and  of  greater  care  in  the  protection  of  national 
secrets;  (2)  the  adoption  and  development  of  a  system  of  counter- 
espionage, in  other  words,  a  secret  service  engaged  as  a  specialty  in  the 
occupation  of  watching  and  spying  upon  spies,  and  (3)  punitive  legisla- 
tion. 

I  cannot  express  in  terms  too  emphatic  my  conviction  of  the 
necessity  of  rigorous  measures  for  the  enforcement  of  secrecy  in  these 
matters  of  vital  national  concern.  I  firmly  believe  that  this  Govern-, 
ment  cannot  too  jealously  guard  the  data  concerning  its  military,  naval 
and  state  affairs.  I  would  recommend  a  law  prohibiting  the  publica- 
tion or  discussion  of  any  facts  or  data  concerning  the  national  defense 
except  such  as  are  expressly  issued  for  publication  by  the  proper  de- 
partments of  the  Government.  Unfortunately  today  no  very  ingenious 
system  of  espionage  is  required  for  the  discovery  of  the  details  of  our 
armed  strength.  The  spy,  if  he  can  read  English,  can  find  almost  all 
that  he  desires  to  know  by  a  persual  of  the  "Congressional  Record" 
alone. 

Within  a  week  I  have  read  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was 
compelled  to  submit  to  a  committee  of  Congress  a  confidential  report 
filed  in  his  office,  demonstrating,  from  the  standpoint  of  one  possessed 
of  the  most  intimate  knowledge  on  the  subject,  the  vulnerability  of 
our  coast  and  naval  defense,  and  setting  forth  at  length  how  a  hostile 
force  could  penetrate  our  protective  barriers,  land  upon  our  shores, 
and  seize  our  important  cities.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  that  foreign 
governments  are  already  familiar  with  the  facts ;  for  their  familiarity, 
if  it  exists,  is  due  largely  to  the  laxity  with  which  our  secrets  have 
been  handled  in  the  past.     Nor  is  it  a  sound  objection  that  it  is 

43 


impossible  to  maintain  secrecy  with  respect  to  weapons  of  defense 
because,  by  their  nature,  they  are  inevitably  subject  to  some  degree  of 
scrutiny.  Were  not  France  and  England,  in  spite  of  their  systems  of 
espionage,  surprised  in  the  present  war  by  the  Germans'  42-centimeter 
guns,  their  sea-going  submarines  and  their  gas  bombs?  Of  course, 
if  it  be  our  policy  to  court  peace  at  any  price,  it  may  be  entirely  use- 
less to  remedy  conditions.  But,  if  we  are  warranted  in  assuming  that 
there  may  at  any  time  arise  such  a  crisis  in  our  national  affairs  as 
shall  require  recourse  to  arms,  we  must  draw  a  cordon  of  secrecy  over 
those  few  instrumentalities  of  defense  upon  which  we  shall  be  con- 
strained to  rely,  and  to  veil  with  some  secrecy  the  sinews  and  nerves 
by  which  the  force  i^  to  be  used. 

What  a  blunder  it  is  to  permit  persons  not  officially  connected 
with  our  fortresses  and  battleships  to  use  them  for  holiday  excursions ! 
Should  it  be  necessary  to  point  out  that  these  units,  of  fabulous  cost, 
are  designed  for  serious,  not  for  frivolous,  purposes,  and  that  these 
purposes  can  be  entirely  frustrated  if  the  public  is  to  make  free  with 
them?  Perhaps  I  am  misinformed  as  to  the  degree  of  scrutiny  with 
which  the  unidentified  public  may  examine  our  fortifications,  but  there 
have  been  at  least  two  instances  which  have  recently  come  within  my 
personal  ken  where  civilians  were  admitted  to  our  fortifications  and 
were  permitted  to  explore  without  restriction.  In  one  case,  in  Fortress 
Monroe,  a  visitor,  not  knowing  the  impropriety  of  his  action,  took 
various  photographs  of  the  great  disappearing  guns  and  of  other  parts 
of  the  fortress  and  was  allowed  to  depart  with  these  interesting  data 
in  his  pocket.  The  superiority  and  effectiveness  of  the  disappearing 
guns  are,  I  understand,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  enemy  does  not  know 
their  exact  location,  and  therefore  cannot  train  its  fire  upon  them.  It 
would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  no  trivial  matter  for  a  stranger  to  obtain 
the  precise  position  of  such  guns  and  a  permanent  plan  of  the  fortress 
in  the  form  of  an  accurate  photograph. 

I  am  not  unaware  that  the  policy  of  the  military  authorities  in 
granting  the  public  easy  access  to  our  instrumentalities  of  defense  is 
designed  to  promote  and  inspire  patriotism  among  the  people.  More- 
over, a  disclosure,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  military  facts,  statistics  and 
data  is  necessary  for  an  intelligent  discussion  in  Congress  of  the 
amount  and  advisability  of  appropriations  of  money  and  of  the  use 
to  which  such  appropriations  shall  be  put.     This  may  be  one  of  the 

44 


flaws  in  the  democratic  form  of  government,  but  I  have  no  doubt 
that,  if  our  public  men  would  but  subordinate  politics  to  patriotism, 
the  most  intimate  and  delicate  affairs  of  State,  as  well  as  of  the  military 
organizations,  could  be  discussed  and  acted  upon  by  our  Government 
without  undue  publicity. 

Similarly,  an  unexceptionably  strict  system  of  secrecy  should  ob- 
tain in  the  executive  offices  of  our  military  and  naval  establishments, 
and  also  in  the  Department  of  State.  All  employees  should,  before 
appointment  to  office,  be  subjected  to  a  most  rigid  examination  both 
as  to  their  personal  qualifications  and  as  to  their  antecedents  and 
connections.  It  may  be  a  harsh  suggestion,  but  I  would  favor  a  rule 
that  in  all  bureaus  where  there  are  handled  documents,  plans  or  speci- 
fications, the  removal  of  which  would  be  useful  to  possible  enemies 
of  the  country,  all  employees  and  visitors  should  be  regularly  and 
thoroughly  searched.  This  suggestion  may  at  first  blush  seem  hard 
upon  honest,  patriotic  citizens,  but,  as  I  view  it,  an  honest,  patriotic 
Government  employee  should  submit  with  alacrity  to  a  rule  which  is  a 
protection  to  him  and  to  his  Government  against  the  activity  of 
possible  treacherous  persons  about  him. 

Closely  akin  to  these  measures  for  the  protection  of  our  national 
secrets,  is  my  second  recommendation:  The  establishment  of  a  highly 
specialized  system  of  counterespionage;  that  is  to  say,  a  force  of 
specially  trained  men  whose  sole  business  shall  be  to  spy  upon  spies. 
Today  such  activity  as  is  directed  to  this  end  seems  to  be  included 
within  the  general  labors  of  our  resourceful  and  versatile  secret  serv- 
ice agents.  But  no  general  investigator,  however  varied  his  accom- 
plisments,  can  acquire  or  develop  the  qualifications  and  efficiency  of 
one  who  devotes  himself  entirely  and  exclusively  to  the  detection  of 
espionage.  What  I  propose  is  that  there  shall  be  a  separate  bureau — 
preferably  one  connected  with  the  Department  of  War — all  of  the 
energies  of  which  shall  be  directed  to  the  discovery,  observation  and 
restraint  of  foreign  spies,  so  that  as  nearly  as  possible  the  movements 
of  each  of  them  may  at  all  times  be  known  and  his  apprehension,  if 
necessary,  made  a  matter  of  comparative  facility. 

Such  a  system,  in  one  form  or  another,  exists  in  practically  every 
European  country.  In  England  it  is  claimed  that  it  has  met  with 
signal  success.    In  a  statement  issued  by  the  English  Home  Office  for 

45 


the  press,  on  Friday,  October  9,  1914,  the  results  attained  are  outlined 
at  length.    The  Secretary  says  in  part: 

"It  was  clearly  ascertained  five  or  six  years  ago  that  the 
Germans  were  majcing  great  efforts  to  establish  a  system  of 
espionage  in  this  country,  and  in  order  to  trace  and  thwart 
these  efforts  a  Special  Intelligence  Department  was  estab- 
lished by  the  Admirality  and  the  War  Office,  which  has  ever 
since  acted  in  the  closest  co-operation  with  the  Home  Office 
and  the  metropolitan  police  and  the  principal  provincial  police 
force.  In  1911,  by  the  passing  of  the  Official  Secrets  Act,  the 
law  with  regard  to  espionage,  which  had  hitherto  been  con- 
fused and  defective,  was  put  on  a  clear  basis  and  extended  so 
as  to  embrace  every  possible  mode  of  obtaining  and  convey- 
ing to  the  enemy  information  which  might  be  useful  in  war. 

"The  Special  Intelligence  Department,  supported  by  all 
the  means  which  could  be  placed  at  its  disposal  by  the  Home 
Secretary,  was  able  in  three  years,  from  1911  to  1914,  to  dis- 
cover the  ramifications  of  the  German  secret  service  in  Eng- 
land. In  spite  of  enormous  efforts  and  lavish  expenditure  of 
money  by  the  enemy,  little  valuable  information  passed  into 
their  hands.  The  agents,  of  whose  identity  knowledge  was 
obtained  by  the  Special  Department,  were  watched  and  shad- 
owed without  in  general  taking  any  hostile  action  or  allowing 
them  to  know  that  their  movements  were  watched.  When, 
however,  any  actual  step  was  taken  to  convey  plans  or  docu- 
ments of  importance  from  this  country  to  Germany,  the  spy 
was  arrested,  and  in  such  case  evidence  sufficient  to  secure 
his  conviction  was  usually  found  in  his  possession.     .     .     . 

"At  the  same  time  steps  were  taken  to  mark  down  and 
keep  under  observation  all  the  agents  known  to  be  engaged 
in  the  traffic,  so  that  when  any  necessity  arose  the  police 
might  lay  hands  on  them  at  once ;  and  accordingly,  on  August 
^  4,  before  the  declaration  of  war,  instructions  were  given  by 
the  Home  Secretary  for  the  arrest  of  twenty  known  spies, 
and  all  were  arrested.  This  figure  does  not  cover  a  large 
number  (upward  of  200)  who  were  noted  and  under  suspicion 
or  to  be  kept  under  special  observation.    The  great  majority 

46 


of  these  were  interned  at  or  soon  after  the  declaration  of 

war." 

A  body  of  trained  men,  in  close  touch  with  alien  spy  organizations, 
would  perform  invaluable  service  to  our  nation.  They  might  assure 
the  defense  of  the  country  when  otherwise  it  might  be  covertly  crippled 
from  within,  or,  through  the  advantage  of  advance  information,  suc- 
cessfully attacked  from  without.  They  might  frustrate  the  intrigues 
and  duplicity  of  hostile  diplomacy,  and,  by  safeguarding  our  secrets  of 
state,  save  the  country  from  embroilments  with  other  nations. 

As  I  have  already  stated,  the  remedy  by  punitive  legislation 
against  the  activities  of  espionage  must  be,  at  the  best,  comparatively 
ineffective.  Nevertheless,  with  the  adoption  of  a  policy  of  secrecy  and 
with  the  aid  of  an  active  system  of  counter-espionage,  a  drastic  and 
thoroughgoing  set  of  legislative  measures  should  be  adopted,  so  that 
no  possible  means  of  protection  may  be  omitted. 

Although  the  existing  laws  go  further  than  is  ordinarily  believed 
toward  the  punishment  of  espionage  and  its  related  activities,  they 
are  far  from  being  sufficiently  comprehensive.  Treason  and  misprison 
of  treason  are  defined  and  made  punishable,  but  treason  is  unfortunate- 
ly limited  to  levying  war  against  the  United  States  or  adhering  to  their 
enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort  (U.  S,  Const.,  Art  3,  Sec.  3; 
Federal  Penal  Code,  Sees.  1  and  2).  We  have  also  on  our  statute 
books  provisions  for  the  punishment  of  correspondence  with  foreign 
governments  "with  an  intent  to  influence  the  measures  or  conduct  of 
any  foreign  government  ...  in  relation  to  any  disputes  or  con- 
troversies with  the  United  States,  or  to  defeat  the  measures  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States"  (Fed.  Penal  Law,  Sec.  5)  ;  for  the 
punishment  of  seditious  conspiracy  "to  overthrow,  put  down  or  to 
destroy  by  force  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  to  levy  war 
against  them,  or  to  oppose  by  force  the  authority  thereof,  or  by  force 
to  prevent,  hinder  or  delay  the  execution  of  any  law  of  the  United 
States,  or  by  force  to  seize,  take  or  possess  any  property  of  the  United 
States  contrary  to  the  authority  thereof"  (id.  Sec.  6).  The  Federal 
Penal  Code  also  punishes  the  recruiting  of  soldiers  or  sailors  within 
the  United  States  to  engage  in  armed  hostility  against  the  United 
States,  and  it  likewise  punishes  enlistment  for  such  a  purpose  (id., 
Sees.  6  and  7).  There  are  further  provisions  punishing  the  act  of 
falsely  pretending  to  be  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  and  of  con- 

47 


cealing  or  embezzling  any  arms,  stores,  money  or  other  property  of 
the  United  States,  and  punishing  bribery  and  attempted  bribery  of 
any  officer  or  official  or  employee  of  the  United  States  (id.,  Sec.  32, 
36  and  39).  By  Sections  42  and  43  of  the  Federal  Penal  Code  it  is, 
moreover,  made  criminal  to  entice,  procure  or  assist  in  desertion  from 
the  army  or  navy. 

A  most  suggestive  provision  of  the  Penal  Code,  to  the  principle 
of  which  I  shall  hereafter  have  occasion  again  to  advert,  punishes 
with  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $50  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than 
three  months,  or  both,  the  act  of  enticing  any  artificer  or  workman 
"retained  or  employed  in  any  arsenal  or  armory  to  depart  from  the 
same  during  the  continuance  of  his  engagement  or  to  avoid  or  break 
his  contract  with  the  United  States."  But  this  provision  is  limited  to 
plants  actually  owned  and  operated  by  the  United  States.  Physical 
injury  to  fortifications  or  other  military  or  naval  works  is  punished 
with  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $5,000  or  imprisonment  for  not  more 
than  five  years,  or  both  (id.,  Sec.  44).  Similarly,  injury  to  telegraph, 
telephone  or  cable  systems  is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than 
$1,000  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  three  years,  or  both,  but 
only  when  such  systems  are  operated  or  controlled  by  the  United  States 
(id..  Sec.  60).  Arson  of  buildings  or  works,  the  property  of  the  United 
States,  is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $5,000  and  imprison- 
ment for  not  more  than  twenty  years. 

With  the  exception  of  the  sections  punishing  injury  to  the  mili- 
tary or  naval  works  or  other  property  of  the  United  States,  and  those 
relating  to  the  enticement  of  desertion  or  the  enticement  of  workmen 
from  Federal  shops,  these  penal  provisions,  over  which  I  have  cursorily 
passed,  are  not  directed  specifically  or  intentionally  to  the  prevention 
or  punishment  of  the  acts  which  are  embraced  within  the  meaning  of 
the  word  "espionage."  It  is  only  because  the  spy  frequently  finds  it 
necessary,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  to  resort  to  the  com- 
mission of  what  we  may  call  an  ordinary  crime,  that  he  brings  himself 
within  the  purview  of  those  more  or  less  general  provisions. 

Before  the  year  1909  there  seems  to  have  been  no  statute,  aside  of 
course  from  the  articles  of  war,  for  the  punishment  of  spying  as  such. 
In  that  year  there  was  enacted  what  is  now  Sec.  45  of  the  Federal  Penal 
Code,  punishing  with  fine  and  imprisonment  the  unlawful  entry  upon 
any  fort,  military  reservation  or  army  post.     Finally,  iii  1911,  there 

48 


was  passed  a  law  entitled  "An  act  to  prevent  the  disclosure  of  na- 
tional defense  secrets"  (Act  of  March  3,  1911,  Chap.  226;  36  Stat,  at 
L.  1084) ,  now  Sections  45a  and  45b  of  the  Federal  Penal  Code.  These 
two  sections  attempt  to  cover  the  entire  subject  of  obtaining  unlaw- 
ful information  respecting  the  national  defense.  The  first  punishes 
any  person  who — 

(1)  "For  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  respect- 
ing the  national  defense,  to  which  he  is  not  lawfully  entitled, 
goes  upon  any  vessel  or  enters  any  navy  yard,  naval  station, 
fort,  battery,  torpedo  station,  arsenal,  camp,  factory,  building, 
office  or  other  place  connected  with  the  national  defense, 
owned  or  constructed  or  in  process  of  construction  by  the 
United  States,  or  in  the  possession  or  under  the  control  of  the 
United  States  or  any  of  its  authorities  or  agents" ; 

(2)  "When  lawfully  or  unlawfully  upon  any  vessel  or  in 
or  near  any  such  place,  without  proper  authority,  obtains,  takes 
or  makes,  or  attempts  to  obtain,  take  or  make  any  document, 
sketch,  photograph,  photographic  negative,  plan,  model  or 
knowledge  of  anything  connected  w^ith  the  national  defense  to 
which  he  is  not  entitled"; 

(3)  "Without  proper  authority  receives  or  obtains,  or 
undertakes  or  agrees  to  receive  or  obtain  from  any  person 
any  such  document,  sketch,  photograph,  etc,  knowing  the  same 
to  have  been  so  obtained,  taken  or  made"; 

(4)  "Having  possession  of  or  control  over  any  such  docu- 
ment, sketch,  photograph,  etc.,  wilfully  and  without  proper 
authority,  communicates  or  attempts  to  communicate  the  same 
to  any  person  not  entitled  to  receive  it,  or  to  whom  the  same 
ought  not  in  the  interest  of  the  national  defense  be  com- 
municated at  that  time" ;  or 

(5)  "Being  laM^fully  intrusted  vs^ith  any  such  document, 
sketch,  photograph,  etc.,  wilfully  and  in  breach  of  his  trust,  so 
communicates  or  attempts  to  communicate  the  same." 

The  punishment  for  any  of  the  above  offenses  is  imprisonment 
for  not  more  than  one  year  or  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $1,000,  or  both. 

Section  45b  provides  that  anyone  who  has  committed  an  offense 
under  the  preceding  section,  and  vi^ho  communicates  or  attempts  to 

49 


communicate  to  any  foreign  government  any  of  the  documents  or 
information  so  obtained  or  intrusted  to  him,  shall  be  imprisoned  for 
not  more  than  ten  years. 

As  I  have  already  indicated,  the  existing  laws,  even  with  the 
specially  added  provisions  to  which  I  have  just  referred,  are  entirely 
inadequate  to  meet  or  cope  with  the  activities  of  espionage.  The 
entire  body  or  system  of  legislation  is  unsound  in  principle  and  de- 
ficient in  scope. 

In  the  first  place,  the  sections  relating  to  the  surreptitious  obtain- 
ing of  information  concerning  the  national  defense  do  not  recognize 
any  distinction  whatever  between  the  procurement  of  such  information 
by  an  alien  spy  in  the  employ  of  a  foreign  'government  and  the  com- 
munication or  betrayal  of  such  secrets  by  a  citizen  or  by  an  official 
of  the  government  to  whom  they  have  been  intrusted.  Manifestly 
there  is  a  great  moral  and  ethical  distinction  between  these  two  acts. 
The  former,  though  injurious  to  our  national  interests,  involves  little 
or  no  turpitude,  for  the  alien  resident  owes  us  legally  but  a  qualified 
allegiance  and  morally  little  if  any  duty.  The  latter  is  a  flagrant  viola- 
tion of  a  sacred  obligation,  if  not  literally  of  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  nation.  My  first  suggestion,  therefore,  is  that  our  legislation  on 
this  subject  should  differentiate  between  such  acts,  even  if  of  the  same 
character,  when  committed  by  aliens  and  when  committed  by  citizens. 
When  done  by  an  alien,  the  act  should  be  punishable  as  one  of  espion- 
age ;  when  perpetrated  by  a  national,  it  should  be  punished  as  treach- 
ery. We  cannot  without  a  constitutional  amendment  make  such  an  act, 
especially  when  committed  in  times  of  peace,  an  act  of  treason,  be- 
cause the  constitutional  definition  of  treason  is  exclusive.  But  there 
would  seem  to  be  no  reason  why  Congress  cannot  classify  such  acts 
and  give  them  the  name  of  treachery.  Furthermore,  I  believe  that  the 
punishment  of  such  treachery  should  be  more  severe  in  the  case  of 
an  official,  who  would  thereby  commit  a  breach  of  an  express  trust, 
than  in  the  case  of  a  citizen  having  no  official  or  other  connection  with 
the  national  defense. 

In  the  second  place,  in  the  case  of  persons  intrusted  with  the 
safeguarding  of  national  secrets  or  property,  the  legislature  should 
constitute  a  crime  negligence  in  permitting  such  secrets,  or  such  secret 
information  to  fall  into  the  possession  of  unauthorized  persons,  or  such 
property  to  be  damaged,  destroyed  or  illegally  removed.    An  official  or 

60 


employee  of  the  United  States  should  be  held  to  a  more  strict  accounta- 
bility than  that  merely  for  positive  wrongdoing  or  breach  of  trust. 
Such  an  official  should,  on  the  contrary,  be  charged  affirmatively  with 
the  safety  of  the  secrets  committed  to  his  care.  He  must  exercise  the 
highest  degree  of  diligence  for  their  protection,  and  his  failure  so  to  do 
should  be  punishable  as  a  crime.  Only  by  such  a  rigid  system  can  we 
be  assured  that  our  national  interests  will  not  suffer  by  laxity  and 
negligence,  even  if  not  by  positive  treachery. 

In  the  next  place,  I  believe  that  the  theory  of  punishing  misprision 
of  treason  should  be  extended  so  as  to  apply  to  acts  of  espionage  and 
treachery  as  above  defined.  In  other  words,  the  law  should,  in  my 
judgment,  make  it  criminal  for  a  person  within  the  United  States, 
having  knowledge  or  reasonable  ground  to  believe  that  such  an  offense 
is  about  to  be  or  has  been  committed,  not  to  make  prompt  report  to 
the  proper  officers. 

To  recapitulate  the  foregoing  suggestions,  they  are: 

1.  The  differentiation  between  espionage  and  treachery. 

2.  The  creation  of  an  offense  which,  for  brevity,  we  may  call 
misprision  of  espionage  or  misprision  of  treachery. 

3.  The  creation  of  an  offense  of  criminal  negligence  in  the  guard- 
ing of  the  secrets  or  the  physical  property  of  the  United  States. 

There  still  remains  to  be  considered  the  kind  of  activities  against 
which  the  laws  on  this  subject  shall  be  directed;  in  other  words,  the 
scope  and  extent  of  the  legislation  to  be  constructed  in  conformity 
with  these  legal  principles.  As  already  stated,  our  laws  today  protect 
against  physical  injury  the  fortifications  and  property  actually  owned 
by  the  United  States.  They  also  safeguard,  to  the  extent  which  I  have 
pointed  out,  the  secrets  directly  connected  with  the  national  defense. 
On  the  other  hand,  our  legislation  fails  entirely  to  protect  the  secrets, 
documents  and  archives  of  the  Department  of  State,  and  the  factories, 
mines,  railroads  and  other  privately  owned  properties  which,  in  the 
event  of  war,  would  be  most  intimately  connected  with  the  national 
defense.  There  must,  therefore,  be  an  enlargement  of  the  scope  of 
the  statutes  which  punish  the  obtaining  of  information  concerning 
the  national  defense  and  which  punish  physical  injury  to  forts,  factories 
and  armories  of  the  United  States,  the  enticement  of  desertion  from 
the  army  or  navy,  and  the  enticement  of  workmen  or  artisans  from 
the  arsenals  or  factories  of  the  United  States. 

51 


In  the  first  place,  all  governmental  records  should  be  included 
within  the  purview  of  the  statute  relating  to  the  improper  procure- 
ment of  information — the  secrets  of  the  Department  of  State  and  the 
data  about  to  be  collected  with  respect  to  the  organization  of  our 
national  resources,  as  well  as  all  military  and  naval  secrets.  In  the 
second  place,  we  must  punish  any  interference  with  the  plants,  fac- 
tories, mills,  mines,  railroads  or  other  enterprises  engaged,  or  which 
have  been  or  may  be  engaged  in  the  construction,  manufacture  or 
transportation  of  any  arms  or  ammunition  or  stores  for  the  army  or 
navy,  and  also  any  interference  with  our  privately  operated  telegraph 
and*  telephone  lines  and  wireless  systems.  With  the  completion  of 
the  planned  systematization  of  our  manufacturing  and  industrial  re- 
sources, it  will  be  possible  to  draft  a  law  defining  with  sufficient 
particularity  the  agencies  of  this  character  relating  to  the  national 
defense.  But  if  such  a  statute  is  found  inadvisable,  I  would  suggest 
a  provision  of  penal  law  prohibiting  in  general  terms  any  interference 
with  plants,  factories  or  other  enterprises  connected  with  the  national 
defense,  and  authorizing  the  Secretary  of  War  from  time  to  time  to 
designate  such  plants,  factories  and  enterprises  as,  by  reason  of  their 
then  activities  or  the  adaptability  of  their  machinery  or  other  features, 
are  in  fact  connected  with  the  national  defense.  These  agencies  so 
designated  by  public  proclamation  would  then  come  automatically 
within  the  intendment  and  purview  of  the  statute.  Further,  with 
respect  to  such  plants,  any  statute  on  the  subject  should  punish  not 
only  actual  physical  injury,  but  also  any  interference  with  the  sources 
of  supply,  either  of  materials  or  implements  or  of  labor.  In  thus  for- 
bidding interference  with  labor,  the  suggested  law  would  be  an  en- 
largement of  the  present  provision  relating  to  the  enticement  of  work- 
men from  Federal  factories  and  arsenals.  Of  course,  any  statute 
designed  to  effect  this  purpose  would  be  carefully  framed  so  as  to 
condemn  not  the  ordinary  industrial  strikes,  but  only  interference 
with  labor  when  brought  about  with  the  intent  to  embarrass  or  to 
defeat  the  measures  of  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

The  necessity  of  such  legislation  must  be  manifest.  In  times  of 
peace  a  shoe  factory  or  a  plant  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  cloth- 
ing, having  especially  developed  facilities  for  the  production  of  army 
stores  and  supplies,  may  not  have  a  single  Government  contract,  and 
would  therefore  be  at  the  mercy  of  a  system  of  spies  intent  upon  the 

52  ..  , .  •  ,    " " 


demoralization  of  its  labor  force  or  the  actual  physical  destruction  of 
its  machinery.  If  the  Secretary  of  War  were  empowered  to  designate 
such  a  plant  as  one  connected  with  the  national  defense,  this  factory 
could  be  protected  by  the  Federal  Secret  Service  and  by  the  system  of 
counter-espionage  which  1  have  suggested. 

Without  some  comprehensive  scheme  of  this  character  for  the 
p  /otection  of  our  industrial  auxiliaries  of  national  defense,  the  nation 
\\'ill  always  be  vulnerable.  If  a  thoroughly  organized  system  of 
espionage  is  to  be  able  to  entice  workmen  from  our  privately  owned 
ammunition  plants  and  from  our  copper  mines,  and  to  foment  strikes 
and  industrial  disorders  in  our  railroads  and  to  cripple  our  meafts  of 
communication,  we  shall  be  utterly  at  the  mercy  of  a  foreign  enemy, 
no  matter  how  strong  or  well  protected  from  secret  scrutiny  may  be 
the  actual  military  and  naval  arms  of  the  Government. 

There  will,  of  course,  occur  to  the  mind  of  the  lawyer  the  query 
as  to  how  far  Congress  may  ^n  in  the  direction  of  my  suggestions 
without  transcending  its  constitutional  limitations.  In  my  opinion,  tha 
exigencies  of  the  situation  would  warrant  a  constitutional  amendment 
if  such  a  step  were  necessary.  On  careful  consideration,  however,  I 
do  not  believe  that  any  difficulty  exists  on  this  score.  The  constitution 
expressly  provides  among  the  powers  of  Congress  the  powers — 

"12.     To  raise  and  support  armies,     .     .     .; 
"13.     To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy; 
"14.    To  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation 
of  the  land  and  naval  forces; 

"17.  To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  what- 
so  ever  over  such  district  ...  as  may  .  .  .  become 
the  seat  of  government  of  the  United  States ;  and  to  exercise 
like  authority  over  all  places  purchased  by  consent  of  the 
legislature  of  the  state  in  which  the  same  shall  be,  for  the 
erection  of  forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dock  yards  and  other 
naval  buildings;    and 

"18.  To  make  all  laws  which  may  be  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers  .  .   ." 

In  addition  to  these  express  powers,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  like  any  government,  has  inherently  the  power  to  protect  its 

53 


own  integrity.  These  special  powers  and  this  general  power  are  clearly 
sufficient' to  authorize  the  enactment  of  legislation  covering  the  sub- 
jects which  I  have  enumerated. 

The  only  suggestion  which,  in  my  opinion,  would  raise  even  a  de- 
batable constitutional  point  is  that  relating  to  the  protection  of  pri- 
vately owned  plants  and  factories  which  are  or  can  be  used  for  th^ 
national  defense.  In  so  far  as  the  statute  may  be  able  specifically  to 
mention  or  accurately  to  define  plants  then  in  use  for  the  manufacture 
or  construction  of  supplies  necessary  for  national  defense,  I  can  see 
no  constitutional  objection,  for  without  the  right  to  protect  the  agents 
engaged  in  the  production  of  munitions  or  supplies  of  war,  the  Gov- 
ernment would  not  be  able  to  "provide  and  maintain  a  navy"  or  to 
"raise  and  support  armies."  With  respect  to  a  general  provision 
covering  factories  and  plants  to  be  designated  from  time  to  time  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  there  may  be  some  question,  but  I  think  that  upon 
study  such  a  provision  will  be  found  to  be  constitutional.  The  possible 
objection  would  be  that  an  attempt  to  vest  such  a  power  in  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  is  unconstitutional  in  permitting  an  executive  officer  to  ex- 
ercise the  function  of  legislation.  But  this  ground  does  not  appeal  to 
my  reason.  The  legislature  defines  the  offense  as  interference  with 
a  plant  connected  with  the  national  defense,  and  it  places  upon  the 
Secretary  of  War  merely  the  duty  of  proclaiming  the  existence  of 
the  facts  with  respect  to  such  factories  or  plants  as  are  in  truth  con- 
nected with  the  national  defense.  There  is  some  precedent  for  such 
a  law.  In  the  case  of  our  reciprocity  treaties,  the  President  is  author- 
ized by  proclamation  to  declare  the  existence  of  such  a  state  of  facts 
as  will  bring  into  effect  a  reduction  of  our  tariff  rates.  Again,  in 
the  case  of  the  administration  of  our  immigration  laws,  administra- 
tive officers  are  invested  with  the  power  of  determining  whether  in- 
coming aliens  are  or  are  not  desirable  citizens,  and  the  decisions  of 
the  immigration  officers  are  not  reviewable  by  the  courts,  but  are  con- 
clusive, except  where  there  has  been  such  a  flagrant  abuse  of  discre- 
tion that  it  can  be  said  that  the  officials  have  entirely  failed  to  attempt 
a  compliance  with  the  law. 

In  making  these  cursory  observations  on  espionage  and  its  dangers 
to  our  country,  I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  sounding  an  alarm. 
I  do  wish  to  establish  in  your  minds  the  fact  that,  in  a  general  scheme 
of  preparedness,  security  against  the  spy  is  quite  as  essential  as  a 

54 


sufficiency  of  resources  for  War;  that  only  by  sucli  security  can  We 
derive  and  maintain  the  maximum  benefit  from  our  expenditures  for 
defense,  and  that  such  security  can  be  obtained  only  by  constant 
vigilance  and  activity  even  in  times  of  peace.  National  protection 
against  espionage  is  but  one  feature  of  a  protective  system.  Never- 
theless, is  is  so  intimately  related  to  every  possible  department  of 
national  defense  that  it  requires  at  least  equally  serious  consideration. 

Mr.  Coudert — Mr  President,  if  not  out  of  order  I  would  like  to 
make  a  suggestion:  that  that  very  able,  very  timely  and  splendidly 
precise  paper  of  Mr.  Stanchfield  be  sent — the  whole  or  at  least  that 
part  respecting  prospective  legislation — from  this  organization  to  every 
member  of  Congress.    I  think  it  would  be  a  useful  and  wise  action. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the  mo- 
tion was  unanimously  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — Now,  I  have  one  announcement  to  make — an  im- 
portant announcement,  which  concerns  every  person  present;  but  be- 
fore doing  so  I  want  to  call  upon  Mrs.  John  Hays  Hammond,  Vice- 
President  of  the  National  Council  of  Women,  to  say  a  few  words. 
Mrs.  Hammond  is  just  going  to  say  a  very  few  words  to  us  at  this 
hour. 

Mrs.  Hammond — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  I  will 
keep  that  promise;  I  shall  say  only  a  very  few  words.  I  come  to  you 
as  a  representative  of  one  of  the  largest — indeed,  the  largest —  wo- 
man's organization  in  America;  in  a  word,  the  National  Council  of 
Women.  We  number  7,000,000  members.  We  represent  women  from 
every  circumstances  and  walk  of  life.  The  potential  strength  of  such 
an  organization  for  strength  in  mind,  in  influence,  in  money,  is  beyond 
exaggeration.  At  our  recent  convention  a  resolution  was  passed  for 
adequate  preparedness.  (Applause.)  I  have  served  the  public  too 
long  not  to  know  how  elastic  such  a  resolution  of  expression  might 
prove,  and,  Mr.  Chairman,  with  your  kind  permission,  I  will  wait 
and  consult  with  my  constituents  before  sending  in  a  written  report 
to  be  incorporated  with  the  proceedings  of  this  meeting.    Thank  you. 

After  an  announcement  by  the  Chairman  as  to  the  necessity  of 
presenting  resolutions  promptly  to  the  secretary,  an  adjournment  was 
taken  until  8:15  o'clock  p.  m. 


55 


SECOND  SESSION 

Thursday,  January  20,  1916,  8:15  p.  m. 

Chairman— WILLET  M.  SPOONER,  of  Wisconsin 

The  Congress  was  called  to  order  in  the  large  ball  room  of  the 
Willard  Hotel  at  8:15  o'clock  p.  m.  by  the  Secretary,  Mr.  Herbert 
Barry. 

Mr.  Barry — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  meeting  will  be  good 
enough  to  come  to  order,  I  wish  to  take  the  opportunity  of  intro- 
ducing the  chairman  of  the  evening,  though  he  needs  no  introduction, 
I  think,  to  anyone  here.  Mr.  Spooner,  as  the  son  of  Senator  Spooner, 
is  known  throughout  the  United  States;  and  in  his  own  environment, 
where  he  has  as  yet  had  less  wide  acquaintance  with  the  people  of  the 
United  States  than  his  distinguished  father,  he  is  known  equally  well 
and  equally  favorably;  and  as  an  officer  of  his  own  branch  of  the 
National  Security  League  he  has  come  as  a  delegate,  and  we  are 
fortunate  enough  to  have  him  as  our  presiding  officer  tonight.  It  is 
with  great  pleasure  that  I  present  Mr.  Willet  M.  Spooner  of  Milwaukee 
as  the  presiding  officer. 

Mr.  Spooner — The  West  is  for  preparedness — wise  and  adequate 
preparedness. 

I  want  to  deliver  this  message:  If  ever  it  should  become  neces- 
sary to  marshal  armies  under  our  flag,  our  so-called  German-Americans 
of  the  West  would  send  their  full  quota  of  men,  whether  that  war  should 
be  with '  England,  Russia,  Germany  or  any  other  nation  under  the 
skies.  The  contrary  indications  come  only  from  a  comparatively  few 
who  do  not  reflect  the  sentiment  of  the  masses.  I  do  not  say  this 
because  I  came  from  Milwaukee,  where  men  and  women  of  German 
extraction  predominate  in  numbers.     I  say  this  because  I  know  it. 

The  only  danger — and  I  think  the  great  danger — confronting  the 
American  people  does  not  lie  in  the  probability  of  war.     War  may 

56 


tome,  and  if  it  should  soon  come  We  should  probably  be  defeated;  but 
great  peoples  always  have  and  doubtless  always  will  survive  the  shock 
of  defeat.  We  would  survive  it.  With  all  its  horrows  and  heartbreak- 
ings,  it  would  not  be  an  unmixed  evil  if  out  of  the  ashes  there  should 
arise  a  united  and  sohdified  people,  transpired  by  a  loyalty  and  devo- 
tion to  country  the  like  of  which  we  do  not  know  today. 

We  can  prepare  for  war  with  money;  we  can't  buy  patriotism. 
Without  the  unhesitating  willingness  of  the  people  to  subordinate  all 
personal  and  political  interests  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation,  we  have 
no  nation,  no  country,  in  the  higher  sense,  but  merely  a  land  in  which 
to  live  and  earn. 

The  nation,  as  such,  has  to  all  people  who  have  accomplished  the 
great  things  of  life  been  a  personal  thing;  a  part  of  the  lives  of  the 
people ;  something  to  live  for,  and  to  die  for  in  war  or  in  peace. 

They  have  been  the  guardians  of  its  honor  and  integrity  as  they 
saw  it,  because  it  was  their  country.  They  have  jealously  safeguarded 
its  interests  and  have  sought  to  extend  its  power  and  influence.  They 
have  always  been  careful  to  protect  its  prestige  and  to  save  it  from 
humiliation  and  distress. 

It  is  not  material  that  sometimes  the  methods  have  been  bad,  nor 
that  the  ends  sought  unconscionable  and  wrong.  The  point  is  that 
these  people  have  done  these  things  because  they  regarded  the  honor 
and  power  and  prestige  of  the  nation  as  their  honor  and  power  and 
prestige,  collectively  and  individually. 

It  is  the  sense  of  common  interest,  the  spirit  of  nationality,  which 
makes  men,  now  and  in  the  past,  refer  to  their  country  as  the  "Father- 
land" or  the  "Mother-land,"  or  in  other  terms  of  similar  import.  Do 
we  not  need  more  of  that  spirit  in  our  country? 

Are  we  willing,  as  individuals  and  as  members  of  political  parties 
or  other  organizations,  to  subordinate  in  times  of  peace  the  personal 
or  party  interest,  to  maintain  the  dignity  and  to  promote  the  interests 
of  the  country — just  because  it  is  our  country? 

Events  of  current  history  to  some  extent  answer  the  question. 
Day  by  day  we  have  seen,  and  without  apparent  resentment  on  the  part 
of  the  people,  men  seeking  to  hinder  and  embarrass  the  President  of 
the  United  States  in  the  discharge  of  great  and  vitally  important  na- 
tional duties.  It  seems  to  be  immaterial  to  these  men,  of  whom  the 
nation  has  the  right  to  expect  other  things,  that  their  efforts  to  make 

57       - 


political  capital  by  nullifying  as  far  as  possible  the  efforts  of  the 
President  to  work  out  in  the  interests  of  the  nation  and  to  a  successful 
issue  delicate  and  perplexing  international  problems,  work  injury  to 
the  nation. 

If  the  constituted  authorities  of  government  achieve  a  so-called 
diplomatic  success  for  the  country,  greatly  increasing  its  prestige  and 
power,  a  large  section  of  the  people  and  press  hasten  to  minimize  its 
importance  and  to  destroy  the  value  of  the  result  obtained  so  far  as 
in  them  lies — and  all  for  the  sake  of  politics. 

We  see  politicians  in  office  and  anxious  to  stay  in,  and  politicians 
out  of  office  and  anxious  to  get  in,  offering  no  word  of  advice,  making  no 
effort  and  apparently  having  no  desire  to  assist  in  the  proper  solution 
of  great  questions  for  the  country's  sake,  but  they  are  swift  to  herald 
to  the  world  the  story  of  failure  of  unfortunate  mistake,  all  to  the  end 
that  political  profit  may  follow. 

Only  a  few  days  ago  there  was  transmitted  to  the  United  States  a 
military  report  from  a  high  officer  of  the  Government  with  the  sugges- 
tion that  part  of  the  document  contained  information  which  should  be 
treated  as  confidential  because  in  the  hands  of  foreign  governments  the 
information  would  be  damaging  to  the  United  States. 

The  Senate  with  a  complete  ingenuity  ordered  the  report  made  a 
confidential  document,  intending  thereby  to  prevent  publication  at  this 
time.  Some  newspaper  men  worked  day  in  and  day  out  to  ascertain  the 
nature  of  the  confidential  facts  submitted  and  having  obtained  those 
facts  immediately  proceeded  to  publish  them  to  the  world  without  the 
slightest  regard  for  the  interest  of  the  nation  or  the  request  of  the 
Department  and  the  Senate  that  such  information  should  not  be  pub- 
lished. 

There  is  an  almost  countless  number  of  instances  of  utter  disre- 
gard for  the  welfare  of  the  nation  when  that  welfare  runs  counter  to 
personal  or  political  profit.  Assume,  if  any  one  will,  that  these  things 
are  in  and  of  themselves  unimportant.  They  lend  persuasive  force, 
however,  to  the  suggestion  that  there  is  not  among  our  people  that 
spirit  of  loyalty  and  patriotism  which  puts  the  nation  before  all  things. 

If  every  one  of  us  felt  as  each  one  should  feel  that  the  nation  is  a 
part  of  himself  and  that  anything  that  injures  it  injures  him,  there 
would  come  a  new  order  of  things  in  the  United  States  and  we  would 
begin  to  move  forward  to  glorious  achievement.    We  will  then  be  a 

58 


united  people,  placing  the  welfare  of  the  nation,  as  such,  above  all  other 
things. 

That  there  should  be  full  and  free  criticism  of  public  officers  is 
undeniable,  but  its  expression  as  to  time  and  manner  should  be  regu- 
lated not  by  restricting  laws,  but  by  a  solid  public  sentiment  which 
springs  only  from  patriotism. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
represents  before  the  world  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  He 
occupies  a  far  different  status  from  that  of  the  ministers  of  France, 
England,  Germany  and  other  countries.  We  ought  always  to  remem- 
ber that  in  a  government  by  the  people  such  as  ours  that  evidence  of 
lack  of  unanimity  in  support  of  the  President  in  dealing  with  interna- 
tional affairs  weakens  his  position  and  thereby  inevitably  the  position 
of  the  country,  and  tends  to  prevent  and  often  times  has  prevented  the 
accomplishment  of  the  national  purpose. 

What  is  true  of  the  present  administration  has  been  true  of  prac- 
tically every  other. 

The  principle  of  free  speech  and  press  lies  very  close  to  the  hearts 
of  the  American  people.  But  the  people,  let  us  fondly  believe,  will 
some  day  curtail,  when  the  interest  of  the  Nation  is  involved,  free 
speech  and  free  press,  not  by  the  enactment  of  restrictive  laws  nor  by 
the  closing  of  newspaper  offices  nor  by  the  dispersing  of  assemblies, 
but  by  some  such  swift  and  crushing  condemnation  that  no  man  nor 
party  nor  paper  will  dare  attempt,  for  personal  or  political  profit,  nor 
for  any  other  reason,  to  impede  and  hinder  the  President  of  the  United 
States  in  the  discharge  of  his  constitutional  duties  nor  to  attempt  to 
humiliate  him  in  the  eyes  of  his  own  people  and  the  peoples  of  the 
world,  much  less  to  speak  or  print  facts  hurtful  to  the  country  and 
helpful  only  to  its  enemies. 

When  our  people  feel  that  degree  of  loyalty  then  indeed  will  we 
have  become  a  Nation ! 

If  Providence  guides  the  destiny  of  our  Republic,  then  time  will 
surely  come  when  at  least  in  times  of  national  peril  and  when  the 
President  is  dealing  with  great  international  problems,  all  men  with- 
out regard  to  personal  prejudices  nor  party  politics,  driven  by  a  sub- 
lime spirit  of  patriotism,  will  say:  You  have  decided  on  your  policy. 
I  do  not  agree  with  it.  But  you  are  the  President  of  my  country  and 
I  shall  not,  by  word  or  deed,  nor  so  far  as  in  me  lies,  will  I  permit  any 

69 


r 


than  to  hinder  or  embarrass  you  in  the  discharge  of  your  duty  as  yoti 
see  it;   but  I  shall  in  all  ways  encourage,  uphold  and  sustain  you. 

Should  we  not  begin  to  do  so  now? 

We  can  and  we  will  prepare  for  our  defense  by  adequate  military 
equipment,  but  the  only  thing  that  will  make  this  Nation  enduring, 
that  will  perpetuate  it  through  the  ages,  that  will  make  it  the  greatest 
Nation  of  the  world,  is  a  spirit  of  unfaltering  and  uncompromising 
patriotism.  We  will  have  that  degree  of  patriotism  when  the  individ- 
ual citizen  can  say,  from  his  heart,  "this  is  my  country" — when  he  feels 
that  spirit  of  nationality  and  gives  expression  to  it. 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  will  now  present  to  you 
a  man  who  needs  no  presentation  to  any  American  audience,  the  man 
who  through  his  course  as  Secretary  of  State  pursued  one  straight, 
even  course,  with  only  one  object  ever  in  view,  and  that  was  the  sus- 
taining of  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  He  was  one  of  our  great 
Secretaries  of  State,  a  student  of  world  politics,  and  he  had  the  respect 
not  alone  of  all  our  people,  but  of  every  people.  I  have  the  honor  to 
present  to  you  the  Honorable  Robert  Bacon.     (Applause.) 


INTERNATIONAL  OBLIGATIONS 
Robert  Bacon,  New  York, 
Former  Secretary  of  State 

Mr.  Bacon — No  international  policy  which  is  not  based  on  a  re- 
spect for  international  law  can  possibly  endure.  The  relations  of  our 
country  with  other  nations  must  depend  upon  certain  accepted,  well- 
defined  rules  of  international  conduct  which  shall  apply  with  equal 
force  to  all  the  members  of  the  society  of  nations,  granting  to  each 
one  equal  rights  and  imposing  equal  obligations.  Responsibility  foi 
the  enforcement  of  these  rules  must  rest,  not  with  any  one  nation, 
but  with  each  and  all. 

In  the  conduct  of  this  war  there  has  been  such  repeated  and  open 
disregard  of  the  principles  which  civilization  had  agreed  should  govern 
the  relations  of  peoples  that  disappointed  statesmen,  particularly 
statesmen  of  Europe,  have  been  heard  to  say  that  international  law 

60 


has  ceased  to  exist.  It  is,  perhaps,  only  natural  that  an  apparent 
triumph  of  force  in  defiance  of  the  rights  of  others  should  shake  faith 
in  the  power  of  law  to  control  the  conduct  of  nations,  but  I  firmly  be- 
lieve that,  when  this  war  is  over,  international  law  will  make  a  greater 
advance  than  it  has  ever  made  before  in  its  short  history,  and  that  not 
only  will  its  recognition  become  general,  but  that  nations  will  rely 
upon  it  as  the  only  sure  foundation  upon  which  their  permanent  rela- 
tions can  rest.  If  this  is  not  so,  then  the  world  will  have  passed  into  a 
state  of  chaos  where  no  man  dare  look  upon  the  future,  for  we  have 
either  to  depend  upon  the  rule  of  law  to  regulate  our  international 
conduct  and  secure  our  international  rights,  or  submit  to  the  rule  of 
might  which  shall  leave  the  weaker  nations  at  the  mercy  of  the  needs 
and  desires  of  the  more  powerful.  There  is  no  middle  course.  In  the 
critical  situation  which  civilization  is  now  called  upon  to  face  there 
can  be  no  compromise. 

"Ubi  societas,  ibi  jus."  Where  there  is  a  society  of  nations  there 
is  a  law  of  nations,  for  a  nation  can  not  exist  and  fulfill  its  mission 
separate  and  apart  from  the  society  any  more  than  man  can  live  in 
isolation.  When  individuals  are  gathered  together  in  municipalities, 
commonwealths  and  nations,  the  need  arises  for  rules  to  regulate  their 
conduct,  and  when  the  individual  nations  are  admitted  into  member- 
ship in  the  society  of  nations  it  is  impossible  that  they  should  live 
together  without  accepted  rules  of  international-  conduct. 

Equality  is  the  very  essence  of  this  relationship.  Either  the 
smallest  and  weakest  nation  shall  enjoy  equal  rights  with  the  largest 
and  strongest  or  we  revert  in  greater  or  less  degree  to  the  domination 
of  force.  It  is  an  axiom  that  individuals  must  be  equal  before  the  law 
if  justice  is  to  prevail  and  the  axiom  applies  with  equal  truth  to  the  re- 
lation of  nations. 

While  equality  confers  independence,  it  is  really  interdependence 
which  results,  for  equality  does  not  give  to  a  nation,  any  more- than  it 
gives  to  an  individual,  the  right  to  act  without  respect  for  the  rights 
of  others.  We  can  not  enjoy  rights  without  accepting  obligations,  for 
rights  and  duties  are  correlative.  The  right  of  one  is  the  right  of  all ; 
the  duty  of  each  is  to  respect  the  right  of  each  and  all.  A  failure  to 
respect  the  rights  of  others  is  a  violation  of  duty,  which,  if  allowed  to 
proceed  unchecked,  and  without  protest,  results  inevitably  in  anarchy. 

61 


Such  a  state  of  affairs  is  impossible  among  men ;  it  is  equally  impossi- 
ble among  nations. 

There  can  be  no  question  that  it  is  the  moral  duty  of  individuals 
not  only  to  refrain  themselves  from  violating  the  rights  of  others,  but 
to  see  that  the  rights  of  the  weak  and  helpless  are  respected.  Such, 
also,  is  the  higher  moral  duty  of  nations.  The  provisions  of  a  conven- 
tion adopted  at  the  First  Hague  Conference  M^hich  have  been  referred 
to  as  marking  "a  considerable  step  towards  a  change  in  the  theory  of 
the  relation  of  third  powers  to  an  international  controversy,"  recom- 
mended that  neutral  nations  should,  on  their  own  initiative,  offer  their 
good  offices.  This  is  certainly  an  indication  that  neutral  powers  have 
a  recognized  interest  in  the  disputes  of  others  and  the  right  to  inter- 
fere to  the  extent  of  offering  their  mediation. 

But  we  must  go  much  further.  This  war  has  proved  beyond  a 
question  of  a  doubt  that  there  must  be  conventional  obligations  be- 
tween the  nations  to  enforce  international  public  opinion.  Some 
formula  must  be  found  and  some  convention  agreed  to  which  shall  not 
only  give  the  majority  of  the  nations  the  right,  but  shall  impose  upon 
them  the  duty  to  act  in  the  enforcement  of  the  decrees  which  spring 
from  and  which  represent,  through  a  court  or  otherwise,  this  public 
opinion  and  its  collective  force. 

International  law,  like  national  law,  is  a  process  of  evolution  and 
its  inadequacy,  as  it  exists  today,  has  long  been  generally  recognized. 
The  very  violations  in  the  present  crisis  have  served  to  emphasize  the 
need  of  "new  rules  of  the  game,"  but  it  is  inconceivable  that  the 
nations  should  not,  by  common  agreement,  recognize  and  supply  this 
need,  devising  the  machinery  by  which  the  laws  may  be  made  effective. 

Let  us  look  forward,  then,  through  the  years,  to  a  new  impulse 
toward  the  "process  of  codification"  of  the  law  of  nations  and  to  the 
creation  of  a  permanent  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,  whose  decrees  shall 
be  enforced  by  the  collective  power  of  the  nations. 

We  are  apt,  I  think,  to  place  too  little  faith  in  the  power  of  public 
opinion,  but  it  is  true  that  in  any  constitutional  form  of  government 
the  source  of  all  authority  springs  from  the  collective  will  of  the 
people,  from  public  opinion,  and  in  like  manner,  the  sanction  of  the  law 
of  nations  is  collective  international  opinion,  and  means  must  be  found 
by  the  nations  to  enforce  it. 

62 


It  is  well  for  us  to  remember  that  our  forefathers  recognized  the 
power  of  public  opinion  in  their  imperishable  Declaration  when  they 
boldly  took  issue  with  the  theory  of  the  divine  rights  of  kings  arbi- 
trarily to  impose  their  will  upon  the  people. 

Mr.  Elihu  Root,  in  a  memorable  address  said,  "  'A  decent  respect 
to  the  opinion  of  mankind'  did  not  begin  or  end  with  the  American 
Declaration  of  Independence ;  but  it  is  interesting  that  the  first  public 
national  act  in  the  new  world  should  be  an  appeal  to  that  universal 
international  public  opinion,  the  power  and  effectiveness  of  which  the 
new  world  has  done  so  much  to  promote." 

Nor  is  the  power  of  public  opinion  without  the  test  of  actual  prac- 
tice in  the  regulation  of  international  conduct,  for  it  is  common  knowl- 
edge, that,  in  cases  of  arbitration,  nations  abide  by  the  decision  of  the 
arbiter,  even  when,  as  frequently  has  been  the  case,  the  decision  is  in 
favor  of  the  weaker  nation  and  against  the  interest  and  desire  of  the 
stronger,  which  is  restrained  from  rejecting  the  award  by  no  power 
except  the  power  of  international  opinion. 

I  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  our  legal  and  moral  international 
rights  and  the  source  from  which  they  are  derived  in  order  to  em- 
phasize what  I  believe  to  be  the  present  international  obligations  of 
this  country.  Never  was  there  such  an  opportunity  for  a  nation  and 
our  clear  duty  has  been,  and  still  is,  I  believe,  to  take  the  initiative,  for 
in  this  great  crisis  in  which  all  our  ideals  and  principles  are  at  stake 
the  outside  nations  of  the  world  have  looked  and  are  still  looking  to  us 
to  take  the  lead  in  the  crystalization  and  expression  of  world  opinion. 

This  war  is  unlike  any  other  war  the  world  has  known.  There  is 
no  precedent.  The  principles  at  stake  vitally  affect  every  nation  of 
the  earth.  For  these  principles  lie  at  the  very  root  of  international 
obligations.  I  believe  that  there  will  never  be  a  conclusive  settlement 
of  the  issues  of  this  war  until  the  collective  forces  of  the  world,  moral, 
spiritual  and  material,  rise  up  in  defense  of  law  and  order  and  impose 
an  end  to  this  monstrous  thing,  this  highly  developed,  technical,  intel- 
lectual machine,  which,  perfectly  organized,  has  been  suddenly  set  in 
motion  to  destroy  weaker  nations,  to  crush  all  who  may  be  in  its  path, 
defiant  of  right  or  of  justice,  deliberately  trying  to  spread  terror 
throughout  civilization. 

Against  this  attempt  to  dominate  the  earth  by  force,  there  can  be 
opposed  but  one  greater  power,  the  supreme  power  of  collective  inter- 

63 


national  opinion,  which  shall  ostracize  the  nation  that  would  thus  hold 
itself  outside  the  law. 

The  opportunity  presented  itself  to  this  country  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  may  still  be  at  hand,  to  express  the  collective  opinion 
of  the  nations  regarding  the  sanctity  of  international  law  and  to  place 
ourselves  unequivocally  on  the  side  of  the  right. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  after  the  admitted  violation  by  Ger- 
many of  The  Hague  Conventions,  to  which  the  United  States  was  a 
signatory,  I  maintained  publicly  that  it  seemed  to  be  our  solemn  duty 
to  protest,  which  would  have  been  in  strict  conformity  with  official 
neutrality.  I  considered  that  by  remaining  silent  we  incurred  a  heavy 
responsibility.  To  justify  a  policy  of  silence  by  the  assertion  so  fre- 
quently repeated  then  and  now,  that  we  were  fortunate  in  being  safely 
removed  from  this  danger  that  threatened  European  powers,  and  to 
urge  that  as  a  reason  not  to  protest  seemed  then  as  weak  as  it  was 
unwise.  Even  more  so  does  it  seem  to  me  now  in  the  light  of  the  events 
that  have  happened  since. 

That  protest  against  the  admitted  violation  of  the  treaties  to  which 
we  had  given  our  adherence,  providing  that  "the  territory  of  neutral 
powers  is  inviolate,"  was  never  made. 

In  many  quarters  there  was  editorial  outcry  that  the  suggestion  of 
a  protest  was  folly  fraught  with  danger,  but  what  has  happened  since 
then?  Indifference  to  one's  rights  or  a  timidity  in  defending  them 
invites  a  disregard  on  the  part  of  others.  Violation  has  followed  viola- 
tion in  appalling  succession,  none  more  flagrant  than  was  that  first  one, 
which  was  publicly  confessed. 

We  were  told  very  often  in  those  early  days  of  the  war,  and  we 
hear  it  occasionally  now,  that  the  quarrels  of  other  nations  were  no 
affair  of  ours,  and  that  it  behooved  us  to  remember  our  traditional 
policy  and  not  to  meddle. 

For  more  than  a  century  this  country,  by  reason  of  its  geograph- 
ical situation,  and  its  traditions,  was  regarded  by  its  citizens  as  isolated 
from  the  rest  of  the  world.  With  the  affairs  of  other  nations,  sep- 
arated from  us  by  two  great  oceans,  we  had  no  intimate  concern. 
Abstention  from  interference  with  their  affairs  became  one  of  the 
principles  of  our  national  life.  It  was  quite  generally  believed  that 
this  condition  was  permanent,  but  a  few  years  have  served  to  bring 
about  a  complete  change.    With  the  annexation  of  Hawaii,  and  with 

.  64 


the  addition  of  territory  after  the  war  with  Spain,  we  found  our  bound- 
aries suddenly  extended,  so  that  the  insular  character  of  our  country 
was  gone.  The  progress  of  science  has  destroyed  forever  the  security 
supposedly  afforded  by  two  oceans. 

The  policy  of  our  fathers  to  refrain  from  entangling  European 
alliances  was  unquestionably  wise,  but  the  world  has  lately  grown  very 
small  and  the  nations  have  been  brought  very  near  to  each  other  and 
have  become,  to  a  great  extent,  interdependent.  We  have  been  forced 
by  the  inevitable  progress  of  affairs  into  the  society  of  nations,  and  we 
can  not  escape  our  duties  and  our  obligations. 

But  this  country  will  never  assume  its  rightful  place  in  the  society 
of  nations  until  a  national  consciousness  has  been  aroused.  In  order 
to  be  a  leader  in  international  opinion,  it  is  necessary  that  we  have  a 
truly  national  opinion,  which  shall  realize  and  respect  the  honorable 
obligations  of  international  conduct.  Such  an  opinion  can  spring  only 
from  a  national  soul  freed  from  the  domination  of  selfish,  material 
interests.  The  ringing  statement  of  Senator  Lodge  that  American 
lives  are  worth  more  than  American  dollars  is  splendid.  Let  us  go  fur- 
ther and  assert  that  worth  more  even  than  American  lives  are  Ameri- 
can ideals  and  American  honor.  In  order  to  be  a  nation  we  must  have 
national  ideals.  A  large  aggregation  of  people  with  varying  and  con- 
flicting ideals,  lacking  cohesion,  does  not  constitute  a  nation.  Does  the 
suddenly  revealed  presence  of  enemies  within  mean  that  our  people  are 
divided?  Has  the  influence  of  large  numbers  among  us  who  have  not 
been  assimiliated  into  the  national  life  grown  so  great  that  we  no 
longer  have  an  American  spirit?  Such  are  the  dark  questions  that 
recent  events  have  unavoidably  suggested,  but  I  for  one  believe  in  the 
National  Soul ;  I  believe  that  there  is  an  American  spirit,  that  there  is 
an  American  opinion,  which  will  manifest  itself  in  no  weak,  inactive, 
negative,  neutral  way,  when  once,  the  public  consciousness  is  aroused. 
There  is  something  new  astir  throughout  the  nation.  It  is  the  awaken- 
ing of  the  public  consciousness. 

The  way,  the  only  way,  in  which  our  national  soul  can  be  revealed 
is  through  the  spirit  of  national  service.  There  can  be  no  American 
spirit  unless  Americans  are  willing  to  make  sacrifices  for  their  country. 

All  this  is  what  this  congress  stands  for,  and  there  is,  perhaps, 
no  better  way  to  make  its  efforts  effective,  than  by  encouraging  and 
co-ordinating  the  work  of  the  many  societies,  which  have,  as  their  in- 

65 


spiration  and  common  purpose,  service  for  the  nation.  It  need  not  be 
military  service  alone  nor  need  it  have  directly  to  do  with  military 
service,  but  it  is  necessary  that  there  shall  be  organization  and  an  ap- 
preciation of  the  needs  of  the  nation  by  men,  women  and  children.  In 
this  lies  true  preparedness.  There  is  work  to  be  done  by  every  one; 
in  the  schools  in  educating  the  children  to  a  realization  of  American 
ideals ;  among  our  foreign-born  that  they  may  understand  the  meaning 
of  American  allegiance  and  appreciate  the  privilege  of  American  citi- 
zenship; among  our  native  born,  lest  they  forget,  in  the  pursuit  of 
their  material  advancement,  the  spirit  of  their  fathers  who  fought  at 
Gettysburg  or  Bunker  Hill,  and  there  is  an  infinite  amount  of  work  to 
be  done  in  bringing  home  to  all  the  people  a  true  conception  of  the 
real  needs  of  defense,  so  that  they  will  not  tolerate,  upon  the  part  of 
their  representatives  in  the  government,  either  delay  or  half-measures 
or  any  temporizing,  make-shift  policy  which  will  give  to  the  country  a 
false  confidence,  more  fatal  even  than  the  unarmed  pacifism  which 
rejects  every  thought  of  preparedness. 

Such,  I  believe,  is  the  meaning  of  this  Congress,  and  through  these 
efforts  will  come  the  growth  of  a  national  spirit  which  necessarily  must 
be  the  first  step  toward  national  self-respect,  legitimate  national  pride, 
from  which  alone  will  spring  a  realization  of  our  honorable  interna- 
tional obligations. 

The  nation  is  responding.  Public  opinion  for  which  we  have 
waited  so  long  is  beginning  to  express  itself  in  no  uncertain  terms. 
There  is  an  awakening  throughout  the  land.  The  call  for  Americans 
to  save  America  is  sounding  from  house  to  house  and  from  city  to  city 
like  that  call  which  "on  the  18th  of  April  in  '75"  went  through  every 
"Middlesex  village  and  farm,"  and  I  believe  the  answer  will  be  as 
strong  and  clear  as  it  was  then,  and  that  our  men  and  women  will  pre- 
pare themselves  for  national  service. 

Let  us  show  to  the  world  without  and  to  our  enemies  within  that 
our  people  are  one  in  heart  and  soul  ready  to  respond  to  needs  at  hofne 
and  to  meet  our  obligations  abroad. 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  next  present  to  you  Mr. 
R.  B.  Price  of  New  York,  who  will  discuss  the  question  of  industrial 
mobilization,  which  is  more  important  than  any  other  feature  of 
mobilization  except  perhaps  the  mobilization  of  men. 

66 


INDUSTRIAL  MOBILIZATION. 
R.  B.  Price,  New  York. 

Mr.  Price  :  Ladies  and  Gentlemen — My  sole  excuse  for  inflicting 
upon  you  my  speech-making  unpreparedness  is  that  a  better  man  fell 
by  the  wayside,  and  I  am  trying  to  fill  the  gap. 

Great  wars  always  bring  great  changes.  Great  changes  always 
bring  the  need  for  great  men,  men  of  courage,  men  of  initiative. 

The  great  war  that  ended  about  100  years  ago  brought  as  its 
great  change  the  substitution  of  steam  horsepower  for  man  power. 
That  change  brought  misery  during  the  fifteen  or  twenty  years  of  its 
first  adjustment;  but,  following  that.  Great  Britain  in  particular  was 
enabled  to  recover  from  the  enormous  losses  and  wastes  of  the  preced- 
ing years  at  an  unprecedented  rate.  The  present  great  war  is  bring- 
ing changes,  and  already  we  begin  to  see  what  those  changes  are; 
co-operation,  co-ordination,  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  Germany, 
France,  Japan — England  is  muddling  towards  it.  Even  Canada  is 
learning  the  lesson.  The  United  States  must  learn  that  lesson,  and  let 
us  hope  that  she  will  learn  it  without  undergoing  the  horrors  of  war. 

When  we  consider  that  perhaps  Japan  is  in  the  lead  in  this  im- 
perial co-ordination  of  resources,  it  is  worth  while  thinking  a  moment 
of  what  Japan  can  teach  to  us.  We  think,  perhaps  that  Germany  is 
the  best  example;  but  perhaps,  take  it  altogether,  the  palm  must  be 
awarded  to  Japan,  and  there  is  one  lesson  in  particular  that  we  of 
America,  as  those  who  have  spoken  to  you  this  evening  already  have 
pointed  out — there  is  one  lesson  in  particular  that  this  country — 
should  take  to  heart.  When  the  Japanese  people  in  1868  began  to  per- 
ceive that  the  western  nations  were  stronger  than  was  Japan  with  the 
system  that  Japan  had  followed  for  500  years,  the  feudal  system,  what 
happened  ? 

The  feudal  chiefs  and  the  samurai,  entrenched  in  their  privilege 
of  five  centuries,  in  an  almost  bloodless  revolution  voluntarily  sur- 
rendered those  rights  and  privileges,  and  even  sacrificed  their  incomes, 
and  shared  those  privileges  with  a  class  that  they  had  been  taught 
to  have  no  confidence  in;   not  even  to  respect. 

Again  in  1890  Japan  set  the  world  a  lesson  that  has  never  been 
equalled.  The  Emperor  of  the  Japanese  voluntarily  gave  to  his  people 
a  constitution,  surrendering  important  prerogatives.    That  is  the  na- 

67 


tion  which  within  the  past  two  months  has  had  presented  to  it  the 
thought,  that  until  the  California  problem  is  solved  its  right  to  exist 
in  the  future  as  a  nation  is  at  stake.  That  is  the  nation  which  today 
controls  American  shipping  on  the  Pacific,  and  has  the  power  to  say 
"American  goods  must  wait;  Japanese  goods  shall  go."  That  is  the 
nation  of  proud,  sensitive  people,  whom  we  have  wounded  to  the 
quick.  That  is  the  nation  that  completes  a  battleship  in  half  the  time 
consumed  by  our  country. 

There  are  problems  before  us,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  great- 
est problems  this  world  has  ever  brought,  and  many  of  them  are  busi- 
ness problems.  Fortunately  to-day  American  industry  is  founded  upon 
integrity,  efficiency,  and  the  desire  to  serve.  There  is  a  force  growing 
in  this  nation,  the  effect  of  which  has  not  yet  been  fully  perceived. 
For  50  years  an  increasing  group  of  young  men  has  been  trained  to 
search  for  truth,  relentlessly,  unfalteringly.  As  those  men  passed 
into  the  business  world  they  acquired  the  human  touch,  and  their 
acquaintance  with  that  phase  is  the  one  thing  that  to-day  leads  us  to 
hope  that  these  industrial  problems  left  to  us  from  the  Napoleonic 
wars  will  be  solved  on  a  basis  of  justice,  liberty,  and  fairness  to  rich 
and  poor. 

For  140  years  America  has  "muddled";  muddled  through  success 
fully,  perhaps;  but  nevertheless,  looking  back,  we  can  see  the  terrible 
mistakes  she  has  made,  and  the  terrible  faults.  In  our  wars,  which 
have  been  greatly  prolonged  through  unpreparedness,  we  have  paid  in 
suffering,  in  loss  of  life,  and  in  treasure.  The  world  is  changing  so 
to-day  through  this  imperial  co-ordination,  of  forces  material,  financial, 
intellectual,  political,  imperial,  that  we  have  more  than  ever  to  con- 
sider the  dangers  of  muddling.  When  Secretary  Daniels  appointed  the 
Naval  Consulting  Board  perhaps  he  builded  better  than  he  knew.  That 
Board  has  already  pointed  the  way  to  a  solution  of  many  of  our 
problems.  It  has  risen  to  its  opportunity.  It  has  shown  real  initiative 
of  its  own,  and  to-day  is  making  the  first  start  towards  a  scientific, 
businesslike  co-ordination  of  the  resources  of  this  nation,  and  that  is 
the  very  foundation  of  preparedness. 

Those  of  you  who  have  not  been  in  touch  with  some  of  the  details 
of  progress  in  the  automobile  field  would  probably  find  it  hard  to 
realize  to  what  an  extent  co-operation  and  co-ordination  of  resources  in 
that  field  have  meant  the  success  of  that  industry.     Literally  hun- 

68 


dreds  of  thousands  of  special  parts,  special  designs,  the  pet  thoughts 
and  projects  of  individuals,  have  been  surrendered,  to  a  simpler,  more 
uniform  system,  based  upon  a  give  and  take,  which  is  a  lesson  to  this 
entire  country;  and  vi^ithout  that  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  individuals 
and  that  courageous  co-operation,  the  automobile  industry  could 
scarcely  exist  to-day.  They  have  standardized  and  simplified  as  never 
before  in  this  vi^orld. 

The  same  thoughts  and  methods  are  being  applied  to  standardiza- 
tion for  military  preparedness.  President  Wilson  has  recently  sought 
the  co-operation  of  the  five  leading  scientific  societies  of  the  country, 
their  membership  numbering  about  thirty-eight  thousand.  The  mem- 
bers of  those  societies  are  located  in  practically  every  factory  in  this 
country.  They  are  planning  to  co-operate  in  obtaining  information, 
in  studying  the  problems  of  assistance,  in  seeing  what  is  needed  that 
does  not  exist,  what  use  can  be  made  of  what  does  exist,  to  the  end 
of  adequate  preparedness.  There  is  one  more  step  needed  to  complete 
that  plan.  Many  of  these  technical  men  as  yet  occupy  subordinate 
positions.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  have  a  business  co-operation 
with  the  scientific  men.  Fortunately  many  scientific  men  are  busi- 
ness men,  and  many  business  men  are,  or  are  becoming,  scientific 
men.  But,  in  addition,  we  need  a  distinct  campaign  to  interest  the 
business  men  of  the  country  in  this  move  for  standardization  and 
co-operation  and  self-sacrifice.  There  is  evidence  enough  to-day  to 
promise  that  that  movement  will  spread  speedily  and  successfully. 

Martin  J.  Gilhn  of  Wisconsin  has  for  a  long  time  been  studying 
this  kind  of  co-operation.  H^  has  prepared  plans,  submitted  them  to 
every  member  of  Congress,  and  all  the  leading  officers  in  the  army  and 
navy,  and  almost  unanimous  is  their  approval  of  the  fundamental 
scheme.  That  scheme  involves,  for  instance,  the  appointment  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  of  one  man  from  each  leading  industry 
and  department  of  science  to  iorm  a  legion  of  honor,  those  men  to  be 
assisted  in  turn  by  at  least  five  other  men  from  each  of  the  leading 
industries  and  scientific  departments,  so  that  not  only  every  manu- 
facturing resource,  but  all  the  skill  of  our  experts  on  sanitation,  health, 
medicine,  transportation,  shall  be  assembled  in  this  general  plan,  and 
their  service  practically  available  to  the  officers  of  the  United  States. 

Fortunately,  there  has  already  been  demonstrated,  on  the  part 
of  the  active  army  and  naval  officers,  great  approval  of  a  more  business- 

69 


like  and  more  scientific  administering  of  the  functions  of  their  depart- 
ments. They  have  already  shown  that  they  are  willing  to  set  aside 
any  pride  of  opinion  and  co-operate.  This  is  one  of  the  most  en- 
couraging features  in  our  present  national  movement  for  prepared- 
ness. 

Speaking  of  standardization,  might  it  not  be  feasible,  with  co- 
operation between  the  government  and  private  ship  owners,  to 
standardize  even  the  construction  of  ships,  so  that  their  building  may 
be  more  rapid  and  more  ecenomical  and  their  repair  much  cheaper  and 
more  readily  carried  out.  There  is  ample  evidence  on  the  part  of  busi- 
ness men  and  manufacturers  that  they  are  only  awaiting  their  oppor- 
tunity to  help.  Their  willingness  to  sacrifice  is  well  instanced  by  the 
action  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board  itself.  Those  men,  all  promi- 
nent in  their  respective  line,  all  business  men,  are  freely  contributing 
their  time,  and  on  top  of  that  voting  to  pay  their  own  expenses. 

The  complexity  of  this  national  preparedness  may  be  conveyed  by 
the  statement  that  there  are  not  to-day  enough  tool  makers  in  the 
United  States  to  prepare  in  a  year's  time  the  gauges  required  just 
for  inspection  of  the  ammunition  that  we  would  need  in  the  event  of 
war. 

There  is  another  phase  of  our  national  problem  which  has  not 
been  brought  into  prominence.  There  are  in  this  country  to-day  one 
million  people  dependent  for  the  privilege  of  working  and  getting  their 
daily  bread  upon  the  toleration,  goodwill  and  permission  of  at  least 
three  maritime  nations  stronger  than  ourselves.  There  is  scarcely 
a  pound  of  crude  rubber  produced  within  the  borders  of  the  United 
States,  and  most  of  the  rubber  is  brought  half  way  around  the  world. 
When  Great  Britain  a  little  over  a  year  ago  applied  an  embargo  upon 
the  importation  of  crude  rubber,  what  happened?  Within  a  very  short 
time  almost  fifty  thousand  people  were  out  of  work  in  American  fac- 
tories— and  America  was  at  peace  with  the  world!  Two  or  three 
weeks  more  and  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  people  would  have  been 
out  of  work,  and  a  million  people  dependent  upon  them,  except  for 
charity,  would  have  been  starving — and  America  at  peace! 

The  automobile  industry  admits  its  dependence  upon  the  rubber 
tire.  Therefore,  several  more  millions  of  people,  with  America  at 
peace,  are  dependent  upon  the  permission  of  foreign  nations. 

70 


It  is  commonly  said,  and  generally  believed  by  the  working  man, 
that  out  of  war  the  rich  man  profits;  the  poor  man  pays.  But  here 
is  an  instance  where  even  in  times  of  peace,  and  even  more  so  in 
time  of  war,  the  poor  man,  the  working  man,  the  man  of  the  daily 
wage,  is  the  first  to  pay  the  bill. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  said  about  the  profits  that  we  do  not  want 
our  makers  of  ammunition  and  arms  to  get  in  case  we  provide  pre- 
paredness. If  I  am  not  very  much  mistaken  regarding  the  business 
man  of  today,  the  manufacturer  of  arms  and  munitions  will  be  very 
glad  to  furnish  to  his  country  whatever  it  desires  at  a  very  reasonable 
profit,  a  profit  that  anybody  would  willingly  grant  to  them.  In  order 
to  accomplish  this  it  may  be  necessary  to  standardize  our  cost  systems. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  the  claim  that  America  can  manu- 
facture its  own  battleships  cheaper  than  the  private  ship  yards  can. 
Not  many  years  ago  there  used  to  be  a  great  disparity  in  claims  as 
to  the  cost  of  producing  a  horsepower,  whether  in  the  central  public 
station  or  in  the  power  plant  of  a  factory.  Differences  of  several  hun- 
dred per  cent  were  advertised.  It  was  not  until  engineers  standardized 
the  methods  of  figuring  costs  of  generating  power  that  those  great 
differences  disappeared,  and  to-day  the  costs  of  power  can  be  accurately 
measured  and  compared.  Perhaps  we  need  in  our  Government  a 
standardized  system  of  accounting,  and  perhaps  the  co-operation  of 
business  firms  will  necessitate  the  same  thing  in  private  companies 
also. 

Just  taking  at  random  a  variety  of  examples  more  or  less  known 
to  all  of  you,  consider  from  the  standpoint  of  business  common  sense 
how  we  have  been  muddling  in  every  direction,  without  exception. 
Switzerland  today  spends  $16  per  year  per  man  on  her  army,  and  she 
can  raise  500,000  men  in  a  short  time,  America  spends  $1,100  per 
man  yer  year,  and  she  has  raised  but  90,000  men,  of  whom  only 
one-third  would  be  available  in  any  particular  part  of  the  country.  Ten 
months  ago  Congress  appropriated  funds  for  two  battleships.  Their 
keels  have  not  yet  been  laid.  The  reason  is  just  coming  out,  but  the 
country  has  had  no  chance  to  express  its  opinion  as  to  whether  that 
was  an  adequate  reason  or  not. 

Our  defense  plans  are  carried  on  separately  by  army  and  navy 
boards,  and  to  no  complete  degree  are  those  plans  co-ordinated.    We 

71 


are  to-day  completing  defenses  in  the  Philippine  Islands  which  were 
planned  chiefly  by  the  navy,  and  the  army  opposed  those  plans. 

The  total  national  income  of  the  United  States  is  probably  forty 
billion  dollars  per  year.  Who  would  not  pay  one  per  cent  insurance 
to  have  his  income  insured  at  the  present  time?  Why  should  we 
hesitate  to  spend  four  or  five  hundred  million  dollars  a  year,  if  neces- 
sary, for  national  insurance?  We  are  spending  seven  billion  dollars 
every  year  on  alcohol,  tobacco  and  immorality. 

Although  we  have  talked  for  years  about  having  no  reserve  for 
army  or  navy,  although  our  army  and  navy  have  been  creating  trained 
men  and  honorably  discharging  them  for  years,  the  Government  has 
made  no  systematic  attempt  to  keep  track  of  those  men  until,  the 
American  Legion  began  to  do  what  the  Government  should  have  done 
years  before. 

In  various  departments  of  the  government  we  are  spending  thou- 
sands and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars,  and  making  that  expendi- 
ture inefficient  for  want  of  a  stenographer  here  and  a  clerk  there,  all 
due  to  the  Congressional  system  of  appropriations. 

Some  of  us  know  about  the  extravagance  of  military  expenditures. 

We  do  not  get  what  we  pay  for.  If  we  are  to  compete  with  that 
imperial  co-operation  and  co-ordination  of  Japan  and  Germany,  we 
shall  have  to  eliminate  artificial  barriers  of  all  kinds.  Think  of  the 
inefficiency  for  national  defense  of  our  militia  system!  And  that 
inefficiency  has  existed  for  one  hundred  and  forty  years. 

Think  of  the  losses  the  business  man  suffers  through  the  an- 
tagonistic, differing  state  laws. 

We  shall  have  to  remodel  our  whole  method  of  administration 
if  we  are  to  meet  the  competition  that  is  surely  ahead  of  us.  A  part 
of  this  plan  for  preparedness  includes  a  scientific  tariff  commission, 
and  it  includes  an  item  which  Senator  Aldrich  called  to  the  attention 
of  the  country  several  years  ago.  He  said  that  by  applying  ordinary 
business  sense, -our  federal  government  would  save  $300,000,000  per 
year.  At  the  same  time  Louis  Brandeis  said  that  the  railroads  of 
the  country,  by  using  well  known,  vindicated  efficiency  methods,  could 
save  a  million  dollars  a  day.  This  inefficient  government  has  forced 
the  inefficient  railroads  to  become  efficient.  (Applause.)  It  is  now 
time  that  the  efficient  railroads  and  efficient  business  men  should  force 
the  inefficient  government  to  become  efficient.     (Applause.) 

72 


It  is  almost  an  axiom  that  anything  that  is  really  needed  is  paid 
for;  perhaps  not  by  money;  perhaps  by  suffering;  perhaps  by  losses 
of  various  kinds.  If  we  need  preparedness  we  shall  pay  for  it,  whether 
at  the  rate  of  a  billion  dollars  the  first  year,  or  nothing.  Some  of  us 
may  believe  that  we  would  be  better  off  without  foreign  possessions; 
but  America  and  American  ideals  are  involved  in  those  possessions. 
We  may  be  willing  to  surrender  them  when  our  ideals  are  carried  out, 
but  not  any  true  American  is  willing  to  surrender  them  against  his 
will,  and  before  the  proper  time.     (Applause.) 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  militarism.  Militarism  is  a  state  of 
mind,  and  there  is  one  fact  in  American  history  well  within  the 
memory  of  many  here  tonight,  that  should  shame  anybody  who  claims 
that  this  country  is  likely  to  become  militaristic.  Fifty  years  ago 
this  country  was  the  greatest  military  power  in  the  world,  and  the 
greatest  naval  power,  and  within  ninety  days  a  million  men  went 
gladly  to  their  homes.  We  hear  a  good  deal  about  the  fighting 
nations  becoming  exhausted,  and  we  forget  that  when  the  French 
made  Maxmilian  the  Emperor  of  Mexico,  and  agreed  to  stand  by  him, 
after  our  wofuUy  exhausting  Civil  War,  America  told  the  French  to 
get  out,  and  they  stood  not  on  the  manner  of  their  going.  We  for- 
get, too,  that  during  that  same  Civil  War  the  Conferate  soldier  was 
paid  about  $13  per  month  in  worthless  paper  money,  and  he  con- 
tributed part  of  that  to  carry  out  his  ideals  and  his  faith.  This  coun- 
try needs  the  truth.  It  needs  facts.  Perhaps  these  young  scientific 
men  who  are  awaiting  a  chance  to  sacrifice  and  help  will  assist  us  in 
getting  those  truths  and-  those  facts. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  who  is  responsible  for  our  present 
unpreparedness,  but  the  future  will  say  that  the  real  responsibility 
began  August  1,  1914,  for  then  the  world  was  faced  by  a  condition  and 
not  a  theory. 

We  must  consider  that  those  who  are  prepared  to  gamble  the  very 
future  of  this  nation  upon  a  theory  must  be  listened  to  with  that 
thought  in  mind.  What  an  opportunity  at  the  present  time  for  a  real 
American,  an  American  in  high  executive  oflSce,  to  surround  himself 
with  sacrificing  men,  thorough  men,  thinkers,  and  be  backed  by  the 
whole  American  people,  raising  himself  above  pride  of  opinion  and 
above  party  for  the  safety  of  the  nation  itself.     (Great  applause.) 

73 


The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  next  speech  on  the 
program  is  on  the  Teaching  of  Patriotism  in  Homes  and  Schools.  I 
have  the  honor  to  present  Mrs.  A.  J.  George,  of  Brookline,  Massachu- 
setts, of  the  Special  Aid  Society,  representing  the  Woman's  Branch  of 
the  National  Security  League. 

Mr.  Barry — I  am  asked  to  make  the  announcement,  before  Mrs. 
George  begins,  that  the  letter  from  Mr.  Roosevelt,  which  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  events  it  w^ould  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  Secretary  to  read, 
will  not  be  read  by  him,  but  I  have  the  very  good  fortune  of  being 
able  to  announce  that  it  will  be  read  by  one  who  is  much  better  able 
to  interpret  it  than  L  I  chanced  to  see  in  the  audience  one  very  near 
and  dear  to  Mr.  Roosevelt,  one  who,  having  grown  up  with  him,  know- 
ing his  feelings  and  his  sentiments,  fundamentally,  can  interpret  his 
written  expression  of  them  far  better  than  perhaps  anyone  else,  and 
I  was  successful  in  getting  Mr.  Roosevelt's  sister,  Mrs.  Douglas  Robin- 
son, to  consent  to  read  the  letter.  She  will  follow  Mrs.  George,  and  1 
wanted  to  let  you  know  that  before  we  went  further  in  the  program. 
Pardon  my  interruption,  Mrs.  George. 

THE  TEACHING  OF  PATRIOTISM  IN  HOME  AND  SCHOOL 
Mrs.  A.  J.  George,  Brookline,  Mass. 

Mrs.  George — The  events  of  the  past  eighteen  months  demand  a 
restatement  of  the  values  of  life.  We  had  drifted  along  on  the  current 
of  prosperity,  a  young  and  successful  nation.  We  had  accepted  the  en- 
joyment of  liberty  and  the  fruits  of  peace  as  we  accept  air  and  sun- 
shine. We  had  forgotten  at  what  price  they  were  bought  and  that  only 
by  zealous  watchfulness  could  they  be  maintained.  We  had  learned  no 
lessons  from  history,  as  if  no  dangers  had  been  sounded  between  the 
signing  of  the  Mayflower  Compact  and  the  adoption  of  the  Seventeenth 
Amendment.  Suddenly  this  complacent  confidence  is  agitated.  We 
gravely  ask  ourselves  if  we  have  a  reasonable  hope  of  security,  are  we 
prepared  to  defend  our  liberties,  prepared  to  preserve  order? 

Have  we  as  a  nation  such  a  devotion  to  the  ideals  on  which  our 
institutions  were  built  that  we  count  life  itself  as  a  trust  to  be  surren- 
dered, if  need  be,  for  the  maintenance  of  those  ideals?  Any  appeal 
for  preparedness  is  vain  unless  the  appeal  be  directed  to  a  people  fired 
with  patriotism. 

74 


Patriotism  had  been  extolled  from  public  platforms  for  political 
purposes,  but  there  was  no  national  patriotism.  While  we  were  yet 
bewildered  by  the  swift  horrors  of  the  European  conflict,  a  silly  song 
suddenly  brought  us  to  the  realization  that  there  was  a  cult  of  cowardice 
in  the  land — a  cult  which  had  a  large  following.  What  had  the  mothers 
in  this  country  of  ours  been  doing  that  it  was  possible  for  them  to 
swell  the  chorus  of  "I  Didn't  Raise  My  Boy  to  Be  a  Soldier"  ?  That  it 
was  possible  for  their  sons  and  daughters  to  organize  anti-enlistment 
leagues  and  other  societies  with  like  seditious  intent?  Had  political 
expediency  taken  the  place  of  patriotic  endeavor?  What  had  been  the 
examples  in  our  homes,  where  were  the  precepts  of  our  elaborate  school 
system,  that  such  results  had  come  to  menace  our  national  existence  ? 

Napoleon  was  right  when  he  demanded  "Give  me  the  mothers!" 
for  the  nation  which  has  ceased  to  be  home-loving  can  not  produce 
patriots.  The  American  woman  has  gone  far  afleld,  often  with  most 
earnest  purpose  it  must  be  acknowledged,  but  she  is  now  facing  dis- 
aster because  of  her  neglect  to  train  her  sons  and  daughters  to  love 
home  above  all  else,  save  honor.  Will  she  wrest  victory  from  this  im- 
pending disaster? 

Love  of  country  is  the  love  of  family  on  a  larger  and  more 
altruistic  scale. 

Patriotism  is  built  up  from  a  foundation  of  the  love  of  the  roof- 
tree,  the  devotion  to  the  institution  of  the  home  and  of  family  life,  and 
the  devoted  purpose  to  defend  that  home  and  that  family.  As  these 
various  units  have  combined  to  form  the  State  and  Nation,  the  field  of 
operations  has  widened,  but  the  base  is  the  individual  family  group 
consecrated  to  the  love  of  man  and  woman  and  the  child  life  for  which 
that  home  exists.  In  that  home  is  the  nursery  of  the  citizen.  Nothing 
which  school  or  church  or  State  can  do  will  quite  make  up  for  the  lack 
in  the  home.  "The  true  test  of  civilization,"  Emerson  told  us  long  ago, 
"is  not  in  the  census,  nor  in  the  size  of  the  cities,  nor  in  the  crops,  but 
in  the  kind  of  men  that  the  country  turns  out."  The  woman  who  has 
taught  her  sons  and  daughters  to  love  liberty,  to  reverence  authority, 
to  obey  the  law,  and  to  help  in  the  betterment  of  mankind  has  rendered 
her  highest  patriotic  service. 

Such  service  has  been  rendered  by  the  mothers  of  France — the 
whole  nation,  men  and  women  alike,  are  today  putting  into  execution 
the  lessons  learned  in  family  life.    For  the  family  spirit  is  the  most 

75 


spontaneous  of  all  instincts  in  France.  The  united  and  permanent  little 
societies  found  in  the  family  units  are  the  foundation  of  society  and 
the  symbol  of  government.  Read  the  early  life  of  Pasteur  as  an 
illustration  of  this  training  for  citizenship,  and  you  no  longer  marvel 
at,  but  pay  the  deeper  tribute  to,  a  nation  defending  as  one  man  the 
liberties  under  the  enjoyment  of  which  family  life  has  been  able  to 
contribute  its  highest  offering  to  the  state. 

We  have  been  prone  in  this  country  to  trust  too  much  to  institu- 
tional work — to  believe  that  the  boy  or  girl  could  be  sent  into  the 
school,  go  through  a  stated  process  and  come  out  a  finished  product, 
bound  in  black  broadcloth  or  white  muslin,  as  the  case  might  be.  Our 
institutions  have  made  excellent  returns,  but  no  community  can  rise 
above  the  average  of  its  individual  homes  in  intelligence,  courage, 
industry,  thrift,  patriotism,  or  any  other  personal  or  civic  virtue.  So 
this  paper  treats  the  subject  of  the  Teaching  of  Patriotism  in  Home 
and  School  as  one  process,  qualified  in  its  results  by  the  ideals  of 
patriotic  service  upheld  within  the  average  home. 

When  Franklin  declared  that  our  form  of  government  was  "A  good 
government  for  good  people,"  I  suppose  he  meant  that  the  distribution 
of  sovereignty  among  the  people  was  powerful  to  advance  the  general 
welfare  only  as  the  people  themselves  were  qualified  to  exercise  that 
sovereignty.  Education  must  be  coextensive  with  sovereignty,  if  our 
great  adventure  of  democracy  is  to  be  successful.  This  education  must 
develop  the  citizen  to  his  highest  efficiency  physically,  mentally  and 
morally,  for  self-government  is  a  form  of  character,  not  of  power.  The 
ideals  of  self-discipline,  of  self-mastery  and  direction,  of  heroic 
fidelity  to  the  principles  of  independence,  must  be  followed 
with  passionate  enthusiasm  if  our  form  of  government  is  to  produce 
the  "good"  people  by  whom  Franklin  meant  a  people  disciplined  in 
self-control  and  able  through  physical  capacity  and  moral  integrity  to 
assume  their  responsible  share  in  building  an  efficient  democracy  on  a 
basis  of  widely  distributed  sovereignty. 

The  boys  of  our  country  have  too  often  been  taught  that  if  they 
would  do  this  or  that  thing  they  might  grow  up  to  be  President.  The 
logical  result  of  such  teaching  is  the  notion  that  the  country  owes  a 
reward  to  its  citizens  for  good  behavior,  as  if  the  good  citizens  were 
in  a  position  to  demand  some  order  of  merit  for  services  rendered. 
This  teaching  has  lead  to  graft,  to  a  wholly  false  conception  of  the 

76 


duty  and  obligation  which  rests  upon  each  and  every  citizen.  True 
teaching  in  regard  to  this  duty  and  obligation  of  our  boys,  and  of  our 
girls  too  for  that  matter,  will  more  and  more  develop  the  conviction 
that  the  common  life  of  all  is  infinitely  more  precious  than  the  in- 
dividual life  of  any  one  member,  and  that  for  the  sake  of  that  common 
life  one  is  called  upon  to  give  one's  best,  not  for  any  gain  or  reward 
there  is  for  one's  self  in  the  action,  but  for  the  sake  of  that  service 
which  is  the  very  heart  of  sound  patriotism. 

Love  for  one's  country  is  not  blind !  It  is  alert  to  detect  weakness, 
quick  to  remedy  defects,  zealous  to  strengthen  weak  places,  and  to 
perfect  the  strongest  possible  organization  for  defense  in  men  and 
material.  This  patriotism  sets  up  one  single  standard  of  action — "is 
this  act  of  mine  the  act  of  a  good  citizen  of  the  United  States?"  A 
simple  test,  but  one  which  entails  endless  sacrifice  and  which  inevitably 
substitutes  patriotic  service  for  personal  or  political  expediency.  There 
is  no  detail  too  trifling  to  be  built  into  this  wall  of  security  which  shall 
defend  our  liberties. 

One  of  the  first  conditions  our  women  recognize  is  that  the  organ- 
ization of  a  powerful  national  defense  on  a  democratic  basis  is  a  ques- 
tion which  concerns  every  citizen. 

What  kind  of  armament  the  country  requires,  how  much,  what 
will  be  the  cost,  how  to  raise  the  money — these  are  questions  for  high 
authorities.  But  our  women  are  aroused  to  the  need  of  defensive 
preparation,  and  insistent  with  the  demand  that  this  need  shall  be  met. 
The  advocate  of  peace  who  lately  assured  a  committee  of  Congress 
that  no  enemy  could  take  us  unawares  because,  forsooth,  wireless 
would  give  us  two  weeks'  notice  of  the  advance  of  the  foe,  did  not 
speak  for  these  women.  In  passing,  one  may  query  if  this  "two 
weeks"  was  a  generous  allowance  of  time  in  which  to  run.  Running 
would  be  the  only  possibility  left,  and  running  is  not  defense,  and  more 
than  rhetoric  is  patriotism.  The  mothers  of  our  land  demand  that 
their  sons  shall  not  be  massacred  in  the  first  line  of  defense,  a  needless 
sacrifice  under  our  existing  military  system,  should  they  be  sent  as 
volunteers  against  trained  soldiers.  They  demand  adequate  training, 
proper  officers,  suitable  equipment  for  the  sons  they  have  trained  in 
the  faith  that  death  is  not  the  worst  thing ;  that  in  moral  issues  there 
can  be  no  neutrality,  and  that  those  whose  moral  sensibilities  are 
blunted  by  "increase  of  goods"  are  to  be  rejected  as  was  the  church  of 

77 


the  Laodiceans,  because  they  are  "lukewarm  and  neither  cold  nor  hot." 

Faulty  education  has  developed  a  cult  of  vain  babbling  and  fur- 
nished audiences  to  a  hundred  dupes  who  prate  of  peace  and  reckon 
national  honor  in  terms  of  a  fancied  security  or  a  present  political 
gain — somehow  this  mischief-making  must  be  reduced  to  a  minimum 
while  the  campaign  of  education  goes  on. 

While  it  is. not  within  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  enter  into  any 
carefully  prepared  details  such  as  would  be  proper  to  lay  before  an 
executive  body,  there  are  a  few  suggestions  in  the  interpretation  of 
these  ideals  of  patriotism  in  practical  ways  which  may  not  be  out 
of  place. 

Any  scheme  for  preparedness  must  include  military  preparedness, 
economic  preparedness,  and  what  we  may  term  broadly  as  moral  pre- 
paredness. Beneath  all  these,  as  a  sub-structure,  is  that  public  opinion 
without  which  all  attempt  to  make  legislation  responsive  to  real 
public  need  is  in  vain. 

A  true  sense  of  patriotism  can  be  aroused  in  the  minds  of  the 
young  by  their  being  trained  to  perform  certain  acts  which  may  be 
helpful  to  their  country  and  which  shall  call  for  a  positive  sacrifice  of 
time  and  effort.  The  belief  must  be  established  that  on  them  rests  a 
share  in  the  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  the  country,  and  with  in 
creased  knowledge  they  must  recognize  their  obligations  toward  the 
protective  powers  placed  by  law  in  the  governing  bodies  of  the  nation. 

There  must  be  something  more  than  mere  lip  service — the  singing 
of  patriotic  songs,  the  saluting  of  the  flag — to  establish  a  habit  of 
thought  and  a  readiness  for  action.  I  well  remember  a  Sunday  at 
gray  old  St.  Giles.  The  troops  had  swung  into  the  church  to  the 
droning  of  bag-pipes;  they  had  sung  the  national  anthem  most  vigor- 
ously, but  at  the  end  of  the  sermon  the  minister  admonished  these 
lads  that  thej'^  need  not  think  they  were  loyal  men  because  they  shouted 
"God  Save  the  Queen"  and  made  a  brave  sight  on  Sundays.  They 
must  do  all  this,  but  in  addition  they  must  behave  decorously  in  church 
and  keep  out  of  the  guard-house  on  Saturday  night.  So  we  must 
journey  beyond  the  gold  lace  and  glory,  the  Fourth-of-July  interpreta- 
tion of  patriotism.  There  must  be  a  sense  of  personal  responsibility 
for  loyal  citizenship.  There  must  be  actual  training,  which  shall  be 
fruitful  in  the  hour  of  our  country's  need.  The  impulse  to  serve  must 
be  re-inforced  by  a  thorough  schooling  which  shall  train  mind  and 

78 


body  to  habit  which  work  with  the  precision  of  reflex  action  when 
the  real  need  is  at  hand. 

A  full  plan  of  preparedness  (and  your  true  patriot  is  the  prepared 
man)  a  full  plan,  so  far  as  it  may  apply  to  the  young  should  include: 

1.  Athletic  exercises  of  a  military  character. 

2.  Training  by  drill  in  simple  military  exercises. 

3.  The  exact  and  truthful  history  of  our  failures  in  preparedness 
as  exemplified  in  war,  and  the  dreadful  cost  to  the  country  due  to  our 
thoughtlessness  in  this  respect. 

In  the  higher  schools  this  program  should  be  extended  and  young 
men  taught: 

1.  The  use  of  military  arms. 

2.  The  practical  drill  with  weapons. 

3.  Target  practice. 

4.  During  the  long  vacation,  camp  life  with  teaching  of  camp 
sanitation,  simple  map  reading,  care  of  the  body,  field  cooking  and 
such  exercises  as  are  now  conducted  by  Boy  Scouts  in  the  training  of 
exact  observation,  obedience,  and  self-reliance. 

The  young  women  should  be  taught,  among  other  subjects: 

1.  Military  calisthenics  and  marching. 

2.  First  aid. 

3.  Hygiene. 

4.  Nursing. 

5.  Conservation  and  preparation  of  food  supplies. 

All  this  and  other  elements  in  the  scheme  of  preparedness  should 
be  under  the  control  of  the  Federal  Government.  A  body  of  trained 
military  instructors  should  be  created,  drawn  from  discharged  soldiers 
of  the  regular  army  or  from  properly  constituted  reserves  of  the  reg- 
ular army,  and  from  the  militia. 

Any  plan  for  military  preparedness  should  be  the  work  of  men 
trained  in  the  military  profession.  Any  other  method  of  developing 
such  a  scheme  must  end  in  failure  and  lack  of  efficiency.  Congress 
must  be  taught  to  take  advice  from  the  experts  of  the  country  and  to 
this  end  a  political  campaign  with  an  issue  based  wholly  on  the  needs 
of  preparedness  might  end  these  long  years  of  military  disgrace  and 
awful  sacrifice. 

79 


Military  athletics  should  be  conducted  always  under  the  control 
of  a  competent  instructor.  It  is  a  pitiful  sight  to  see  our  children  at 
their  recess  amusements.  Only  a  small  percentage  are  actually  taking 
part  in  physical  exercise  in  any  form  and  that  of  a  kind  to  provoke 
the  least  exertion.  Most  of  them  are  lolling  about  with  shoulders 
hunched  and  twisted  bodies,  acquiring  early  habits  of  physical  laziness 
and  reluctance  to  bodily  exercise.  Military  athletics  will  give  not  only 
needful  exercise  of  the  muscles,  but  erectness  of  form,  alertness  of 
body  and  mind  and  an  understanding  of  obedience  and  self-control. 

One  who  has  watched  school  children  in  Tokyo  writes  that  these 
were  organized  into  squads,  the  smaller  ones  for  exercise  and  march- 
ing, the  older  for  training  in  tiny  arms  and  manoeuvering.  The  girls 
did  calisthenics  and  marching  and  went  through  exercises  which  it 
was  a  joy  to  witness.  They  were  all  so  intent  and  earnest  and  eacli 
face  bore  the  aspect  of  one  who  believed  he  was  doing  something  for 
the  glory  of  Nippon. 

The  military  drill  carries  on  the  lessons  learned  in  the  calisthenics 
and  helps  to  fix  the  proper  conception  of  patriotic  duty  and  the  share 
each  individual  has  in  the  broad  scheme  of  citizenship  responsibility. 

The  military  history  of  our  country  should  be  attacked  boldly  and 
fearlessly  on  the  basis  that  in  the  past  our  achievements  in  this  respect 
have  been  as  bad  as  they  possibly  could  be  and  were  lessons  for  which 
future  preparedness  was  the  only  solution. 

Children  should  be  taught  that  even  when  our  country  was  striving 
for  independence,  there  was  a  woeful  lack  of  public  spirit.  Men  would 
not  enlist  without  inducements  of  many  sorts,  including  bounties ;  and 
many  deserted  the  colors  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  It  should  be  shown 
that  the  whole  scheme  of  volunteers  and  militia  broke  down  utterly  in 
the  midst  of  a  war  for  the  establishment  of  this  country,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  in  those  days  the  youth  of  the  Colonies  were  far  better 
prepared  in  the  use  of  arms  than  are  those  of  today.  Campaign  after 
campaign  resulted  in  disaster.  The  final  successful  outcome  was  largely 
the  result  of  the  friendly  assistance  of  a  foreign  power. 

Have  we  forgotten  our  indebtedness  to  Lafayette  and  Rocham- 
beau?  Are  we  unmindful  of  the  debt  of  "the  embattled  farmers"  to 
Von  Steuben,  memorialized  in  the  inscription  on  his  statue,  "He 
gave  military  training  and  discipline  to  the  citizen  soldiers,  who 
achieved  the  Independence  of  the  United  States"? 

80 


The  lessons  of  this  war  made  no  impression  on  the  civilian  mind. 
The  war  of  1812  found  us  with  no  system  of  preparedness,  with  no 
conception  of  a  proper  military  policy.  Again  recourse  was  had  to 
t^olunteers,  and  patriotism  was  not  a  sufficient  motive  to  create  large 
armies.  Patriots  had  to  be  paid  double  and  triple  bounties  to  join  the 
colors  and  a  comparatively  satisfying  peace  was  made  possible  only  by 
the  semi-piratic&l  operations  of  an  improvised  navy. 

The  lessons  of  this  war,  profound  and  humiliating  as  they  were, 
made  no  impression  on  the  civilian  mind.  Nothing  was  done  to  prepare 
the  country  for  future  conflicts,  a  military  policy  was  undreamed  of  by 
Congress,  and  in  the  meantime  as  our  urban  population  grew,  the 
actual  familiarity  with  arms  characteristic  of  our  colonists,  corre- 
spondingly decreased. 

The  Civil  War  found  our  people  untrained  in  the  simplest  of  mili- 
tary exercises,  without  trained  officers  for  a  large  army  and  even  with 
no  laws  on  the  statute  books  able  to  create  a  real  fighting  force.  In 
consequence,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives  were  needlessly  sacrificed 
and  the  war  debt  has  been  steadily  paid  by  two  generations  since,  the 
close  of  this  bloody  struggle. 

Children  should  be  taught  that  military  preparedness  means  the 
saving  of  lives,  of  property,  of  immense  treasure  and  a  due  regard 
for  the  progress  and  prosperity  of  those  who  are  to  come  after  them  in 
future  generations. 

Now,  what  are  we  going  to  do  about  it?  In  times  of  calamity,  in 
times  of  stress  and  strain,  our  women  have  responded  wonderfully  to 
the  needs  of  the  hour.  Existing  organizations  in  which  women  are 
associated  will  co-operate  in  this  campaign  for  good  citizenship.  The 
American  Red  Cross,  the  National  Civic  Federation,  this  National 
Security  League,  will  contribute  their  resources  and  experience. 

I  am  an  optimist,  and  I  believe  this  is  a  Congress  which  will  not 
stop  at  phase-making.  The  day  is  counted  lost  here  in  Washington 
whose  low-descending  sun  does  not  go  down  on  some  sort  of  congress 
or  convention;  but  I  am  hoping  that  from  this  assembly  we  will  take 
to  our  homes,  that  we  will  take  to  our  social  circles  for  subject  of 
conversation  and  discussion,  the  idea  of  preparedness;  the  conviction 
that  we  must  be  prepared  in  a  military  way  (and  this,  of  course, 
includes  both  branches  of  the  service),  in  an  economic  and  in  a 
moral  way.    Military  provisions  are  a  question  for  experts  to  under- 

81 


take  and  to  carry  through;  economic  preparedness  includes  frugality 
and  thrift  on  the  part  of  all  men  and  women,  and  moral  preparedness 
finds  one  ready  to  make  the  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  country's  good. 
I  believe  the  members  of  this  Congress  mean  to  go  into  the  various 
cities  and  tovi^ns  and  homes  represented  here  and  teach  the  duty 
of  patriotic  service  which  can  be  interpreted  only  in  these  three  forms 
of  preparedness. 

Others,  I  doubt  not,  if  not  we, 
The  issue  of  our  toils  shall  see; 
Young  children  gather  as  their  own 
The  harvest  that  the  dead  had  sown, 
The  dead  forgotten  and  unknown. 
(Great  applause,  the  audience  rising.) 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  you  will  now  hear  a  letter 
from  a  man  whom  none  of  us  have  ever  heard  of,  T.  R.  (Laughter 
and  applause.)  It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  present  Mrs.  Douglas 
Robinson,  who  has  kindly  consented  to  read  the  letter.     (Applause.) 

Mrs.  Robinson — I  think  after  Mrs.  George  it  is  very  difficult  for 
any  woman,  or  certainly  for  any  man,  to  speak,  and  I  feel  very,  very 
modest  about  even  speaking  vicariously,  after  Mrs.  George.  (Ap- 
plause.) At  the  same  time,  it  is  a  very  great  pleasure  to  me  to  speak 
vicariously  in  this  Congress. 

From  its  inception,  almost,  I  thought  it  was  one  of  the  things  that 
should  be  done  in  America  to  co-ordinate  into  some  form  of  effort  for 
national  security ;  and  this  we  owe  very  largely,  and  I  would  like  to  say 
so  to  Mr.  Stanwood  Menken  and  Mr.  Herbert  Barry.  (Applause.)  A 
great  many  of  us,  looking  at  the  audience,  are  almost  as  old  as  I  am, 
and  therefore  probably  have  read  Nicholas  Nickleby,  and  whenever  I 
think  about  preparedness  and  national  security  I  go  back  in  my  mind 
to  old  Squeers  at  Dotheboy's  Hall,  and  how  he  used  to  make  them  spell 
"window";  and  they  spelled  it  "winder,"  and  he  would  say,  "Go  and 
wash  it."  (Laughter.)  And  I  think  when  we  respond  to  Mr.  Robert 
Bacon's  splendid  address,  as  we  all  did  respond,  it  was  because  Mr. 
Bacon  had  washed  his  window  so  thoroughly  during  the  past  years. 

And  when,  in  the  same  way,  this  afternoon  every  heart  was  full 
when  Miss  Maude  Wetmore  read  that  beautiful  paper  of  Mrs,  Lindon 

82 


Bates,  we  felt  as  we  felt  because  Mrs.  Lindon  Bates  had  yielded  up 
something-  very,  very  dear  to  her  heart  largely  because  there  was  no 
adequate  preparedness  in  the  American  people,  or  the  Lusitania  trag- 
edy would  never  have  occurred.  (Applause.)  In  spite  of  that  tragedy 
Mrs.  Lindon  Bates  did  not  approve  of  the  song,  "I  Didn't  Raise  My 
Boy  to  Be  a  Soldier,"  and  therefore  when  I  read  you  this  letter,  the 
letter  of  my  brother.  Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt  (applause,  shouts  and 
cheers),  I  ask  you  all  to  remember,  no  matter  what  your  political 
affiliations,  no  matter  how  you  may  have  disagreed  with  him  in  the 
past  or  agreed  with  him  in  the  past  on  any  subject — all  I  ask  you  to 
remember  as  I  read  his  letter  is — that  it  is  the  letter  of  a  man  who 
has  trained  his  boys  to  be  soldiers,  and  who  expresses  a  strong  con- 
viction in  every  word  of  the  letter,  a  conviction  for  which  he  would 
gladly  lay  down  his  life.  (Applause.) 
(Reading.) 

LETTER  FROM  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT. 

"Gentlemen  : 

"I  wish  it  were  possible  for  me  to  be  present  to  speak  at  your 
meeting.  As  that  is  not  possible,  I  send  you  this  line  of  hearty  greet- 
ing and  good  will. 

"It  seems  to  me  there  are  two  matters  which  every  good  American 
citizen  should  now  get  clearly  before  his  mind  as  regards  national 
defense. 

"The  first  of  these  matters  is  not  to  mistake  names  for  facts. 
Peace  is  not  a  question  of  names.  It  is  a  question  of  facts.  If  murders 
occur  in  a  city,  and  if  the  police  force  is  so  incompetent  that  no  record 
is  made  of  them  officially,  that  does  not  interfere  with  the  fact  that 
murders  have  been  committed  and  that  life  is  unsafe.  In  just  the  same 
way,  if  lives  are  taken  by  violence  between  nations,  it  is  not  of  the 
slightest  consequence  whether  those  responsible  for  the  government 
of  the  nation  whose  citizens  have  lost  their  lives  do  or  do  not  assert 
that  the  nation  is  at  peace.  During  the  last  three  years  we  have  been 
technically  at  peace.  But  during  those  three  years  more  of  our  citizens 
have  been  killed  by  Mexicans,  Germans,  Austrains  and  Haitians  than 
were  killed  during  the  entire  Spanish  War.  It  is  true  that  the  Ameri- 
can citizens  killed  during  the  past  three  years  have  been  mostly  non- 
83 


combatants,  including  women  and  children,  although  many  men  wear- 
ing the  national  uniform  have  also  been  killed,  some  of  them  on 
American  soil.  But  the  fact  that  women  and  children  are  killed  in- 
stead of  full-grown  men  in  uniform  surely  increases  instead  of  dimin- 
ishes the  horror. 

"We  have  had  a  great  many  more  citizens  killed  during  this  time 
of  alleged  peace,  and  thanks  to  the  activities  of  the  emissaries  of  for- 
eign governments  with  the  torch  and  the  bomb  on  our  own  soil,  we 
have  had  much  more  American  property  destroyed,  than  was  the  case 
during  the  open  war  with  Spain ;  and  whereas  no  benefit  whatever  has 
come  from  this  loss  of  life  and  destruction  of  property  during  the  last 
three  years,  the  short  war  with  Spain  brought  incalculable  benefits  to 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines,  not  to  speak  of  ourselves.  On  Feb- 
ruary 12  it  will  be  a  year  since  the  time  when  we  notified  Germany  that 
in  case  any  of  our  citizens  were  killed,  we  would  hold  her  to  a  strict 
accountability;  and  during  these  eleven  months  the  passenger  ships 
sunk  by  German  or  Austrian  submarines  in  defiance  of  our  warning 
have  included  among  others  the  Falaba,  Lusitania,  Arabic,  Hesperian, 
Ancona,  Yasaka,  Ville  de  la  Ciotat  and  Persian.  They  were  British, 
Italian,  Japanese  and  French.  Many  hundreds  of  Americans  were 
among  the  passengers  and  a  couple  of  hundred  of  these,  including  many 
women  and  children,  were  killed.  The  total  deaths  on  these  ships  since 
March  last  amount  to  between  2,000  and  2,100. 

"The  campaign  against  them  has  been  a  campaign  of  sheer  mur- 
der, on  a  vaster  scale  than  any  indulged  in  in  a  like  time  by  any  of  the 
old-time  pirates  of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Spanish  Main.  Now. 
the  total  number  of  lives  of  non-combatants,  including  many  hundreds 
of  women  and  children,  thus  taken  exceeds  many  times  over  the  aggre- 
gate in  all  the  sea-fights  of  the  War  of  1812  both  on  the  American  and 
on  the  British  side.  It  is  over  double  the  number  of  lives  lost  by  the 
British  sailors  in  Nelson's  three  great  victories  at  the  Battle  of  Trafal- 
gar, at  the  Battle  of  the  Nile  and  the  Battle  of  the  Baltic  combined. 
It  much  exceeds  the  total  number  of  lives  lost  in  the  Union  navy — and 
indeed  in  the  Union  and  Confederate  navies  combined — during  the 
Civil  War.  That  is,  this  nation  has  been  'peaceful'  during  the  past 
year,  while  peaceful  ships  on  which  its  citizens  were  sailing  lost  a 
larger  number  of  lives  than  we  lost  at  sea  in  the  entire  War  of  1812  and 
than  we  inflicted  at  sea  in  the  War  of  1812,  a  much  greater  loss  than 

84 


Farragut's  fleet  suffered  in  the  aggregate  in  all  its  victories,  a  greater 
loss  than  Nelson's  fleets  suffered  in  his  three  great  victories. 

"If  any  individual  finds  satisfaction  in  saying  that  nevertheless 
this  was  'peace'  and  not  'war,'  it  is  hardly  worth  while  arguing  with 
him;  for  he  dwells  in  a  land  of  sham  and  of  make-believe.  Of  course, 
incidentally,  we  have  earned  contempt  and  derision  by  our  conduct  in 
connection  with  the  hundreds  of  Americans  thus  killed  in  time  of 
peace  without  action  on  our  part.  The  United  States  Senator,  or  Gov- 
ernor of  a  State,  or  other  public  representative,  who  takes  the  position 
that  our  citizens  should  not,  in  accordance  with  their  lawful  rights, 
travel  on  such  ships,  and  that  we  need  not  take  action  about  their 
deaths,  occupies  a  position  precisely  and  exactly  as  base  and  as  cow- 
ardly (and  I  use  those  words  with  scientific  precision)  as  if  his  wife's 
face  was  slapped  on  the  public  streets  and  the  only  action  he  took  was 
to  tell  her  to  stay  in  the  house. 

"Every  man  who  is  both  intelligent  and  patriotic  must  therefore 
advocate  preparedness,  thorough-going  and  adequate,  and  therefore  the 
willingness  to  incur  the  necessary  expense  for  financing  preparedness. 

"Nearly  eighteen  months  have  gone  by  since  with  the  outbreak  of 
this  war  it  became  evident  to  every  man  willing  to  face  the  facts,  that 
military  and  naval  problems  and  international  problems  of  every  kind 
were  infinitely  more  serious  than  we  had  had  reason  to  believe,  that 
treaties  were  absolutely  worthies  to  protect  any  nation  unless  backed 
by  armed  force,  and  that  the  need  of  preparedness  was  infinitely  more 
urgent  than  any  man  in  this  country  had  up  to  that  time  believed.  The 
belief  that  public  opinion  or  international  public  opinion,  unbacked  by 
force,  had  the  slightest  effect  in  restraining  a  powerful  military  nation 
in  any  course  of  action  it  chose  to  undertake  was  shown  to  be  a  pathetic 
fallacy.  But  any  man  who  still  publicly  adheres  to  and  defends  that 
opinion  at  the  present  time  is  engaged  in  propagating  not  a  pathetic, 
but  an  absolutely  mischievous  and  unpatriotic,  fallacy.  It  is  the  sim- 
ple and  literal  truth  that  public  opinion  during  the  last  eighteen  months 
has  not  had  the  very  smallest  effect  in  mitigating  any  atrocities  or 
preventing  any  wrongdoing  by  aggressive  military  powers,  save  to  the 
exact  degree  that  there  was  behind  the  public  opinion  actual  strength 
which  would  be  used  if  the  provocation  was  sufficiently  great.  Public 
opinion  has  been  absolutely  useless  as  regards  Belgium,  as  regards 

85 


Armenia,  as  regards  Poland.  No  man  can  assert  the  contrary  with 
sincerity  if  he  takes  the  trouble  to  examine  the  facts. 

"It  remains  therefore  for  us  to  prepare  in  adequate  fashion.  I 
commend  to  you  very  strongly  the  speeches  and  statements  of  Con- 
gressman Augustus  P.  Gardner  on  this  subject. 

"For  eighteen  months,  with  this  world-cyclone  before  our  eyes, 
we  as  a  nation,  have  sat  supine  without  preparing  in  any  shape  or 
way.  It  is  an  actual  fact  that  there  has  not  been  one  soldier,  one  rifle, 
one  gun,  one  boat,  added  to  the  American  Army  or  Navy  so  far,  be- 
cause of  anything  that  has  occurred  in  this  war,  and  not  the  slightest 
step  has  yet  been  taken  looking  toward  the  necessary  preparedness. 
Such  national  shortsightedness,  such  national  folly,  is  almost  incon- 
ceivable. We  have  had  ample  warning  to  organize  a  scheme  of  de- 
fense. We  have  absolutely  disregarded  the  warning,  and  the  measures 
so  far  officially  advocated  are  at  best  measures  of  half-preparedness, 
and  as  regards  the  large  aspect  of  the  question,  are  not  even  that. 

"We  should  consider  our  national  military  policy  as  a  whole.  We 
must  prepare  a  well  thought  out  strategic  scheme,  planned  from  the 
standpoint  of  our  lasting  national  interests,  and  steadily  pursued  by 
preparation  and  the  study  of  experts,  through  a  course  of  years.  The 
navy  is  our  first  line  of  defense,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  can 
be  used  wisely  for  defense  only  as  an  offensive  arm.  Parrying  is  never 
successful  from  the  standpoint  of  defense.  The  attack  is  the  proper 
method  of  efficient  defense.  For  some  years  we  have  been  using  the 
Navy  internationally  as  a  bluff  defensive  force,  or  rather  asserting  that 
it  would  be  so  used  and  could  be  so  used.  Its  real  value  is  as  an  offen- 
sive force  in  the  interest  of  any  war  undertaken  for  our  own  defense. 
Freedom  of  action  by  the  fleet  is  the  secret  of  real  naval  power.  This 
can  not  be  attained  until  we  have  at  our  disposal  an  effective  military 
establishment  which  would  enable  us  when  threatened  to  repel  any 
force  disembarking  on  our  coast.  This  is  fundamental.  It  is  only  by 
'treating  a  sufficient  army  that  we  can  employ  our  fleet  on  its  legitimate 
functions.  The  schemes  of  the  Navy  must  always  be  correlated  with 
the  plans  of  the  Army,  and  both  of  them  with  the  plans  of  the  State 
Department,  which  should  never  under  any  circumstances  undertake 
any  scheme  of  foreign  policy  without  considering  what  our  military 
situation  is  and  may  be  made. 

"For  reasons  I  have  given  elsewhere  I  believe  that  we  should  base 

86 


our  military  and  naval  program  upon  the  retention  and  defense  of 
Alaska,  Hawaii,  the  Panama  Canal  and  all  its  approaches,  including  all 
the  points  of  South  American  soil  north  of  the  Equator,  and  of  course, 
including  the  defense  of  our  own  coasts  and  the  islands  of  the  West 
Indies.  To  free  the  Navy  we  need  ample  coast  defenses  manned  by  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  and  a  mobile  regular  army  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men.  As  regards  the  Navy,  I  call  your  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  statement  in  the  President's  Message  as  to  what  the  pres- 
ent naval  program  will  produce  is  not  borne  out  by  the  statements  of 
the  General  Board  of  the  Navy.  For  example,  the  President  says  that 
when  this  program  is  finished  we  will  have  twenty-five  efi"ective  battle- 
ships for  the  second  line  of  defense.  The  General  Board,  on  the  con- 
trary, shows  that  we  will  have  but  thirteen  and  that  the  other  twelve 
are  fit  only  for  harbor  defense  or  as  a  third  line.  In  other  words,  they 
are  not  efficient  second-line  ships.  They  are  not  second-line  ships  at  all. 
"The  proposed  program  is  a  paper  program.  It  is  entirely  inade- 
quate to  our  needs.  It  is  a  proposal  not  to  do  something  effective  im- 
mediately, but  to  do  something  entirely  ineffective  immediately,  and  to 
trust  that  the  lack  will  be  made  good  in  succeeding  years.  Congress 
has  never  been  willing  to  carry  out  the  plans  advocated  by  the  General 
Board.  Until  1911,  however,  the  difference  between  what  was  needed 
and  what  was  actually  appropriated  for,  although  real,  was  not  ap- 
pallingly great.  At  the  very  time,  however,  when  the  extraordinary 
developments  of  navies  abroad  rendered  it  imperative  that  we  should 
enlarge  our  own  program  and  treat  it  far  more  seriously  than  ever  be- 
fore. Congress  stopped  entirely  the  proper  upbuilding  of  the  Navy.  At 
present  what  is  needed  is  immediately  to  strain  every  nerve  of  the 
government  so  that  this  year  we  will  begin  work  on  half-a-dozen 
formidable  fighting  battleships  and  formidable  speedy  armed  cruisers. 
Frederick  Palmer  has  recently  showed  that  in  the  three  squadron 
actions  of  this  war  the  beaten  side  has  behaved  with  the  same  skill  and 
prowess  shown  by  the  victors,  but  has  been  beaten  purely  because  of 
the  superiority  of  its  opponent  in  the  speed  of  the  ships  and  in  the 
range  and  power  of  the  guns.  He  has  furthermore  shown  that  in  these 
three  squadron  actions  the  defeated  ships  were  in  each  ease  superior  to 
any  of  our  cruisers  in  speed  and  range  and  power  of  guns.  In  other 
words,  our  cruisers  would  be  helpless  against  those  of  a  first-rate  power 
at  the  present  time. 

87 


"We  need  the  best  types  of  sea-going  submarines.  We  need  an  im- 
mense development  of  the  Aviation  Corps.  I  vi^onder  how  many  of  our 
people  understand  that  at  this  time  the  total  strength  of  the  officers  and 
men  in  the  French  Aviation  Corps  surpasses  in  number  the  total 
strength  of  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  in  the  United  States  Army. 

"But  taking  the  amplest  care  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the  Regular 
Navy  is  not  enough.  A  democracy  should  do  its  own  fighting.  I  be- 
lieve in  universal  service  on  the  Swiss  and  Australian  models,  adapted 
to  our  own  needs;  that  is,  to  military  training  in  the  schools  after  the 
age  of  sixteen  and,  too,  for  a  six  months'  service  with  the  colors  in  the 
field  for  every  man  some  time  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  twenty- 
one.  With  a  small  regular  army  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  men — a  force 
which  relatively  to  the  nation  bears  the  same  proportion  that  the  police 
force  of  New  York  City  bears  to  the  population  of  New  York  City — 
we  would  be  given  the  time  to  develop  from  our  citizens,  if  they  had 
universal  military  training,  an  efficient  army  adequate  to  our  needs. 
Military  service  should  no  more  be  optional  in  a  democracy  than  should 
the  payment  of  taxes.  One  should  be  accepted  as  an  obligation  just  as 
much  as  the  other.  The  proposed  Continental  Army  is  a  sham.  It 
would  be  merely  an  inefficient  rival  of  the  National  Guard.  For  a  year 
or  so,  during  the  period  of  novelty  it  might  attract  some  men.  But  we 
can  not  expect  men  to  sacrifice  their  business  interests  and  put  them- 
selves at  a  disadvantage  compared  to  their  less  patriotic  business  rivals 
as  a  permanent  thing.  They  ought  not  to  do  it ;  and  it  is  an  outrage  to 
ask  them  to  do  it.  Military  training  should  be  required  as  a  matter  of 
right  and  not  asked  as  a  matter  of  favor  of  all  our  citizens.  In  a  free 
democracy  the  nation  has  a  right  to  the  service  of  its  citizens  both  in 
war  and  in  peace. 

"Sincerely  yours, 

(  (Signed)     "Theodore  Roosevelt, 

"To  the  National  Security  League." 
(Applause  and  cheers.) 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  would  you  rather  hear 
General  Luke  Wright  tonight  or  tomorrow?  All  in  favor  of  tonight 
will  say  "Aye."     (The  ayes  responded.) 

88 


All  in  favor  of  tomorrow  will  say  "aye."     (The  audience  responded 
as  requested.)     You  evidently  want  to  hear  him  tonight. 
I  introduce  General  Luke  Wright.     (Applause.) 


MILITARY  NEEDS 

Luke  E.  Wright,  Memphis,  Tenn. 
Former  Secretary  of  War 

General  Wright — Ladies  and  Gentlemen :  After  listening  to  the 
inspiring  address  of  Mrs.  George  and  the  ringing  letter  of  the  Colonel, 
1  fear  that  anything  that  I  may  say  will  be  in  the  nature  of  anti-climax, 
but  I  will  say  what  little  I  have  to  say  tonight  as  briefly  as  possible, 
due  to  the  fact  that  my  speaking  tomorrow  might  disarrange  the  pro- 
gram already  prepared. 

The  subject  given  me  is  "Military  Needs."  Of  course,  in  discuss- 
ing that  question,  the  first  thought  that  presents  itself  is,  what  are  our 
needs  as  a  people?  Are  we  really  in  danger  of  war?  "  There  are  two 
classes  of  people  in  the  United  States,  one  who  are  in  a  state  of  chronic 
excitement  and  alarm  for  fear  we  should  be  invaded  over  night,  and  the 
other  blissfully  certain  that  by  no  possibility  can  danger  ever  come  to 
the  United  States.  In  my  judgment  both  these  classes  of  people  ought 
to  be — their  views  ought  to  be — ignored.  We  are  not  in  danger  of 
immediate  invasion.  It  may  come  to  pass — I  hope  it  will  come  to 
pass — that  we  never  will  be  invaded.  But  who  knows?  Is  it  wise  for 
us  to  assume  that  we  will  not  be ;  that  no  danger  will  ever  come  to  us 
because  in  the  past  we  have  fortunately  escaped?     I  think  not. 

The  truth  is  that  no  nation  of  the  importance  of  the  United  States 
can  afford  to  take  such  chances  as  we  have  taken  in  the  last  few  years 
and  will  be  compelled  to  take  in  the  immediate  future.  Now,  nobody 
knows  or  can  know  what  will  be  the  outcome  of  this  great  European 
war.  Whether  Germany  or  the  Allies  shall  triumph  is  in  the  womb  of 
the  future.  We  can  only  guess  about  it.  And  when  that  war  is  over, 
if  one  or  the  other  contending  powers  shall  triumph,  whether  we  shall 
be  brought  into  it  must  again  remain  a  matter  of  surmise.  We  know, 
historically  speaking,  that  most  of  the  great  wars  of  the  world  have 
grown  out  of  trade  disputes. 

89 


The  fact  is,  when  you  come  to  read  between  the  lines  the  history 
of  the  American  Colonies,  they  declared  their  independence  because  of 
the  restrictive  trade  laws  of  the  mother  country.  We  are  told  by  high 
authority  in  the  last  few  days  that  after  this  war  is  over  there  will  be 
a  great  industrial  war  between  the  United  States  and  Europe;  that 
their  goods  will  be  dumped  upon  us  and  that  our  industries  will  be 
swamped;  and  tariff  barriers  are  recommended  to  be  erected,  and  all 
the  rest  of  it.  Now,  I  have  had  some  experience  with  the  Englishman, 
and  whilst  he  is  not  essentially  a  quarrelsome  man,  there  is  nothing 
that  peeves  him  so  as  to  interfere  with  his  trade.  (Laughter.)  That 
is  just  one  thing  he  will  fight  about.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

Now  then,  we  may  be  involved.  The  fact  is,  and  we  had  as  well 
admit  it,  we  are  not  making  friends  either  with  the  central  powers  or 
the  allies.     (Applause.) 

And  there  is  another  fact,  that  in  times  past,  in  the  little  wars  we 
have  had — or  the  little  war  with  Spain — consciously  or  unconsciously 
we  were  leaning  upon  England.  (Applause.)  Now,  the  time  may 
come  when  England  will  decline  to  be  leaned  upon.  It  is  not  wise  for 
any  people,  certainly  for  any  people  as  rich  as  we  are,  to  depend  for 
our  security  upon  the  good  will  of  any  foreign  power.  (Applause.) 
We  are  the  richest  people  in  the  world.  I  believe  statistics  showed  that 
we  were  even  before  this  war  broke  out  in  Europe,  and  a  steady 
stream  of  foreign  gold  has  been  pouring  in  here.  Now  then,  when  this 
war  is  over  it  may  be,  finding  us  so  rich  and  so  defenseless,  and  finding 
furthermore  that  we  have  absorbed  largely  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
world,  that  they  may  say,  "Stand  and  deliver."  I  hope  that  will  not 
happen,  but  who  knows;  and  what  prudent  man  would  store  gold,  un- 
protected gold,  on  his  premises?  What  prudent  nation  will  trust  to 
luck  under  such  circumstances  as  these? 

Another  thing,  my  friends;  we  have  become  a  world  power.  We 
are  not  isolated  any  longer.  American  enterprise,  American  energy,  is 
finding  outlets  all  over  Central  and  South  America  and  all  over  the 
Orient.  We  can  not  exclude  ourselves  if  we  would,  and  I  am  sure  no 
red-blooded  American  would  make  a  hermit  nation  of  the  United  States 
if  he  could.  (Applause.)  Now,  intercourse  means  the  possibility  of 
national  differences.  Our  nationals  are  scattered  all  over  the  world, 
and  if  we  are  to  respect  ourselves  or  are  to  be  entitled  to  the  respect  of 

90 


the  world  at  large,  we  must  see  to  it  that  our  nationals  are  not  mis- 
treated.    (Applause.) 

Again,  this  Monroe  Doctrine,  so  called,  is  as  prolific  of  fights  as  a 
barrel  of  red  liquor.  (Laughter  and  applause.)  We  are  constituting 
ourselves  the  international  policeman  of  the  American  Continent.  In 
addition  to  that  we  have  recently  taken  on  other  obligations  in  the 
form  of  what  our  able  Secretary  of  State  terms  a  moral  partnership 
with  the  A.  B.  C.  and  other  American  powers.  It  does  not  decrease, 
therefore,  the  obligations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  increases  them, 
and  we  must  face  the  fact  that  with  all  this  country  south  of  us  here 
the  time  may  come  when  we  shall  have  to  make  good  the  vaunt  we  have 
made  of  "America  for  the  Americans."     (Applause.) 

I  remember  the  saying  of  a  distinguished  man  that  the  true  motto 
for  a  nation  was  "Speak  softly  and  carry  a  big  stick."  (Laughter.) 
It  seems  to  be  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  just  reversed 
that  proposition;  they  speak  loudly  and  carry  a  stuffed  club.  (Laugh- 
ter.) 

Now  then,  that  we  are  unprepared  goes  without  saying.  It  is 
unwise  to  lean  upon  any  other  power.  The  experience  of  the  last  25 
years  shows  how  little  the  wisest  and  most  far-seeing  statesmen  can 
tell  what  a  few  years  will  bring  forth.  Twenty-five  years  ago  you  will 
all  remember  (that  is,  of  course,  all  but  the  ladies,  and  of  course  they 
do  not  remember  it)  Lord  Salisbury,  the  Premier  of  England  and  a 
great  statesman,  gave  up  the  little  Island  of  Heligoland,  which  com- 
manded the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser,  upon  the  express  ground 
that  there  never  could  be  a  war  between  Germany  and  England. 
(Laughter.)  Ten  years  ago  Russia  and  Japan  were  at  each  other's 
throats,  and  today  they  are  allies.  England  and  Russia,  traditional 
enemies  for  many  generations,  are  now  friends.  And  so  it  goes.  Now, 
a  combination,  not  probable,  but  possible,  between,  if  I  may  name 
nations,  Japan  and  England  for  instance — it  might  come  about — or 
between  Germany  and  Japan  (cries  of  "Hear,  hear";  "Now,  that's  it"), 
and  a  great  many  things  are  possible  in  this  scheme  of  human  affairs. 
I  say  we  are  remiss  in  our  duty  if  we  do  not  prepare  to  meet  any 
emergency.  (Applause.)  I  do  not  think  we  should  prepare  in  a 
spasm  of  excited  fear.  I  believe  our  preparation  should  be  based  upon 
fixed  policy,  religiously  lived  up  to. 

91 


The  President  and  his  able  and  efficient  Secretary  of  War  have 
laid  before  Congress  a  scheme  of  preparedness.  Of  course,  it  is  a 
step  in  the  right  direction,  and  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  not  out  of 
place  for  me  to  talk  frankly  and  as  I  feel,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is 
only  a  very  short  step,  (Applause.)  The  entire  plan  is  based  upon 
two  fundamental  thoughts,  both  of  vi^hich  seem  to  me  fundamentally 
erroneous.  The  first  is  that  you  can  make  a  soldier  while  you  wait. 
Shorthand  methods  as  a  rule  are  not  the  best,  to  put  it  mildly.  I  think 
I  know  what  I  am  talking  about  when  I  say,  and  upon  that  proposition 
every  military  man  who  has  had  any  experience  will  agree  with  me, 
that  you  can  not  make  a  soldier  worth  his  salt  by  drilling  him  two 
months.     (Applause.) 

Again,  the  example  of  Switzerland  is  pointed  out  and  their  system 
is  taken  in  a  large  degree  as  a  model  as  answering  that  criticism;  but, 
my  friends,  Switzerland  is  a  little  bit  of  a  country,  perched  upon 
mountain  tops,  with  mountain  barriers  all  around  her.  Her  young  men 
from  the  time  of  early  boyhood  until  they  are  past  military  age,  are 
engaged,  and  are  required  to  engage,  in  target  practice,  which  is,  as  I 
understand  it,  not  included  in  this  scheme.  For  purely  defensive  war, 
involving  no  large  military  evolutions,  such  a  system  as  a  mere  make- 
shift may  do;  but  we  have  a  country  that  is  larger  than  all  Europe 
combined,  and  we  can  not  content  ourselves  with  a  preparation  simply 
for  defensive  conflict,  as  can  the  Swiss. 

Now  we  come  to  the  volunteers.  That  is  the  second  objection  I 
have  really  got  to  this  scheme ;  and  I  am  not  making  these  observations 
by  way  of  criticism  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  I 
quite  understand  that  no  public  man  can  get  too  far  ahead  of  public 
opinion,  and  he  has  got  to  gradually  educate  the  people  up  to  advanced 
views ;  and  especially  is  it  necessary  for  him  to  go  rather  slow  when  it 
comes  to  inadequate  and  wrong  education.  It  is  easier  to  put  an  idea 
into  a  man's  head  when  there  is  none  there,  than  to  take  one  out  when 
it  has  become  fixed.  (Laughter  and  applause.)  Our  people  have  been 
led  to  believe  through  our  school  histories  and  through  Fourth  of  July 
declamations,  and  the  perfervid  utterances  of  politicians,  that  we  a,re 
the  people,  and  world-beaters,  and  the  embattled  farmers,  of  whom 
Mrs.  George  spoke,  that  when  they  come  to  the  front  the  enemy  takes 
to  his  heels.  (Laughter.)  That  system  of  self-glorification  is  very 
gratifying  to  the  audience,  but  unfortunately  history  does  not  bear  it 

92 


out.  If  there  is  anything  or  any  body  of  men  that  is  thoroughly  unde- 
pendable,  it  is  the  raw  volunteers.  War  is  a  trade  or  a  profession, 
never  more  so  than  today.  When  weapons  were  primitive,  the  possibil- 
ity of  converting  a  man  into  a  soldier  was  great,  it  was  comparatively 
easy;  but  now  all  the  arts  and  sciences  have  been  brought  into  play 
for  the  purpose  of  human  destruction.  The  panoply  of  glorious  war 
is  gone,  and  it  requires  drill,  discipline,  trained  skill,  to  make  a  soldier. 
You  can  not  do  it  in  two  days  or  two  months,  and  six  months  is  a 
minimum. 

Our  own  Civil  War  shows  the  utter  undependability  of  the  volun- 
teer. Of  course  you  do  not  read  it  in  the  histories.  There  never  was 
a  battle  in  which  both  sides  did  not  cover  themselves  with  glory,  and 
our  boys  have  been  fed  with  that  sort  of  stuff  until  it  is  generally  ac- 
cepted. But  the  fact  is  that  it  was  a  pure  toss-up  in  the  early  days  of 
our  Civil  War  which  side  ran  first  (laughter)  ;  not  that  those  men  were 
not  brave  men.  A  year  later  they  were  veterans  and  they  could  have 
faced  the  world  in  arms  without  blanching.  (Applause.)  It  was  not 
because  the  raw  material  was  not  good;  it  was  because  the  training 
was  lacking.  I  was  reading  some  time  ago — a  thing  I  do  not  often  do — ■ 
a  book  about  the  great  battles  of  the  Civil  War,  written  by  a  Confed- 
erate General,  a  West  Pointer,  and  Chief  of  Artillery  of  Longstreet's 
Corps  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  a  very  able  man.  This  was 
purely  a  soldier's  book,  absolutely  non-partisan,  and  he  was  discussing 
the  theory  and  tactics  of  the  great  battles  of  the  Civil  War,  and  was 
awarding  blame  and  praise  without  bias,  apparently,  and  he  told  about 
the  first  battle  of  Manassass,  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  as  it  is  called. 

He  tells  about  the  fact  that  the  southern  soldiers  there  were  licked, 
to  use  a  very  expressive  phrase  of  the  Colonel,  "to  a  frazzle" ;  they  were 
going.  There  was  a  man,  a  genius,  who  happened  to  come  up  with  his 
brigade,  a  man  by  the  name  of  Jackson,  "Stonewall"  Jackson,  as  he  was 
afterwards  called,  who  earned  his  title  that  day.  He  posted  his  brigade 
and  gave  the  advancing  and  victorious  Federals  what  is  termed  in 
military  parlance  the  counter-stroke,  that  is,  he  hit  them  a  crack  when 
they  thought  all  was  over  but  the  shouting,  and  they  ran  and  never 
stopped  until  they  reached  Washington. 

Mr.  Davis,  Jefferson  Davis,  he  says,  hearing  the  conflict  was  on, 
came  up  from  Richmond  on  a  train  and  reaching  the  field  he  rode 
through  masses  of  flying  Confederates,  and  he  thought  the  battle  was 

93 


lost  until  he  arrived  at  a  field  hospital  where  General  Jackson  was  hav- 
ing his  hand  dressed,  he  had  been  shot  in  the  hand,  and  he  said  to 
him,  "This  has  been  a  bad  day  for  us.  General,"  and  Jackson  replied, 
"We  have  won  a  glorious  victory";  and  that  was  the  first  that  Davis 
knew  of  it.    Now,  why  not  tell  the  truth  about  these  things? 

The  fact  is  that  the  volunteer  is  not  a  reliable  soldier,  and  any 
people  that  leans  upon  him  leans  upon  a  broken  reed.     (Applause.) 

Again,  the  volunteer  system;  I  will  say  just  a  word  or  two  about 
that,  and  then  I  will  not  weary  you  any  further.  That  system  is  a  fail- 
ure. It  is  wrong  in  principle  and  it  is  bad  in  practice.  No  people  have 
ever  been  able  to  fight  a  long  continued  war,  to  endure  a  strain  upon  all 
their  resources,  under  the  volunteer  system.  The  fact  is  that  the  Con- 
federacy in  our  Civil  War  thought  that  they  could  lick  the  Yankees  in 
just  a  year;  they  gave  themselves  ample  margin;  and  so  they  enlisted 
their  men  for  twelve  months.  The  twelve  months  expired  and  they 
were  mistaken,  woefully  so ;  and  thereupon  by  a  conscripting  act  all  of 
those  twelve-month  men  were  simply  blanketed  into  the  army  for  the 
rest  of  the  war. 

The  Federals  only  gave  themselves  ninety  days  to  finish  the  Re- 
bellion, and  they  went  upon  the  idea  of  voluntary  service;  but  at  the 
end  of  twelve  months  they  seemed  to  be  no  nearer  than  they  were  at 
the  beginning.  They  had  to  reorganize  their  whole  system.  Then 
they  began  a  system  of  bounties,  and  finally  went  to  the  system  of 
drafting  or  conscription;  and  there  you  are. 

England  today,  as  some  of  her  statesmen  express  it,  is  muddling 
through  this  war,  and  after  seventeen  months  of  trying  the  volunteer 
system  she  is  now  conscripting.  Had  she  resorted  in  the  beginning 
to  compulsory  service  or  universal  service — I  do  not  like  the  word 
"compulsion" — universal  service  with  the  colors,  see  how  different 
her  condition  would  be  today. 

Now,  I  have  never  understood,  to  be  frank  about  it,  upon  princi- 
ple, why  the  brave  and  chivalrous  and  unselfish  youths  of  our  country 
should  be  required  to  rush  in  and  bear  the  burden  of  holding  the  colors 
aloft  while  the  slothful  and  selfish  and  indifferent  stay  at  home.  (Ap- 
plause.) I  do  not  look  at  military  service  as  being  a  burden  upon 
the  individual;  I  regard  it  as  a  privilege  and  a  duty  that  we  owe  this 
country.  (Applause.)  General  Lee  said  once,  I  believe,  that  duty 
was  the  noblest  word  in  the  English  language.    If  a  man  owes  a  duty, 

94 


I 


if  all  men,  as  they  do,  owe  a  duty  to  protect  and  pi^eserve  their  coun- 
try, then  all  men  should  bear  the  burden,  and  no  man  is  entitled,  in  my 
judgment,  to  any  particular  credit  for  doing  his  duty.     (Applause.) 

Again,  I  think  the  idea  of  pay  in  connection  with  military  ser- 
vice, except  for  a  small  professional  army,  is  wrong  in  principle.  In 
my  judgment  pay  ought  to  be  the  most  minor  of  minor  considerations. 
The  fact  it,  if  we  required  every  young  man  in  the  United  States  be- 
tween nineteen  and  twenty-one  to  serve  six  months  with  the  colors, 
and  thereafter  one  month  each  summer  for  six  years,  he  would  be 
giving  a  year  of  his  life  for  preparation  for  war  if  it  should  come.  He 
would  be  getting,  however,  from  the  country  and  at  the  expense  of 
the  whole  country,  a  much  greater  service  than  he  would  be  giving. 
(Applause.) 

In  the  first  place,  it  would  set  him  up  physically,  as  Mrs.  George 
so  aptly  said  here  just  now;  it  would  give  him  physical  stamina  which 
would  prolong  his  life  many  times  one  year.  He  would  be  taught  how 
to  take  care  of  his  body;  and,  above  all,  he  would  be  taught  habits  of 
respect  for  constituted  authority,  which  our  youth  so  woefully  lack. 
He  would  be  taught  order  and  discipline.  Now,  it  is  not  a  hardship 
if  it  is  borne  equally  by  everybody.  If  you  put  the  son  of  the  work- 
ingman  and  the  son  of  the  millionaire  side  by  side  in  the  ranks,  it 
does  not  build  up  a  military  aristocracy,  but  it  builds  up  a  democratic 
body  of  men  who  love  their  country  and  its  institutions,  and  are  pre- 
pared to  protect  them  when  danger  arises. 

We  hear  a  great  deal  about  Prussian  militarism,  and  of  course 
I  would  not  for  a  moment  favor  that  stern  and  rigorous  discipline  that 
the  Prussian  subject  goes  through,  1  at  the  fact  is,  in  my  opinion  at 
least,  that  we  are  very  much  mistaken  when  we  think  of  the  Kaiser 
as  being  a  mere  despot  whose  word  is  law.  Germany  has  a  constitu- 
tional government,  and  public  opinion  in  Germany  finds  a  way  to  reach 
those  in  authority.  The  real  reason,  my  friends,  why  Germany  is 
making  the  showing  today  that  she  is  making,  is  not  because  the 
Kaiser  wills  it,  but  it  is  because  the  masses  of  the  German  people  are 
behind  him.     (Applause.) 

I  was  out  in  Japan  some  years  ago,  and  one  of  our  paymasters 
came  to  Tokio  where  I  was  then  living  and  wanted  to  inspect  the 

95  ■ 


Japanese  pay  system.  I  was  able,  through  the  courtesy  of  the  foreign 
minister,  to  get  him  permission  to  do  it.  He  came  back  and  thanked 
me  for  it  a  few  days  afterwards,  and  I  asked  him,  "Is  there  anything 
peculiar  about  their  system  that  you  think  is  better  than  ours?"  He 
said,  *'No,  it  is  very  much  the  same."  He  said,  "There  is  one  remark- 
able fact,  though."  I  said  to  him,  "What  is  that?"  He  said,  "The 
Japanese  pay  their  private  soldiers  40  sen  a  month  "  Forty  sen,  as 
you  know,  is  20  cents  of  our  monev. 

A  few  nights  after  that  1  met  the  Minister  for  War  and  I  men- 
tioned the  fact  that  I  had  been  informed  that  their  soldiers  were  paid 
40  sen — 30  or  40  sen,  some  trivial  amount — that  they  paid  their  sol- 
diers only  this  amount  of  money.  He  drew  himself  up,  and  he  said, 
"My  dear  sir,  the  Japanese  government  pays  the  Japanese  soldier 
nothing."  He  said,  "The  Japanese  would  feel  insulted  at  the  thought 
that  he  had  to  be  paid  to  serve  his  emperor  and  his  country.  As  a 
gratuity  we  give  them  40  sen  a  month  to  buy  little  knick-knacks  and 
things  that  minister  to  their  comfort." 

Now  the  Japanese,  of  course,  are  not  good  Christians  like  we  are, 
and  possibly  they  are  more  or  less  benighted  (laughter),  but  the  spirit 
of  Japan,  as  they  call  it,  is  a  wonderful  spirit  and  it  makes  those  little 
brown  men  do  extraordinary  things;  and  when  you  remember  how 
they  went  up  those  blood-stained  steeps  and  almost  with  their  hands 
tore  down  the  fortifications  around  Port  Arthur,  dying  as  they  went, 
with  their  dying  breath  crying  out,  "Banzai,  Nippon,"  you  can  under- 
stand that  there  is  something  in  the  spirit  of  a  people  like  them  that 
makes  them  capable  of  doing  very  great  things.  Now,  I  believe  our 
people  have  just  as  much  native  patriotism  as  the  Japanese  or  any- 
body else,  but  the  trouble  is  it  is  asleep.  They  have  been  maleducated, 
and  the  time  has  come  for  the  American  people  to  wake  up;  and  such 
bodies  as  this  find  their  duty  in  waking  them  up  to  a  realization  of 
what  is  best  for  the  country. 

In  what  I  have  said  I  hope  the  most  critical  will  understand  that 
I  am  not  attempting  to  belittle  the  efforts  of  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  do  something  toward  National  preparedness. 
Whether  we  all  agree  with  him  or  not,  he  is  our  President  (applause), 
and  when  it  comes  to  National  defense  and  National  preparedness, 
that  man  or  that  woman  who  thinks  in  terms  of  politics  is  not  a  good 

96 


citizen.  (Applause.)  In  a  matter  of  this  transcendant  importance 
we  are  all  Republicans  and  we  are  all  Democrats;  or,  to  put  it  in  a 
better  form,  we  are  all  Americans.     (Great  applause.) 

(Thereupon  at  11.30  o'clock  p.  m.  an  adjournment  was  taken  until 
tomorrow,  Friday,  January  21, 1916,  at  10.30  o'clock  a.  m.) 


97 


THIRD  SESSION 

New  Willard  Hotel 

Friday,  January  21,  1916,  10:30  a.  m. 

Chairman — Franklin  S.  Edmonds,  of  Pennsylvania. 

The  session  was  called  to  order  by  Mr.  Franklin  S.  Edmonds, 
presiding. 

Mr.  Edmonds — It  was  with  very  great  gratification  that  I  ac- 
cepted the  invitation  of  the  committee  to  preside  at  this  morning's 
session  which  has  met  to  consider  the  problem  that  is  most  vital  to 
the  life  of  the  Nation  today,  not  only  preparedness  from  the  point 
of  National  defense,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  social  development. 

With  a  long  program,  and  eminent  speakers,  it  would  not  be  fit- 
ting for  the  Chairman  to  himself  take  the  time  which,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  meeting,  might  be  better  employed,  and  therefore,  with- 
out further  preliminaries,  I  will  call  upon  Mr.  P.  H.  W.  Ross,  of 
Washington,  D.  C,  President  of  the  National  Marine  League  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  to  address  you. 

THE  MERCANTILE  MARINE   IN   ITS   RELATION  TO  THE 
NAVY  AND  PREPAREDNESS 

P.  H.  W.  Ross,  President, 

The  National  Marine  League  of  the  United  States  of  America 

Mr.  Ross — Mr.  Chairman  and  Gentlemen  of  the  Congress  of  The 
National  Security  League: 

I  have  been  asked  to  speak  to  you  on  the  necessity  of  a  National 
Mercantile  Marine — 

(a)  as  the  means  of  supplying  sailors  for  our  vessels, 

(b)  as  an  auxiliary  force  to  our  fleet. 

98 


There  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  a  Nation  desires  Sea  Power,  it  must 
have  seamen,  the  men  before  the  mast  as  well  as  the  "men  behind  the 
gun."  Nor  is  there  anyone  who  will  deny  that  inasmuch  as  one  "can- 
not make  bricks  without  straw"  so  cannot  a  navy  be  mobile  and  really 
effective  without  the  auxiliary  forces  that  a  merchant  marine  atfords. 

A  most  striking  and  practical  illustration  of  this  truth  is  afforded 
from  across  seas. 

The  New  York  "Evening  Post,"  by  no  means  a  rampantly  mili- 
taristic organ,  on  December  31st  published  the  following: 

"ONE  OF  THE  SINEWS  OF  WAR. 

"An  English  Shipowner  on  How  Great  Britain  Moved  Her  Supplies. 

"Without  the  British  mercantile  marine,"  Lord  Inchcape  asked, 
at  the  recent  Peninsula  &  Oriental  annual  meeting,  "where  would  the 
country  have  been  in  this  war?  The  British  Government  did  not  pos- 
sess a  single  transport,  a  single  vessel  adapted  for  the  conveyance  of 
munitions  or  stores  or  horses  or  mules  or  camels,  or  a  single  hospital 
ship.  Why  did  the  admiralty  not  possess  a  fleet  capable  of  doing  that 
magnificent  work  of  which  Mr.  Asquith  spoke  in  such  glowing  terms 
the  other  night?  I  will  tell  you  why.  The  admiralty  had  far  more 
sense. 

"  'They  had  the  plans,  and  they  knew  the  dimensions,  the  capacity, 
the  equipment,  the  speed  of  every  British  ship  afloat,  and  her  where- 
abouts. They  had  been  scheduling  those  in  their  own  quiet  way  for 
years.  They  recognize  that  the  most  economical,  in  fact,  the  only 
possible  plan  was  to  let  the  shipowners  go  on  building  vessels  on  their 
own  account,  running  them  in  their  ordinary  trades  without  a  farthing 
of  expense  to  the  country,  because  they  knew  when  the  hour  struck 
and  the  admiralty  required  their  services,  the  ships  would  be  at  the 
disposal  of  the  nation  on  perfectly  reasonable  terms,  and  in  this 
they  were  right." 

Of  course  things  are  different  in  America,  we  have  neither  the 
adequate  auxiliary  facilities  in  the  shape  of  United  States  Government 
transports  nor  an  adequate  foreign  going  Merchant  Marine.  Great 
Britain  could,  as  Lord  Inchcape  said,  dispense  with  transport  ships, 
because  of  her  magnificent  merchant  navies.  We  cannot.  It  does  not 
follow  that  we  must  wait  until  our  merchant  marine  alone  supplies 

99 


our  needs  in  these  directions,  but  we  must  have  both  and  as  quickly 
as  possible. 

Now  comes  the  question  of  how  and  whence  shall  we  obtain  these 
ships  so  vitally  necessary  to  our  honor,  our  safety  and  our  economic 
existence.  The  answer  is  plain — by  the  consent  of  and  from  the 
pockets  of  our  people.  ^ 

We  must  always  remember  that  the  people  are  sovereign  in  this 
Republic  and  not  whatever  Government  or  Administration  may  happen 
to  be  in  power,  and  the  Wisdom  of  Congress  is  but  the  representative 
wisdom  of  the  people.  Hence  it  is  idle  to  berate  Congressional  opinion. 
It  is  but  the  reflex  of  the  thoughts  of  the  voters  who  sent  those  men  to 
Congress,  at  the  time  when  they  were  so  elected.  But,  of  this  be  sure! 
Congress  will  change  its  mind.  Senators  and  Representatives  will  mod- 
ify their  opinions  when  they  perceive  (and  they  do,  very  quickly, 
perceive)  that  the  People  is  changing  its  mind.  Therefore  if  my 
advice  is  of  any  value,  I  would  urge  my  fellow  members  of  The  Na- 
tional Security  League  not  to  attempt  to  force  the  hands  of  Congress. 
It  is  a  proud  and  distinguished  body  that  knows  no  National  Security 
League,  no  National  Marine  League,  no  "any"  League.  It  knows  no 
law  save  of  its  own  making.  It  bows  to  but  one  over-lord,  the  People 
itself,  which  placed  the  members  of  Congress  where  they  are.  You 
are  more  effective  with  a  man  in  his  sovereign  capacity  of  American 
citizen  than  you  are  with  him  in  his  bounden  capacity  as  Congressman. 

Now,  in  our  approach  upon  the  people  we  have  to  consider  two 
things : 

An  Eastern  Sage  once  said,  "Some  reach  God  by  the  mind  through 
the  heart;  others  by  the  heart  through  the  mind."  This  may  seem 
"a  dark  saying,"  but  it  is  not.  How  are  you  going  to  induce  the 
American  people  to  reach  National  Security?  By  the  mind  through 
the  heart,  or  by  the  heart  through  the  mind  ? 

Obviously  the  latter,  so  far  as  you  have  gone,  for  the  majority 
of  your  members  have  been  stirred  in  the  first  place  by  their  hearts, 
by  noble  emotions,  by  patriotic  impulse,  by  fiery  ardor,  by  the  splendid 
ecstasy  that  flowed  from  the  lips  of  Garfield  when  he  said: 

"A  nation  is  not  worthy  to  be  saved  if,  in  the  hour  of  its 

fate,  it  will  not  gather  up  all  its  jewels  of  manhood  and  life 

and  go  down  into  the  conflict,  however  bloody  and  doubtful, 

resolved  on  measureless  ruin  or  complete  success." 

100 


The  lips  tremble,  the  heart  throbs,  the  blood  sifr^es'thidirgh'xJiir'VeiiiB' 
even  in  the  recital  of  such  words,  but  alas  1  the  more  fiery  the  emotion 
the  sooner  it  burns  itself  away,  and  we  must  remember  that  "God  is 
also  reached  by  the  heart  through  the  mind." 

We  must  remember  that  millions  of  our  fellow  voters  have  not 
this  ardent  temperament.  They  are  equally  brave,  equally  courageous, 
probably  more  constant.  They  are  not  the  "Ruperts"  of  our  cause, 
but  they  are  the  solid  "Cromwellians"  of  our  country  whose  affections, 
once  engaged,  stay  with  us  to  the  gates  of  Death.  Fear  plays  but 
small  part  in  the  psychology  of  Americans,  especially  fear  of  naval 
attack  in  the  minds  of  those  whose  habitations  are  far  inland  and  pro- 
tected by  the  natural  ramparts  of  mountain  ranges. 

These  men  are  hastily  dubbed  "Pacifists"  by  our  "Ruperts."  They 
are  not.  They  are  simply  men  of  another  temperament  who  will  reach 
the  same  goal  as  that  towards  which  our  Ruperts  are  striving  if  only 
they  are  approached  by  methods  appropriate  to  Cromwellian  tem- 
peraments. 

No  one  is  a  "Pacifist"  in  the  last  analysis,  but  men  as  a  rule  do 
live  in  that  state  of  life  into  which  it  has  pleased  God  to  call  them,  and 
as  a  rule  it  is  hard  to  shake  them  out  of  that  state,  which  by  the  force 
of  reiterated  action  generally  becomes  a  "rut," — and  "ruts"  are  worthy 
and  noble,  quite  as  often  as  not.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  rut  and  very 
difficult  it  is  to  peer  over  the  bounds  of  that  rut  and  appreciate  the  vast 
play  and  interplay  of  National  and  economic  forces  tnat  bind  us  to- 
gether in  spite  of  the  narrow  channels  of  time  and  place  and  circum- 
stance. 

I  said  that  fear  of  foreign  attack  had  small  place  in  the  lives  of 
many  of  our  countrymen.  However,  there  is  a  fear  that  constantly 
haunts  the  hearts  of  millions  of  our  voters,  especially  of  those  whose 
lives  are  cast  in  the  deadliest  of  commonplace  ruts.  It  is  the  fear  of 
not  being  able  to  feed  and  clothe  their  wives  and  children  as  they 
would  wish  to ;  fear  of  loss  of  employment ;  an  economic  fear  that  pos- 
sesses their  souls.  Such  men  and  women  will  but  fitfully  respond  to 
the  fife  and  drum;  they  will, — "in  extremis," —  as  gallantly  as  the  mil 
lions  of  workers  in  Europe  are  now  doing,  but  their  normal  response 
is  to  the  necessity  of  paying  the  rent,  of  a  few  more  groceries  in  that 
corner  cupboard,  a  new  frock  for  the  baby  and  such  things  as  these. 

101 


.  Haw  .will  .yoa:  2fit.  r^eir  support  and  the  supj)ort  of  those  whose 
business  cares  on  larger  scale  are  still  as  intimate  and  pressing? 

And  you  must  get  their  support  or  you  won't  get  the  remedial  leg- 
islation for  the  evils  you  see  so  clearly,  but  which  they  see  as  only 
through  a  glass,  darkly. 

It  warms  the  heart  to  speak  in  glowing  terms  of  patriotism  but 
the  heat  of  pride  dies  away  when  the  hearth  is  cold. 

You  can  only  reach  these  hearts  through  their  minds.  You  have 
to  show  them  that  permanent  prosperity  and  steady  employment  in 
a  country  so  highly  developed  industrially  as  is  America,  can  only  be 
attained  by  our  having  the  control  of  the  ocean  transportation  of  the 
products  of  American  industry  in  our  own  hands. 

They  must  be  shown  that  the  development  of  an  American  Mer- 
chant Marine  is  the  keystone  to  their  own  immediate  prosperity,  which 
it  is.  Just  as  in  Germany  and  in  Great  Britain  every  industrial  worker 
in  the  whole  population  has  been  imbued  with  the  conviction  that  the 
regularity  of  his  employment,  the  "steadiness  of  his  job,"  depends  upon 
his  country  having  its  own  merchant  marine,  so  must  we  in  America 
patiently  and  fervently  work  for  the  same  end. 

I  am  greatly  pleased  to  speak  to  you  here  because  I  bring  you  a 
message  of  comfort  and  of  help. 

The  National  Marine  League,  with  which  I  have  the  honor  of 
being  connected,  is  doing  a  great  work  of  incalculable  benefit  to  this 
country.  Many  of  our  members  are  of  a  non-militaristic  temperament, 
and  it  was  thought  by  some  that  my  appearance  here  might  imply  such 
an  affiliation  of  effort  as  might  injure  our  cause  in  the  minds  of  many 
who  are  not  prepared  to  think  quite  as  you  do.  But  these  are  idle 
fears.  By  different  roads  both  Leagues  are  striving  for  one  object, 
the  permanent  good  and  safety  of  our  Country. 

The  Light  of  the  World  said  to  His  followers,  "Be  ye  fishers  of 
men."  We  are  all  fishers  of  men,  you  in  your  way,  we  in  ours.  There 
are  those  who  can  be  caught  from  the  bank,  these  are  they  who  quickly 
and  readily  respond  from  their  hearts  and  such  you  have  already  in 
great  measure.  There  are  also  those  who  stay  in  the  deeper  waters 
of  humanity  and  to  catch  them  a  longer  cast,  a  wider  throw  is  needed. 
It  is  to  these  that  The  National  Marine  League  has  to  direct  its  efforts. 
But  eventually  they  also  will  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  you,  be- 
cause never  in  all  the  world  do  you  find  human  beings  possessed  of 

102 


property  who  do  not  protect  that  property.  I'fev'e'r'  ia-^r^-toihiTi^ce' 
to  regulate  that  you  do  not  find  policemen  or  navies  to  regulate  that 
commerce. 

Hence  it  follows  that  ultimately  the  most  pacific  of  pacifists  will 
be  brought  upstanding  with  you  because  his  heart  has  been  awakened 
through  his  mind. 

He  will  understand  the  economic  advantages  of  an  American 
Merchant  Marine  by  which  the  disposition  of  the  things  he  makes  is 
facilitated.    He  will  readily  vote  for  that. 

An  American  Merchant  Marine,  owned  by  Americans,  manned  by 
Americans  and  at  the  beck  and  call  of  our  government  solves  more  than 
half  our  problem,  just  as  Lord  Inchcape  has  shown  that  Britain's  mer- 
chant marine  was  not  only  a  second  line  of  defense  but  actually  an 
integral  part  of  her  first  line  of  naval  defense. 

As  an  instance,  apart  from  simply  providing  sailors  for  their 
vessels.  Great  Britain  summoned  5,000  wireless  telegraphers  from  her 
merchant  ships  for  service  in  her  navy.  Where  would  Uncle  Sam  get 
5,000  wireless  operators  from  I  should  like  to  know? 

In  masonry  there  are  two  roads  to  the  Shrine.  One  is  called  the 
York  Rite,  the  other  the  Scottish  Rite.  Some  take  one  road,  some  the 
other,  many  take  both,  but  the  objective  is  the  same.  So  would  I,  who 
have  taken  both  roads  of  The  National  Security  League  and  of  The 
National  Marine  League,  venture  to  remind  you  that  there  are  many 
who  may  not  take  your  road;  but,  like  the  men  of  old,  "Be  of  good 
cheer,  we  shall  meet  at  Philippi."  We  shall  help  your  cause.  I  am  do- 
ing my  utmost  to  help  now.  Will  you,  when  you  encounter  one  who 
is  not  disposed  to  accompany  you  on  your  chosen  path,  point  his  way 
to  ours?  It  is  not  much  to  ask.  I  am  not  of  those  who  believe  that 
because  a  man  may  not  see  exactly  as  I  see,  it  follows  the  man  must 
be  lacking  in  patriotism,  good  sense  and  courage.  It  is  simply  that 
he  does  not  respond  to  exactly  the  same  stimuli  that  activate  me.  But 
other  stimuli,  equally  noble  and  forceful,  the  stimuli  of  love  and  pro- 
tection of  his  little  ones,  will  move  him  and  perhaps  awaken  a  grimmer 
determination  in  him  than  exists  in  me. 

We  shall  find  that  increasing  riches  have  not  brought  increasing 
weakness. 

In  the  splendid  words  of  Alexander  Rogers  Smith,  "We  must  have 
a  merchant  marine  as  equal  to  our  necessities  as  that  of  our  navy,  a 

103 


niai-iife  lipofi  which  tiur  'lister  republics  of  this  hemisphere  will  depend 
to  promote  their  development  without  menacing  their  security,  a  ma- 
rine unexcelled  in  efficiency  and,  therefore,  preparedness.  We  have 
every  resource  within  ourselves,  in  our  mines,  our  forests,  our  mills, 
our  shipyards  and  in  our  people  to  establish  and  maintain  a  merchant 
marine  and  a  navy  that  will  secure  forever  our  true  independence. 
With  such  a  navy,  supplemented  by  such  a  marine,  we  need  never  fear. 
Our  mines,  our  forests,  our  mills,  our  shipyards  and  our  people  will 
ever  remain — our  own." 

"Our  national  wealth  is  reaching  rapidly  toward  the  two  hundred 
billion  mark,  an  indication  of  boundless  resources.  We  are  a  people 
who  in  intelligence,  dexterity,  ability,  industry,  perseverance  and  re- 
sourcefulness, are  unmatched.  Our  sentiments  are  as  lofty,  our  ideals 
as  high,  and  our  achievements  as  brilliant  as  any  in  history.  Why 
should  we  not  aspire,  as  is  our  right,  to  the  commanding  position  which 
is  our  natural  destiny?  All  that  is  needed  are  the  will  and  the  courage 
to  achieve  and  the  wisdom  to  fulfill.  Such  world  dominance  is  only 
possible  through  the  possession  of  a  navy  and  merchant  marine  'equal 
to  that  of  any  other  nation.'  " 

If,  in  the  distant  future,  there  should  be  an  alignment  or  amal- 
gamation of  the  peoples  of  our  common  tongue  and  blood,  our  geo- 
graphical position,  no  less  than  our  great  people  and  our  illimitable 
resources,  suggests  that  the  distinctive  features  of  our  virile  nation 
shall  remain  undimmed. 

A  splendid  people,  we  stand  sturdy  and  strong,  between  the  old 

civilization  of  Europe  and  the  older  civilization  of  the  Orient,  capable 

of  being,  probably  destined  to  be,  a  veritable  Justice  balancing  the 

scale  fairly  and  equally ;  so  situated  and  so  inspired  as  to  wish  nothing 

but  the  well  being  and  the  good  will  of  all. 

♦- 

The  Chairman — It  was  the  intention  of  the  committee  that  at  the 

conclusion  of  the  formal  program  there  should  be  a  general  discussion 

from  the  floor.     The  further  consideration,  therefore,  of  Mr.  Ross's 

interesting  address  will  be  reserved  for  the  present. 

The  second  topic  on  the  program  is  "The  Economic  Value  of  Uni- 
versal Service,"  and  it  is  with  pleasure  that  I  introduce  Professor 
Henry  C.  Emery,  of  Yale  University. 

104 


THE  ECONOMIC  VALUE  OF  UNIVERSAL  SERVItE:  *  - 

Professor  Henry  C.  Emery, 
Yale  University. 

Prof.  Emery — Delegates,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  There  are  two 
bugaboos,  if  I  may  so  call  them,  to  many  pacifists  and  to  many  people 
who  place  dollars  and  cents  at  the  head  of  the  column  of  things  to  be 
considered.  One  is  the  terrible  cost  by  military  armament  and  the 
maintenance  of  an  army  of  any  considerable  size;  and,  second,  is  the 
fear  of  militarism. 

Just  a  word  regarding  each  of  these.  I  wish  to  say  in  the  first 
place  that  I  feel  embarrassed  to  be  speaking  on  this  subject  as  if  I 
myself  were  influenced  purely  by  the  economic  question.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  I  feel  something  like  the  young  man  who  at  the  time  of  his 
engagement,  in  his  first  embrace,  was  told  by  the  young  lady,  "George, 
you  are  breaking  my  watch;"  whereupon  he  replied,  "Damn  expense 
at  a  moment  like  this!"     (Laughter.) 

I  think  the  American  people  feel  like  that  today.  This  is  not 
merely  a  question  of  dollars  and  cents.  No  matter  what  it  costs  us, 
we  are  going  to  have  adequate  defense  (applause)  ;  but  unfortunately 
we  are  not  able  to  make  that  noble  sacrifice  which  we  would  like  to 
make.  I  have  a  friend  in  Providence,  a  lady  of  large  wealth,  who  has 
her  checks  coming  in  rolling  up  month  by  month,  who  let  them  pile 
up  in  the  bank  because  she  was  so  anxious  to  make  some  sacrifice  in 
the  way  of  lending  money  to  the  Allies,  and  when  the  Anglo-French 
loan  was  put  out,  she  put  all  her  money  in  those  bonds,  and  then  was 
told  by  her  brother  that  she  had  made  a  tiptop  investment ;  whereupon 
she  was  very  much  disgusted.  We  would  like,  in  ttie  same  way,  to  make 
great  sacrifices,  to  have  universal  service  at  some  cost  to  show  our 
patriotism,  but  unfortunately  you  can  not  do  it  because  unfortunately 
one  of  the  most  profitable  investments  this  country  can  make,  from 
tne  standpoint  of  universal  business,  is  universal  service  and  training. 
There  can  be  no  question  about  that. 

It  has  been  an  old  theory  of  the  economists  for  years  that  there 
are  two  great  costs  in  the  maintenance  of  military  establishments,  one 
the  money  cost  year  by  year  paid  out  of  taxes,  the  other  what  is  sup- 
posed to  be  the  great  economic  loss  in  the  employment  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  young  men  in  non-productive  activities.     Neither  of  these  is 

105 


■qiiife"  justified.'  Of  cotti'se  there  is  the  money  expense;  1  do  not  need 
consider  the  question  as  to  how  that  compares  with  other  expenditures. 
I  only  call  your  attention  particularly  to  the  fact  that  the  money  spent 
by  Germany  before  the  war  in  maintaining  her  great  establishment 
was  one-third  the  amount  spent  by  the  Germans  for  beer. 

If  the  American  people  were  willing  to  sacrifice,  say,  two  things, 
chewing  gum  and  going  to  the  movies,  we  could  maintain  an  army  so 
big  that  nobody  would  dare  to  look  at  us  from  across  the  way.  These 
expenditures,  when  compared  with  the  real  expenditures  of  living, 
the  things  we  care  for,  are  very  small.  But  it  makes  no  difference 
how  much  the  amount  is,  it  does  cost  money,  of  course,  to  maintain  a 
large  military  establishment.  But  then  it  takes  money  to  build  a 
Union  Pacific  Railroad;  it  costs  money  to  build  a  Panama  Canal;  it 
costs  money  to  build  any  great  constructive  enterprise. 

The  question  is,  what  do  you  get  back  for  your  money,  and  the 
question  of  the  actual  dollars  and  cents  invested  is  of  no  importance. 
It  makes  no  difference  whether  you  spend  $100,000,000  or  $500,000,000, 
from  the  economic  point  of  view;  the  question  is,  are  you  getting  a 
fair  return  on  your  money?  My  argument  is  simply  that  for  every 
man  that  you  educate  in  the  military  training  for  a  short  period  suffi- 
cient to  give  him  the  efficiency  necessary  for  the  industrial  life,  you 
get  back  more  than  the  expense.    (Applause.) 

Now,  the  German  experience  has  proved  that.  You  can  not  put 
it  in  terms  of  figures.  You  can  not  say  just  how  much  Germany  has 
gained  from  the  military  training  given  to  the  mass  of  her  population. 
But  one  thing  is,  I  think,  admitted  by  all  serious  students,  namely,  that 
German  military  training  and  German  industrial  success  have  not 
only  gone  hand-in-hand  in  the  last  30  years,  but  that  there  is  a  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect.  The  young  men  come  out  of  the  country  un- 
prepared for  any  serious  undertaking,  stupid,  dull,  untrained,  and 
are  put  through  a  rigid  drill  for  a  period  of  time,  which  I  consider 
simply  compulsory  education. 

You  can  argue  as  some  people  do  against  sending  boys  to  the  high 
school,  and  you  can  argue  in  the  same  way  about  giving  boys  military 
training,  but  we  are  all  convinced  now  that  education  pays,  pays  from 
the  business  point  of  view;  and  in  the  same  way  if  the  training  in  the 
Army  is  simply  a  compulsory  education,  you  get  your  return. 

106 


Just  one  word  more  on  this  point  as  to  the  argument  which  is  made 
regarding  the  great  loss  to  the  labor  force  of  the  country  in  having 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  young  men  simply  doing  military  duty  for  a 
certain  period.  Mind  you,  I  am  not  now  arguing  in  favor  of  prepared- 
ness at  all — I  mean  preparedness  for  war — I  am  arguing  purely  from 
the  economic  point  of  view,  as  to  what  the  effect  of  preparedness  would 
be  on  business.  I  am  arguing  in  favor  of  preparedness  for  the  purposes 
of  peace. 

Some  philosopher  has  said  that  if  there  were  no  Supreme  Being, 
the  human  race  would  have  invented  one  in  order  to  maintain  social 
order;  so  I  can  grant  to  the  most  extreme  pacifist,  for  the  purposes 
of  this  argument,  that  there  is  no  danger  of  war,  that  we  do  not  need 
to  prepare  against  other  nations.  I  claim  that  even  if  that  is  so,  we 
had  better  pretend  that  preparedness  is  needed,  and  we  had  better 
pretend  that  we  are  in  danger,  for  the  purely  economic  advantage 
of  putting  ourselves  in  the  best  condition  for  the  arts  of  peace. 
(Applause.) 

In  the  first  place,  the  young  men  who  would  be  called  into  military 
training  are  not  so  much  needed  in  business  as  many  economists  think, 
or  as  they  themselves  probably  think.  They  are  not  in  a  position  of 
responsibility,  in  most  cases.  They  have  not  married;  they  have  not 
assumed  ths^ responsibilities  of  family  life;  there  is  nobody  dependent 
upon  them  but  themselves;  so  that  if  there  is  any  sacrifice,  we  are 
only  asking  the  sacrifice  from  the  young  man  himself. 

In  the  second  place,  he  is  not  at  the  point  of  his  greatest  economic 
productivity.  There  is  a  period  just  between  boyhood  and  manhood 
when  these  young  people  are  not  of  much  use  to  anybody;  they  are 
simply  waiting.  They  are  looking  around.  They  are  taking  jobs  here 
and  there,  perhaps;  they  are  moving  from  one  thing  to  another;  they 
are  experimenting,  or  they  are  loafing,  and  their  productivity  is  not 
of  very  vital  importance  to  the  country.  Instead  of  having  this  period 
of  idleness,  it  seems  to  me  very  much  better  that  for  a  period  of  six 
months  or  a  year  they  should  be  given  a  rigid  drill. 

Again,  I  know  nothing  about  what  is  needed  to  make  a  soldier. 
I  do  not  know  whether  you  need  six  months  or  twelve  months  to  make 
a  soldier.  I  do  not  know  whether  you  need  to  distribute  it  over  two 
years  or  six  years  to  make  a  soldier.  But  to  make  a  good  mechanic, 
to  make  a  good  laborer,  you  need  a  rigid  drill  for  a  continuous  period 

107 


of  at  least  six  months;  and,  personally,  I  believe  that,  not  from  the 
military  point  of  view — I  v^^ould  not  attempt  to  criticise  on  any  mili- 
tary subject — but  from  the  economic  point  of  viev^,  v/e  should  aim  at  a 
continuous  period  of  service  rather  than  a  discontinuous  one,  because 
the  young  men  vi^hom  you  are  going  to  take  in  can  afford  to  take  that 
time — it  is  absurd  to  say  they  can  not  afford  it — and  we  shall  simply 
take  up  what  I  call  the  slack  of  idleness. 

It  is  not  true  that  everybody  is  working  hard  all  the  time.  Any- 
one who  knows  the  life  of  the  country  knows  there  is  an  enormous 
amount  of  idling,  of  waiting,  of  moving  from  one  occupation  to  an- 
other. There  is  an  unexpended  labor  force,  a  potential  labor  force, 
which  is  not  active,  which  might  as  well  be  controlled  and  trained  for 
economic  activity.  And,  furthermore,  I  believe  not  only  that  it  would 
be  an  economic  gain  in  this  case,  but  from  a  moral  standpoint,  because 
that  is  a  very  dangerous  period  in  the  life  of  young  men.  There  is, 
I  think  we  must  frankly  admit,  whether  it  is  on  the  East  Side  of 
New  York  or  whether  it  is  in  my  own  local  village  down  in  Maine,  a 
certain  hoodlum  period  in  the  Ufe  of  the  average  young  man  of  this 
country. 

In  the  village  as  in  the  city  there  is  that  dangerous  period  from 
the  time  they  get  out  of  school,  before  they  get  into  the  responsibili- 
ties of  life,  when  the  most  attractive  thing  is  to  sit  around  in  pool 
parlors  or  make  loud  talk  in  barber  shops  or  engage  their  activities 
in  every  way  which  is  offensive  to  everybody  except  themselves. 
(Laughter.) 

Whether  you  come  from  the  city  or  from  the  country,  I  think 
you  have  all  had  experience  with  that  dangerous  period  in  the  life 
of  our  young  men.  I  admit  that  99  per  cent.,  if  you  like,  come  out  of 
that  all  right.  They  learn  the  lessons  of  responsibility.  They  learn 
that  they  must  become  industrially  independent,  and  they  must  be- 
come socially  responsible;  but  they  are  not  gaining  anything  in  this 
particular  period,  and  that  is  just  the  time  that  you  can  get  them; 
when  without  economic  loss,  and  I  think  with  some  economic  and  moral 
gain,  you  can  give  them  a  military  training  which  will  make  them  far 
more  desirable  citizens  and  far  more  productive  laborers. 

I  have  given  these  arguments  to  people  who  have  said,  "That 
is  all  very  well.  We  approve  of  some  kind  of  training.  We  approve 
even  of  compulsory  training  of  some  kind;  but  we  have  got  to  find 

108 


something  besides  military  training."  I  was  talking  the  other  day 
with  one  of  the  most  intelligent  and  earnest  men  I  know,  who  is  very 
sincere  in  all  his  convictions,  and  who  is  very  enlightened,  not  narrow- 
minded,  on  this  point,  and  he  said,  "I  would  like  to  find  some  kind  of 
compulsory  service,  but  I  would  make  it  a  social  service.  I  would 
compel  every  young  man  to  serve  the  community  for  six  months  or  a 
year  in  helping  eradicate  filth  in  the  slums,  or  disease,  or  any  of  a 
hundred  things  that  might  be  named ;  because,"  he  said,  "I  agree  with 
you  that  a  period  of  compulsory  service,  when  you  have  to  do  things 
day  by  day  according  to  rule,  when  you  have'  got  to  absolutely  get  up 
in  the  morning  and  do  your  job  no  matter  how  you  feel  or  what  your 
pleasure  may  dictate,  is  essential  to  American  youth;  because  the  only 
thing  we  lack  is  discipline. 

"We  have  everything,"  he  said,  "except  discipline.  We  have  in- 
itiative, we  have  imagination,  we  have  capacity,  but  one  thing  we  have 
not  got  is  capacity  to  steadily,  day  in  and  day  out,  for  a  period  of 
months,  stick  to  a  definite  job  and  do  it  under  any  conditions  (ap- 
plause) ;  and,"  he  said,  "I  want  to  find  some  compulsory  training  for 
our  young  men;  but,"  he  said,  "I  do  not  want  it  a  military  training." 

Well,  he  felt  like  Professor  James  of  Harvard.  Many  of  you  have 
probably  read  his  significant  essay,  "A  Moral  Substitute  for  War." 
Professor  James  was  our  most  distinguished  philosopher  of  a  gen- 
eration, and  he  felt  that  it  was  up  to  him,  as  a  philosopher  opposed  to 
war  and  military  armament,  to  find  some  substitute  for  them.  Person- 
ally, I  think  he  did  not  discover  it.  Personally,  I  think  it  has  not  yet 
been  discovered.  But  anyway,  if  we  want  this  compulsory  service 
from  a  social  and  economic  point  of  view,  and  if  we  need  it  for  the 
purposes  of  preparedness,  why  not  combine  the  two  and  have  it  at 
once? 

This  man  was  afraid  of  militarism.  Now,  what  do  we  mean  by 
"militarism"  ?  We  hear  that  phrase  very  commonly,  but  I  seldom  have 
seen  it  defined.  It  is,  as  I  said,  a  bugaboo  which  the  pacifist  has 
raised  up  to  frighten  us  when  his  last  argument  is  gone.  Samuel 
Johnson,  you  remember,  in  his  cynical  mood,  put  in  his  dictionary  as  a 
definition  of  patriotism,  "The  last  refuge  of  a  scoundrel."  And  I 
should  put  in  my  dictionary  as  my  definition  of  militarism,  "The  last 
refuge  of  the  pacifist";  but  I  have  a  more  serious  definition  to  give 
than  that.     I  should  say  that  by  militarism  we  mean  that  philosoph- 

109 


ically — because  you  have  got  to  distinguish  between  the  philosophic 
plan  and  practical  results — the  State  finds  its  highest  and  best  ex- 
pression in  its  militant  organization  to  protect  its  rights,  to  defend 
itself  from  its  enemies,  to  conquer  what  they  may  need  for  their 
development. 

Practically,  this  carries  with  it  the  establishment  of  a  military 
caste  which  is  socially  superior  to  any  other  class  in  the  community; 
the  establishment  of  the  sanctity  of  the  military  code,  which  is  differ- 
ent from  the  civilian  code ;  the  exemption  of  the  military  class  from  the 
rules  of  the  civilian  code;  and  finally,  the  assumption  that  military 
efficiency  is  all  that  is  necessary  for  any  of  the  activities  of  life. 

That,  it  seems  to  me,  is  a  fair  description  of  what  militarism 
really  is.  Now,  are  we  afraid  of  that  kind  of  militarism  in  this  coun- 
try? Is  there  any  danger  of  our  being  Prussianized?  It  is  not  the 
German  army  or  the  German  military  training  which  has  made  the 
militaristic  spirit  of  Prussia.  It  is  the  Prussian  spirit  which  has  given 
peculiar  character  to  the  German  army  and  the  German  life.  (Ap- 
plause.) 

Twenty  years  ago,  when  I  was  in  Berlin  very  frequently,  an  able 
statesman  was  forced  out  of  office  and  a  distinguished  soldier  was  put  in 
his  place,  a  soldier  who  had  never  had  any  experience  outside  of  his  sol- 
dierly duties,  and  the  phrase  went  over  Germany,  "Ein  cavalry  general 
kann  alles,"  a  general  of  cavalry  can  do  anything.  To  be  sure,  this 
was  said  with  half  tolerant  derision,  but  there  with  that  a  different 
spirit. 

To  come  back  to  our  old  friend  Pinafore,  where  the  clerk  in  the 
attorney's  firm  polished  up  the  handle  of  the  big  front  door,  and  he 
polished  it  up  so  carefullee,  "That  now  I  am  ruler  of  the  Queen's 
Navee."  That  of  course  was  said  with  half  tolerant  derision.  But  I 
think  the  distinction  between  the  two  points  of  view  is  to  be  found 
right  there. 

In  Germany  the  assumption  is  that  a  general  can  tackle  any  job, 
state  department,  interior  department,  or  any  other,  and  do  it,  while 
in  England  or  in  this  country  we  think  that  on  the  whole  perhaps 
we  will  leave  a  lavi^er  in  charge  of  the  War  Department  or  the  Navy 
Department.  Look  at  the  pictures  of  Germans ;  whether  it  is  Bismarck, 
when  he  was  Chancellor,  or  Bethmann-Hollweg  at  the  present  time, 
they  always  get  into  a  military  uniform  whenever  they  can;  and  in 

110 


England  a  field  marshal  like  Roberts,  or  in  this  country  a  major  gen- 
eral like  wood,  gets  out  of  his  uniform  just  as  soon  as  he  can.  That, 
it  seems  to  me,  expresses  a  difference.  We  need  not  be  afraid  of  this 
spectre. 

There  is  a  picture  many  of  you  will  recall,  an  old  daguerreotype 
of  Lincoln  standing  with  the  commanding  general  in  front  of  the  tent 
at  headquarters.  That  queer  old  tall  hat  and  that  long  frock  coat 
give  a  thrill  to  anybody  who  looks  at  that  picture  greater  than  that 
from  the  star  on  the  general's  straps,  or  any  lace  and  epaulettes.  There 
was  the  Commander-in-Chief.  It  made  no  difference  whether  the 
army  consisted  of  100,000  men  or  whether  the  army  consisted  of  10,- 
000,000  men,  that  Illinois  lawyer  was  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Read 
his  immortal  letter  to  Hooker  when  he  gave  him  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  said,  "I  have  heard,  in  a  way  that  I  must 
believe,  that  you  have  recently  said  that  the  country  and  the  Army 
need  a  dictator.  Needless  to  say,  it  is  not  because  of  this  but  in  spite 
of  it  that  I  have  given  you  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"Only  those  who  win  military  successes  can  set  up  a  dictator.  It  is 
for  you  to  win  military  successes;  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship."  (Ap- 
plause.) 

There  was  a  period  when  people  were  afraid;  there  was  a  period 
when  serious  people  were  afraid.  We  have  all  been  reading  lately, 
doubtless,  the  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,  and  my  attention  was 
called  only  this  morning  while  dressing  to  the  significant  passage, 
which  I  had  skipped  in  two  or  three  readings,  where  he  tells  how  in 
the  early  part  of  1861  Lincoln  and  Seward,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  went  to  the  house  of  General 
McClellan  to  call  on  him  for  a  conference.  The  general  was  out,  at 
some  wedding. 

Finally  the  general  returned,  and  he  was  told  at  the  door  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Secretary  of  State  were  waiting 
for  him.  They  waited  another  half  hour  without  seeing  him,  and  then 
asked  the  servant  what  had  become  of  the  General,  and  they  were  told 
that  he  had  gone  to  bed.  That  was  in  1861,  and  Mr.  Hay  notes  it  in 
his  diary,  and  he  heads  it  "An  Ominous  Event,"  or  "An  Ominous  In- 
cident," and  he  says,  "This  unparalleled  insolence  of  epaulettes" — a 
grand  phrase — "This  unparalleled  insolence  of  epaulettes  is  the  first 
step  in  the  establishment  of  the  superiority  of  military  authority." 

Ill 


It  looked  dangerous.     The  world  went  on;  the  Nation  arose  in  arms 
North  and  South;  armies  grew  and  grew;  and  what  happened? 

Contrast  with  that  incident  the  letter  which  Secretary  Stanton 
sent  to  Grant  on  March  3,  1865.  Grant  had  no  thought  of  such  a 
thing,  but  if  there  ever  was  a  time  when  a  military  dictatorship  could 
be  set  up,  or  when  we  might  have  felt  fear  of  militarism,  it  was  not 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  with  McClellan,  it  was  not  in  the  middle 
of  the  war,  with  Hooker,  it  was  at  the  end  of  the  war,  with  the  vic- 
torious Grant.  Grant  had  won  the  victories  which  Lincoln  told  Hooker 
to  win  and  he  would  take  his  chances.  Grant  had  come  out  of  the  West 
with  his  laurels,  and  he  had  added  to  the  laurels  and  was  pushing  to 
the  final  conclusion.  If  there  ever  was  a  time  in  our  history  when  a 
general  might  consider  himself  as  of  some  importance  in  the  affairs 
of  this  country  more  than  from  a  military  point  of  view,  it  certainly 
was  in  March,  1865,  and  Grant  was  the  man  who  might  have  felt  it: 
and  Stanton  writes  a  curt  note  to  Grant  on  March  3,  "The  President 
directs  me  to  tell  you  that  in  your  conversations  with  General  Lee 
you  shall  discuss  nothing  except  the  terms  of  capitulation  or  minor  ■ 
military  matters."  These  are  absolute  instructions  from  the  master. 
"You  are  not  to  discuss  any  political  question  whatsoever  with  Gen- 
eral Lee.  These  the  President  reserves  entirely  to  himself.  In  the 
meantime,  push  on  your  military  advantage."  That  is  what  one  great 
war  showed  as  to  the  danger  of  militarism.  No,  gentlemen,  do  not 
fear  this  spectre. 

On  that  steep  road  which  leads  to  the  supremacy  of  civilian  au- 
thority and  the  sanctity  of  individual  rights,  from  Runymede  to  Gettys- 
burg, we  have  come  too  high.    We  shall  not  fall.     (Great  applause.) 

The  Chairman — I  am  requested  to  read  the  following  telegram, 
which  was  received  last  evening: 

"New  York,  January  20,  1916. 

National  Security  League, 

New  Willard  Hotel,  Washington,  D.  C. 

The  National  Wholesale  Dry  Goods  Assn.  at  its  annual  meeting 
held  today  unanimously  adopted  a  resolution  approving  the  plans  now 
being  made  by  the  National  Security  League  toward  the  education  of, 

112 


the  people  on  the  important  question  of  industrial  and  military  pre- 
paredness for  defense. 

Frank  S,  Evans,  President." 

The  third  topic  is,  The  American  Red  Cross,  and  it  is  with  very 
great  pleasure  that  I  present  one  whom  we  all  know  as  the  personifi- 
cation of  the  ideals  and  the  spirit  of  the  Red  Cross,  Miss  Mabel 
Boardman. 

THE  AMERICAN  RED  CROSS 
Miss  Mabel  Boardman 

Miss  Boardman — In  giving  our  moral  support  to  the  necessity  for 
preparedness  for  the  defense  of  our  country  and  the  rights  of  our 
people  we  must  not  forget  what  further  responsibilities  lie  upon  us  as 
individuals.  Congress  in  providing  appropriations  must  also  pass  tax- 
ation laws  for  the  raising  of  money  to  meet  such  appropriations. 
Therefore  our  first  responsibility  as  individuals  lies  in  meeting  finan- 
cial demands  willingly  from  our  own  purses  and  not  from  the  purses 
of  others.  Secondly,  a  responsibility  falls  upon  us  as  individuals  that 
will  provide  a  true  test  for  our  sincerity.  We  approve  of  an  adequate 
navy;  we  approve  of  an  adequate  army  and  cost  defenses;  we  approve 
of  the  training  of  our  young  men  to  fit  them  to  be  soldiers.  In  the 
centuries  of  man's  existence  his  invulnerability  to  weapons  of  warfare 
has  not  increased  one  iota,  whereas  the  inventive  genius  of  man  cre- 
ates today  the  most  terrible  weapons  ever  produced  for  the  destruction 
of  human  life.  Against  these  weapons  the  men  of  our  army  and  our 
navy  must  place  their  human  bodies  in  the  protection  of  their  country. 
These  men  have  a  right  to  receive  from  the  great  mass  of  their 
fellow-citizens  adequate  provision  for  the  proper  care  of  the  sick  and 
wounded.  In  war  all  government  energies  must  be  devoted  first  to 
fighting  forces.  No  medical  corps  of  any  army  has  been  or  ever  can 
be,  therefore,  equal  to  the  demands  that  war  will  make  upon  it.  Upon 
the  civilian  population,  therefore  falls  the  duty  of  being  adequately 
prepared  for  this  service. 

The  American  Red  Cross  has  a  definite  organization  for  such 
work.  It  has  two  great  departments — that  of  Military  Relief  and  that 
of  Civilian  Relief.    Under  the  Military  Relief  department,  of  which  an 

113 


army  surgeon  is  in  charge,  we  have  the  medical  bureau,  under  another 
army  surgeon,  with  its  divisions  for  the  male  personnel;  first  aid  in- 
structions, which  hias  trained  hundreds  of  thousands  of  industrial  em- 
ployees of  this  country  in  first  aid,  and  whose  services  may  be  utilized 
in  transportation  columns ;  its  first  aid  supply  sales  department,  keep- 
ing it  constantly  in  touch  with  the  manufacturers  of  hospital  supplies 
all  over  the  country.  Under  the  Nursing  Bureau  over  six  thousand 
(6,000)  of  the  best  graduate  trained  nurses  in  the  country  are  enrolled, 
with  their  names  on  file  in  the  Red  Cross  office.  Through  more  than 
100  state  and  local  committees  these  nurses  may  be  mobilized  on  short 
notice.  Patterns  and  samples  belong  under  this  bureau,  for  the  kind 
of  supplies  the  Surgeon  General's  office  of  the  army  and  navy  desire. 
Classes  for  lay  women  are  also  organized,  that  these  may  become 
nurses'  aids  in  case  of  war.  Under  the  regulations  issued  for  the 
American  Red  Cross  by  the  war  and  navy  departments,  field  and  hos- 
pital columns  of  its  trained  personnel  are  being  organized,  with  their 
full  equipments.  The  other  branches  of  these  departments  have  to  do 
with  warehouses,  supply  columns  (like  quartermasters'  departments), 
and  information  sections  for  the  securing  of  information  of  the  sick 
and  wounded  to  transmit  to  their  families. 

The  Civilian  Relief  Department,  which  has  charge  of  disaster 
relief  in  this  country  in  time  of  war,  would  have  the  care  of  the  fam- 
ilies of  soldiers,  their  widows  and  orphans,  the  permanently  crippled, 
the  unemployed,  and,  if  need  be,  the  refugees. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  the  organization  of  the  Red  Cross  for  its  pre- 
paredness for  service  in  time  of  war. 

Japan,  with  a  population  of  40,000,000  has  a  membership  in  its 
Red  Cross  of  1,800,000.  Germany,  with  a  population  of  67,000,000, 
has  more  than  a  million  members  in  its  Red  Cross,  700,000  of  whom  are 
German  women.  The  United  States,  with  a  population  of  100,000,000, 
contributes  to  this  great  international  organization  in  its  Red  Cross 
a  membership  of  27,000.  Japan  has  an  endowment  fund  of  thirteen 
million,  and  there  are  millions  in  the  endowment  funds  of  other  Red 
Cross  societies.  The  American  Red  Cross  has  an  endowment  of  less 
than  $900,000.  And  yet  with  this  meager  membership  and  this  small 
endowment  it  has  provided  already  a  definite  plan  and  has  an  organ- 
ization of  great  value.    It  is  far  from  perfect.    It  is  far  too  small. 

It  is  the  duty  of  every  man,  woman  and  child  in  this  country  to 

114 


do  their  share  in  adequately  preparing  for  the  care  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  men  who  defend  their  country,  through  the  medium  of  the 
American  Red  Cross,  the  official  organization  for  volunteer  relief  of 
the  United  States  Government,  created  by  Act  of  Congress  for  this 
purpose,  and  recognized  under  the  Treaty  of  Geneva  by  every  one  of 
the  signatory  powers.  Patriotism  is  not  a  virtue,  it  is  a  duty.  And 
only  by  active  participation  in  the  Red  Cross  may  we  give  expression 
to  our  patriotism. 

The  Chairman — The  fourth  topic  of  the  morning's  program  is 
Our  Naval  Inferiority  and  the  President's  Program.  I  take  pleasure 
in  introducing  Mr.  Charles  G.  Curti%. 

OUR  NAVAL  INFERIORITY;  THE  PRESIDENT'S  PROGRAM; 

THE  RELATION  OF  THE  SHIP-BUILDING  INDUSTRY 

TO  THE  PROBLEM  OF  A  LARGER  NAVY 

Charles  G.  Curtis,  New  York 

Mr.  Curtis — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  It  so  hap- 
pens that  my  business  for  the  last  fifteen  years  has  brought  me  in 
contact  with  warship  building  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  and 
with  the  admiralties  of  the  principal  countries,  so  that  I  have  had 
an  opportunity  to  learn  things  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  learn 
in  any  other  way.  I  suppose  this  is  why  I  have  been  asked  to  read 
this  paper.  The  title  of  the  paper  is  not  properly  given  in  the  an- 
nouncement. There  are  three  headings.  The  first  is,  "Our  Naval 
Inferiority,"  and  I  am  going  to  tell  you  in  a  very  condensed  way  how 
the  warships  we  have  been  building  in  recent  years  compare  with 
those  of  foreign  nations.  The  second  topic  is,  "The  President's  Pro- 
gram." The  third  topic  is,  "The  Relations  of  the  Ship-building  Indus- 
try to  the  Problem  of  a  Larger  Navy." 

Very  few  people  have  any  idea  of  the  present  state  of  the  Amer- 
ican Navy,  or  of  how  the  ships  we  have  been  building  in  recent  years 
compare  either  in  number  or  in  efficiency  with  those  of  other  nations. 
Still  fewer  realize  what  things  must  be  done  and  what  definite  govern- 
mental changes  must  take  place  before  we  can  build  up  such  a  Navy 
as  the  American  people  undoubtedly  want.  Popularly,  our  Navy  has 
been  considered  something  like  second  among  the  great  Powers,  but 

115 


this  is  far  from  the  truth  at  the  present  time.  And  yet  we  have  an 
accumulated  wealth  and  a  population  almost  equal  to  those  of  England 
and  Germany  combined,  with  many  thousand  miles  of  coast  to  defend. 
The  fact  is  that  warship  building  abroad  has  greatly  increased  in  the 
last  decade.  In  this  country  our  Congress  has  permitted  no  increase. 
Our  Navy  therefore  has  become  very  inferior  in  important  respects 
to  those  of  the  principle  Powers,  and  might  not  be  able  to  cope  with 
the  combined  fleets  of  some  of  the  minor  ones. 

Take  the  speed  of  our  warships,  for  example,  how  many  of  our 
citizens  know  that  while  other  nations  have  been  building  battleships 
capable  of  making  from  22  to '26  knots,  battle-cruisers  of  over  30 
knots  and  scouts  or  commerce  destroyers  of  30  knots,  the  United 
States  has  been  building  nothing  to  match  these  vessels  except  bat- 
tleships capable  of  making  21  ^^  knots, — and  very  few  of  them.  While 
other  nations  have  been  building  destroyers  of  36  knots,  we  have 
been  building  destroyers  of  only  30  knots.  The  foreign  battleships 
turned  out  in  the  last  few  years  are  provided  with  machinery  designed 
to  develop  from  40,000  to  55,000  horse  power  and  some  on  trial  have 
developed  as  much  as  75,000  horse  power.  Even  our  latest  battleships 
— those  just  ordered — will  not  be  able  to  develop  more  than  35,000 
horse  power. 

During  the  ten-year  period  preceding  the  war  England  laid  down 
34  battleships,  Germany  24  and  the  United  States  only  15. 

England  laid  down  10  battle-cruisers,  Germany  7  and  the  United 
States  none. 

England  laid  down  41  scout  cruisers,  Germany  22  and  the  United 
States  only  3  (none  in  the  last  ten  years). 

England  laid  down  167  destroyers,  Germany  120  and  the  United 
States  only  46. 

The  total  of  all  four  types  of  fighting  ships  is  252  for  England, 
173  for  Germany  and  64  for  the  United  States. 

Surprising  as  all  this  may  seem,  it  is  the  truth. 

How  incompetently  our  Government  has  dealt  with  the  naval] 
situation  can  best  be  seen  from  its  actions  during  the  last  five  years. 
In  the  three  years  just  before  the  war — 1911-12  and  13 — England! 
completed  and  put  in  service  18  capital  ships,  Germany  13  and  France] 
10.  The  United  States  in  the  same  time  and  with  full  knowledge  of j 
what  the  other  nations  were  doing  authorized  the  construction  of  only] 

116 


4  capital  ships.  Even  Japan — poor  as  she  was — put  into  service  4 
capital  ships.  Not  a  single  battle-cruiser  or  scout  cruiser  was  author- 
ized in  this  country.  To  grasp  what  this  means  one  must  bear  in  mind 
that  it  requires  at  least  four  years  to  build  and  put  in  service  one  of 
our  battleships  after  it  is  authorized  by  Congress,  so  that  the  ships 
ordered  during  this  period  would  not  become  available  until  4  years 
later.* 

Since  the  war  began,  England  and  Germany  have  suppressed  all 
information  as  to  what  ships  they  were  laying  down,  but  it  is  known 
that  there  has  been  a  tremendous  increase  in  both  countries.  It  is  said 
that  warship  orders  by  the  British  Navy  in  the  last  two  years  alone 
represent  a  tonnage  something  like  that  of  the  entire  United  States 
Navy.  France  in  1915  completed  5  battleships  and  has  9  more  in 
course  of  completion.  It  is  reported  that  the  construction  of  at  least 
8  battleships  and  8  battle-cruisers  is  provided  for  in  the  naval  program 
of  the  Japanese  Government  for  the  next  three  years.  Notwithstand- 
ing this  increase  in  foreign  construction,  which  includes  many  large 
and  very  fast  vessels,  and  the  lessons  of  the  war,  there  has  been  no 
increase  in  the  annual  naval  program  of  the  United  States.  Amazing 
as  it  may  seem,  orders  have  just  been  placed  for  only  2  battleships 
and  6  destroyers — the  usual  number — the  battleships  to  be  of  only 
20 1^  knots  and  the  destroyers  of  only  30  knots.  The  "Queen  Elizabeth" 
class  of  English  battleships  which  went  into  service  in  1914-15  has  a 
designed  speed  of  25  knots,  but  these  ships  will  undoubtedly  make 
26  knots.  The  destroyers  which  came  out  at  the  same  time  have  a 
designed  speed  of  35  knots,  but  will  undoubtedly  make  37  or  38  knots ; 
whereas  our  destroyers  with  possibly  two  or  three  exceptions  are  not 
capable  of  making  more  than  31  knots.  Many  of  the  foreign  battle- 
cruisers  are  very  fast— over  30  knots — one  being  reported  to  have  made 
33  knots.  No  orders  have  been  placed  in  this  country  for  battle- 
cruisers  which  the  present  war  has  shown  to  be  so  important.  Neither 
have  any  been  placed  for  high  speed  small  or  scout  cruisers  which 
have  cut  such  a  figure  as  commerce  destroyers.  The  submarines 
which  we  have  in  service  are  very  poor  affairs,  and  are  quite  unequal 
to  the  work  they  would  be  called  upon  to  perform  in  any  serious  naval 
situation. 


*  At  the  conclusion  of  this  address  is  given  a  table  showing  the  ships 
authorized  by  the  different  nations  in  each  of  the  10  years  preceding  the  war. 

117 


Our  ships,  though  lacking  in  speed,  are  well  designed,  and  some 
are  well  built,  and  they  are  equipped  with  good  guns  and  armor,  the 
number  of  large  guns  on  each  ship  being  greater  than  in  any  of  the 
foreign  battleships  of  which  we  have  knowledge. 

The  personnel  of  our  Navy  also,  though  dangerously  limited  in 
number,  is  most  admirable  in  every  way  and  I  believe  superior,  man 
for  man,  particularly  so  far  as  capacity  for  clever  action  in  emergency 
is  concerned,  to  that  of  any  other  nation.  No  finer  set  of  men  can  be 
found  in  any  organization  or  with  greater  capacity  to  get  results  if 
they  are  given  the  opportunity.  But  at  the  present  time  we  have 
nothing  like  enough  officers  to  man  our  ships,  and  it  is  absolutely 
essential  that  steps  be  taken  to  secure  a  large  increase  without  further 
delay. 

In  giving  these  figures  showing  how  painfully  out  of  date  our 
Navy  has  become,  I  do  not  mean  to  reflect  in  any  way  on  the  General 
Board  of  the  Navy  or  on  the  heads  of  the  departments  who  have  de- 
signed the  ships.  These  officers  have  been  men  of  great  ability  and 
knowledge  of  the  subject  and  have  always  had  the  best  interests  of  the 
Navy  at  heart,  but  they  have  labored  under  great  difficulties.  In- 
stead of  being  allowed  by  Congress  to  build  what  ships  they  thought 
the  country  ought  to  have,  they  were  compelled  year  after  year  to 
limit  their  program  substantially  to  a  couple  of  battleships  and  a  few 
destroyers,  and  they  selected  the  heavily  armored  and  therefore  slow- 
speed  type  of  battleships,  and  the  moderate  speed  but  substantially 
built  type  of  destroyers  to  accompany  such  battleships,  because  they 
thought  these  types  best  suited  to  the  defence  of  the  country.  Thus 
they  had  good  reasons  for  their  decisions,  and  cannot  be  held  responsi- 
ble for  the  results. 

The  records  of  the  last  thirteen  years  showing  the  ships  recom- 
mended by  the  General  Board,  those  recommended  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  and  those  authorized  by  Congress,  and  given  in  a  table 
at  the  end  of  this  paper,  are  very  interesting.  They  show  clearly  that 
in  every  year  Congress  has  cut  to  pieces  the  recommendations  of  the 
General  Board  and  has  been  responsible  for  the  results.  I  regret  to 
say  that  in  many  instances  our  civilian  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and 
often  our  President  have  been  equally  blameworthy.  With  a  few  ex- 
ceptions our  Secretaries  have  failed  to  endorse  the  recommendations 
of  the  General  Board  for  no  adequate  reasons.    In  1903  the  General 

118 


Board  proposed  and  laid  out  an  excellent  building  prograni  covering 
a  period  of  fifteen  years.  Had  Congress  looked  into  the  matter  for 
itself  and  followed  the  program  of  the  General  Board  we  should  now 
have  a  Navy  very  different  from  the  one  in  existence.  Examination 
of  the  records  or  a  talk  with  our  best  naval  officers  at  once  brings  out 
the  fact  that  interference  with  the  plans  of  our  technical  advisers 
year  after  year  by  a  Congress  knowing  nothing  of  the  requirements 
and  inspired  mainly  by  considerations  of  political  compromise  has 
blocked  the  progress  of  our  Navy  in  the  most  improper  way.  In  my 
judgment  the  American  people  should  now  put  a  stop  to  this  way  of 
legislating. 

While  many  of  our  Secretaries  have  yielded  to  the  political  at- 
mosphere of  Washington  which  exerts  such  a  powerful  though  un- 
conscious influence  upon  almost  every  one  connected  with  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  have  substituted  their  own  views  for  those  of  our  tech- 
nical advisers,  there  have  been  a  few  marked  exceptions.  Secretary 
Metcalf,  under  the  Roosevelt  Administration,  adopted  the  full  program 
of  the  General  Board  without  change,  and  Secretary  Meyer,  under  the 
Taft  Administration  had  the  courage  to  support  vigorously  the  rec- 
ommendations of  the  Board  and  pointed  out  the  many  serious  features 
of  our  naval  situation.  Had  his  reports  been  written  yesterday  instead 
of  before  the  war  they  could  not  have  given  a  more  correct  picture 
of  the  situation  and  the  dangers  which  confront  the  American  people. 
Notwithstanding  the  strong  common  sense  of  Secretary  Meyer's  re- 
ports. Congress  ignored  his  recommendations  completely  and  elim- 
inated two-thirds  of  the  important  ships  he  advocated. 

Instead  of  following  in  the  path  of  Secretary  Meyer  the  present 
Administration  has  gone  back  to  the  old  way  of  doing  things.  Six 
months  ago  it  called  upon  the  General  Board  for  a  special  report  on 
our  naval  requirements,  and  on  July  30th  the  Board  presented  a  report 
urging  a  large  and  immediate  increase  of  our  ships  and  specifying 
a  definite  building  program  which  it  thought  essential  for  defense. 
The  Administration  instead  of  disclosing  this  report  called  upon  the 
Board  for  a  different  report  limited  to  a  much  smaller  expenditure 
($100,000,000  instead  of  $265,000,000  involved  in  the  Board's  report), 
and  then  proceeded  to  recommend  to  Congress  this  much  more  limited 
program.  Why  the  President  or  the  Secretary  should  feel  justified 
in  suppressing  this  report  and  should  assume  to  have  better  knowledge 

119 


of  the  subject  than  the  experts  of  the  Navy  I  do  not  know,  but  such 
seems  to  have  been  the  fact. 

ADMINISTRATION  PROGRAM. 

This  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  Administration's  program, 
which,  with  that  urged  by  the  General  Board  six  months  ago,  are  given 
below : 

'  Table. 


Year  to  be  Authorized 


Battleships  

Battle  cruisers 

Scout  cruisers  

Destroyers 

Fleet  submarines   

Coast  submarines  

Gunboats  

Hospital  ships  

Ammunition  ships    . . . .  , 

Fuel  oil  ships 

Repair  ships 

Destroyer  tenders 

Fleet  submarine  tenders. 

Supply  ships    , 

Transports 


General 

Board's 

Program 

July 

Report 


1916 


4 
4 
6 

23 
7 

30 
6 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 


President's  Program 


2 
2 
3 

15 
5 

25 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 


1917 

1918 

1919 

2 

2 

2 

0 

1 

2 

1 

2 

2 

10 

5 

LO 

4 

2 

2 

15 

15 

15 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

1 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 
1 
2 

10 
2 

15 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 


Passing  over  the  question  of  whether  the  Administration  pro- 
gram is  adequate  or  not,  it  will  be  noted  that  it  calls  for  only  2  battle- 
cruisers  and  3  scout  cruisers  the  first  year,  with  no  battle-cruisers 
and  only  one  scout  cruiser  the  second  year.  If  this  plan  were  carried 
out  there  would  be  a  period  of  two  years  after  these  battle-cruisers 
were  completed  during  which  they  would  have  to  travel  about  and  go 
into  action  substantially  alone,  if  at  all,  because  none  of  our  other 
ships  except  possibly  a  few  destroyers  which  may  be  built  simultane- 
ously would  have  speed  enough  to  accompany  them,  and  there  would 
be  an  excellent  chance  of  their  being  promptly  wiped  out  by  a  larger 


120 


Bquadron  of  the  same  type  of  ship.  Four  is  the  very  least  number 
of  battle-cruisers  that  should  be  ordered  the  first  year.  Again,  since 
we  have  no  scout  cruisers  (except  3  built  eight  years  ago  and  too 
antiquated  to  consider)  only  four  of  this  very  necessary  type  will  be 
available  for  two  years  after  completion.  These  four  will  be  of  little 
use  in  the  event  of  war  either  as  scouts,  convoys  or  commerce  de- 
stroyers. 

Another  feature  of  the  Administration's  program  is  the  elimina- 
tion by  one  stroke  of  the  pen  of  the  last  eleven  ships  recommended  by 
the  Board — all  essential  to  an  effective  Navy,  and  yet  eliminated  with 
trifling  exceptions  for  the  next  five  years.  The  Board  recommends  one 
ammunition  ship  immediately.  The  records  show  that  we  have  no 
ammunition  ship  at  present,  and  yet  the  program  provides  none  until 
the  fourth  year.  The  Board  thinks  that  4  additional  fuel  ships  are 
needed  the  first  year,  and  yet  the  President  provides  none  the  first 
year,  and  only  one  covering  the  next  three  years.  The  Board  recom- 
mends one  repair  ship.  We  have  none  now,  but  the  President  post- 
pones its  construction  until  the  fifth  year.  The  Board  recommends  2 
submarine  tenders  immediately.  The  President  provides  none  in  his 
five-year  program.  We  have  only  2  of  this  type,  but  they  were  built 
four  or  five  years  ago  and  are  out  of  date.  Imagine  our  submarines 
going  into  action  with  no  tenders  at  all  for  the  next  six  or  seven  years 
except  our  present  antiquated  ones  which  are  entirely  unfit  for  the 
work.  In  my  opinion  it  is  nothing  short  of  a  crime  to  ask  our  naval 
officers  to  risk  their  lives  in  submarines  unless  these  vessels  are  the 
best  that  can  be  built  and  are  accompanied  by  as  many  tenders  for 
their  safety  as  can  possibly  be  used  to  advantage.  If  our  Executive  or 
our  Congressmen  could  experience  a  little  real  submarine  life  under 
conditions  of  war  they  would  see  a  new  light. 

Shortly  after  the  General  Board's  report  had  been  made  public 
I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  saying  that  it  seemed  very  un- 
wise to  so  cut  down  the  Board's  program  and  that  it  would  be  danger- 
ous to  build  only  2  battle-cruisers  and  so  few  scout  cruisers  at  present. 
I  asked  for  the  reasons  for  his  radical  changes  and  whether  these 
changes  were  the  result  of  consultation  with  naval  experts.  If  so, 
would  he  permit  me  to  talk  with  these  experts  to  obtain  their  views 
before  forming  an  opinion. 

121 


To  this  the  Secretary  repHed  as  follows: 

"I  am  in  receipt  of  your  favor  of  the  31st  and  in  reply  to 
your  inquiries  I  send  you  under  another  cover  a  copy  of  my 
Annual  Report  which  gives  my  full  reasons." 

If  anyone  can  find  in  this  Report  any  reasons  for  the  Secretary's 
action  other  than  a  desire  to  economize  I  hope  he  will  point  it  out.  I 
quote  from  page  5: 

"The  General  Board  is  influenced  by  its  professional 
views,  while  an  Administration  takes  into  consideration  the 
whole  National  policy  and  does  not  overlook  the  question  of 
National  revenues." 

Is  it  a  proper  function  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  ignore 
and  suppress  the  advice  of  his  technical  advisers  and  base  his  report 
to  Congress  upon  his  own  views  on  the  subject  of  National  economy? 
It  needs  no  expert  to  see  how  little  consideration  has  been  given  to  the 
Administration  program  and  how  devoid  of  merit  it  is. 

Adequacy  of  the  President's  Program. 

How  many  people  of  this  country  realize  what  it  means  to  furnish 
naval  protection  for  the  coast  of  the  United  States  and  also  for  the 
Panama  Canal,  without  considering  Alaska,  the  Philippines,  or  Ha- 
waii? The  case  is  well  put  by  Admiral  Fiske  in  his  admirable  paper 
on  "Naval  Policy"  in  the  North  American  Review  for  January,  which 
I  commend  to  everyone  interested  in  the  subject.    Admiral  Fiske  says: 

"They  (meaning  the  people)  do  not  take  even  the  first 
step  towards  formulating  a  naval  policy  because  they  do  not 
study  the  'mission'  of  the  Navy;  that  is,  they  do  not  study 
the  International  and  National  situations  in  their  bearing  on 
the  need  for  a  Navy." 
He  well  says : 

"We  have  no  military  power  as  our  ally  and  therefore 
must  be  ready  to  meet  alone  a  hostile  attack  from  another 
foreign  power.  To  see  that  this  is  true  it  is  merely  necessary 
to  note  the  facts  of  history  and  observe  how  nations  that  long 
have  been  on  terms  of  friendship  have  suddenly  found  them- 
selves at  war  with  each  other  and  how  countries  which  have 


122 


always  been  hostile  have  found  themselves  fighting  side  by 
side.  In  the  present  war  Great  Britain  is  *  *  *  fighting 
the  country  to  which,  more  than  any  other,  she  is  bound  by 
ties  of  consanguinity  and  common  interest." 

One  can  readily  imagine  a  situation  with  two  or  more  powers 
combined  against  us  where  it  would  be  impossible  to  protect  the 
United  States  and  the  Panama  Canal  and  at  the  same  time  defend  the 
Philippines  and  Hawaii.  In  my  opinion,  the  American  people  may 
as  well  make  up  their  minds  to  run  the  risk  of  losing  these  latter 
possessions  under  conditions  which  may  arise  and  that  it  will  be  quite 
all  that  we  can  do  to  make  sure  of  defending  the  United  States,  Alaska 
and  the  Panama  Canal.  The  tremendous  length  of  coastline  to  be 
defended,  the  remoteness  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  its  exposure  on 
both  oceans  and  on  both  sides  to  land  attacks  make  the  problem  an 
extremely  difficult  one.  If  we  are  going  to  defend  our  western  coast 
and  the  western  end  of  the  Panama  Canal,  we  should,  in  the  opinion 
of  many  well  qualified  to  judge,  keep  a  substantial  fleet  on  the  Pacific 
in  addition  to  that  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  At  any  moment  both  these 
coasts  and  both  sides  of  the  Panama  Canal,  which  is  thousands  of 
miles  from  our  nearest  coast  line,  could  be  attacked  simultaneously  by 
two  powers  working  together  or  possibly  by  one  power. 

It  does  not  require  an  expert  therefore  to  see  that  unless  we  can 
rely  upon  the  co-operation  of  some  other  strong  naval  power,  or  unless 
the  other  countries  which  might  attack  us  undertake  to  disarm  we 
shall  need  a  Navy  at  least  as  strong  as  that  outlined  in  the  July  re- 
port of  the  General  Board.  Admiral  Fiske  truly  says  the  problem  of 
defense. 

"more  than  any  other  problem  before  the  country  is  urgent; 
because  in  no  other  problem  have  we  so  much  lost  time  to 
make  up,  and  in  no  other  work  of  the  Government  are  we  so 
far  behind  the  great  nations  that  we  may  have  to  contend 
against." 

It  has  been  said  in  support  of  the  President's  program  that  the 
capacities  of  our  private  and  Government  yards  combined  are  inade- 
quate to  deal  with  a  larger  program.  This  view  of  the  matter  was 
exnressed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  the  banquet  of  the  Automo- 

123 


bile  Engineers  in  New  York  on  January  5th.    I  quote  from  a  copy  of 
his  address  which  the  Secretary  himself  sent  to  me: 

"The  Navy  program  for  new  construction  will  tax  the 
capacity  of  the  shipbuilding  yards,  private  and  Government, 
and  if  Congress  should  order  a  larger  program  it  could  not 
be  carried  out  in  any  reasonable  time  unless  conditions  were 
so  critical  as  to  cause  private  shipbuilding  yards  to  quit  work 
on  merchant  ships  and  concentrate  on  fighting  ships." 
Again  he  said : 

"With  the  adoption  by  Congress  of  the  program  recom- 
mended every  resource  of  shipbuilding  establishments  will  be 
taxed  to  the  fullest  for  their  construction  in  a  reasonable  tim.e. 
Is  it  wise  to  order  larger  constructions  now  when  every  well- 
informed  man  knows  no  larger  program  can  be  carried  out 
unless  the  Government  compels  private  yards  to  stop  work  on 
merchant  ships  and  concentrate  on  naval  craft?" 

I  have  gone  into  this  question  carefully  with  the  shipbuilders,  and 
I  do  not  find  that  such  is  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  the  shipbuilders 
inform  me  that  they  stand  ready  to  enlarge  their  yards  promptly,  so 
that  they  will  be  able  to  handle  such  a  program  as  the  General  Board 
recommends,  provided  they  have  reasonable  assurance  of  a  continu- 
ing business  and  under  conditions  that  will  yield  a  reasonable  profit. 
I  quote  from  letters  I  have  recently  received  from  these  companies: 

"There  is  no  question  but  that  the  principal  shipbuilders 
can  be  put  in  position  to  deal  effectively  with  a  program  such 
as  arranged  by  the  General  Board,  and  if  this  Company  were 
assured  of  Contracts  for  a  correspondingly  large  amount  of 
tonnage  under  terms  which  would  give  a  reasonable  profit  if 
would  make  the  enlargement  to  carry  out  the  work." 
Another  company  writes: 

"In  my  judgment,  the  principal  shipyards  can  be  put  in 
condition  to  effectively  deal  with  a  larger  program,  and  I  un- 
derstand that  some  are  now  being  put  in  this  condition.  I 
think  we  would  be  entirely  willing  to  make  the  necessary  en- 
largements of  our  plant  if  we  felt  that  we  would  get  the 

124 


contract  when  we  were  the  lowest  best  responsible  bidder, 
and  by  bid  I  do  not  mean  estimate." 
Other  Companies  express  the  same  views. 

Up  to  a  week  ago,  the  principal  shipbuilders  had  not  been  con- 
sulted in  any  way  about  the  matter  by  the  Government. 

The  Scientific  American  of  January  8th  says  editorially: 

"To  show  what  could  be  done,  the  Scientific  American  re- 
cently made  an  investigation,  with  the  assistance  of  one  of  the 
leading  officers  of  our  Navy,  and  found  that  with  the  enlarge- 
ment of  existing  building  ways  and  by  the  construction  of 
additional  ways,  both  at  the  government  and  private  yards,  it 
would  be  possible  to  take  care  of  the  nine  dreadnaughts  which 
are  at  present  under  construction  or  authorized  and,  by  Janu- 
ary 1st,  1917,  to  have  twelve  additional  dreadnaughts  under 
construction." 

Without  intending  any  offensive  criticism  of  our  Executive  Of- 
ficers, I  ask  whether  it  is  fair  to  the  public  or  to  the  shipbuilders  to 
give  out  such  misleading  information.  Why  did  not  the  Administra- 
tion six  months  ago  call  in  the  shipbuilders  as  any  level-headed  business 
man  would  have  done  and  say,  "Here,  gentlemen,  is  a  serious  situation. 
This  country  has  got  to  build  a  larger  Navy,  How  are  we  going  to  do 
it?  Will  you  co-operate  and  advise  us  in  the  matter  and  let  us  know 
what  is  necessary  to  put  your  yards  in  condition  to  carry  out  the  advice 
of  our  naval  experts?  Instead  of  this,  the  shipbuilders  are  not  even 
sounded  in  the  matter,  but  are  kept  at  arms  length  as  if  they  could  not 
be  trusted  and  as  if  their  advice  and  co-operation  were  of  no  value. 

Whether  the  American  people  through  Congress  will  now  rise  to 
the  emergency  and  vote  an  adequate  defense,  or  fail  to  do  this,  and  then 
when  war  comes  pay  an  unspeakable  penalty,  as  England  has  done,  is 
a  question  which  seems  to  be  just  hanging  in  the  balance. 

But  even  if  the  people  should  so  decide,  there  is  one  thing  as  sure 
as  "death  and  taxes"  and  that  is  that  we  cannot  build  up  and  maintain 
a  proper  Navy  under  any  such  regime  as  has  existed  in  the  last 
decade, — involving  congressional  interference,  inadequate  and  irreg- 
ular appropriations,  political  pressure,  absurd  muzzling  of  our  officers 
and  shifting  them  about  frequently  from  one  position  to  another  and, 

125 


last  but  not  least,  unfair  methods  and  discouraging  treatment  of  the 
shipbuilders  by  the  Navy  Department.  In  regard  to  this  last  point 
I  will  give  the  substance  of  a  letter  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  last 
summer : 

"The  first  point  which  I  wish  to  make  is  that  a  country 
cannot  have  a  great  Navy  unless  it  has  great  shipbuilders, 
and  it  cannot  have  great  shipbuilders  unless  the  shipbuilding 
business  is  profitable  and  is  conducted  on  lines  to  attract  cap- 
ital, brains  and  energy.  This  has  been  pre-eminently  the  case 
in  England  and  Germany  where  the  ablest  and  most  resource- 
ful men  of  the  country  have  been  for  years  attracted  to  that 
line  of  activity.  In  my  opinion  it  is  quite  out  of  the  question 
that  the  United  States  should  have  a  proper  Navy  except 
through  the  hearty  co-operation  of  shipbuilders  who  must 
be  financially  strong,  so  that  they  can  command  a  high  class 
of  talent,  can  buy  their  materials  cheaply  and  conduct  their 
business  on  a  scale  which  will  insure  the  best  designs,  the 
highest  class  of  workmanship  and  the  most  economical  manu- 
facture. 

"I  have  no  interest  in  any  of  the  shipbuilding  companies, 
but  I  am  convinced  that  the  policy  pursued  by  our  Gov- 
ernment heretofore  in  dealing  with  these  companies  has  "been 
most  unwise. 

"As  a  disinterested  observer  of  the  working  of  our 
Navy  Department  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  United 
States  Navy  has  had  to  pay  heavy  penalties  in  various  ways — 
quality  of  work,  inferior  design,  slow  construction,  etc.,  on 
account  of  this  mistaken  policy  and  I  do  not  think  it  will  ever 
get  the  kind  of  ships  it  ought  to  have  until  this  policy  is 
reversed." 

I  often  wonder  that  the  shipbuilders  are  willing  to  do  business 
with  the  Government  at  all.  Recently  these  concerns  went  to  great 
trouble  and  expense  to  put  themselves  in  condition  to  build  the  two 
battleships  just  awarded  to  the  Navy  Yards.  The  President  of  one 
of  the  companies  told  me  that  he  was  ready  to  spend  a  million  dollars 
in  enlarging  his  plant  if  he  secured  one  of  the  ships,  so  as  to  get 
the  ship  out  as  quickly  as  possible.    Another  made  a  similar  statement. 

126 


After  roundly  abusing  the  companies  for  putting  in  bids  which  the 
Secretary  claimed  were  excessively  high,  he  decides  to  award  both  ships 
to  the  Navy  Yards — basing  his  decision  upon  the  point  that  the  bids 
with  some  small  items  added  would  exceed  the  appropriation  by  some 
trifling  amount  and  therefore  the  contracts  must  not  be  given  to  the 
shipbuilders.  The  facts  is  that  the  bids  were  higher  than  the  De- 
partment's original  estimates  because  the  prices  of  material  and  labor 
have  gone  up  greatly.  It  now  develops  that  one  of  the  Navy  Yards 
cannot  lay  the  keel  of  one  of  these  ships  for  another  year,  and  that  it 
may  be  several  years  before  the  keel  of  the  other  ship  can  be  laid. 
What  better  illustration  could  we  have  of  the  incapacity  of  our  Gov- 
ernmental machinery  to  deal  with  an  important  situation.  Imagine 
the  English  Government  in  such  an  emergency  rejecting  bids  of  private 
shipyards  with  their  superior  building  facilities  and  thus  postponing 
the  completion  of  its  entire  battleship  program  for  at  least  one  and 
more  likely  two  or  three  years.  I  quote  from  a  letter  recently  received 
from  one  of  the  shipbuilders: 

"The  Secretary  is  apparently  a  profound  believer  in  doing 
^  everything  in  the  Navy  Yard  and  as  little  as  possible  by 
^t  private  contract.  This  Departmental  policy  discourages  plant 
^B     extension  except  for  assured  business." 

Another  writes: 

"With  the  present  attitude  of  the  Government  in  regard 

to  doing  work  in  Navy  Yards  our  stockholders  would  not  be 

justified  in  putting  out  any   new  money  to  compete  with 

Government  construction." 

Others  tell  the  same  story. 

I  This  brings  up  the  question  of  the  comparative  cost  to  the  Gov- 

ernment of  ships  built  in  the  Navy  Yard  and  those  built  in  private 
I  yards, — a  question  which  interests  Congress  and  the  public  very 
much.  The  present  Secretary  of  the  Navy  contends  that  warships 
built  in  the  Navy  Yard  cost  less,  while  the  shipbuilders  contend  that 
:  they  cost  more — in  fact  a  great  deal  more.  The  Navy  Department 
I  has  adopted  certain  methods  of  book-keeping  and  the  shipbuilders 
I  maintain  that  these  methods  are  radically  wrong  and  leave  out  many 
I  items  which  should  be  included  and  are  so  large  as  to  make  an  enor- 
!  mous  difference  in  the  result.     I  have  no  doubt  from  the  carefully 


127 


I 


prepared  evidence  I  have  seen  which  has  recently  been  placed  in  the 
hands  of  one  of  our  Senators  that  the  shipbuilders'  contention  is 
correct  and  that  the  Government's  methods  of  deterimning  cost  are 
wrong. 

But  how  idle  it  is  for  the  Government  to  continue  a  dispute  of 
this  kind.  Why  not  put  impartial  Expert  Accountants  on  the  Gov- 
ernment's books  and  have  them  determine  the  facts  on  a  correct 
book-keeping  basis.  In  a  letter  to  the  shipbuilders  I  suggested  this, 
and  I  quote  from  their  replies: 

"I  think  it  would  be  a  good  idea  to  have  competent 
accountants     report     on     the     Government's     book-keeping 
methods." 
From  another  — 

"It  would  be  a  good  thing  to  have  public  accountants  in- 
vestigate the  matter  as  to  the  real  cost  to  the  Government  of 
Navy  Yard-built  ships  provided  the  investigators  were  free 
and  untrammelled  to  report  the  facts  as  they  found  them." 
From  another  — 

"It  seems  to  me  that  if  the  Government  wanted  to  know 
the  cost  of  its  work  it  should  pay  qualified  public  accountants 
experienced  in  shipbuilding  affairs  to  investigate  charges  as 
now  made  in  their  building  yards,  with  a  view  to  determinng 
a  system  that  would  show  the  real  cost  of  the  work." 

In  regard  to  the  cost  of  warships  built  in  Government  Yards  one 
of  the  shipbuilders  says: 

"Warships  built  in  Navy  Yards  cost  the  Navy  much  more 
than  sister  ships  built  in  private  yards  and  the  Govern- 
ment's estimates  are  entirely  incorrect.  You  have  in  your 
possession  full  data  on  this  subject. 

"Only  recently  in  the  Naval  appropriation  Congress  voted 
$1,500,000  extra  for  a  battleship  to  be  built  in  a  Navy  Yard 
beyond  the  amount  to  build  the  same  one  in  a  private  yard." 
From  another  shipbuilder 

"I  think  warships  built  in  Navy  Yards  actually  cost  very 
much  more  than  those  built  in  private  yards.  Many  hundred 
of  thousands  of  dollars  of  direct  labor  costs  with  us  do  not 

128 


i 


appear  in  the  Government's  estimates  at  all,  and  we  do  not 
know  how  much  indirect  cost  is  left  out,  but  a  large  amount 
certainly  is." 

An  appeal  should  at  once  be  made  to  Congress  or  to  the  President 
to  have  this  question  investigated  by  impartial  accountants  and  the 
results  made  public  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  so  that  the  people 
of  this  country  may  know  the  truth. 

Another  point  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  is  continually 
harping  on  is  the  profit  made  by  the  shipbuilders  on  Government 
business,  which  he  claims  is  excessive.  From  what  I  have  learned 
about  the  shipbuilding  business,  quite  the  contrary  is  the  truth.  None 
of  the  large  shipbuilding  companies  have  paid  dividends  for  many 
years,  and  under  the  conditions  existing,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the 
average  profit  has  been  anything  like  as  much  as  that  on  private  work 
or  large  enough  to  justify  the  investment.  I  quote  from  letters 
recently  received  from  the  shipbuilders: 

"Taking  the  last  25  vessels  completed  for  the  United 
States  Navy,  the  gross  profit  on  our  Government  work  has  not 
equalled  a  percentage  that  would  represent  a  fair  depreciation 
to  cover  the  use  of  the  plant." 
From  another 

"The  profits  from  individual  contracts  from  the  Govern- 
ment have  not  been  sufficient  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  plant 
and  six  per  cent  on  the  capital  investment." 

Conclusions 

What  is  the  moral  to  be  drawn  from  all  these  facts,  which  are 
brought  out  to  show  how  utterly  unfitted  the  present  machinery 
of  our  Government  is  to  deal  with  our  major  Naval  problems.  The 
moral  is,  get  busy  at  once  and  do  the  best  we  can  with  a  bad  situation. 
Follow  the  advice  of  the  General  Board  and  adopt  its  program  without 
further  delay;  enlist  the  co-operation  of  the  shipbuilders  and  have 
both  the  private  and  the  Government  Yards  put  into  condition  to 
build  warships  with  the  greatest  practicable  rapidity.  Hereafter 
deal  with  the  shipbuilding  concerns  on  a  businesslike  basis  with  the 

129 


view  that  they  as  well  as  the  Government  shall  prosper  and  become 
the  great  Naval  asset  they  ought  to  be. 

A  far  better  method  than  the  present  one  would  be  to  have  the 
price  of  warships  fixed  by  a  permanent  commission, — like  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission. 

At  the  same  time  we  should  do  what  every  othei-  civilized  country 
has  done,  establish  a  Board  or  body  of  men — performing  the  same 
general  functions  as  the  German  General  Staff — but  not  appointed  by 
the  Secretary  and  wholly  free  from  his  influence  or  that  of  politics. 
This  Board  or  Staff  should  be  permanent,  and  its  members  should  be 
qualified  by  experience,  training  and  ability  to  deal  cleverly  with  the 
various  elements  of  the  problem.  Essentially  these  are :  Which  of  our 
possessions  are  we  going  to  protect,  and  against  what  possible  foes. 
What  Naval  forces  ought  we  to  have  to  furnish  this  protection.  What 
facilities  are  available  or  must  be  created  for  this  purpose,  and  what 
kind  of  an  organization  is  necessary  to  carry  out  the  program  and  to 
provide  the  "trained  skill  in  strategy  necessary  to  direct  the  move- 
ments of  its  forces"  which  Admiral  Fiske  wisely  says  is  "the  most 
valuable  asset  in  the  real  crisis  of  a  nation's  life." 

Our  present  method  of  managing  the  Navy  by  a  civilian  Secretary 
changed  every  four  years,  and  more  or  less  involved  in  politics  is  the 
height  of  absurdity.  The  managing  director  should  be  a  permanent 
officer — not  changing  with  each  administration — and  should  be  trained 
in  the  methods  and  the  policy  of  the  organization.  He  should  be 
obliged  to  carry  out  the  views  of  the  General  Staff.  Congress  should 
also  feel  bound  to  carry  them  out  unless  it  has  reasons  for  doing 
otherwise  very  different  from  any  that  have  existed  in  the  last  fifteen 
years.  Without  such  a  body  and  without  such  change  in  policy  as  will 
really  develop  the  shipbuilding  industry  we  will  surely  continue  to 
have  a  most  unsatisfactory  navy,  and  a  very  costly  one  considering  its 
efficiency. 

Our  general  method  of  shaping  legislation  for  both. the  Army  and 
the  Navy  should  also  be  changed.  Such  vital  matters  should  not  be 
left  to  "Naval"  and  "Military"  Committees  of  Congress  which  have  no 
technical  knowledge,  change  frequently,  and  are  too  much  involved  in 
politics,  but  should  be  dealt  with  by  an  independent  body  or  "Council 
of  Defense"  comprising  a  considerable  proportion  of  qualified  experts. 

130 


By  bringing  together  in  one  general  committee  Members  of  the 
General  Staffs  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  Members  of  Congress,  some 
of  the  Cabinet  Officers  and  preferably  some  practical  business  men  or 
manufacturers  a  Council  could  be  obtained  better  qualified  to  act  wisely 
and  to  harmonize  the  views  of  the  different  branches  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  recommendations  of  the  General  Staffs  should  receive  final 
action  by  such  a  Council  of  Defense,  and  its  conclusions,  though  subject 
technically  to  Congressional  approval,  should  be  respected  and  in 
practice  followed  by  both  the  Senate  and  the  House  without  material 
alteration.  The  formation  of  a  Council  of  Defense  with  suitable  Army 
and  Navy  Staffs  is  the  very  first  thing  that  Congress  should  do,  be- 
cause Congress  is  not  qualified  to  decide  these  questions  and  should 
not  understake  to  act  until  it  has  before  it  the  recommendations  of  a 
competent  body. 

Shall  we  take  the  kind  of  action  now  that  will  deter  other  nations 
from  attacking  us,  or  shall  we  wait,  and  some  day  be  startled  from 
our  complacency  by  the  horrors  of  war? 

Construction  Recommended  and  Authorized  since  1903. 


Recommended  by  the 
General  Board. 


1903. 


2  battleships  

1  armored  cruiser  . . 

3  protected  cruisers. 

4  scout  cruisers  . . . . 


2  fuel  ships  . 

3  deystroyers 


1904. 

3  battleships  

6  destroyers   

scout  cruisers  

torpedo  boats   

fuel  ships   

gunboat    

river  gunboats   

Philippine  gunboats. . 


$850,000  for  submarines. 


Recommended  by  the 

Secretary  of  the 

Navy. 


(Secretary  Moody.) 

2  hospital  ships 

1  battleshipa  

1  armored   cruisera. . 

3  protected  cruisersa 

2  to  4  scout  cruisersa 

2  submarines    

2  fuel   shipsa 


(Secretary   Morton.) 

3  battleships^   

6  destroyers   (if  prac 
ticable)  b    


Authorized  by 
Congress. 


(Act  of  1904.) 

1  battleship. 

2  armored  cruisers. 

3  scout  cruisers. 

4  submarines. 
2  fuel  ships. 


(Act  of  1905.) 
2  battleships. 


131 


Recommended  by  the 

Recommended  by  the 

Authorized  by 

General  Board. 

Secretary  of  the 
Navy. 

Congress. 

1905. 

(Secretary   Bona- 

(Act of  1906.) 

3  battleships  

parte)  . 

1  gunboat   

2  battleships   

1  battleship. 

2  river  gunboats  

3  scout  cruisers  

1  gunboat   

2  river  gunboats  . . . 

4  destroyers 

2  scout  cruisers  

4  submarines    

4  destroyers    

3  destroyers. 

4  torpedo  boats  

2  submarines    

8  submaries. 

2  small  gunboats 

1906. 

(Secretary  Bona- 

(Act of  1907.) 

2  battleships  

parte.) 
1  battleship,       and, 

1  gunboat   

with  hesitation,  2. 

1  battleship. 

2  river  gunboats  

2  gunboats    

4  destroyers   

3  river  gunboats  .  . . 

2  fuel  ships 

4  destroyers    

2  destroyers. 

4  ships'  torpedo  boats . . . 

2  fuel  ships    

2  scout  cruisers  

4  ships'  torpedo  boats 

2  small  gunboats 

1  ammunition  ship 

1907. 

(Secretary  Metcalf.) 

(Act  of  1908.) 

4  battleships  

4  battleships 

2  battleships. 

4  scout  cruisers  

4  scout  cruisers  .... 

10  destroyers   

10  destroyers  

10  destroyers. 

4  submarines    

4  submarines 

8  submarines. 

2  fuel  ships   

4  fuel  ships 

2  fuel  ships. 

1  ammunition  ship   

1  ammunition  ship 

1  repair  ship   

1  repair  ship   

2  mine-laying  ships  (con- 

2 mine-laying     ships 

version   of  2   cruisers 

(conversion    of    2 

Purchase  of  3  new 

now  on  list) 

cruisers    now    on 
list)     

fuel  ships. 

4  ships'     motor     torpedo 

boats    

1908. 

(Secretary  Metcalf.) 

(Act  of  1909.) 

4  battleships  

4  battleships 

2  battleships. 

4  scout  cruisers  

4  scout  cruisers  .... 

1 

182 


Recommended  by  the 
General  Board. 


10  destroyers 

4  submarines    

3  'fuel  ships   

1  ammunition  ship   

1  repair  ship   

2  mine-laying  ships  (con- 

version of  2  cruisers 
now  on  list)    


1909. 

4  battleships  . . . 
1  repair  ship   . . 


10  destroyers    

4  scout  cruisers  

1  ammunition  ship   . . . 
1  fuel  ship  (oil  tank) . 

1910. 

4  battleships  

1  gunboat    

2  river  gunboats   


4  fuel  ships    

2  tugs    

3  submarines  tenders. 
16  destroyers   

1  repair  ship   

4  scout  cruisers  

2  destroyer   tenders.  . 

1  mine  layer 

2  transports   

1  hospital  ship 


Recommended  by  the 

Secretary  of  the 

Navy. 


10  destroyers   

4  submarines    

3  fuel  ships 

1  ammunition  ship  .. 

1  repair  ship   

2  mine-laying     ships 

(conversion  of  2 
cruisers  now  on 
list)    


(Secretary   Meyer.) 

2  battleships 

1  repair  ship   


(Secretary   Meyer.) 

2  battleships 

1  gunboat    

1  river  gunboat  . , . . 

2  submarines    

1  fuel  ship   

2  tugs  

1  submarine  tender., 


Authorized  by 
Congress. 


destroyers, 
submarines, 
fuel  ship. 


destroyer  whose 
vitals  are  located 
below  the  water 
line. 


(Act  of  1910.) 
2  battleships. 

2  fuel  ships. 
4  submarines. 
6  destroyers. 


(Act  of  1911.) 
2  battleships. 
1  gunboat. 

1  river  gunboat. 
4  submarines. 

2  fuel  ships. 
2  tugs. 

1  submarine  tender. 
8  destroyers. 


133 


Recommended   by   the 
General  Board. 


1911. 
4  battleships   

4  fuel  ships    

16  destroyers   

2  destroyer  tenders  . 

5  submarines    

2  submarine  tenders 

1  repair  ship    

4  scout  cruisers  . . . . 
1  ammunition  ship.  . 

1  mine  layer 

2  transports    

1912. 

4  battleships  

2  battle  cruisers  . . . 

2  gunboats    

16  destroyers   

6  submarines    


1  ammunition  ship 

2  transports    

2  tugs  

1  submarine  tender 

1  destroyer  tender 

1  supply  ship  

1  submarine  testing  dock 

1913. 

4  battleships  

16  destroyers    

8  submarines    


1  destroyer  tender. 


1  submarine  tender  . . . 

2  fuel  ships    (oilers)  . . 

2  gunboats    

1  transport  

1  supply  ship 

1  hospital  ship 


Recommended  bj^  the 

Secretary  of  the 

Navy. 


(.Secretary    Meyer.; 

2  battleships    

2  fuel  ships 


(Secretary    Meyer.; 

3  battleships 

2  battle  cruisers    .  .  . 

2  gunboats    

16  destroyers   

3  submarines    

1  fuel     ship     (condi- 
tionally)      

1  ammunition   ship.  . 

2  transports    

2  tugs    

1  submarine  tender. . 
1  destroyer  tender. .  . 

1  supply  ship 

1  submarine     testing 

dock    

(Secretary    Daniels.) 

B  battleships 

8  destroyers    

3  submarines    


Authorized  by 
Congress. 


(Act  of  1912.) 

1  battleship. 

2  fuel  ships. 
6  destroyers. 

1  destroyer  tende? . 

8  submarines. 

1  submarine  tender. 


(Act  of  1913.) 
1  battleship. 


6  destroyers. 
4  submarines. 


1  transport. 


1  supply  ship. 


(Act  of  1914.) 

3  battleships. 

6  destroyers. 

8  or  more  subma- 
rines. 

1  submarine  testing 
dock. 


134 


1914. 


(Secretary   Daniels.)        (Act  of  1915.) 


4  battleships   

16  destroyers   . . . . 
3  fleet  submarines 


4  scouts  

4  gunboats    

2  oil  fuel  ships.  . . . 
1  destroyer  tender. 
1  submarine  tender. 
1  Navy  transport  . 
1  hospital  ship  .... 
1  supply  ship 


2  battleships 

6  destroyers    

8  submarines  or 
more,   1   to  be  of 
seagoing  type  and 
7  or  more  of  coast- 
defense  type   . . . . 


1  gunboat 
1  oiler    .  . 


2  battleships. 

6  destroyers. 

2  seagoing   subma- 
rines. 

16  coast-defense  sub- 
marines. 


1  oil  fuel  ship. 


a  Recommended  in  his  hearings  before  the  House  Naval  Commit- 
tee.   Not  in  his  annual  report. 

b  Recommended  in  his  hearings  before  the  House  Naval  Commit- 
tee.    No  specific  recommendation  in  his  annual  report. 

Reprinted  from  Report  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy — 1915. 


Fighting  Ships  Authorized  and  Laid  Down  1904  to  1913 

Inclusive. 

1904 


0)   n 


r-±;         CO 

pq  U 


§2 


NOTES. 


United  States. 

England    

Germany 

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  


1 
2 
2 
2 


19 


1905 


United  States.  . .  . 

England    

Germany 


135 


Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  

United  States 

England   

Germany  .... 

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia 

United  States 
England   

Germany  . . . 
Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  

United  States 
England  .... 
Germany  .... 

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  

United  States, 

England   

Germany    . . . , 

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  


1 

1 

"6 

i 

39 

1906 


1 

3 

3 

1 

i 

2 

12 

3 

1 

•• 

1907 


1 

2 

3 
3 

1 

2 

M7 

2 

12 

**37 

3 

•• 

***i  g 

*Total  for  years  1903- 
1907 

**Total      for      years 

1904-1907 
***Total     for     years 

1906-1907 


1908 


2 

10 

1 

2 

5 

16 

3 

1 

2 

12 

1 

1 

12 
*10 

*Total  for  years  1905- 
1908 


1909 


2 

5 

6 

2 

6 

20 

3 

1 

2 

12 

1 

3 

1 

2 

2 

1 

'4 

i 

;: 

136 


1910 


United  States, 

England    

Germany    . . . . 

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia 


2 

6 

4 

2 

6 

26 

3 

1 
1 

2 

12 

2 

1 

"i 

1911 


United  States. 

England    

Germany    . . . . 

Italy    

Japan    

France   

Russia 


2 

8 

4 

1 

6 

20 

3 

1 

2 

24 

2 

2 

1 

2 

3 

6 

3 

.. 

.. 

9 

1912 


United  States. 

England    

Germany    

Japan    

France    

Italy    

Russia  


1 

6 

5 

8 

23 

3 

1 

2 

12 

1 

2 

,  , 

2 

4 

3 

2 

1 

•  • 

4 

2 

36 

1913 


United  States. 

England   

Germany    . . . . 

Japan    

France    

Italy    


Russia 


1 

6 

5 

8 

15 

1 

1 

2 

12 

3 

5 

6 

4 

4 

•  • 

4 

**27 

**Total      for      years 
1909-1913 


TOTALS 


All  4  classes. 


United  States, 

England   

Germany 

Japan    

France   

Italy   

Russia  


15 

0 

3 

46 

64 

34 

10 

41 

167 

252 

24 

7 

22 

120 

173 

10 

6 

4 

43 

63 

22 

0 

6 

46 

74 

16 

0 

4 

37 

57 

3 

8 

6 

104 

121 

Compiled  from  Jane's  Fighting  Ships — 1914  Edition 

137 


A  Delegate — Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  to  propose,  if  it  is  not 
the  intention  to  publish  the  proceedings  in  full,  that  this  extremely 
illuminating  address  of  Mr.  Curtis  should  be  printed,  and  a  copy  of  it 
sent  to  every  Member  of  Congress. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the  motion 
was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — The  fifth  topic  of  the  morning  is  "The  Value  of 
Waterways  as  a  Means  of  Defense."  At  the  appropriate  time  there 
comes  a  Representative  of  our  National  Congress  to  speak  on  this, 
the  Honorable  Murray  Hulbert,  a  Representative  from  the  State  of 
New  York. 

THE  VALUE  OF  WATERWAYS  AS  A  MEANS  OF  DEFENSE 

Honorable  Murray  Hulbert 

A  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  New  York 

Mr.  Hulbert — Mr.  Chairman,  and  ladies  and  gentlemen:  You 
are  engaged  in  a  very  serious  work;  a  work,  however,  which  is  one 
followed  by  us  all  in  our  everyday  life. 

It  is  perhaps  proper,  that  I  should  preface  my  remarks,  with  a 
statement  as  to  my  position  upon  the  subject  of  "Preparedness  and 
National  Defense,"  in  which  I  do  not  indulge  in  idle  conjecture  as  to 
the  attitude  of  my  constituents;  but,  before  Congress  convened,  I 
inaugurated  a  method  of  ascertaining  the  real  sentiment  of  public 
opinion,  by  taking  a  census  of  the  voters  of  my  district,  to  each  of 
whom  I  mailed  a  question  blank,  and  letter  of  explanation,  whereby  I 
sought  their  views  upon  some  18  important  subjects  of  legislation, 
including  "1.  Do  you  favor  an  increase  in  the  Army?  2.  To  what 
extent?  3.  Do  you  favor  an  increase  in  the  Navy?  4.  To  what 
extent?"  and  while  my  clerks  are  still  engaged  in  classifying  the  replies 
received,  I  am  able  to  state,  with  reasonable  certainty,  that  more 
than  85  per  cent,  have  answered  questions  1  and  3  in  the  affirmative 
and  made  varying  suggestions  in  answer  to  questions  2  and  4.  So 
that,  when  I  say  I  favor  substantial  preparedness,  it  is  not  alone 
my  individual  conviction,  but  voices  the  sentiment  of  the  people  of  the 
21st  Congressional  District,  of  New  York,  comprising  Harlem,  Lower 
Washington  Heights  and  South  Bronx,  New  York  City. 

138 


The  value  of  waterways  as  a  means  of  defense  is  not  a  theory 
but  a  fact,  thoroughly  demonstrated  by  the  great  German  Government, 
where  a  most  improved  and  economic  system  has  been  in  operation 
for  many  years.  The  United  States,  where  first  saw  the  light  of  day, 
Fulton,  who  conceived  the  first  steamboat,  Ericson  the  creator  of  the 
"Monitor"  and  where  lived  Holland,  the  inventor  of  the  submarine, 
has  been  least  progressive  in  appreciating  the  importance  of  and 
scientifically  developing  her  waterways.  If  I  were  to  discourse  to  any 
degree  of  completeness,  I  would  exhaust  you,  and  even  myself,  long 
before  the  subject.  But  unfortunately  for  your  patience,  I  realize  that 
neither  of  us,  under  present  circumstances,  has  the  time  or  inclination, 
and  I  can  perhaps  best  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  Subject  by 
illustrating  one  particular  improvement  to  be  made  by  the  Federal 
Government,  which  will  be  of  inestimable  value  to  the  entire  Nation. 
Of  course,  I  am  privileged,  I  suppose,  to  find  that  illustration  in  my 
own  City,  though  I  am  sure  you  will  agree  with  me  none  better  exists 
elsewhere. 

The  East  River  is  a  tidal  strait,  which  extends  from  the  Battery, 
New  York,  to  Throgg's  Neck,  a  distance  of  only  16  miles  and  forms 
an  eastern  entrance  to  New  York  Harbor,  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 
through  the  sheltered  waters  of  Long  Island  Sound.  Just  above  the 
Brooklyn  Bridge,  is  the  Navy  Yard,  where  our  Dreadnaughts,  with  a 
draft  of  30  and  31  feet  have  been  built  and  are  now  building. 

In  1868,  only  3  years  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  the  Federal 
Government,  with  far  sighted  statesmanship,  adopted  a  project  foi 
a  26-foot  channel,  at  a  cost,  with  subsequent  amendments,  of  about 
$8,500,000.  In  1913,  about  50  per  cent,  of  the  work  had  been  com- 
pleted, and  the  River  bore  a  commerce  in  round  numbers  of  45  million 
short  tons,  having  a  value  of  one  billion  five  hundred  million  dollars, 
besides  22  millions  passengers.  On  July  16th,  1913,  Col.  Black, 
U.  S.  A.,  District  Engineer,  made  a  report  in  which  he  recommended 
improvements  aggregating  $33,000,000,  which,  however,  the  General 
Board  of  Engineers  reduced  to  $13,400,000,  and  a  provision  therefor 
was  carried  in  the  Rivers  and  Harbors  Bill  reported  by  the  House 
in  the  first  session  of  the  63rd  Congress,  but  was  defeated  in  the 
filibuster  carried  on  in  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Burton,  so  that  since  1913, 
when  the  Board  reported  '*It  is  believed  that  the  present  26-foot 
project  has  been  outgrown  by  the  commercial  interests  involved,  and 

139 


that  further  work  on  this  project  is  not  economically  inadvisable"  no 
appropriation  has  been  made  for  the  East  River.  Which  brings  me  to 
the  consideration  of  a  letter  recently  written  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  referred  to  the  Rivers  and 
Harbors  Committee,  of  which  I  am  a  member,  and  makes  the  foregoing 
relevant  to  the  subject  matter  assigned  to  me  for  discussion: 

Navy  Department,  Washington 
"Sir: 

"I  have  the  honor  to  invite  your  attention  to  the  serious 
condition  existing  at  the  Navy  Yard,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  in  so 
far  as  pertains  to  the  depth  of  water  in  ship  channels  leading 
thereto. 

"There  is  not  sutRcient  water  in  these  channels  to  ensure 
the  entering  of  a  first  class  battleship  at  all  times. 

"At  present  only  one  battleship  can  be  handled  per  day 
and  then  only  provided  the  weather  conditions  are  normal.  If 
the  winds  are  such  to  blow  the  water  out  of  New  York  Bay 
then  the  depth  of  water  in  the  approach  channel  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  safely  navigate  a  large  ship.  As  an  illustration  the 
following  is  noted: 

"On  November  3,  1915,  the  U.  S.  S.  Texas  (one  of  our 
new  first  class  battleships)  was  ready  to  leave  the  yard,  but 
the  prevailing  northwest  winds  had  so  reduced  the  depth  of 
water  in  Buttermilk  Channel  that  even  at  high  water  there 
was  not  sufficient  depth  to  ensure  her  leaving  the  yard  in 
safety.  This  ship  therefore  was  forced  to  remain  in  the  Navy 
Yard  for  over  twenty-four  hours. 

"This  condition  is  a  serious  one  and  might  cause  grave 
complications.  I  understand  there  are  two  propositions  before 
Congress,  one  providing  a  channel  35  feet  deep  and  1,000  feet 
wide  in  Buttermilk  Channel  and  the  other  north  of  Governor's 
Island  up  the  East  River  through  Hell  Gate.  The  second 
would  provide  for  ships  passing  from  the  yard  to  Lower  New 
York  Bay  or  to  the  Sound,  a  condition  highly  desirable  from 
a  strategic  point  of  view.  Either  project  will  provide  for 
free  access  to  the  Navy  Yard. 

140 


"The  increase  in  the  size  of  ships  has  not  yet  reached 
its  limit. 

"Through  injuries  received  in  battle  a  ship  could  readily 
be  drawing  more  water  than  normally  at  a  time  when  it  was 
most  necessary  to  dock  her. 

"It  is  therefore  most  urgent  that  an  approach  channel 
to  the  New  York  Navy  Yard  be  maintained  of  not  less  than 
35  feet  depth  at  mean  low  water  and  1,000  feet  wide,  and  I 
cannot  too  strongly  urge  the  serious  attention  of  Congress 
to  this  matter. 

"Sincerely  yours, 

(Signed)     "Josephus  Daniels, 

"Secretary  of  the  Navy." 

The  Speaker, 

House  of  Representatives, 

Referred  to  Rivers  and  Harbors  Committee. 
1-8-1916. 

The  communication  is  self-argumentative.  It  requires  no  com- 
ment. But  it  needs  this  explanation  to  the  uninitiated.  The  generai 
impression  prevails  that  no  new  projects  will  be  taken  on  in  the  Rivera 
and  Harbors  Bill.  A  new  project  is  one  which  has  been  adopted  by 
Congress.  I  have  tried  to  spell  out  a  construction  which  will  pass 
this  improvement  as  a  part  of  the  old  project,  but  thus  far,  without 
favorable  result.  Yet  it  is  contemplated  to  ask  for  $44,000,000  (in 
round  figures)  for  old  projects. 

I  favor  the  immediate  and  early  completion  of  such  projects  as 
are  essentially  a  part  of  the  national  defense,  in  which  connection 
it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  until  they  are  actually  required  as  a 
matter  of  defense,  they  serve  as  revenue  producers,  and  bring  back 
into  the  Federal  Treasury,  the  amount  expended,  with  a  substantial 
return  upon  the  investment.  This  is  not  a  time  for  the  Government  to 
be  "penny  wise  and  pound  foolish."  It  were  better  to  spend  millions 
in  preparation  than  billions  for  tribute. 

The  Chairman — There  is  now  opportunity  for  discussion. 

Mr.  James  M.  Sheen,  of  Atlantic  City,  New  Jersey — Mr.  Chair- 
man and  fellow  delegates,  and  lady  delegates:  The  delegates  from 
Atlantic  City,  thinking  that  the  real  object  of  this  convention  was  or 

141 


is  to  get  Congress  to  pass  a  bill  or  bills  for  preparedness,  called  oa 
their  Congressman,  Mr.  Bachrach,  and  they  have  his  assurance  that 
he  will  not  only  vote  for  such  a  bill,  but  he  vv'ill  do  everything  he  can 
to  help  vi^hen  the  act  comes  before  the  House.  It  occurred  to  me  that 
other  delegates  might  work  along  the  same  line,  so  that  I  drew  up 
the  following  resolution: 

"Be  it  resolved  by  The  National  Security  League  in  congress 
assembled  that  the  several  delegations  of  the  League  call  personally 
upon  their  respective  Senators  and  Congressmen  and  obtain  their 
assurance  of  support  for  Preparedness." 

The  resolution  being  seconded,  it  was  unanimously  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Alexander  L.  Anderson,  of  New  Rochelle,  New  York. 

Mr.  Anderson — Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  resolution  to  offer,  but 
I  want  to  ask  of  the  chair,  and  get  the  opinion  of  the  Congress,  as  to 
the  procedure  that  we  shall  follow  here  from  now  on.  I  have  listened 
with  a  great  deal  of  interest  to  the  speeches  we  have  heard  thus  far. 
They  have  been  enlightening  and  entertaining  and  have  had  great 
merit.  But  we  are  all  confirmed  in  our  opinion  on  preparedness,  and 
I,  for  one,  and,  I  feel,  many  of  the  other  delegates  here,  have  come 
for  the  purpose  of  learning  how  we  can  bring  about  the  opinion  of 
our  constitutents  and  our  friends  in  our  own  communities  to  favor 
our  own  ideas,  not  to  listen  to  speeches,  five  in  a  session,  and  day  in 
and  day  out.    We  want  to  get  some  actual,  concrete  action. 

Now,  I  spoke  to  two  or  three  delegates  outside  last  night,  one 
from  Kentucky  and  another  from  Maine  and  two  from  Oklahoma. 
They  had  some  very  pertinent  suggestions  to  make  as  to  the  opinions 
of  their  communities,  and  how  we  could  get  the  people  of  those  middle 
west  states  with  us  on  the  question  of  preparedness,  and  we  want 
those  ideas  brought  before  the  open  session  on  this  occasion  and  pre- 
sented to  us  so  that  we  may  know  what  is  their  opinion  and  how  we 
can  change  the  opinion  that  is  against  preparedness  and  bring  it  in 
favor  of  preparedness. 

I  understand  now  that  we  are  to  have  open  discussion,  and  we  have 
it  for  fifteen  minutes  here  at  the  conclusion  of  the  morning  period, 
and  I  suggest  that  we  change  the  time  of  the  public  discussion  and 
give  more  time  to  public  discussion  and  have  it  at  the  beginning  of  the 
sessions,  when  all  the  delegates  are  here  and  when  they  are  fresh  and 

142 


active  and  interested  in  the  work  of  the  convention,  and  not  wait  until 
everybody  has  gone  to  lunch  and  left,  and  there  is  a  bare  corporal's 
guard  to  listen  to  the  suggestions  of  the  members.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — Those  suggestions  are  exceedingly  appropriate 
and  will  be  considered.  At  5  o'clock  today  in  the  cabinet  room  there 
will  be  a  meeting  of  the  secretaries  of  the  various  branches  of  the 
Security  League.  That  meeting  is  for  the  purpose  of  formulating  a 
program  of  work  in  the  various  localities,  and  that  program  will  be 
presented  at  one  of  the  future  sessions  of  the  Congress.  That  meets 
your  first  question. 

Mr.  Menken  authorized  me  to  state  that  when  the  next  session 
meets,  at  2  o'clock,  there  will  be  open  discussion  for  half  an  hour 
right  at  the  beginning  of  the  sepj»ion.  .  (Applause.) 

May  I  say,  so  far  as  the  morning  session  is  concerned,  this  is  a 
much  larger  and  more  representative  gathering  than  would  have 
been  here  at  10:40,  and  it  is  possible  there  would  be  more  time  for 
public  discussion  if  the  delegates  would  arrive  on  time.  It  would  be 
extremely  gratifying,  I  am  sure,  to  the  speakers  if  all  the  delegates 
upon  arriving  would  seat  themselves  and  would  stay  seated  until  the 
end  of  a  paper,  and  those  who  have  conferences  which  it  is  necessary 
for  them  to  have  would  take  their  conferences  into  the  anteroom 
rather  than  into  the  back  of  this  hall. 

The  floor  is  open  for  discussion.  Is  there  anything  further  to 
come  before  the  meeting. 

Mrs.  H.  W.  Knott — Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  to  ask  if  the 
ladies  here — and  the  women  are  very  enthusiastic  in  this  movement — 
are  going  to  do  anything  to  get  together  for  an  effective  propaganda 
to  try  and  further  the  work  from  the  woman's  point  of  view? 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Menken,  in  response  to  that  suggestion, 
asks  if  you  will  not  make  a  motion  that  the  ladies  who  are  willing 
to  co-operate  in  this  work  will  please  register  with  the  secretary,  so 
that  arrangements  can  be  made  for  calling  them  together.  Do  you 
make  that  motion? 

Mrs.  Knott — I  do. 

The  motion  was  seconded. 

143 


The  Chairman — The  motion  is  that  the  ladies  who  are  willing 
to  co-operate  in  this  work  shall  register  with  the  secretary  so  that 
arrangements  can  be  made  for  calling  them  together,  that  they  may 
consider  the  phase  of  work  to  which  they  can  contribute  best. 

A  Member — And  that  they  impart  the  result  of  that  conference 
to  those  present. 

The  Chairman — I  hear  no  objection  to  the  amendment. 

The  question  was  taken  and  the  motion  was  unanimously  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — Is  there  anything  further?  If  not,  we  will 
stand  adjourned. 

At  12:15  o'clock  p.  m.,  an  adjournment  was  taken  until  2  o'clock 
p.  m. 


144 


FOURTH   SESSION 

New  Willard  Hotel 

Friday.  January  21,  1916,  2:00  p.m. 
Chairman — Henry  H.  Ward 
Vice-President,  Navy  League 

The  session  was  called  to  order  by  the  President,  S.  Stanwood 
Menken. 

The  President — I  take  pleasure  in  introducing  to  you  Mr.  Ward, 
Vice-President  of  the  Navy  League,  who  will  be  your  Chairman  at  this 
session. 

DO  WE  TAKE  THE  NAVY  SERIOUSLY? 

Henry  H.  Ward,  District  of  Columbia 

Vice-President,   Navy  League 

Mr.  Ward — Mr.  Chairman  and  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  the 
National  Security  League:  I  have  been  asked  to  speak  on  the  subject, 
or  part  of  the  subject,  do  or  do  we  not  take  the  Navy  seriously? 

In  our  country,  the  United  States  of  America,  a  government  by 
the  people,  has  established  a  working  plant,  a  going  concern.  In 
certain  directions  magnificent  results  have  been  accomplished,  for 
liberty,  justice,  for  national  and  personal  welfare.  Whatever  have 
been  or  whatever  are  our  shortcomings  they  are,  in  the  main,  being 
corrected.  But  wherever  our  success  has  been  the  most  conspicuous, 
it  has  been  where  the  whole  body  of  people  upon  whom  the  respon- 
sibility ultimately  falls  have  taken  that  responsibility  to  some  degree 
seriously. 

Now  the  public  has  heretofore  not  taken  the  general  question 
of  National  Defense  seriously,  and  it  has  taken  the  Navy — not  the 
least  important  factor  in  the  problem — even  less  seriously.     The  ro- 

145 


mance  of  the  Navy,  the  glitter  of  the  vessels  of  the  old  white  squadron, 
with  their  white  paint  and  brass  fittings,  the  grim,  almost  mysterious 
power,  of  the  Dreadnought,  the  miracle  of  the  Submarine,  all  carry  a 
popular  appeal,  and  evoke  an  enthusiasm  that  seem  actually  to  have 
stifled  serious  thought  on  the  subject  of  the  Navy. 

Why  did  we  have  a  navy  at  all?  Sometimes  we  have  had  almost 
none.  Why — because  every  nation  that  was  a  nation  had  a  navy! 
Or  perhaps  the  answer  was  that  it  did  some  mysterious  good  to 
"show  our  flag  in  foreign  ports,  or  that  we  had  to  protect  our  citizens 
in  foreign  countries— China  or  Smyrna."  But  as  to  a  navy  designed  as 
a  great  national  bulwark,  to  be  essential  some  day  to  the  honor  or 
security  of  the  nation,  perhaps  even  a  safeguard  for  the  life  of  the 
nation  as  a  nation,  it  seems  that  we  have  rarely  if  ever  been  serious. 

We  have  taken  things  as  they  have  come,  and  they  have  come 
fortunately  for  us.  We  have  never  had  a  great  foreign  war;  let  us 
pray  that  we  may  never  have.  While,  in  more  than  one  sense  of  the 
word,  we  have  been  treading  a  golden  path,  our  head  has  been  in  the 
clouds. 

We  have  been  so  accustomed  to  a  factitious  immunity  from 
serious  attack  that  we  have  begun  to  regard  ourselves  as  invul- 
nerable; we  have  neglected  to  note  the  changing  commercial,  political, 
scientific,  and  physical  conditions  of  the  last  century.  One  hundred 
years  ago  America  was  in  truth  isolated — more  remote  from  the 
civilized  centers  of  Europe  than  the  farthest  Orient  is  from  us  today. 
A  war  with  England,  while  she  had  a  greater  part  of  Europe  at  her 
throat;  a  so-called  War  with  Mexico,  then  barely  advanced  beyond 
the  conditions  of  a  frontier  republic;  a  war  with  Spain  with  all  of 
the  advantages  on  our  side,  she  thousands  of  miles  away  from  the 
scene  of  contention,  we  at  its  gates — she  with  a  navy  never  intended 
for  serious  conflict;  make  up  the  sum  of  our  so-called  foreign  wars. 
Our  apparently  easy  path  of  success  in  each  of  these  exploits  (though 
in  fact  the  cost  was  comparatively  great)  has  created  an  impression 
which  the  American  temperament  is  only  too  ready  to  seize  upon.  We 
beat  England,  though  they  burned  the  White  House  and  occupied 
Washington ;  we  beat  Mexico,  though  at  a  wasteful  expenditure  of  life 
and  money;  we  beat  Spain,  though  our  army  was  dying  of  typhoid 
within  ten  miles  of  Washington  City,  but  we  remember  only  the  suc- 
cesses.   We  forget  the  cost,  because,  after  all,  measured  in  the  total 

146 


of  our  resources,  the  cost  was  small.  For  years  the  sea  did  protect  us. 
It  did  stand  as  a  barrier  between  us  and  outside  aggression.  Science 
had  not  solved  the  problems  of  the  sea.  Steam  vessels  were  all  but 
unknown  three  quarters  of  a  century  ago.  The  old  time  clipper  ship, 
the  pride  of  our  fathers,  after  all  nothing  but  a  refinement  of  the 
Venetian  Merchantman  of  four  centuries  ago,  defied  commercial  com- 
petition, almost  up  to  the  time  of  our  Civil  War.  Even  then,  fifty 
years  ago,  the  adaptation  of  steam  and  mechanical  power  to  fighting 
ships  gave  to  them  only  a  limited  field  of  operation.  They  had  not 
reached  the  point  where  they  could  be  a  means  of  transportation  of 
lalge  bodies  of  troops.  Development  was  slow,  and  only  within  the 
last  twenty-five  years,  has  the  world  begun  to  realize  the  possibility 
of  steam,  of  oil,  of  electricity,  as  applied  to  the  overseas  transport 
of  men  and  explosives,  and  destruction.  A  few  thousand  British 
troops  landing  on  our  shores  in  1812  were  sufficient  to  paralize,  for 
the  time  being,  the  principal  energies  of  our  east  coast.  Never- 
theless, when  they  landed  there  they  had  gained  little  or  nothing 
except  this  temporary  holding  of  our  cities.  We  were  still  a  frontier 
country  with  no  heart  at  which  to  strike.  Today,  after  years  of  free- 
dom from  outside  interference,  spendthrift  in  our  energies,  we  have 
built  up  enormous  industries  along  this  same  coast  line,  and  are  still 
looking  to  the  ocean  to  keep  the  invader  out.  Never  threatened,  never 
disturbed  in  our  freedom,  security  and  comfort,  we  have  gone  on 
building  up  a  richer  prize  for  almost  anyone  to  take.  We  have  looked 
upon  our  navy  in  a  purely  sentimental  fashion.  We  think  we  have 
adequately  described  it  when  we  speak  of  the  spirit  of  '76,  or  recall 
the  dashing  exploits  of  John  Paul  Jones,  or  recall  the  undeniable 
brilliancy  of  the  Frigate  Actions  of  1812;  we  come  from  school  able 
to  quote  Lawrence's  dying  words,  or  to  recount  the  daring  of  Perry's 
victory;  we  approve  ourselves  for  our  enterprise  in  Japan,  and  we 
think  that  a  navy  that  has  done  these  things  must  necessarily  be 
great,  but  we  have  never  had  a  navy  that  has  been  put  to  a  real  test 
of  war  against  the  individual  effort  of  a  single  naval  power.  We 
•sat  at  our  door  and  met  the  divided  fleet  of  Spain;  yet  we  think  only 
of  the  romance  of  yesterday  and  turn  our  backs  upon  the  realities  of 
today.    We  have  not  seen  what  is  coming  across  the  water. 

But  now  we  do  seem  to  see  the  beginning  of  a  change,  the  public 
is  becoming  more  interested  in  National  Defense,  and  in  the  Navy  as 

147 


y 


its  first  arm.  But  we  must  take  it  more  and  more  seriously.  There 
are  vast  possibilities  for  waste  and  even  harm  in  unintelligent  direc- 
tion of  the  new  energies  that  are  gathering.  Today  there  are  few 
among  our  leaders  in  the  professions,  in  business,  among  writers, 
or  in  public  life,  who  will  not  have  to  begin  their  understanding  of  a 
navy  with  the  learning  of  the  A.  B.  C.'s.  We  often  hear  the  cry  that 
the  navy  must  keep  out  of  politics.  In  a  sense  of  the  word,  it  has 
always  been  out  of  politics,  and  in  another  sense  always  in  it.  Until 
the  campaign  of  1912  the  Navy  was  all  but  unknown  as  a  political 
issue  of  national  significance.  Then  for  the  first  time  the  two  great 
parties  realized  the  necessity  of  at  least  mentioning  it,  and  both  the 
Democratic  and  Republican  conventions  adopted  a  plank  approving  in 
general  terms  of  naval  expansion.  The  tariff,  the  currency,  labor 
laws,  the  railroads  all  had  been  political  issues,  all  had  been  in  politics, 
matters  discussed  and  more  or  less  understood  by  the  voter:  the  Navy 
never.  The  Navy  was  always  in  politics  whenever  the  spoilsman  type 
of  politician  came  into  his  own.  He  was  always  in  favor  of  an  increase 
in  the  Navy.  It  was  one  of  his  favorite  fields  of  exploitation.  The 
minority  party  has  usually  been  against  a  naval  increase.  Political 
speeches  and  pronouncements  in  favor  of  a  navy  have  ever  dealt  in 
generalities,  as  have  also  political  pronouncements  against  it.  One 
side  has  called  for  a  navy  "second  to  none  on  earth,"  the  other  has 
decried  useless  expenditure.  It  was  simply  an  attitude  in  favor  of  or 
against  naval  development,  not  a  question  of  any  belief  or  theory 
which  would  justify  the  existence  of  a  navy  and  determine  how  much 
of  a  navy  we  need.  Seldom  has  the  Navy  been  taken  seriously.  It 
has  been  looked  upon  sometimes  as  a  plaything,  sometimes  as  a 
vehicle  of  patronage,  sometimes  merely  as  a  means  of  magnificent 
display.  So  let  us  put  the  Navy  into  politics,  let  both  great  parties 
interest  themselves,  study  the  problems  for  the  solution  of  which  a 
navy  is  created,  announce  in  their  platforms  their  position  in  the 
matter;  make  it  a  political  issue  if  you  will,  giving  it  the  same  chance 
as  the  tariff,  currency,  reform,  labor  and  the  railroads.  We  shall  no 
longer  find  our  country  hampered  by  two  camps  of  extremist — one- 
favoring  no  navy,  the  other  wishing  to  build  without  let  or  reason. 
The  question  will  be  thrashed  out  and  understood,  differences  will 
appear  and  be  resolved,  and  whichever  party  prevails,  we  shall  have  a 
common-sense  solution  of  the  problem  of  an  adequate  navy,  just  as 

148 


in  the  end  we  get  a  good  enough  law  on  every  vital  question  that  the 
country  finally  takes  seriously. 

We  shall  know  that  inadequacy  in  a  navy  is  as  fatal  to  safety  as 
inadequacy  in  a  bridge  or  in  fire  protection.  We  shall  also  know  to 
what  end  it  is  that  we  wish  our  Navy  to  be  adequate,  and  what  that 
adequacy  will  cost.  We  shall  know  whether  we  have  or  have  not 
sufficient  shipbuilding  slips  (slips)  and  shops,  and  what  enough  of 
them,  and  enough  of  the  Navy  will  cost,  and  we  shall  then  put  our 
hands  in  our  pockets  and  spend  that  most  plenteous  of  American 
products — money. 

I  cannot  close  without  saying  a  word  as  to  the  responsibility,  as 
I  see  it,  for  our  naval  condition  as  it  exists  today.  No  one  party,  no 
one  authority,  no  one  body  is  wholly  responsible.  The  parties  have 
each  had  their  part  in  the  good  and  the  bad,  the  Navy  itself  has 
sometimes  failed,  perhaps,  to  recommend  all  that  was  seen  to  be 
needed,  thinking  that  it  was  futile  to  do  so,  and  fearing  that  to  tell 
the  whole  truth  would  mark  it  as  extreme.  The  private  citizen  has 
sometimes  failed,  and  upon  him  perhaps  rests  the  greatest  burden. 
But  today  the  fullest  responsibility  is  upon  all  of  us.  The  lesson  is 
before  our  eyes.  Facing  the  ghastly  picture  of  misery  that  may 
some  day  be  for  us  the  cost  of  neglect,  we  can  no  longer  plead 
ignorance. 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  now  have  the  pleasure 
of  introducing  to  you  the  Honorable  J.  Hampton  Moore,  who  will 
speak  to  you  on  the  subject  of  waterways. 

INTER-COASTAL  WATERWAYS  AND  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 

Hon.   J.   Hampton   Moore 

A  Representative  in  Congress  from  the  State  of  Pennsylvania, 
President  of  the  Atlantic  Deeper  Waterways  Association 

Mr.  Moore — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  As  a  Member 
of  Congress  all  I  would  care  to  say  just  now  to  this  convention  is  that 
I  stand  for  a  reasonable  preparedness  of  this  country  against  the 
possibility  of  war.  As  the  representative  of  the  Atlantic  Deeper 
Waterways  Association  I  wish  to  invite  your  interest  in  the  proposi- 
tion of  improved  waterways  along  the  coastal  line  of  this  country, 

149 


with  a  view  of  being  prepared  for  commerce  and  for  war,  for  com- 
merce is  absolutely  necessary  in  order  that  we  may  obtain  the  revenue 
with  which  to  support  war  if  war  should  come  upon  us.  This  was  so 
from  the  beginning,  as  it  is  so  now. 

In  the  days  of  the  French  and  Colonial  wars  we  have  but  to  point 
to  Crown  Point  or  Ticonderoga  to  understand  that  the  preparations 
that  were  then  made  along  the  lines  of  the  waterways  were  against 
the  possibilities  of  invasion.  If  today  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  where 
we  have  9,000  American  troops  stationed,  were  suddenly  to  be  taken 
from  us,  the  whole  of  the  Pacific  Coast  would  be  in  danger,  and  those 
mediocre  fortifications  that  we  have  along  that  tremendous  coast  line 
would  be  at  risk.  If  we  were  to  consider  the  matter  of  the  Soo,  and 
the  tremendous  tonnage  that  is  carried  over  it  now,  daily,  we  would 
probably  find  that  the  dropping  of  a  bomb  or  the  closing  of  the  locks 
by  some  enemy,  would  not  only  involve  us  in  the  greatest  difficulties 
with  respect  to  defense,  but  would  also  check  probably  90  or  95  per 
cent  of  the  business  done  in  iron  and  steel  in  this  country,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  tremendous  grain  output  that  comes  through  that  great 
waterway. 

Along  the  coast  we  have  the  same  problem  as  we  would  have  in 
Panama.  It  is  not  without  the  range  of  possibility  that  the  Panama 
Canal  might  be  dynamited.  It  is  not  without  the  range  of  possibility 
that  it  might  be  so  assaulted  at  any  time  as  to  involve  this  nation  in 
the  deepest  humiliation,  the  Navy  of  the  United  States  being  busily 
occupied  on  one  side  or  the  other  and  not  in  strength  to  afford  suitable 
defense.  The  man  behind  the  bars,  put  there  for  some  petty  offense, 
having  sent  for  the  attorney,  to  whom  he  explained  his  case,  was  told 
"Why,  they  cannot  put  you  in  jail  for  that,"  when  he  promtply  replied, 
"But  they  have  done  it.  They  have  put  me  here."  It  may  be  that  we 
are  very  much  in  that  position  in  the  United  States. 

Some  of  our  friends  who  are  avoiding  preparations  for  war  are 
inclined  to  think  that  nobody  will  attack  us;  that  it  is  beyond  the 
range  of  possibility  that  anyone  would  dare  to  assault  the  United 
States;  and  yet  they  have  done  it.  Twice  it  has  been  done.  On  two 
occasions  the  soil  of  the  United  States  has  been  invaded.  In  1812,  or 
during  what  we  call  the  War  of  1812 — we  will  call  it  1814  to  be  exact — 
the  British  sailed  up  the  Chesapeake  Bay  and  up  the  Potomac  River 
and  they  captured  Washington,  and  to  the  deep  humiliation  and  shame 


of  this  nation,  they  burned  our  national  buildings.  We  attempted  to 
meet  them  at  Bladensburg  with  such  militia  as  we  had,  and  we  were 
badly  driven  back.  And  then  the  fleet  sailed  out,  and  in  due  course  it 
arrived  somewhere  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  intending  to 
take  New  Orleans.  There,  fortunately,  we  were  able  to  defeat  the 
enemy  and  to  drive  him  back.  But  here  are  two  instances  where 
this  sacred  soil  of  ours  has  been  invaded  and  where,  apparently,  we 
were  not  in  the  best  shape  to  protect  ourselves.  To  be  sure,  we  had  a 
tremendous  war  for  seven  years,  mostly  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard, 
during  the  period  of  the  Revolution,  and  we  fought  back  the  best  we 
could,  with  a  handful  of  troops  at  times,  if  you  will  just  bear  in  mind 
the  distress  of  Washington  at  Valley  Forge,  and  ultimately  we  were 
victorious ;  but  at  what  a  cost  ?  Most  of  the  fighting  in  those  days  was 
done  around  about  the  waters. 

In  both  of  those  wars  of  invasion  the  waterways  of  the  country, 
particularly  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  were  absolutely  necessary  for 
defensive  as  well  as  for  offensive  purposes.  To  the  shame  and  dis- 
grace of  this  nation,  many  of  these  waterways  and  avenues  of  ap- 
proach, avenues  of  egress  and  ingress  for  defensive  as  well  as  for 
offensive  purposes,  are  in  no  better  condition  today  than  they  were  in 
the  beginning ;  yet  there  are  numerous  good  people  about  this  land  who 
are  hurling  the  epithet  of  "pork  barrel"  at  those  who  are  insisting 
that  our  waterways  shall  be  improved  for  purposes  of  defense  as  well 
as  for  purposes  of  commerce.  I  wish  those  of  you  who  come  from 
the  great  cities  of  the  country  to  kindly  bear  in  mind  this  when  you 
go  back  with  your  minds  filled  with  the  idea  of  preparedness,  that 
upon  this  one  subject  of  the  waterways  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the 
Navy  leeway  for  strategy,  you  are  as  primeval  as  you  were  in  the 
days  of  George  Washington  and  Thomas  Jefferson. 

There  is  your  Florida  coast.  Some  day  off  yonder  in  the  Carib- 
bean Sea  there  may  be  a  naval  warfare  the  like  of  which  the  world  has 
never  yet  attained.  Those  islands  may  some  day  be  an  objective  of 
the  great  powers.  I  should  like  to  have  some  of  them  today  for  the 
United  States.  If  the  question  ever  arises  again  as  to  one  of  them,  I 
think  I  shall  be  for  taking  it  if  it  does  not  come  within  the  regula- 
tions we  have  provided  for  it.  But  when  that  day  comes,  with  these 
vessels  of  ours,  large  and  small — larger  than  some  people  may  some- 
times think  they  are,  in  comparison  with  the  depth  of  water — how 

151 


many  feet  of  water  have  we  on  which  to  deploy  along  the  coast  of 
Florida?     Probably  three  or  four  feet  for  a  distance  of  500  miles. 

Come  a  little  further  up  into  the  rivers,  the  St.  John's  and  Savan- 
nah and  Wilmington  and  Cape  Fear,  and  we  find  that  the  depths  have 
been  grudgingly  increased  by  the  people  of  the  United  States — the 
great  people  of  the  United  States  who  have  to  pay  the  bills — grudgingly 
simply  because  they  want  to  spend  the  money  elsewhere,  and  they  do 
not  care  whether  we  are  protected  or  whether  commerce  grows  or  not. 
It  is  only  in  recent  years  that  we  have  taken  out  of  these  southern 
streams  the  hulks  of  the  old  vessels  sunk  there  during  the  blockade 
period  of  the  Civil  War.  We  have  begun  to  deepen  them,  grudgingly, 
now;  but  they  were  the  avenues  upon  which  the  great  vessels  of  the 
Civil  War  went  in  and  out. 

There  is  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  Canal,  bisecting  the  States 
of  Delaware  and  Maryland,  saving  a  total  sailing  distance  on  the  river 
and  the  bay  and  along  the  ocean  of  325  miles  as  between  Philadelphia 
and  Baltimore  or  as  between  the  entire  North  and  the  South,  con- 
necting up  rivers  that  run  into  the  coast  line,  if  they  were  completed, 
numbering  148  along  the  Atlantic  Seaboard  alone.  Yet  the  depth  of 
that  canal  today  and  the  width  of  its  locks  are  exactly  what  they  were 
when  its  founders  left  it  in  1829 ;  and  we  are  passing  millions  of  tons 
of  commerce  through  that  canal  today  despite  conditions  against 
which  no  modern  civilization  ought  to  contend. 

In  the  event  of  war,  with  a  fleet  driven  into  the  Delaware  Bay 
by  the  adversary,  unable  to  fight  the  enemy,  you  might  as  well  throw 
up  your  hands  as  Cervera's  Fleet  did  at  Santiago,  and  stay  just 
where  put,  because  you  cannot  proceed  to  the  north  by  way  of  the 
canal  across  New  Jersey  to  New  York,  and  you  cannot  proceed  to  the 
Chesapeake  through  this  canal  which  you  ought  to  have  opened  for 
purposes  of  strategy  if  for  no  other  reason  in  the  world.  Then  when 
we  ask  for  appropriations  for  these  projects  to  link  up  these  cities 
along  the  Atlantic  seaboard  for  effective  service,  for  purposes  of  war 
and  defense,  we  are  told  that  it  is  "pork  barrel,"  and  most  of  the 
suggestion  comes  from  the  skyscrapers  in  New  York  where  the 
metropolitan  journals  are  published  which  have  so  much  influence 
upon  the  public. 

Talk  about  preparedness!  You  want  to  put  your  fleet  out  on  the 
sea  and  increase  it  in  numbers,  and  then  if  it  is  driven  back,  give  it 

152 


no  place  to  go ;  put  it  in  one  of  your  harbors  and  tell  it  that  it  must  ■ 
stay  there,  because  there  is  no  opportunity  for  it  to  get  up  the  stream 
even  to  a  navy  yard.  Until  a  private  corporation  recently  constructed 
a  canal  through  Cape  Cod,  saving  a  week's  sailing  time  from  Boston 
to  Long  Island  Sound,  you  had  to  endure  the  perils  of  that  treacherous 
cape  in  time  of  stress  and  storm. 

I  do  not  knoviT  how  much  time  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  am  about 
to  quit,  as  I  know  the  time  is  limited,  and  I  want  to  get  back ;  because 
Members  of  Congress  have  to  get  back  to  their  work  these  days,  but 
I  am  talking  and  preaching  preparedness  now.  We  want  substantial 
preparedness  in  this  country,  which  means  not  only  increasing  our 
fighting  fleet  upon  the  high  seas,  but  giving  our  fighting  fleet  a  chance, 
if  it  is  driven  from  the  sea,  being  in  such  condition  that  it  cannot 
meet  the  enemy. 

We  had  a  mosquito  fleet  during  the  Revolutionary  War  that  ran 
in  and  out  of  these  streams  which  run  into  the  interior  from  the 
Atlantic  coast,  and  they  gave  great  trouble  to  the  enemy.  But  we 
have  larger  vessels  now  in  the  naval  service,  and  not  one  of  them  that 
is  effective  for  war  purposes  or  for  purposes  of  attack  or  defense  can 
pass  through  these  antiquated  canals  that  still  exist. 

Please  think  these  things  over  when  you  are  talking  about  pre- 
paredness, and  see  if  we  cannot  prepare  in  a  substantial  way  to 
protect  ourselves  all  along  the  line. 

The  Chairman — No  student  of  our  naval  situation  can  have 
failed  to  realize  that  the  one  thing  which  is  perhaps  most  obscure 
and  least  understood  is  the  question  of  naval  organization  and  admin- 
istration. Among  the  most  distinguished  of  our  former  Secretaries  of 
the  Navy,  none  have  excelled  our  next  speaker  in  the  appreciation  of 
those  problems  and  in  the  effort  to  solve  them.  Ladies  and  gentle- 
men, 1  have  the  pleasure  of  introducing  Mr.  George  Von  L.  Meyer, 
formerly  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

OUR  NAVAL  REQUIREMENTS 

George  Von  L.  Meyer,  Massachusetts, 
Former  Secretary  of  the  Navy 

Mr.  Meyer — Mr.  Chairman  and  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  is  most 
encouraging  to  see  just  such  an  attendance  as  I  see  here  today.    It 

153 


demonstrates  how  far-reaching  the  feeling  is,  and  how  we  begin  to 
realize  in  this  country  that  we  must  necessarily  pay  absolute  atten- 
tion to  preparedness. 

Some  of  us  for  the  last  eighteen  months  have  been  calling  atten- 
tion to  preparedness,  and  we  have  been  claiming  that  the  fleet  was 
falling  off  in  its  efficiency,  that  there  was  not  sufficient  personnel,  that 
our  fleet  was  unbalanced;  that  we  were  short  of  ammunition,  and  so 
forth  and  so  on,  and  we  were  told  by  the  highest  aathorities,  in  this 
report  of  a  year  ago,  that  the  increase  of  the  Navy's  personnel  in  their 
training,  in  the  improving  of  the  morale  of  officers  and  men,  and  the 
perfection  of  its  organization,  tell  the  story  of  a  year  of  effort  crowned 
with  the  most  gratifying  advance. 

The  danger  of  the  present  agitation  for  PREPAREDNESS  is 
that  it  will  only  result  in  increased  appropriation  without  in  any  way 
remedying  our  inefficiency  in  the  Navy  caused  by  certain  basic  faults: 

Want  of  proper  organization. 
Shortage  of  personnel, 

and  we  add  to  our  difficulties  by  being  the  only  civilized  nation  that 
hasn't  a  budget  system.  France,  Russia,  Germany,  Japan,  England, 
Italy,  Spain,  Roumania,  Serbia,  Portugal,  Bulgaria  and  Venezuela — all 
these  countries  and  many  more  have  budgets.  In  each  country  certain 
responsible  officers  prepare  a  definite  plan  for  doing  things,  estimate 
the  cost  of  executing  it,  and  suggest  means  for  raising  the  money. 
There  is  only  one  important  nation  that  has  no  business  plan,  and 
that  is  the  one  that  has  chiefly  distinguished  itself  as  a  nation  of 
business  men — the  United  States. 

In  the  hearings  before  Congress  last  winter,-  an  officer  testified  that 
it  would  require  five  years  to  develop  the  organization  of  the  Navy 
Department  to  a  high  state  of  efficiency.  Another  officer,  after  calling 
attention  to  the  wonderful  work  of  the  general  staff  of  the  German 
Army,  announced  that  Congress  has  failed  to  provide  a  general  staff 
in  the  American  Navy.  It  should  have  been  done  years  ago.  We  have 
no  tested  war  plans,  no  tested  organization  for  war,  no  tested  mobili- 
zation scheme.  At  the  present  time  it  is  the  rare  exception  for  a  ship 
in  the  United  States  Navy  to  have  its  full  complement,  and  to  provide 
the  necessary  crews  for  all  the  ships  in  the  Navy  that  would  be  useful 
in  time  of  war,  would  require  35,000  additional  men. 

154 


The  torpedo  destroyers  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  are  short  of  their 
proper  complement  and  only  about  twenty  left  in  actual  service. 

The  battleship  fleet  this  winter  will  consist  of  only  fifteen  battle- 
ships, where  formerly  it  comprised  twenty-one.  At  the  present  time 
we  could  put  no  reliance  in  the  submarine  fleet  to  protect  our  coast,  it 
being  unfit  for  service. 

Nothing  demonstrates  unpreparedness  in  the  Navy  more  than 
shortage  of  personnel.  The  Japanese  and  Germans  have  one  officer  to 
every  ten  men.  We  have  one  officer  to  every  twenty.  Ships  without 
the  proper  complement  of  trained  officers  and  men  are  of  greatly 
reduced  value,  as  it  weakens  the  efficiency  of  the  ships  and  invites 
defeat.  To  go  on  a  war  basis,  we  are  short  about  2,000  officers  after 
employing  all  that  are  on  the  retired  list,  and  about  45,000  men. 
Outside  of  the  naval  militia  in  a  few  States,  we  have  only  250  naval 
reserves  to  fall  back  on.  This  should  be  remedied,  as  there  are  about 
5,000  blue  jackets  retiring  each  year  from  the  Navy,  many  of  whom 
might  be  enrolled  in  the  reserve  under  proper  inducements. 

The  fundamental  defect  of  the  Navy  Department  is  that  it  has  no 
brain,  no  competent  military  organization  charged  with  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  fleets  for  war  and  with  their  conduct  in  war,  and  in  conse- 
quence the  Navy  is  being  built  and  administered  on  a  peace  basis,  and 
is  not  being  efficiently  prepared  for  war  service.  In  this  respect  it 
differs  from  the  admiralties  of  all  other  navies,  whose  energies  are 
all  directed  by  a  thoroughly  educated  military  staff.  The  leading  offi- 
cers of  our  Navy  have  for  years  continuously  advocated  this  essential 
organization,  but  Congress  has  always  refused  to  grant  it. 

A  naval  campaign  is  a  great  game,  with  the  sovereignty  of  a 
country  at  stake,  and,  like  all  other  games,  victory  between  equal 
force  will  be  decided  by  superiority  of  training. 

Now,  for  what  do  we  need  a  fleet?  It  is  conceded  that  we  do  not 
want  it  for  aggression,  but  to  insure  peace  and  protect  our  people. 

Experts  agree  that  our  country  can  only  be  attacked  by  some 
great  naval  power,  therefore,  with  our  extended  coast  line,  both  on 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific,  we  cannot  wait  and  assume  the  defensive,  but 
must  have  a  fleet  combining  strength  and  speed  capable  of  going  out 
and  destroying  the  enemy's  fleet.  No  country  will  ever  land  troops 
on  our  shores  until  our  fleet  has  been  crushed  and  defeated. 

155 


It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  the  event  of  war  with 
this  country  one  of  the  world  prizes  would  be  the  Panama  Canal,  and 
a  powerful  fleet  will  be  requisite  for  its  safety  and  preservation. 

The  Panama  Canal,  now  being  finished,  and,  as  Admiral  Mahan 
put  it — "having  become  a  part  of  the  coast  line  of  the  United  States," 
will  require,  notwithstanding  it  has  been  fortified,  the  additional  pro- 
tection of  the  Navy,  for  it  would  become  a  vital  factor  if  this  country 
becomes  involved  with  any  other.  In  this  connection,  the  value  of  our 
naval  base  at  Guantanamo,  700  miles  from  Panama,  has  never  been 
appreciated  by  Congress  in  connection  with  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

It  is  conceivable  that  the  United  States,  due  to  the  relations  with 
immigrants  and  their  disputed  rights  on  the  Pacific  coast,  may  find 
itself  in  opposition  with  the  rival  nation  to  such  an  extent  that  it  can 
only  be  decided  by  the  country  having  the  greatest  naval  power.  In 
that  case  preparedness  and  a  fleet  combining  speed,  range  and  arma- 
ment would  be  of  unquestionable  value  in  deciding  the  safety  of 
Hawaii  and  the  Canal,  as  well  as  the  control  of  the  entire  commerce 
of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

The  complete  paralyzation  of  Germany's  commerce  or  England's 
fleet  demonstrates  as  never  before  to  labor  and  capital  in  every  State 
that  an  adequate  fleet  thoroughly  equipped  and  prepared  for  any 
emergency  is  necessary  for  the  future  of  our  trade  and  shipping. 

The  Russian-Japanese  war  is  an  evidence  of  what  happens  to  a 
nation  unprepared.  We  will  be  unfortunate  if  we  do  not  learn  the 
lesson  that  billions  of  money  due  to  unpreparedness  must  be  expended 
after  war  is  declared  in  order  to  overcome  the  unwise  saving  of 
millions  previous  to  war. 

The  modern  superdreadnaught  is  the  most  complicated  structure 
designed  and  built  by  engineers,  and  it  has  been  called  a  moving  power 
station  with  the  most  intricate  machinery.  It  requires  experienced 
officers  and  a  complement  of  1,000  trained  men.  In  1903  the  General 
Board  announced  its  opinion  as  to  what  our  naval  development  should 
be,  and  its  forecast  was  a  fleet  of  forty-eight  battleships,  one  hundred 
and  seventy-two  torpedo  destroyers,  with  their  attendant  auxiliaries 
of  submarines,  hospital  ships,  colliers,  supply  ships,  ammunition  ships, 
mine  layers  and  scout  cruisers,  ready  for  action  by  1920.  This  fore- 
cast has  proved  to  be  wise  from  events  that  have  transpired.  But 
Congressional  opposition  has  thwarted  the  General  Board's  program, 

156 


and  we  are  falling  in  consequence,  to  fourth  position,  with  an  unbal- 
anced fleet  lacking  the  highest  efficiency. 

The  aim  of  a  naval  policy  in  this  country  should  be  to  establiah 
an  organization  which  would  conduce  to  the  prompt  and  effective 
conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  Navy ;  an  organization  which  would  enable 
a  Navy  Department  to  pass,  if  it  became  necessary,  from  a  state  of 
peace  to  a  state  of  war  in  an  effective  way  without  a  complete  revolu- 
tion in  the  machinery  and  the  agencies  that  are  depended  upon  in 
times  of  peace. 

A  definite  building  program  for  the  fleet  which  Congress  should 
adhere  to  for  a  series  of  years.  The  abolition  of  useless  navy  yards, 
those  to  be  retained  to  be  decided  upon  by  a  joint  Army  and  Navy 
Board  of  experts.  The  necessary  increase  of  personnel  with  the 
increase  of  tonnage.  The  establishment  of  a  National  Council  of 
Defense,  made  up  of  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  members  of  the 
Cabinet  and  members  of  the  House  and  Senate,  to  bring  about 
co-operation  between  the  executive  and  legislative  bodies  (this  is  done 
by  all  other  world  powers,  but  has  been  refused  thus  far  by  Con- 
gress). The  prompt  organization  of  a  naval  reserve  of  twenty-five 
to  fifty  thousand  men.  The  creation  of  a  general  staff,  established 
by  law  in  the  Navy  Department,  to  furnish  this  country  with  a  con- 
tinuous and  up-to-date  naval  policy  in  order  that  we  may  possess  a 
fleet  effective  in  case  of  war. 

We  have  had  not  very  long  ago  as  many  as  six  Secretaries  of 
the  Navy  in  seven  years.  How  was  it  possible  for  a  Secretary  lacking 
expert  knowledge  and  without  a  staff  of  recognized  council  of  advisers 
to  properly  direct  all  the  varied  operations  of  the  Naval  Service? 
Admiral  Mahan  aptly  stated  that  a  general  staff  is  to  supply  the 
defect  inherent  in  temporary  tenure  and  periodical  changes. 

If  we  are  to  learn  the  lesson  of  the  past  eighteen  months,  we  must 
realize  that  England's  homes  and  institutions  are  only  intact  on 
account  of  her  fleet. 

Congress  and  the  country  in  the  past  have  been  most  inexcusably 
indifferent  as  regards  our  military  organization.  There  is  no  excuse 
now  for  not  providing  a  general  staff  and  sufficient  personnel  to  enable 
our  fleet  to  be  kept  in  readiness  and  in  a  state  of  preparedness  to  strike 
at  a  moment's  notice  if  the  country's  safety  requires  it.  No  nation 
will  ever  attack  us  if  it  knows  that  victory  is  impossible. 

157 


The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  have  the  pleasure  of 
introducing  Mr.  Henry  A.  Wise  Wood,  who  has  given  generously  of 
his  talent  for  this  patriotic  problem  of  national  defense.     (Applause.) 

AN  ADEQUATE  NAVAL  POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Henry  A.  Wise  Wood 

Chairman,  Conference  Committee  on  National  Preparedness, 

New  York 

Having  masters  at  sea,  we  may  neither  command  others 
nor  disobey  them. 

In  discussing  naval  policy  I  conceive  it  to  be  necessary  at  the 
beginning  to  lay  dov^^n  the  follovi^ing  principles: 

In  order  that  a  nation  shall  be  able  to  devise  intelligently  its 
naval  and  military  organisms  it  must 

(a)  Determine  and  formulate  the  poHcies  which  these  organisms 
shall  be  used  to  maintain; 

(b)  Ascertain  by  comparison  with  the  like  organisms  of  other 
nations,  particularly  of  those  nations  with  which  its  policies  are  likely 
to  bring  it  into  conflict,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  forces  it  must 
create  and  maintain  in  order  that  its  policies  shall  prevail  if  they  be 
challenged ; 

(c)  Determine  the  extent  of  the  naval  and  military  organisms  it 
can  afford  in  men  and  money; 

(d)  Determine  by  what  method  it  shall  obtain  the  men; 

(e)  Determine  where  and  how  it  shall  obtain  the  material,  and 

(f)  How  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  these  organisms  shall 
be  financed. 

Before  a  nation's  policies  may  be  formulated  there  must  be  con- 
sidered the  extent  and  geographic  disposition  of  its  territory ;  of 
adjacent  territory  which  may  become  a  source  of  danger  to  it,  and  of 
the  territory  not  its  own  in  which  nevertheless  it  has  assumed  obliga- 
tions analogous  to  those  of  sovereignty. 

Also,  the  extent  and  disposition,  and  naval  and  military  strength, 
of  every  other  nation  must  be  borne  in  mind,  whether  or  not  there  be 
with  it  a  conflict  of  policies,  because  accidental  causes  of  friction  some- 

158 


times  occur  between  nations  which  for  long  periods  of  time  have  lived 
in  seemingly  unshakeable  amity. 

As  a  nation's  policies  are  modified  by  the  nature  and  extent  of 
its  commerce,  by  its  foreign  investments,  by  the  rights  abroad  it 
demands  for  its  citizens,  and  the  rights  at  home  in  grants  to  the 
citizens  of  other  nations,  as  well  as  many  other  things,  these  also 
must  be  taken  into  consideration. 

In  a  paper  so  brief  as  this  all  may  not  be  dealt  with.  Nevertheless, 
those  which  are  controlling  may  be  treated  with  such  breadth  that 
the  result  will  be  the  same  in  substance  as  if  each  had  been  discussed. 

In  this  treatise  I  shall  speak  of  the  United  States  in  the  singular; 
it  is  time  we  had  begun  to  think  of  our  country  as  a  Nation,  instead 
of  as  a  federation  of  States. 

The  United  States  has  an  Atlantic  coast  line  of  2,435  nautical 
miles,  a  Gulf  coast  line  of  740  miles,  a  Pacific  coast  line  of  1,125  miles 
— in  all  4,300  sea  miles  of  coast  line.  Alaska  has  a  coast  line  of  6,500 
miles.  Thus  we  have  bounding  our  continental  territory  a  coast  line 
to  be  defended  of  10,800  miles. 

Mexico  has  an  eastern  coast  line  of  1,345  miles,  a  western  coast 
line  of  1,815  miles,  while  Central  America's  eastern  coast  is  1,200 
miles,  and  its  western  coast  1,500  miles  long. 

If  the  territory  described  be  taken  as  a  whole  and  its  eastern  and 
western  coasts  be  considered  separately,  it  will  be  found  that  the 
United  States,  Alaska,  Mexico,  and  Central  America  have  an  eastern 
coast  line  of  5,720  miles,  and  a  western  coast  line  of  10,940  miles. 

If  we  intend  to  defend  our  position  in  the  Northern  Continent 
against  invasion  directly  by  way  of  the  Atlantic,  we  have  5,720  miles 
of  coast  to  be  considered;  if  against  invasion  directly  by  way  of  the 
Pacific,  we  have  10,940  miles  to  be  dealt  with. 

The  north  and  east  coasts  of  South  America  measure  8,500  miles, 
and  its  west  coast  5,300  miles.  If  it  be  our  intention  to  continue  to 
support  the  Monroe  Doctrine  we  shall  have  to  defend  in  this  hemi- 
sphere 14,220  miles  of  coast  upon  the  Atlantic  side,  and  16,240  miles 
upon  the  Pacific  side,  or  upon  both  sides  30,460  miles,  which  is  con- 
siderably more  than  the  circumference  of  the  earth. 

The  foregoing  makes  it  plain  that  these  coasts  cannot  be  defended 
from  within,  but  must  be  defended  from  without,  if  they  be  defended 
at  all.     For  this  purpose  a  navy   is  needed.     It  becomes   necessary 

159 


therefore  to  determine  what  is  a  navy  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  in 
size  and  kind. 

Turning  now  to  the  subject  of  our  policies,  it  may  be  said  with 
accuracy  that  we  have  no  foreign  policies  at  the  moment.  With  the 
destruction  of  our  citizens  while  upon  foreign  merchant  ships  or 
upon  our  own  merchant  ships  we  offer  no  armed  interference,  nor  do 
we  offer  armed  interference  when  our  citizens  while  upon  foreign 
soil  are  destroyed,  their  wives  and  children  outraged,  their  property 
confiscated.  Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  doubted  whether  at  the  moment 
we  are  willing  to  enforce  by  armed  intervention  such  of  our  domestic 
policies  as  are  inimical  to  the  interests  of  foreign  nations.  If,  for 
instance,  the  Japanese  fleet,  convoying  troop  transports,  should  appear 
off  the  coasts  of  California,  or  of  adjacent  Mexico,  with  the  com- 
mand that  we  abandon  our  Asiatic  exclusion  policy  or  fight,  arid  the 
Canal  were  blocked,  I  doubt  not  we  should  instantly  abandon  our 
exclusion  policy.  Therefore,  to  discuss  a  naval  policy  for  the  United 
States  at  this  time  would  seem  a  mere  academic  occupation  were  it 
not  for  certain  indications  which  are  present  that  we  are  about  to 
experience  a  nation-wide  reaction  of  opinion  which  cannot  fail  to 
crystallize  into  a  national  spirit,  a  national  spirit  finding  expression 
in  a  definite  code  of  policies  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  in  order  to 
sustain  which  the  United  States,  if  need  be,  will  declare  war. 

What  these  policies  are  likely  to  be  I  venture  now  to  suggest. 
They  will  declare  for  the  United  States : 

First,  that  it  shall  be  treated  in  all  respects  as  becomes  the  equal 
of  every  other  nation; 

Second,  that  it  shall  deal  with  all  other  nations,  and  by  them  be 
dealt  with,  in  that  spirit  of  exact  justice  which  is  born  of  scrupulous 
regard  for  the  rights  of  others,  unselfishly  interpreted,  be  those  others 
great  or  small; 

Third,  that  it  wishes  those  peoples  to  be  free,  who  wish  to  be 
free,  and  shall  offer  to  all  such  its  sympathy  and  moral  support; 

Fourth,  that  its  first  duty  is  to  its  own  citizens,  be  they  at  home, 
abroad,  or  upon  the  high  seas,  and  to  the  strangers  within  its  gates; 
its  second  duty  to  those  peoples,  however  remote,  for  whose  welfare 
it  is  responsible;  its  third  duty,  to  its  neighbors,  whose  proximity 
has  made  of  them  its  intimates,  and  its  fourth,  and  no  less,  duty,  to 
the  other  peoples  of  the  earth ; 

160 


Fifth,  that  it  has  witnessed  with  surprise  and  horror  the  re- 
crudescence of  the  use  of  armaments  to  settle  the  disputes  of  nations 
which  it  had  fervently  trusted  would  never  again  be  resorted  to  by 
the  more  enlightened  among  them; 

Sixth,  that  this  reassertion  of  the  principle  that  the  use  of  force 
is  permissible  where  negotiation  fails,  has  aroused  not  only  its  deep 
concern  for  the  progress  which  it  believed  was  being  made  towards  an 
international  life  of  unshakeable  amity,  but  its  profound  anxiety  for 
its  own  position  in  the  world,  no  less  than  for  the  safety  of  its  citizens 
and  dependents,  and  of  those  sacred  institutions  which  it  has  reared 
slowly  at  such  great  cost  in  labor  and  suffering; 

Seventh,  that  in  view  of  the  dangers  which  are  inseparable  from 
such  an  altered  conception  of  international  obligation  as  it  is  apparent 
the  world  has  undergone,  and  of  the  grave  responsibility  devolving 
upon  the  living  generations  of  Americans  to  maintain  its  equal  dignity 
and  prestige  among  nations,  to  insure  the  survival  of  its  institutions, 
and  to  safeguard,  wherever  •'situated,  the  lives  and  property  of  its 
citizens  and  dependents,  it  is  imperative  that  the  United  States  shall 
notify  its  intention 

(a)  To  protect  its  coasts  from  invasion; 

(b)  To  insure  respect  for  the  inalienable  rights  upon  the  high 
seas  and  in  foreign  lands  of  its  people  and  dependents ; 

(c)  To  preserve  such  domestic  policies  as  it  deems  to  be  necessary 
for  the  welfare  of  its  people ; 

I'  (d)   To   protect  the   Panama   Canal,   and  to   insure   its    control 

thereof ; 

(e)  To  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and 

(f)  To  protect  its  oversea  possessions;  and 

Eighth,  that  the  United  States  shall  acquire  naval  and  military 
strength  sufficient  to  enable  it  to  make  these,  its  declared  policies, 
effective  as  against  any  other  nation  or  nations. 

The  principal  sea  powers  are  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France, 
Japan,  Russia,  Italy,  and  Austria,  ourselves  excluded.  These  nations 
may  be  separated  into  active  and  .passive  groups,  in  so  far  as  the 
existence  of  possible  causes  of  conflict  between  our  policies  and  theirs 
in  normal  times  is  concerned. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  I  shall  omit  to  consider  the  fric- 
tional  questions  which  as  incidents  of  the  present  war  have  involved 

161 


us  in  controversies  with  nearly  all  of  its  belligerents.  I  believe  it  to 
be  controlling  that  we  should  predicate  our  naval  policy  upon  consid- 
erations of  a  more  permanent  character,  and  therefore  shall  concern 
myself  w^ith  fixed  rather  than  with  such  fleeting  conflicts  of  policy. 

In  the  passive  group  I  place  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and 
Austria;  in  the  active  group  Germany,  Japan,  and  Russia. 

Great  Britain  I  place  in  the  passive  group  because  in  normal 
times  there  is  no  conflict  between  its  policies  and  our  own.  All  dis- 
putes with  its  colonies  in  this  hemisphere  have  been  settled,  and 
elsewhere  there  are  no  questions  open  between  us.  Nevertheless,  we 
must  beai'  it  in  mind  that  if  Canada  carries  out  its  intention  of  sending 
half  a  million  men  to  the  front  we  shall  have  upon  our  northern  border 
after  the  war  upwards  of  three  hundred  thousand  well-trained  war- 
taught  British  troops.  Our  General  Staff  has  told  us  that  before  the 
war  Great  Britain  in  fourteen  days  could  have  landed  upon  our  shores 
170,000  men,  a  number  which  represents  but  a  small  portion  of  the 
army  it  will  be  able  to  send  in  future.  With  such  a  force  already 
ashore  to  the  north  of  us,  and  that  other  force  which  its  command 
of  the  sea  will  enable  it  to  deliver  here  at  will,  it  is  a  correct 
induction  that  in  the  final  analysis  we  shall  have  to  conduct  our 
affairs  in  conformity  with  the  wishes  of  the  British  people. 

France  is  placed  in  the  passive  group  because  nowhere  do  its 
policies  conflict  with  ours,  or  are  there  questions  open  between  us. 

Of  Italy  and  Austria  the  same  may  be  said. 

Germany  belongs  in  the  active  group.  It  is  an  expanding  nation 
with  imperial  ambitions  as  yet  unrealized,  and  a  thirst  for  sea  power 
wherewith  to  create  for  itself  a  colonial  empire  second  to  that  of  no 
other  nation.  Finding  itself  beset  in  Africa  and  Asia  by  powerful 
rivals  already  in  possession,  it  is  not  unnatural  that  Germany  should 
have  turned  to  the  only  remaining  continent  which  is  occupied  by  little 
powers  and  free  of  great  ones,  therein  to  set  up  the  dependencies  upon 
which  its  growth  oversea  depends.  Nor  is  it  surprising  that  the 
prosecution  of  this,  its  colonial  policy  in  South  America  which  has 
been  so  carefully  outlined  by  its  economists,  should  have  been  held 
in  abeyance  thus  far.  Germany,  as  events  have  proven,  foresaw  the 
necessity  of  effecting  in  Europe  a  state  of  equilibrium  whereby  it 
should  be  made  secure  from  attack  by  neighborhood  enemies  before 
undertaking  extensive  operations  so  far  afield.     Its  decisive  victory, 

162 


or  a  peace  by  the  terms  of  which  it  shall  have  secured  for  itself 
freedom  of  action  in  the  southern  half  of  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
must  inevitably  be  followed  by  a  knock  at  the  gates  of  one  or  more  of 
the  Spanish-American  republics.  This,  unless  the  United  States  is 
able  to  interpose  the  only  obstacle  that  is  effective,  superior  sea  power. 
Germany,  as  our  General  Staff  advises  us,  can  land  upon  our  shores 
827,000  men  in  forty-six  days.  If  Germany  be  permitted  to  retain  its 
present  superiority  to  us  in  sea  power  then,  in  the  last  analysis,  we, 
having  in  it  a  second  master  in  the  Atlantic,  shall  have  to  conduct 
our  affairs  in  conformity  with  the  wishes  of  Germany  also. 

Japan  is  placed  in  the  active  group  because  it,  like  Germany,  is 
an  expanding  nation  having  a  definite  mission,  conscious  of  its  pos- 
sibilities and  fully  aware  that  these  may  be  realized  only  by  the 
exercise  of  naval  and  military  prowess.  Ambitious  to  dominate  the 
Pacific,  desirous  of  a  base  near  the  Canal,  and  determined  to  secure 
for  its  people  in  foreign  lands  the  same  rights  that  are  enjoyed  by 
those  of  other  first-class  powers,  Japan  is  a  rapidly  growing  sea 
power  to  be  reckoned  with  by  us.  Japan,  our  General  Staff  tells  us,  can 
deliver  upon  our  Pacific  coast  238,000  men  in  sixty-three  days.  As  in 
the  cases  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  we  have  in  Japan  still  a 
third  master,  in  so  far  as  our  western  coast  is  concerned,  who  may 
dictate  our  policies  for  a  time  at  least  unless  we  possess  in  the  Pacific 
superior  sea  power. 

Russia  is  placed  among  the  active  powers  because  of  the  discrim- 
ination against  our  Jewish  citizens  which  it  practices,  in  which  there 
lie  the  seeds  of  controversy. 

Thus,  with  four  sea  powers  we  have  no  conflict  of  policy,  while 
with  a  fifth  its  colonial  policy  conflicts  with  our  Monroe  Doctrine,  with 
a  sixth  its  demand  for  equality  of  treatment  conflicts  with  our  Asiatic 
exclusion  policy,  and  with  a  seventh  its  Jewish  exclusion  policy  con- 
flicts Avith  our  own  demand  for  equality  of  treatment.  In  the  latter 
case  we  complain  of  that  which  we  ourselves  accord  to  another. 

Other  nations  fight  in  packs,  and  v/e  singly.  Whether  we  shall 
be  able  to  hold  to  our  traditional  policy  of  isolation  amid  nations  which 
avail  themselves  of  the  advantages  of  organized  co-operation  our  next 
wars  probably  will  determine.  Meanwhile,  it  is  upon  the  assumption 
that  we  shall  have  to  bear  in  full  the  brunt  of  our  defense  against  a 
coalition  of  powers  making  common  cause  against  us  that  we  shall 

163 


have  to  formulate  our  naval  policy.  It  is  not  that  we  should  assume 
vaguely  that  we  shall  have  to  meet  any  two  or  more  powers,  but  that 
we  should  accept  as  a  military  axiom  the  likelihood  of  our  having  to 
face  any  two  of  the  powers  with  which  our  policies  conflict  already 
whose  interests  and  aims  would  be  served  by  their  conducting 
operations  in  common  against  us. 

I  shall  now  lay  down  three  propositions  which  are  fundamental 
to  the  maintenance  of  independent  nationality: 

(g)  It  is  the  first  duty  of  government  to  secure  its  people  against 
attack  by  alien  peoples. 

(h)  As  independent  nationality  is  possible  only  when  and  so 
long  as  security  against  alien  attack  is  effective  physically,  the 
defenses  of  a  nation  must  take  precedence  over  public  works  and 
social  betterments  if  the  nation  is  to  be  secure  in  the  enjoyment  of 
its  internal  life. 

(i)  When  and  so  soon  as  public  works  and  social  betterments 
absorb  the  attention  and  resources  of  a  people  at  the  cost  of  its 
defenses,  the  nation  is  in  danger  of  subjugation  to  the  extent  that  its 
defenses  are  insufficient  for  its  protection,  and  its  independence  is  in 
jeopardy.    In  this  case  stands  the  United  States. 

We  are  surrounded  by  possible  enemies,  in  the  sense  that  friction 
leading  to  war  may  arise  conceivably  between  ourselves  and  any  most 
friendly  neighbor.  Of  this  the  past  is  full  of  appropriate  examples.  We 
are  not  free  of  probable  enemies,  in  the  sense  that  friction  which  may 
lead  to  war  already  is  present,  conceivably  in  the  form  of  an  enduring 
conflict  between  our  own  policies  and  those  of  the  nations  which  I 
have  placed  in  the  active  group. 

In  determining  a  naval  policy  suitable  for  the  United  States  our 
first  a:nd  imperative  duty  is  to  secure  ourselves  against  successful 
attack  by  those  whose  policies  conflict  with  our  own.  To  do  less 
would  be  to  lay  ourselves  open  to  charges  of  malfeasance,  who  are 
trustees  holding  for  the  benefit  of  those  to  come  that  which  our 
progenitors  created  for  them  at  the  cost  of  treasure  and  blood.  And 
our  second  duty  is  to  conceive  and  create  and  administer  our  defenses 
in  such  fashion  that  they  shall  afford  us  the  maximum  of  protection 
should  we  have  to  meet  those  with  whom  we  have  no  enduring  conflict 
of  policy,  should  an  unforeseeable  controversy  arise  with  them. 

164 


Further  than  this  we  need  not  consider  going  for  the  moment, 
although  a  broad  survey  of  affairs  in  the  world  and  of  our  excep- 
tionally favorable  location  therein,  of  our  vast  wealth  and  the  rapidity 
with  which  we  are  increasing  it  and  our  population,  all  point  to  the 
need  of  our  becoming  ultimately  the  first  naval  power.  Therefore 
our  defenses  should  be  designed  with  this  in  view  and  our  plans  laid 
accordingly,  for  a  well-thought-out,  continuing  development  of  our 
navy  and  its  adjuncts,  towards  a  definite  aim  which  has  been  prede- 
termined, will  insure  economy  of  time,  of  labor,  and  of  resources. 

Such  a  policy  must  be  predicated  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  law, 
which  human  history  has  firmly  established,  that  war  is  a  recurring 
pheno7nenon  and  must  be  classed  as  such  with  fire,  internal  outbreaks 
must  be  provided  for  in  advance  in  order  that  its  likelihood  may  be 
lessened,  and  its  operations  excluded  from  one's  own  soil. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  and  of  the  first  duty  imposed  upon  us 
thereby  a  fit  naval  policy  for  the  United  States  requires  that  we 
shall: 

(j)  Maintain  at  all  times  in  the  Atlantic  a  force  superior  to  that 
of  Germany,  and 

(k)  Maintain  at  all  times  in  the  Pacific  a  force  superior  to  that 
of  Japan,  and  that  we  shall 

(1)  Endeavor  to  protect  the  Canal  so  thoroughly  against  capture 
or  destruction  by  land  or  sea,  or  injury  by  air,  or  stoppage  by  the 
accidental  or  intentional  sinking  or  explosion  therein  of  appropriately 
laden  merchant  vessels,  that  this  passage  shall  constitute  a  means  as 
nearly  dependable  as  may  be  whereby  either  fleet  may  be  supplemented 
from  the  other,  or  both  combined  in  case  of  need.  In  formulating  our 
naval  policy,  however,  it  is  inadmissible  that  the  Canal  be  treated 
as  a  link  which  is  dependable,  because  the  utmost  vigilance  of  those 
in  charge  cannot  assure  its  freedom  from  closure  by  artificial  means 
or  by  natural  forces.  And  upon  so  unstable  a  means  of  communication 
no  nation  so  great  as  ours  should  stake  the  success  of  its  defense. 

In  performing  our  first  duty  we  shall  have  performed  our  second, 
in  that  we  shall  have  created  and  disposed  adequate  forces  appro- 
priately,  and  provided  as  well  as  may  be  for  their  coalition  and  use  in 
the  event  of  a  major  operation  in  the  Atlantic,  where,  it  is  safe  to 
assume,  any  European  enemy  will  have  to  be  met  and  dealt  with. 

165 


How  such  a  navy  shall  be  built  and  financed  and  administered  are 
interesting  questions,  the  discussion  of  which  will  not  be  permitted  by 
the  limitations  of  this  paper.  These  questions,  however,  are  wholly 
aside  from  and  secondary  to  the  needs  of  the  navy,  and  the  require- 
ments of  national  self-preservation  which  demand  imperatively  that  a 
sufficient  navy  shall  exist.  However,  I  think  it  necessary  to  refer 
herein  to  a  condition  which  must  be  preserved  scrupulously  if  effective 
sea  power  is  to  be  achieved  and  maintained.  A  navy  to  be  effective 
mu^t  be  modelled  exclusively  by  naval  men  of  the  highest  technical 
attainments,  and  never  may  be  modelled  in  any  respect  by  civilians, 
whether  they  chance  to  sit  for  the  moment  in  the  Secretary's  chair,  or 
in  a  legislative  committee  room,  or  in  the  halls  of  Congress  itself. 
A  navy  is  a  highly  complex  and  delicate  instrument  of  precision  un- 
derstandable by  those  only  who  have  spent  long  years  in  its  study  and 
use,  and  is  as  subject  to  injury  through  the  tampering  of  those  who 
are  ignorant  of  its  parts  and  their  subtle  relationships  as  is  the 
telephone  system. 

Therefore,  secretaries  and  legislators  who  are  wise  will  content 
themselves  with  determining  the  policies  a  navy  shall  execute  and  the 
size  it  shall  be  given  as  a  whole,  while  rigorously  refraining  from 
attempting  to  determine  nature  of  its  units,  its  proportions,  or  the 
disposition  of  its  divisions.  With  respect  to  a  navy,  that  great  outer 
wall  of  a  nation's  defenses,  upon  which  depend  the  safeguarding  of 
its  commerce  afloat,  of  its  wealth  ashore,  of  the  lives  and  honors  of 
its  men  and  women,  of  its  free  and  independent  national  life,  these 
searching  words  of  Christ  should  be  big  with  meaning  for  all  who  are 
charged  with  the  awful  responsibilities  of  government:  "Render  unto 
Caesar  the  things  that  are  Caesar's,  and  unto  God  the  things  that  are 
God's." 

The  Chairman — The  next  speaker  will  be  Mr.  William  Barclay 
Parsons. 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  AUXILIARY  FORCES  OF  RESERVE 

OFFICERS  DRAWN  FROM  THE  PROFESSIONAL  CLASS 

William  Barclay  Parsons,  New  York 

Mr.  Parsons — Mr.  Chairman  and  fellow  delegates:  Before 
beginning  the  address  that  I  prepared  to  deliver  to  you,  I  have  the 
honor  to  read  some  resolutions  that  were  passed  at  the  convention 

166 


of  the  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers,  which  is  the  largest 
engineering  society  in  the  United  States,  at  their  convention  which 
was  held  during  this  week.    The  resolutions  are  as  follows: 
Resolutions  drawn  by  Annual  Convention  of  the  American  Society  of 

Civil  Engineers,  held  in  New  York,  January  19,  1916,  and  pre- 
sented by  Mr.  Wm.  Barclay  Parsons,  as  directed  by  the  Society: 

"Whereas,  we  believe  that  the  United  States  has  definitely  adopted 
the  following  policies: 

"To  sustain  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 

"To  retain  guardianship  or  control  over  all  territories  it  now 
holds. 

"To  protect  the  rights  of  its  citizens  to  freedom  of  travel  and 
traffic  on  the  high  seas,  and 

"To  protect  the  rights  of  all  people  within  its  borders  in  the 
pursuit  of  legitimate  business;  and 

"Whereas,  we  believe  that  these  policies  are  just,  wise  and  benefi- 
cent, not  only  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  but  to  all  peoples  of 
the  World,  and  are  without  purpose  of  territorial  expansion  or  unfair 
quest  of  commercial  advantage;  and 

"Whereas,  the  terrible  events  of  the  last  two  years  have  indefi- 
nitely deferred  the  hope  of  establishing  and  maintaining  the  rights  of 
nations  and  peoples  by  peaceful  means  alone,  and  have  forced  the 
conviction  that,  as  yet,  no  nation  can  safely  maintain  its  rights,  how- 
ever firmly  rooted  in  justice,  without  the  aid  of  effectively  developed 
physical  force;  and 

"Whereas,  the  United  States  has  not  maintained  its  Army  and 
Navy  establishments  on  a  basis  to  meet  the  test  of  a  great  war,  which 
has  so  long  appeared  remote,  but  which  it  is  now  perceived  may  at 
any  moment  become  a  reality;  and 

"Whereas,  patriotism  and  self-preservation  demand  that  these 
establishments  be  placed  as  promptly  as  possible  on  a  basis  of  strength 
an  efficiency  which  will  enable  them  to  cope  adequately  with  the  task 
which,  in  support  of  our  national  policies,  they  may  at  any  moment 
have  to  perform;  therefore,  be  it 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  this  annual  meeting  of  the 
American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers  that  our  national  policies,  both 
at  home  and  abroad,  imperatively  demand  not  only  adequate  enlarge- 
ments of  our  Army  and  Navy  establishments,  but  also  a  thorough  and 
efficient  plan  of  mobilization  of  those  industrial  and  ti'ansportation 
resources  of  the  country  which  are  essential  to  the  creation  and 
operation  of  these  establishments;  and,  be  it  further 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  this  meeting  that  the  adequacy 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  establishments  for  properly  supporting  our 
national  policies  should  be  determined  by  the  experts  of  the  Govern- 

167 


ment  who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  dealing  w^ith  such  problems,  and 
who,  by  reason  of  their  technical  knowledge,  experience  and  patriotism, 
command  the  fullest  measure  of  confidence;  and,  be  it  further 

"Resolved,  That  a  copy  of  these  resolutions  be  sent  to  the  National 
Security  Congress  to  convene  tomorrow  at  Washington,  through  the 
Chairman    of   the    Joint    Committee    of    the    National    Engineering 
Societies  on  a  Reserve  Corps  of  Civilian  Engineers. 
"January  19,  1916." 

It  is  hoped  that  the  earnestness  and  character  of  this  Congress 
will  impress  the  gentlemen  at  both  ends  of  Pennsylvania  Avenue  with 
the  determination  of  the  American  people  that  they  shall  be  put,  and 
when  put,  kept  in  that  respected  position  among  nations,  which  will 
spare  them  insult  and  secure  them  peace.  One  of  the  objects  of  this 
Congress  is  to  permit  expression  of  views  on  matters  of  general  policy 
to  be  followed  by  the  Government,  or  on  details  of  such  general  policy. 
It  is  my  good  fortune  to  be  able  to  present  to  you  a  definite  move 
for  a  definite  detail  of  national  defense. 

Last  spring  the  five  national  engineering  societies  of  the  United 
States,  realizing  the  great  need  for  a  very  large  increase  in  the 
numerical  strength  of  the  Engineer  Corps  of  the  Army,  should  the 
unfortunate  contingency  of  war  arise,  appointed  separate  committees 
to  consider  the  problems  involved.  These  committees,  in  order  to 
avoid  duplication  of  work,  organized  from  their  number  a  joint  com- 
mittee representing  the  whole  profession  in  all  its  branches,  whether 
mechanical,  electrical,  mining  or  civil,  the  last  term  covering  all 
branches  of  engineering  not  otherwise  especially  described.  The  engi- 
neers enrolled  in  these  societies,  and  therefore  represented  by  this 
joint  committee,  number  more  than  26,000. 

In  the  United  States  Army  there  are  210  officers  in  the  Engineer 
Corps,  some  of  whom  serve  with  the  very  limited  allowance  of  engineer 
troops,  while  the  others  are  on  special  duty,  usually  engaged  in  the 
improvement  of  our  rivers  and  harbors.  These  men  stand  in  the  front 
rank  of  the  profession.  For  high  character,  for  engineering  skill  and 
experience  in  their  particular  lines,  they  have  no  superiors;  but  in 
number  they  are  wholly  inadequate  should  a  serious  situation  arise 
to  demand  their  services. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  deficiency  in  numerical  strength,  the 
Engineer  Corps  of  the  United  States  Army  consists  at  present  of  1 
general  officer,  with  rank  of  brigadier-general;  14  colonels,  and  195 

168 


officers  of  rank  less  than  that  of  colonel.  In  1912,  before  the  British 
army  was  affected  by  the  war,  the  engineer  corps  of  that  army 
(known  as  the  Royal  Engineers)  consisted  of  1  field  marshal,  11 
general  officers,  14  colonels-in-chief  and  60  colonels,  or  86  officers  of 
rank  of  colonel  and  higher,  as  compared  with  15  in  our  army;  and 
1,007  officers  of  rank  less  than  that  of  colonel,  as  compared  with  195 
here.  These  figures  in  the  British  army  were  exclusive  of  any 
engineer  organizations  in  the  militia  or  territorial  forces. 

When  the  British  army  was  called  upon  to  take  its  part  in  a  great 
war,  although  the  part  that  the  army  took  was  but  small  as  compared 
with  the  duties  falling  upon  their  allies,  this  engineer  force,  strong 
as  it  was  compared  with  the  American,  was,  like  other  departments 
of  the  army,  wholly  inadequate  in  strength  to  meet  the  demand  that 
was  put  upon  it,  but  the  difference  between  the  engineer  strength 
of  the  British  army  and  of  our  own  is  even  greater  than  what  would 
appear  by  comparison  of  figures  alone. 

In  the  British  Isles  the  coast  is  amply  protected  by  permanent 
fortifications  or  by  Great  Britain's  mighty  navy.  Therefore,  not  only 
have  no  engineering  works  at  home  of  magnitude  been  necessary,  but 
not  even  works  of  minor  or  temporary  character.  The  war  in  which 
the  British  forces  are  engaged  has  been  for  a  large  part  in  a  country 
where  railway  and  highway  communications  are  of  unsurpassed  excel- 
lence and  where  only  the  comparatively  lighter  class  of  engineering 
works  or  military  field  works  have  been  required.  In  our  own  country, 
where  our  frontiers  and  our  coast  line  are  measured  by  tens  of 
thousands  of  miles,  there  are  defensive  works  located  at  the  mouths 
of  our  principal  harbors,  and  that  is  all.  Along  our  great  land 
frontiers  to  the  north  and  south  there  is  absolutely  nothing.  Like- 
wise, there  is  nothing  along  the  actual  coasts  between  harbors.  In 
England,  when  the  war  broke  out,  nothing  had  to  be  done  to  protect 
her  frontiers ;  with  us,  should  war  break  out,  there  is  nothing,  so  far 
as  land  defenses  are  concerned,  to  prohibit  a  foreign  force  from 
crossing  the  land  frontiers,  or  to  effect  a  landing  at  any  point  on 
either  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific  or  the  Gulf  coasts,  except  in  the 
immediate  neighborhood  of  the  fortifications  protecting  entrances  to 
our  main  harbors. 

If  a  war  should  arise,  or  if  we  were  put  on  the  defensive  as 
against  invasion,  engineers  would  be  needed  at  once  to  prepare,  place 

169 


and  maintain  mines  in  all  our  harbors;  to  construct  emplacements  for 
large  guns  and  light  earthworks  and  trenches,  along  our  many  miles  1 
of  coast ;  to  construct  the  secondary  lines  of  earthworks  to  be  held 
by  such  an  army  as  could  be  collected  at  the  time  to  protect  our  cities 
in  the  event  of  a  landing  being  effected  at  any  point;  to  locate  and 
build  branch  lines  of  railways  to  reach  the  points  selected  for  defense 
in  order  to  transport  men  and  supplies  of  all  kinds,  because  the  places 
on  the  coast  most  inviting  for  a  landing  are  those  lacking  in  railway 
communication;  to  build  thousands  of  miles  of  highways  capable  of; 
standing  up  again'^t  heavy  motor  traffic,  and  to  repair  these  roads  as 
they  broke  down;   to  string  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  and  con- 
struct wireless  stations;  to  make  military  surveys  and  maps;  to  erect ^! 
barracks  and  supervise  the  sanitary  drainage  and  water  supply  of . 
camps;  to  furnish  inspectors  to  supervise  the  manufacture  of  war- 
supplies;  and  to  do  a  multitude  of  other  duties. 

If  the  war  were  one  of  offence,  as,  for  instance,  to  maintain  thei 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  some  South  American  or  Central  AmericanJ 
country,  by  dislodging  a  foreign  force  which  had  already  obtained  a 
foothold,  there  would  be  needed  all  the  above  works  to  resist  a  divert- 
ing home  attack,  and  in  addition  the  doing  of  the  same  things  abroad, 
and  also  the  construction  of  harbor  works  in  order  to  permit  the; 
successful  landing  of  our  own  men  and  supplies,  and  the  development 
and  proper  operation  of  local  transportation  lines. 

It  is  but  necessary  to  enumerate  some  of  the  needs  of  engineer 
service  to  appreciate  how  inadequate  in  number  is  the  existing 
Engineer  Corps  of  our  Army.  Then  it  must  be  remembered  that  in 
case  of  war  our  regular  Engineer  Corps  would  be  stripped,  as  in  1861 
and  1898,  of  its  ablest  men  to  make  Army  commanders  of  them;  so  at 
the  very  time  when  the  increase  of  engineers  would  be  most  demanded. ; 
they  would  probably  be  actually  decreased.  m 

For  many  years  the  Army  has  maintained  a  Medical  Reserve 
Corps,  in  which  surgeons  and  doctors  were  regularly  commissioned! 
subject  to  immediate  call  in  case  of  war,  and  with  their  consent  atf 
any  time  in  peace.    This  Medical  Reserve  has  been  found  exceedingly; 
useful  in  cases  of  emergencies,  such  as  floods,  fires  and  other  dis- 
asters, and  at  present  along  the  Mexican  frontier.     With  this  as  a| 
model,  the  Engineer  Committee  has  urged  upon  the  War  Department 
the  formation  of  an  engineer  reserve.     Engineers  and  doctors  may  be 

170 


said  to  be  always  mobilized.  They  are  doing  in  times  of  peace  exactly 
what  they  will  be  called  upon  to  do  in  times  of  war,  but  for  the  sake 
of  an  efficient  organization  in  the  Army,  the  selection  of  these  addi- 
tional men  cannot  be  left  until  the  arrival  of  a  crisis.  The  men  for 
such  a  reserve  should  be  selected  in  times  of  peace  when  there  is  no 
excitement  and  no  pressure,  when  care  can  be  taken  to  investigate 
each  candidate,  to  select  him  on  account  of  his  fitness,  and  then  each 
year  to  call  upon  him  to  do  a  certain  limited  amount  of  work — not 
necessarily  to  teach  him  how  to  build  bridges  or  railways  or  high- 
ways, because  that  he  will  be  doing  anyway,  but  to  teach  him  how 
these  same  bridges  and  railways  and  highways  should  be  best  adapted 
for  military  purposes;  to  instruct  him  in  the  details  of  large  gun 
foundations  and  large  gun  mechanism,  the  size  and  shape  of  field 
earthworks;  to  call  upon  him  to  study  the  topography  of  his  own 
district,  its  railways  and  highways,  and  being  informed  as  to  plans 
of  defense  could  at  once  set  out  to  put  the  construction  of  such  works 
in  execution.  This  instruction  would  also  cover  the  duties  of  a 
soldier,  subordination,  obedience  and  willingness  to  do  what  he  is 
told,  and  how  engineering  methods  must  be  changed  to  meet  the 
exigencies  of  war,  where  time  and  not  economy  is  paramount.  This 
regular  annual  work  would  not  turn  out  highly  trained  military 
engineers  as  the  term  is  understood  in  European  armies,  but  it  would 
bring  together  a  force  of  men  highly  trained  in  their  several  special- 
ties and  with  soriie  military  training,  and  who  could  be  ordered  out  at 
once  in  any  emergency  and  without  waiting  for  either  further  legisla- 
tion by  Congress  or  the  approval  of  their  commissions  by  the  Senate, 
and  avoid  the  seriously  hampering  disadvantage  of  gathering  a  force 
of  men  together  in  a  great  hurry  without  any  information  as  to  their 
specific  knowledge,  experience  or  personal  qualifications. 

In  the  legislation  which  has  been  tentatively  drafted  there  is  a 
provision  for  an  officers  reserve,  into  which  reserve  the  present  Med- 
ical Reserve  would  be  incorporated.  This  officers  reserve,  as  outlined, 
is  so  broad  as  to  include  all  arms  and  staff  corps.  It  is  proposed  that 
men  should  be  commissioned  for  periods  of  five  years,  the  commission 
renewable  with  the  permission  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  advan- 
tage of  this  renewal  provision  is  that  it  would  prevent  the  officers 
reserve  becoming  loaded  with  men  who,  while  capable  at  the  time  of 
their  first  appointment  for  rendering  service,  might  in  the  course  of 

171 


time  become  incapable  from  any  one  of  many  reasons,  and  if  this 
renewal  provision  is  effectively  exercised  it  will  free  the  corps  of  ai 
accumulation  of  human  deadwood.  There  would  be  no  pay  attache 
to  the  office,  except  at  such  times  as  they  shall  be  called  upon  for^ 
service.  They  would  hold  rank  in  the  Army  and  be  subject  to  be  callec 
upon  for  service  in  times  of  war  exactly  the  same  as  any  other  officer 
of  the  Army,  and  in  times  of  peace,  in  case  of  emergency,  with  theii 
consent. 

Confining  my  attention  to  the  engineers  in  this  reserve,  the  men" 
would  be  selected  as  the  President  or  Secretary  of  War  would  dictate. 
They  would  receive  the  amount  of  annual  training  as  outlined  above. 
They  could  be  classified  geographically  and  professionally,  that  is  to 
say,  in  what  particular  line  their  experience  lay,  so  that  the  War 
Department  would  know  where  to  call  for  men  especially  versed  in 
railway  or  highway  construction,  bridge  building,  sanitation,  or  any^; 
other  line,  so  that  when  engineers  were  needed  the  Department  coulif ' 
at  once  have  at  hand  not  only  men,  but  the  kind  of  men,  and  men 
especially  trained. 

It  is  highly  gratifying  and  distinctly  encouraging  that  this  plan' 
of  an  engineer  reserve  has,  so  far  as  our  committee  knows,  met  the* 
approval  of  the  officers  in  the  army  from  the  Secretary  of  War  down. 
The  following  extract  from  a  letter  from  an  officer  of  high  standing 
and  rank  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers  is  but  one  illustration  of  such 
official  support: 

"I  am  strongly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  it, 
and  it  is  good  to  know  that  men  who  likewise  realize  this 
importance  are  giving  of  their  time  and  efforts  to  assist  in 
putting  our  United  States  in  a  condition  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency which  may  arise.  To  those  of  us  who  know,  it  is  very 
plain  that  one  of  our  greatest  lacks  under  present  conditions 
will  be  a  body  of  trained  officers.  The  present  war  emphasizes 
the  fact  that  such  a  body  of  men  is  a  valuable  asset  and  the 
lack  of  it  a  cause  of  disaster.  I  was  told  recently  by  one  of 
the  observers  with  the  Austrian  army  that  this  was  most 
noticeable  there.  He  attributed  the  poor  showing  of  the 
Austrians  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  to  the  lack  of  proper 
training  on  the  part  of  their  officers  and  their  subsequent 

172 


successes  in  Galicia  to  the  coming  to  their  aid  of  the  more 
highly  trained  Germans.  England,  too,  has  suffered  severely 
due  to  this  same  lack  of  trained  officers  and  the  consequent 
inability  to  fit  her  men  for  their  services  in  the  field." 

The  project  for  an  engineer  reserv6,  if  enacted  into  law,  will  be 
the  forging  of  one  link  in  the  chain  of  national  preparedness  and  will 
be  one  step  on  the  path  marked  out  by  that  great  patriot  who  pre- 
ferred to  die  loving  his  country  and  beloved  by  his  people  for  gen- 
erations— a  simple,  American  gentleman  at  Mount  Vernon,  and  who 
left  us,  among  other  priceless  heritages,  these  words:  "If  we  desire 
to  avoid  insult,  we  must  be  prepared  to  repel  it,  and  if  we  desire  to 
secure  peace,  it  must  be  known  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war." 

The  Chairman — I  wish  to  introduce  next  Mrs.  Barret  Wendell, 
the  head  of  the  Boston  Relief  Association. 

Mrs.  Wendell — Mr.  Chairman  and  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  is 
very  kind  of  you  to  let  me  have  a  moment  to  speak,  and  I  will  detain 
you  but  a  few  seconds.  We  have  in  Boston  a  woman's  society  Which 
is  the  Special  Aid  Society  for  American  preparedness.  It  is  a  branch 
of  the  National  Society  for  Women  which  was  gotten  up  in  New  York. 

His  Excellency,  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts,  Governor  Walsh, 
last  October  called  together  a  number  of  Boston  women  and  asked 
us  to  form  such  a  society,  and  we  are  affiliated  with  the  men's 
Security  League,  and  are  doing  our  best  to  help  them  in  every  pos- 
sible way,  feeling  also  that  there  are  a  great  many  things  that  the 
women  can  do  that  men  cannot. 

What  I  wanted  particularly  to  call  your  attention  to  this  after- 
noon was  a  poster  which  has  just  been  sent  on  to  me  here,  and  which 
I  felt  would  be  interesting  to  all  the  different  branches  of  the  National 
Security  League.  Our  society  in  Massachusetts  offered  a  prize  for 
the  best  poster,  we  offered  a  sum  of  money  for  the  best  poster,  and 
this  poster  that  I  am  going  to  show  you  now  was  given  the  first  prize. 
It  seems  to  me  very  remarkable  to  have  been  done  by  a  young  art 
student.  We  are  copyrighting  it,  and  will  have  it  lithographed,  and  I 
want  to  say  to  all  members  of  the  league  who  would  like  to  get  copies 
of  it  to  use  in  propaganda  or  in  any  appealing  way  for  the  National 
Security  League,  if  they  would  write  to  me  in  Boston,  I  of  course 

173 


would  send  them  as  many  copies  as  they  like.  I  cannot  tell  now 
exactly  what  the  cost  will  be,  but  it  is  not  a  money-making  concern, 
and  we  will  give  it  to  you  for  exactly  what  it  is  worth.  I  am  going 
to  show  you  the  poster,  and  I  think  it  is  very  fine  and  very  appealing. 
(Mrs.  Wendell  here  exhibited  the  poster,  a  woman  with  her  children 
about  her  at  the  foot  of  a  flagstaff  from  which  floats  the  American 
flag.) 

Below,  it  says,  "Can  it  protect  them?"  Is  not  that,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  exactly  the  object  of  the  National  Security  League?  It  is 
what  we  are  all  trying  to  do — to  have  our  flag  protect  our  citizens.  I 
thank  you  very  much.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — The  discussion  will  now  be  opened,  the  addresses 
having  been  concluded,  with  the  offering  of  a  resolution  by  David 
Jayne  Hill,  formerly  Ambassador  to  Germany. 

Mr.  Hill — Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  requested  and  authorized  by  the 
president  of  the  National  Society  of  the  Sons  of  the  American  Rev- 
olution to  state  the  sentiment  of  that  body  upon  the  subject  under 
discussion  by  this  congress.  I  shall  do  it  in  one  minute,  by  reading 
the  following  resolution  which  was  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  the 
National  Society  at  Portland,  Oregon,  on  July  20,  1915: 

"Resolved,  That  the  Sons  of  the  American  Revolution,  in 
congress  assembled,  endorse  the  sentiment  of  a  system  of 
preparedness  on  the  part  of  the  Government  and  the  people, 
and  the  guarantee  of  peace  with  honor,  in  accordance  with 
the  traditions  and  the  policies  of  our  Revolutionary  ancestry. 
This  is  the  .most  vital  subject  now  under  consideration  by 
the  Federal  Congress.  Since  the  inception  of  this  Society,  its 
efforts  have  been  to  promote  patriotism,  based  upon  true 
American  ideals.  In  fact,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  very 
reason  for  organization  was  for  this  purpose."     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — Dr.  Woods  Hutchinson. 
Dr.  Hutchinson — I  have  been  asked  to  say  just  a  word  in  regard 
to  a  resolution  which  is  before  the  committee  for  the  expanding  and 
developing  of  the  army  and  navy  medical  corps  to  its  proper  propor- 
tions in  preparation  for  eventualities.  When  I  looked  over  this  mag- 
nificent program  here  before  us  and  saw  the  amazing  array  of  splendid 

174 


I 


authorities  from  all  sides,  and  saw  that  there  was  nothing  from  the 
point  of  view  of  health  and  sanitation  and  the  doctor,  I  really  was 
shocked.  It  looked  to  me  like  the  play  of  "Hamlet"  with  the  hero 
omitted. 

The  question  of  what  the  doctor  has  to  do  with  the  matter  of 
preparedness  is  one  that  can  be  answered  by  saying  that  in  the  old 
style  of  war  the  real  danger  was  not  from  bullets,  but  from  bugs  and 
bacilli.  The  deaths  from  disease  were  five  times  as  many  as  those 
that  took  place  from  wounds-  on  the  field  of  battle. 

In  the  war  with  Spain  there  were  five  times  as  many  deaths  from 
typhoid  fever  as  from  battle  wounds  or  any  other  cause. 

In  the  present  day,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  that  propor- 
tion has  been  absolutely  reversed.  There  are  five  times  as  many  men 
killed  and  injured  by  battle  casualties  as  die  of  disease.  Disease  has 
been  almost  wiped  out — typhoid  by  vaccination,  cholera  by  inoculation, 
typhus  by  the  destruction  of  the  insect  which  carries  the  disease, 
what  the  Germans  call  ein  lousem,  those  little  friends  of  theirs  that 
come  to  populate  them  when  the  laundry  is  suspended.  Not  only  that, 
but  when  a  man  is  wounded,  provided  he  is  able  to  be  carried  off 
the  field  in  one  piece,  only  three  per  cent,  of  him  die.  They  have 
actually  reduced  the  death  rate  from  what  it  once  was  to  that  almost 
insignificant  proportion. 

I  do  not  want  to  seem  unduly  presuming  about  the  matter,  but 
it  does  seem  to  me  that  the  one  department  of  this  war  that  has  scored 
a  hit  and  has  come  out  with  credit  has  been  the  medical  department, 
and  the  best  that  can  be  said  of  the  other  departments  is  that  they 
have  come  to  a  stalemate.  I  believe  that  that  point  ought  to  be  most 
decidedly  emphasized  and  taken  into  consideration  in  our  prepara- 
tions for  the  future. 

There  is  another  point,  and  that  is  the  one  of  military  training  in 
the  schools.  All  doctors,  I  think  I  am  safe  in  saying,  welcome  that 
program  as  a  program  of  being  able  to  build  up  the  health  of  the 
rising  generation  and  to  get  rid  of  some  of  the  things  that  used  to  be 
in  the  curriculum.  We  doctors  have,  a  curriculum,  which  we  would 
like  to  present  to  you,  for  the  education  of  the  rising  generation.  The 
first  is  that  the  child  should  have  everything  it  wants  to  eat  and  when- 
ever it  wants  it. 

175 


The  second  is  that  he  should  have  all  the  play  he  can  take  in  the 
open  air. 

The  third  is  that  he  shall  have  all  the  sleep  he  can  be  got  to  take 
in  the  twenty-four  hours,  and  the  rest  can  be  devoted  to  education  and 
will  not  do  him  any  particular  harm. 

So  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  physician,  I  think  we  wish 
to  endorse  and  support  in  every  possible  way  this  magnificent  program 
of  preparedness  which  this  Association  is  presenting  and  is  bringing 
home  to  the  American  people. 

May  I  say  just  one  word  more,  and  that  is  that,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  physician — and  it  happens  to  have  been  one  of  my  pet 
hobbies,  the  study  of  the  human  animal  itself,  under  all  sorts  of  con- 
ditions, on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic — physically,  we  have  here  in 
the  United  States  the  finest  material  for  making  an  army  that  I 
know  of  anywhere,  in  any  part  of  the  world.  I  was  talking  with  a 
former  superintendent  of  West  Point  only  a  short  time  ago,  and  he 
told  me  what  I  was  already  inclined  to  believe,  that  the  type  of  men 
we  have  in  our  American  armies  was  such  that  if  they  were  taken 
over  to  Europe  they  would  be  delighted  over  there  to  get  one-half  of 
them  for  officers. 

War  is  what  Sherman  said  it  was,  but  it  is  also  machinery.  The 
man  of  the  future  is  going  to  do  most  of  his  fighting  with  machinery; 
he  is  going  to  do  it  with  blue  overalls  on;  and  he  is  going  to  be  in- 
structed, from  the  point  of  view  of  health,  how  to  take  care  of  himself 
in  the  trenches,  to  take  care  of  his  health,  and  to  keep  from  breaking 
down  under  disease. 

There  is  going  to  be  a  great  development  on  the  scientific  side. 
One  indignant  scientist  said  a  while  ago  that  all  of  these  wonderful 
improvements  that  are  used  in  slaughtering  men  in  modern  war  have 
been  invented  by  innocent  non-combatants,  clear  outside  of  the  ranks 
of  the  army;  and  he  was  moved  to  say  that  if  the  military  men  had 
been  left  to  themselves  they  would  still  be  fighting  with  clubs  and 
stone  axes.  (Laughter.)  So  that  there  is  going  to  be  much  training 
in  science,  and  sanitary  science,  and  chemistry  particularly.  That  i» 
a  thing  that  has  won  Germany's  victories — her  magnificent  scien- 
tific and  industrial  organization,  rather  than  her  military  organiza- 
tion, good  as  that  is.     (Applause.) 

176 


Rear  Admiral  Colby  M.  Chester,  U.  S.  N.,  Retired — Ladies  and 
gentlemen,  I  come  here  as  a  rather  old  man,  and  I  have  listened  to 
these  brilliant  addresses  that  have  been  delivered  here  today  and 
yesterday,  and  I  know  something  of  whsit  is  going  to  follow;  and  I 
come  from  a  point  of  experience,  having  gone  through  two  campaigns 
of  this  kind — once  when  we  had  to  fight  the  Copperheads  and  Bryans 
of  1861  (applause),  and  again  in  1882,  when  we  had  to  build  up  a  navy 
in  order  to  prepare  us  for  the  Spanish  war.  We  went  through  the 
same  ideas  as  we  have  today. 

I  come  rather  interested  in  many  of  the  points  that  have  been 
discussed  here.  I  am  somewhat  of  a  crank  on  aviation,  having  I  think, 
been  the  first  man  in  this  country  to  fly  in  an  airship,  outside  of  the 
professionals.  I  went  up,  in  spite  of  my  age,  in  order  that  I  might 
instill  into  the  minds  of  our  young  men  in  the  navy  the  importance 
of  aviation  to  the  navy. 

So  I  have  as  regards  the  interior  waterways.  Forty  years  ago 
I  wrote  a  paper  on  that  subject,  and  having  been  in  charge  of  the 
surveys  of  the  United  States  at  that  time,  1  had  the  interior  water- 
ways along  the  Atlantic  coast  surveyed  in  order  to  prepare  for  a 
possible  war,  that  we  might  use  them  for  the  navy. 

But  we  have  got  to  come  right  down  to  a  concrete  proposition 
today.  We  are  many  men  of  many  minds,  and  many  of  the  things  you 
hear  of  here  will  never  be  heard  of  again.  We  all  like  to  see  them 
introduced,  but  it  would  take  a  thousand  years  to  get  them  through 
our  political  Congress;  and  so  you  have  got  to  come  down  to  one  real 
thing,  and  to  work  upon  that,  and  nothing  else.  We  all  say,  and  I 
am  very  strongly  in  that  position,  that  we  need  every  ship  in  the 
navy  that  the  General  Board  have  provided  for,  and  I  know  that  if  you 
do  not  give  them  to  us,  one  of  these  days  you  have  got  to  pay  the 
price  for  that  negligence  at  this  time.  (Applause.)  At  the  same 
time,  there  is  one  point  that  you  have  got  to  consider :  that  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  has  the  constitutional  right  to  say  how  far 
that  policy  shall  be  adopted,  and  you  have  got  to  take  what  he  says 
and  put  it  through,  or  take  nothing. 

The  only  point  is  then,  that  as  long  as  you  have  a  Board  of 
Directors  you  have  got  to  comply  with  the  policies  that  they  have 
adopted  or  get  them  out.  If  you  are  not  satisfied  with  your  Board  of 
Directors,  and  with  your  President  who  is  in  charge  of  it,  take  him 

177 


out  and  put  in  another  man.  (Applause.)  But  as  long  as  he  is 
there,  support  him  with  every  effort  you  have  in  your  heart  and  mind, 
because  you  cannot  get  more  unless  you  support  him,  and  if  he  can 
get  through  more  in  Congress  he  will  get  it  for  you;  so  that  I  want 
to  introduce  a  resolution,  and  I  shall  have  a  few  words  to  say  after 
showing  you  what  it  is.    My  resolution  is  as  follows: 

Whereas,  The  National  Security  League  of  the  United 
States,  assembled  in  congress  at  the  capitol  of  the  Nation,  on 
this  22nd  day  of  January,  1916,  recall  with  a  profound  sense 
of  responsibility  to  the  country  the  memorable  words  of  the 
father  of  his  country,  when  he  said :  "There  is  a  rank  due  to 
the  United  States  among"  nations.  If  we  desire  to  avoid 
insult,  we  must  be  able  to  repel  it;  if  we  desire  to  secure 
peace,  one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments  of  our  prosperity, 
it  must  be  know  that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war." 
Therefore,  be  it 

Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  is  in  hearty 
sympathy  with  and  will  lend  its  best  efforts  to  support  the 
Government  in  its  policy  as  represented  in  the  statement  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  as  follows:  "We  feel 
justified  in  preparing  ourselves  to  vindicate  our  right  to  inde- 
pendent and  unmolested  action  in  making  the  force  that  is 
within  us  ready  for  assertion." 

I  find  that  in  the  letter  we  have  here  today  practically  the  only 
thing  that  is  mentioned  is  to  adopt  a  definite  military  and  naval  policy, 
and,  as  far  as  the  navy  is  concerned,  to  adolish  useless  navy  yards. 
Now,  that  is  executive  action. 

We  have  one  Secretary  of  the  Navy  come  in  and  propose  one  thing, 
and  the  next  Secretary  will  come  in  and  tear  that  out,  because  he  did 
not  propose  it.  The  point  is  that  if  we  had  sold  the  navy  yards  that 
had  been  advocated  to  be  sold  in  one  administration,  we  would  have 
been  buying  them  back  today  at  ten  times  their  price.  Every  navy 
yard  in  this  country  we  need ;  and  if  we  cannot  do  anything  else  with 
it  we  want  to  remove  the  buildings  and  plant  it  in  grass  seed  for  an 
avitation  field,  which  we  must  have  one  of  these  days. 

As  for  a  naval  policy,  there  is  your  Naval  General  Staff,  which 
we  ought  to  have  today  and  which  we  have  been  fighting  for  for  forty 

178  X  .    - 


years.  I  was  on  the  first  naval  policy  board  of  the  United  States  that 
was  ever  formed,  and  it  was  built  up  that  we  might  have  a  general 
staff;  but  we  could  not  do  it,  because  the  secretaries  of  the  navy  would 
not  let  us.  And  let  me  tell  you  that  when  you  come  to  the  position 
of  a  war  in  the  future,  you  will  not  have  any  secretaries  of  the  Navy. 
(Applause.) 

You  will  put  out  of  action  your  Churchill,  just  as  the  English 
have  done  today  on  account  of  the  fatal  policy  that  he  pursued  in 
opposition  to  the  navy  officers  in  England,  and  they  have  had  to  come 
right  down  to  Sir  John  Fisher  in  order  that  they  might  carry  on 
a  naval  war  that  is  suitable  for  the  nation  and  that  is  suitable  for 
the  navy,  which  the  civilian  does  not  know  anything  about;  so  that 
when  the  war  comes  the  first  thing  you  are  going  to  do  is  to  take  your 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  out  of  action  and  put  in  a  military  man  there 
who  knows  something  about  it. 

I  want  to  impress  upon  your  minds  at  this  time,  in  connection 
with  the  resolution  that  I  have  introduced  here,  to  support  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States.  Sign  that  call  for  reinforcements  made 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States;  sign  it  with  the  President 
when  he  is  voicing  the  sentiment  of  this  country  on  national  military 
affairs,  that  he  may  speak  with  potency,  as  did  Commodore  Decatur 
when,  in  1815,  with  the  power  to  make  war  in  his  hands  and  a  battle 
fleet  composed  largely  of  British  ships  captured  in  the  war  of  1812, 
he  demanded  from  the  rulers  of  the  Barbary  States  that  they  should 
sign  the  treaties  which  forever  deprived  them  of  the  right  to  commit 
piratical  actions  against  our  ships  or  to  make  slaves  of  our  citizens, 
and  by  the  potency  of  his  words  he  broke  up  the  piractical  practice 
that  had  existed  so  many  years.  Sign  that  call  for  reinforcements 
advocated  by  the  President,  that  he  may  speak  today  as  did  Lincoln 
when,  in  1865,  with  the  grand  army  of  100,000  men  marching  to  the 
Rio  Grande  under  Sherman,  he  told  France  to  get  out  of  Mexico. 

Sign  that  call,  that  your  President  may  speak  as  did  General  Grant 
when,  in  1872,  with  the  entire  American  navy  mobilized  in  the  waters 
of  the  Carribean  Sea,  he  demanded  from  Spain  redress  for  the  murder 
of  American  citizens  captured  on  the  high  seas,  and  by  the  force  of 
his  voice  he  avoided  a  war  between  the  two  nations.  Sign  that  call, 
that  your  President  may  speak  as  did  Benjamin  Harrison  when,  in 
J 892,  with  Admiral  Girard's  fleet  anchored  off  Montevideo  clared  fgr 

179 


action,  he  demanded  of  Chili  an  apology  for  the  killing  of  American 
seamen  in  Valparaiso,  and  again  war  was  averted  by  the  size  of  our 
fleet  and  nothing  else  in  the  world.  Sign  that  call,  that  your  Presi- 
dent may  speak  as  did  Grover  Cleveland  when  he  told  Great  Britain 
that  the  Monroe  doctrine  was  a  sacred  obligation  on  our  part,  and  the 
whole  United  States  was  behind  it — and  you  know  the  result. 

Sign  that  call,  that  your  President  may  speak  as  did  Theodore 
Roosevelt  when  he  told  the  Governor  of  California  if  he  did  not 
manage  his  people  and  obey  the  solemn  treaties  that  were  made  with 
the  United  States,  he  would  send  an  army  and  navy  there  to  enforce 
respect  for  those  treaties;  or  when  later  he  brought  about  that  re- 
markable peace  pact  between  Russia  and  Japan  which  has  now  brought 
those  countries  so  closely  together  that  they  are  fighting  a  common 
enemy  in  a  common  cause. 

And,  last  but  by  no  means  least,  sign  that  call  because  your  fore- 
fathers, when  they  founded  this  government,  bound  you  into  a  firm 
league  to  assist  each  other  against  all  forces  offered  to  or  attacks 
made  upon  these  United  States  on  accout  of  religion,  sovereignty, 
trade  or  any  other  pretense  whatever.     (Great  applause.) 

Admiral  Chester  at  this  point  read  the  following  paper: 

WE   NEED   TWO   THOUSAND   AEROPLANES  AND   HAVE 

BUT  TWELVE.     WHAT  ARE  YOU  GOING  TO 

DO  ABOUT  IT? 

By  Henry  Woodhouse 

A  Governor  of  the  Aero  Club  of  America,   Director  of  the 

American  Society  of  Aeronautical  Engineers,  Managing 

Editor  of  Flying  and  Contributing  Editor  of 

Aerial  Age  Weekly 

There  is  an  important  question  for  you  to  decide:  Whether  you 
want  the  United  States  to  be  with  the  first  and  second  class  powers  or 
with  their  colonies.  We  need  two  thousand  aeroplanes;  we  have  but 
twelve,  and  the  published  estimates  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments 
for  next  year  provide  for  less  than  one  hundred  aeroplanes  in  all. 
This  is  the  situation  in  a  nutshell,  and  as  the  Tjurpose  of  the  adminis- 
tration in  publishing  the  tentative  estimates  is  to  get  your  opinion 

180 


of  how  much  you  are  wilHng  to  see  this  country  spend  in  providing 
sufficiency  in  the  system  of  defense,  it  is  up  to  you  to  state  what 
you  want. 

This  country  can  be  made  fifth  in  aeronautical  equipment  by  spend- 
ing $25,000,000 — England,  Germany,  France  and  Russia  remaining  at 
the  head;  or  seventh,  behind  Austria  and  Italy,  by  cutting  the  al- 
lowance down  to  $17,500,000;  or  it  can  be  left  behind  Japan,  Spain 
and  the  Netherlands  by  allowing  only  $10,000,000.  Lastly,  it  can  be 
left  where  it  is,  behind  the  least  of  the  other  countries'  colonies,  by 
allowing  less  than  $10,000,000. 

Which  do  you  want?  Secretary  Daniels  and  the  Senators  and 
Congressmen  who  head  the  Committees  on  Naval  Affairs,  after  a  con- 
ference, proposed  to  allow  only  $2,000,000  for  naval  aeronautics  in 
1916  and  $1,000,000  for  each  year  thereafter,  until  1920.  Money  is 
needed  in  every  branch  of  the  service  and  they  feared  to  propose 
a  large  expenditure. 

The  navy  itself  shows  an  example  of  how  little  can  be  done  with 
$1,000,000.  That  was  the  sum  allowed  for  naval  aeronautics  by  the  last 
Congress.  It  is  now  practially  all  obligated,  and  we  did  not  have  any 
aeroplanes  to  maneuver  with  the  fleet  in  the  recent  war  game,  and  we 
have  not  had  over  six  aeroplanes  in  commission  at  any  one  time  during 
the  past  twelve  months! 

Secretary  Daniels  and  the  Congressmen  and  Senators  at  the  head 
of  the  committees  are  supposed  to  represent  you  in  this  matter;  they 
are  the  managers,  as  it  were,  whom  you  have  appointed  to  look  after 
the  nation's  welfare  in  your  behalf,  because  your  business  prevents 
you  from  giving  the  time  and  consideration  required  by  such  an  im- 
portant matter.  Are  they  expressing  your  wish  in  proposing  to  give 
the  army  and  navy  less  than  one  hundred  aeroplanes?  Do  you  want 
this  country  to  be  last — the  very  last — and  less  than  the  colonies? 

Of  course  you  do  not.  You  know  that  in  competitive  life  to  be 
among  the  least  means  being  at  the  mercy  of  the  best  equipped,  and 
you  have  learned  that  preparedness  is  to  the  ills  of  war  what  prevention 
is  to  other  ills — the  best  cure.  You  also  know  that,  as  Richard  Harding 
Davis  pointed  out  in  his  article  in  the  November  Metropolitan,  "Of  all 
the  weapons  produced  by  this  war,  the  aeroplane  is  most  efficient.  It 
protects,  it  destroys,  it  fights.  It  is  the  super-spy,  the  super-scout,  the 
super-belligerent.    Without  it  the  army  and  navy  are  blind." 

181 


"American  Constructors  Make  the  Very  Best  Aeroplanes. 
"The  Russian  aeroplanes  again  rendered  invaluable  serv- 
ice in  supporting  our  fleet." 

''Fourteen  Italian  aeroplanes  bombarded  Austrian  head- 
quarters at  Kostanjavica,  causing  considerable  damage." 
These  are  but  some  of  the  official  reports  from  Europe  published 
a  few  weeks  ago,  at  about  the  time  when  the  American  fleets  played  the 
"big  naval  war  game"  off  the  middle  Atlantic  coast — without  aero- 
planes! 

The  Russian  and  Italian  seaplanes  referred  to  were  of  American 
make,  many  supplied  before  the  war  American  aeroplane  constructors 
have  supplied  scores  of  aeroplanes  to  Russia  and  Italy  and  hundreds 
to  England.  One  thousand  American  aeroplanes  will  have  been  shipped 
to  Europe  by  the  close  of  the  year  1915,  including  scores  of  potential  air 
destroyers  capable  of  carrying  one  ton  of  bombs  at  a  speed  of  ninety- 
five  miles  an  hour;  huge  air-cruisers  which  have  solved  the  most 
difficult  problems  of  submarine  warfare,  and,  being  capable  of  making 
speeds  upwards  of  eighty  miles  an  hour — four  times  the  speed  ci 
cruisers  and  eight  times  the  speed  of  submarines — displace  four  cruis- 
ers in  submarine  warfare,  and  hundreds  of  speed  scouts  (two-passenger 
warplanes  and  'planes)  for  use  in  spotting  artillery  fire.  This  last 
brings  to  mind  the  fact  that  our  field  artillery  practiced  all  summer 
at  Tobyhannan,  Pennsylvania,  without  aeroplanes;  there  were  not 
any  available! 

The  "big  naval  war  game"  proved  to  be  a  sort  of  blind  man's 
game.  When  it  was  over  a  naval  authority  stated  that,  "One  of  the 
principal  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  the  game  is  that  until  the  United 
States  fleet  is  equipped  with  air  craft  to  protect  it  against  such  torpedo 
attacks  as  that  which  overhelmed  the  blue  division,  it  will  be  almost 
helpless  when  pitted  against  a  navy  having  battle  cruisers,  fast  scouts 
and  a  generous  allowance  of  torpedo  craft." 

The  reason  no  aeroplanes  maneuvered  with  the  fleets  was  that 
there  were  not  any  available — "We  have  but  twelve,"  as  Richard  Hard- 
ing Davis's  forceful  article  in  the  November  Metropolitan  stated. 
Only  twelve  aeroplanes  in  commission  between  the  army  and  the  navy, 
and  they  were  needed  for  training.  Therefore,  the  few  available 
aviators  had  to  stay  at  Pensacola  to  train  the  ten  students,  and  fill 

182 


positions  in  the  "motor  erecting  shop,"  "test  division,"  and  other  de- 
partments of  the  under-manned  Pensacola  Station. 

Had  the  "Reds,"  the  invading  fleet,  been  a  real  hostile  fleet  con- 
ditions would  not  have  been  different  on  the  defender's  side.  The  ten 
full-fledged  naval  aviators  and  the  ten  students  now  completing  their 
course  of  training  would  have  been  called  from  Pensacola,  the  navy's 
only  training  station,  and  hastily  supplied  with  aeroplanes  rushed  from 
the  various  aeroplane  factories.  And  these  twenty  hastily  equipped 
aviators,  who  have  never  had  the  opportunity  of  maneuvering  with 
the  fleet,  half  of  them  having  just  learned  the  rudiments  of  flying — 
this  handful  of  flyers,  without  bases  or  reserves,  would  have  been  ex- 
pected to  protect  our  fleets  and  our  shores.  Even  with  extreme  optim- 
ism we  could  only  expect  mournful  results. 

Our  army  is  not  better  off.  Despatches  from  the  front  bring  daily 
accounl"s  of  raids  in  which  as  many  as  eighty-four  aeroplanes  have 
participated  at  one  time,  extending  hundreds  of  miles  over  the  enemy's 
lines.  Great  Britain,  with  fifteen  hundred  licensed  aviators  and  three 
aeroplanes  for  each  aviator,  seeks  more — lots  more. 

Sir  John  French,  in  a  report,  summarized  the  reasons  for  his 
wanting  more  aviators  as  follows: 

"The  work  performed  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corp  has  con- 
tinued to  prove  of  the  utmost  value  to  the  success  of  the  opera- 
tions. Almost  every  day  new  methods  of  employing  them, 
both  strategically  and  tactically,  are  discovered  and  put  into 
practice.  The  development  of  their  use  and  employment  has 
indeed  been  quite  extraordinary,  I  feel  that  no  effort  should 
be  spared  to  increase  their  number  and  perfect  their  equip- 
ment and  efficiency." 

WE  ARE  FAR  BEHIND  JAPAN.  ^ 

When  it  became  necessary  to  send  aeroplanes  to  the  Mexican  bor- 
der, several  months  ago,  our  army  had  only  two  to  send  there,  and  is 
not  in  a  position  to  send  more  than  that  even  today.  In  contrast,  we 
find  Japan  holding  its  army  maneuvers  with  twelve  on  each  side, 
armored  aeroplanes  equipped  with  quick  firing  guns — our  Army  has 
not  any  aeroplane  guns.  And  these  Japanese  Army  aviators,  having 
had  sufficient  equipment,  have  been  able  to  keep  up  their  training,  and 

183 


we  find  twelve  Japanese  military  aviators  flying  together  between  To- 
korozawa  and  Hirosaki,  a  distance  of  over  400  miles.  In  other  words, 
whereas  in  the  United  .States  we  cannot  send  more  than  two  aviators  to 
the  Mexican  border  to  protect  our  military  men  there  against  sniping, 
and  we  have  not  any  machine  guns  to  mount  on  our  aeroplanes,  our 
neighbor,  Japan,  can  afford  to  employ  twenty-four  aeroplanes  in  its 
army  maneuvers  and  send  flocks  of  twelve  aeroplanes  in  cross-country 
flights  of  four  hundred  miles. 

Incidentally,  the  warplanes  giving  such  remarkable  demonstra- 
tions in  Japan  are  equipped  with  American  motors. 

In  the  United  States  we  have  good  aeroplanes  and  aeronautical 
motors  and  an  imperative  need  for  them  in  the  Army  and  Navy.  And 
the  general  public  and  the  military  authorities  know  that  we  need  them. 
Why  then  have  we  "but  twelve"  when  we  need  two  thousand  and  would 
be  unprepared  if  we  had  only  two  hundred?  The  responsibility  is 
yours — you  did  not  instruct  your  Congressmen — unless  you  made  a 
worse  mistake  and  elected  one  who  should  be  a  plumber. 

The  tentative  estimates  published  for  your  benefit  would  give  the 
Army  between  now  and  June,  1917,  when  the  next  appropriation  be- 
comes available,  only  forty  aeroplanes  and  to  the  Navy  perhaps  even 
less,  seeing  that  only  $2,000,000  is  allowed  for  Naval  aeronautics  for 
1916,  and  it  would  cost  more  than  that  to  do  any  one  of  a  dozen  differ- 
ent things  which  the  Navy  must  do  to  form  a  substantial  aeronautical 
organization.  This  is  utterly  inadequate.  The  Navy  needs  immedi- 
ately : 

(1)  At  least  three  more  aviation  stations  at  important  naval  cen- 
ters in  the  United  States,  and  one  at  each  of  the  important  naval  bases 
in  the  Philippines,  Guam,  Hawaii,  Guantanamo,  the  Panama  Canal 
Zone,  and  Porto  Rico,  with  between  twenty  to  forty  seaplanes  and  aero- 
planes at  each  base. 

(2)  At  least  two  fully  equipped  mother  ships  for  seaplanes,  with 
at  least  one  dozen  aviators  and  twice  as  many  seaplanes  permanently 
assigned  to  each  ship.  The  Mississippi  was  assigned  to  aeronautical 
duty  in  1913,  but  just  as  important  experiments  with  a  launching  de- 
vice for  seaplanes  were  being  planned,  the  Mississippi  was  sold  to 
Greece,  and  the  experiments  had  to  be  postponed  for  a  year,  until  this 
October,  when  the  North  Carolina,  which  was  assigned  to  aviation 

184 


duty,  finally  reached  Pensacola.     This  ship  is  not  yet  equipped  fot 
service  as  a  seaplane  ship. 

(3)  The  Navy  should  acquire  large  seaplanes  for  submarine  war- 
fare and  torpedo-launching.  Probably  the  most  interesting  thing 
about  the  conflict  between  the  German  U-boats  and  the  seaplanes  is 
that  the  "America,"  which  was  built  here  before  the  war  and  in  which 
Flight-Commander  Porte  intended  to  cross  the  ocean,  has,  it  is  said, 
destroyed  without  assistance  no  fewer  than  three  submarines.  One 
was  blown  up  with  bombs,  and  the  other  two,  we  are  told,  were  forced 
to  come  up,  the  "America"  having  broken  off  their  periscopes  by  flying 
over  them.  The  destroyers  then  go  them.  Seaplanes  of  the  "America" 
and  "super-America"  class,  carrying  heavy  armament  and  a  large  num- 
ber of  bombs,  are  much  feared  by  the  U-boats,  There  have  been  a 
number  of  cases  where  the  aviator  has  swooped  down  on  the  sub- 
marine and  smashed  its  periscope.  Then  the  submarine,  being  blind, 
must  come  to  the  surface,  where  it  is  easy  prey  for  either  the  seaplane, 
the  destroyer  or  the  trawler. 

The  Navy  does  not  yet  possess  any  large  seaplane  fitted  for  war- 
fare against  submarines  and  has  only  one  such  ordered  for  experi- 
mental purposes. 

(4)  A  need  which  will  become  evident  in  the  next  six  months 
will  be  for  large  seaplanes,  to  be  used  for  launching  torpedoes.  All  the 
European  powers  are  now  regretting  that  they  did  not  pay  attention  to 
the  development  of  the  torpedo-launching  seaplane,  by  means  of  which 
it  would  be  possible  for  every  merchant  ship  and  transport  to  mate- 
rially protect  itself  against  attack  not  only  of  submarines,  but  also  of 
torpedo  boats  and  cruisers. 

Torpedo-launching  by  aeroplane  is  a  new  development,  not  yet 
practiced  in  the  war  for  the  reason  that  the  powers  need  seaplanes  in 
large  numbers  for  other  purposes  and  cannot  allow  their  constructors 
and  officers  the  time  required  to  construct  large  machines  and  to  con- 
duct experiments  in  launching  full-sized  torpedoes. 

The  feasibility  of  launching  torpedoes  from  seaplanes  has  been 
demonstrated  by  the  experiments  of  Captain  Alessandro  Guidoni,  Royal 
Italian  Navy,  at  the  arsenal  at  Spezia,  Italy,  and  advocated  in  the 
United  States  by  Rear  Admiral  Bradley  A.  Fiske,  U.  S.  N.  But  the 
possibility  of  getting  better  results  with  a  seaplane  costing  only  about 
$15,000  and  requiring  but  two  men  to  operate  it,  than  are  obtainable 

185 


from  a  destroyer  costing  $1,360,000,  requiring  hundreds  of  men  to  man 
it,  has  seemed  too  preposterous  to  be  taken  seriously,  and  neither  of 
the  above-mentioned  officers  received  serious  consideration  until  a  few 
months  ago.  Captain  Guidoni  has  succeeded  in  launching  torpedoes 
weighing  700  pounds  and  hitting  the  target  nine  times  out  of  ten  from 
a  distance  of  one  and  a  half  miles.  When  torpedo-planes  are  in  use,  the 
accepted  status  of  things  in  naval  warfare  will  change. 

A  light  cruiser,  such  as  the  German  "Emden,"  or  even  a  small 
gunboat  now  terrorizes  a  whole  section — nothing  can  reach  it;  the 
sending  of  a  large  ship  is  hardly  worth  while,  when  a  torpedo-plane, 
from  a  steamer  or  station,  would  be  ample  to  deal  with  it.  Again,  a 
large  merchant  steamer  is  now  at  the  mercy  of  a  small  gunboat  or 
submarine.  With  two  torpedo-planes  aboard  it  would  be  quite  beyond 
trouble — it,  rather,  could  make  trouble  for  the  gunboat.  Another  in- 
stance :  an  impudent  little  gunboat  sails  to  the  entrance  of  a  port, 
blockades  it,  and  prevents  the  flow  of  commerce.  The  torpedo-planes 
would  deal  with  this  easily. 

It  would  probably  cost  $25,000,000  to  carry  out  the  four  lines  of 
development  outlined ;  $10,000,000  would  give  it  a  good  start. 

The  aeronautical  service  is  comparatively  inexpensive  and  being 
indispensable,  there  should  not  be  difficulties  in  the  way  of  an  appro- 
priation of  between  $7,500,000  and  $10,000,000  for  the  Navy,  to  lay  the 
foundation  of  a  substantial  naval  aeronautical  organization.  Two 
years  ago  the  German  Reichstag  allowed  $35,000,000  to  be  spent  in 
military  aeronautics  in  the  following  five  years  and  it  had  already  spent  i 
a  round  $50,000,000  in  Zeppelins,  hangars,  landing  stations  and  other 
aeronautical  equipment.  Had  the  Reichstag  then  allowed  only 
$6,000,000  for  five  years,  as  Secretary  Daniels  proposes  at  such  critical 
times,  the  history  of  the  war  would  be  read  differently.  Likewise,^ 
Great  Britain  would  be  in  a  sorrowful  plight  if  $10,000,000  had  not 
been  spent  in  naval  aeroplanes  and  equipment  in  the  twelve  months 
following  March  20,  1913. 

The  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  realizing  the  importance  of. 
building  the  air  service  last  year  asked  for  $5,000,000.  Secretary; 
Daniels  told  Congress  that  he  could  not  even  spend  $1,000,000  and 
Congress  finally  allowed  $1,000,000.  How  inadequate  this  sum  was  to 
meet  the  need  is  shown  by  the  results:  it  was  impossible  to  develop 
the  air  service  and  there  were  not  even  sufficient  aeroplanes  to  use  in 

186 


the  naval  maneuvers.  True,  it  was  thought  that  one  million  dollars 
would  supply  a  large  number  of  aeroplanes.  There  was  overlooked  the 
fact  that  aeroplanes  are  consummables  and  not  fixtures,  and  require 
continuous  overhauling  and  replacing.  This  very  important  point  is 
undoubtedly  still  being  overlooked,  else  nothing  but  sheer  Bryanisni 
would  make  the  authors  of  the  estimates  propose  an  allowance  of  only 
$2,000,000  for  aeronautics  for  1916. 

Aeroplanes  sinking  submarines,  a  dirigible  halting  a  ship  at  sea, 
a  squadron  of  aeroplanes  attacking  a  ship  with  bombs,  a  fleet  of  sea- 
planes starting  from  hangar-ships  at  sea  to  attack  military  bases,  a 
seaplane  launching  torpedoes — these  are  some  of  the  daily  events  which 
mark  the  new  stage  in  the  development  of  naval  aeronautics  and  show 
clearly  the  advent  of  a  new  epoch,  a  period  the  ships  of  the  sea  rhust 
face,  the  new  and  potential  aerial  adversary ;  when  transports  equipped 
with  torpedo  launching  seaplanes  will  be  a  match  to  armored  warships, 
and  in  naval  battles  the  side  winning  in  the  air  will  have  a  preponder- 
ous  advantage  over  the  other.  The  United  States  Navy  needs 
$10,000,000  to  establish  an  adequate  aeronautical  organization; 
$7,500,000  is  the  minimum,  on  which  the  Navy  can  hope  to  develop  a 
substantial  air  service.  Less  than  that  does  not  meet  the  need  and 
the  Navy,  this  country's  principal  protector,  remains  not  second,  as  we 
aspire  to  be,  nor  third,  nor  fourth — nor  tenth.  It  will  remain  at  the 
tail  of  the  list.    It  is  up  to  you  to  state  where  you  want  it  to  be. 

What  the  Army  Needs. 

The  Army,  like  the  Navy,  has  at  present  only  one  aviation  station, 
at  San  Diego.  In  each  case  the  station  consists  essentially  of  half  a 
dozen  hangars,  and  the  entire  flying  equipment  is  exposed  and  would 
perish  if  a  crank  or  other  cause  should  start  a  fire. 

Unlike  the  Navy,  the  Army  does  not  own  the  grounds  on  which 
the  station  is  "established.  The  grounds  are  the  property  of  John  D. 
Spreckels,  who  allows  the  Army  to  keep  its  aviation  school  there. 

The  Army  has  charge  of  the  work  of  coast  defense,  and  the  ha:lf 
dozen  aeroplanes  at  San  Diego  is  all  there  is,  and  would  be  in  case  of 
trouble,  to  protect  miles  of  coast,  gather  and  transmit  information  for 
the  defending  armies,  defend  cities  from  aerial  attack,  co-operate  with 
the  artillery  to  make  the  fire  of  the  big  guns  effective,  and  perform  p 
dozen  other  duties  which  now  devolve  upon  the  air  service. 

187 


We  are  not  in  trouble  and  some  people  are,  furthermore,  obsessed 
with  the  idea  that  the  Army  would  play  only  a  secondary  part  if  this 
country  were  attacked.  Therefore,  it  is  needless  to  outline  the  full 
aeronautical  needs  of  the  Army.  But  even  the  "peace-at-any-price" 
disciples  will  concede  that  it  would  be  far  from  being  extravagant  to 
propose  to  establish  eight  aviation  stations  at  or  near  different  military 
centers  with  at  least  two  full  squadrons  with  sufiicent  spare  parts  and 
reserve  motors  at  each  station,  and  to  allow  aeroplanes  for  use  in 
spotting  artillery  fire.  In  Europe  they  allow  an  aeroplane  for  each 
battery;  we  might  allow  one  aeroplane  to  three  batteries. 

To  start  work  on  such  a  plan  the  Army  should  get  $5,000,000. 
The  United  States  Signal  Corps  has  found  that  the  initial  cost  of  the 
equipment  of  an  aero  squadron  of  eight  aeroplanes  and  spare  parts 
and  spare  motors  is  approximately  $230,000  and  it  costs  about  $5,000 
per  year  for  maintenance  of  each  machine  to  military  standard.  Then 
must  be  added  the  cost  of  trucks,  motorcycles,  and  other  equipment 
necessary  to  make  an  aero  squadron  complete. 

Do  you  want  the  Army  to  get  the  $5,000,000  and  start  work  on 
this  modest  plan?    Again,  it  is  up  to  you  to  decide. 

What  the  Militia  Needs.  , 

Whether  you  are  one  of  the  multitude  and  want  preparedness  or 
one  of  the  few  peace-at-any-price  advocates  you  are  in  favor  having 
an  efficient  militia,  therefore,  of  having  aeroplanes  in  the  Militia.  Thei 
Militia  is  the  backbone  of  our  defense  and  has  formed  the  bulk  of  our 
fighting  forces  in  all  past  wars.  The  Militia  has  not  any  areoplanes 
excepting  the  few  secured  by  public  subscriptions  to  the  National 
Aeroplane  Fund  instituted  bythe  patriotic  Aero  Club  of  America.  But] 
for  this  movement  of  the  Aero  Club  of  America  this  year  the  MilitiaJ 
would  not  have  had  aeroplanes  for  the  maneuvers  and  encampments. 

The  Militia  heads  are  anxious  to  get  aeroplanes,  and  many  Militia 
officers  are  anxious  to  learn  to  pilot  aeroplanes.  But  there  are  no 
funds  available  for  this  purpose  and  the  War  and  Navy  Departments, 
while  heartily  in  favor  of  developing  aviation  corps  in  the  Militia,  are 
themselves  short  of  aeronautical  equipment  and  cannot  let  the  Militia 
have  aeroplanes. 

188 


Forty-eight  states  have  a  national  guard,  twenty-three  states  have 
also  Naval  Militia  organizations.  If  each  were  supplied  with  the 
equipment  inside  of  a  year  there  would  be  seventy-one  Militia  aero 
companies  with  four  aeroplanes  and  as  many  trained  Militia  flyers  to 
each  company. 

To  create  this  valuable  reserve  of  284  aeroplanes  and  aviators,  a 
reserve  of  tremendous  military  value,  but  composed  of  men  who  are 
employed  daily  in  peaceful  pursuits,  to  create  this  reserve  and  have  it 
ready  within  a  year,  would  require  only  $7,100,000,  that  is,  the  sum 
of  $100,000  for  each  company. 

You  will  admit  that  we  would  sleep  more  peacefully  if  we  had 
such  reserve,  and  I  dare  say  that  it  would  cause  the  having  of  many 
times  seven  million  dollars  that  we  now  spend  in  nerve  tonics  by  people 
who  worry  over  our  utter  unpreparedness. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  only  peace-at-any-price  advocates  and  people 
of  small  mental  perspective  can  consider  as  being  excessive  the  ex- 
penditure of  one  billion  dollars,  which  is  the  amount  required  to  bring 
our  defenses  up  to  a  state  of  sufficiency.  This  is  a  rich,  prosperous 
country  with  tremendous  resources._  The  National  wealth  is  estimated 
at  over  $187,000,000,000  and  the  sum  of  one  billion  dollars  is  really  not 
excessive  to  spend  to  insure  it.  It  means  a  payment  per  capita  of  less 
than  $10. 

Can  you  consider  that  excessive,  to  pay  $10  this  year  for  national 
security — to  protect  your  country,  your  family  and  your  home?  Of 
course  not,  you  spend  more  than  that  in  any  one  of  a  hundred  superflu- 
ities. If  you  have  a  cat,  you  undoubtedly  pay  more  than  $10  a  year  for 
cat  meat,  just  to  keep  your  house  free  from  mice.  Supposing  that  it 
does  cost  $500,000,000  a  year  to  support  our  army,  navy  and  militia 
after  this  year,  a  point  which  is  worrying  the  peace-at-any-price  dis- 
ciples and  people  of  small  mental  perspective,  that  surely  is  not  large 
enough  to  worry  about. 

What  has  been  spent  in  armament  in  this  country  in  the  past  has 
proven  to  be  a  good  investment.  Even  Henry  Ford,  who  objected  to 
further  expenditures  because  one  billion  dollars'  worth  of  military 
equipment  had  deteriorated  unused,  could  not  find  that  it  had  been  a 
bad  investment  when  it  was  pointed  out  that  that  equipment  protected 
the  country  while  the  national  wealth  increased  from  $7,136,000,000  in 
1850  to  $187,739,000,000  in  1915. 

189 


Recapitulating,  we  need  2,000  aeroplanes  and  "have  but  twelve." 
You  are  asked  to  decide  where  you  want  the  United  States  to  be 
aeronautically. 

This  country  can  be  made  fifth  in  aeronautical  equipment  by 
spending  $25,000,000 — England,  Germany,  France  and  Russia  remain- 
ing at  the  head;  or  seventh,  behind  Austria  and  Italy,  by  cutting  the 
allowance  down  to  $17,500,000 — or  it  can  be  left  behind  Japan,  Spain 
and  the  Netherland  by  allowing  only  $10,000,000.  Lastly,  it  can  be  left 
where  it  is,  behind  the  least  of  other  countries'  colonies,  by  allowing 
less  than  $10,000,000. 

Which  do  you  want  ?  While  you  are  considering  the  subject  let  me 
quote  Balfour's  significant  statement  to  the  House  of  Commons  in  reply 
to  those  vi^ho  wanted  to  know  why  London  was  not  better  protected 
against  Zeppelin  attacks.  He  said  among  many  other  highly  impres- 
sive things : 

"If  we  had  set  to  work,  let  us  say,  three  or  four  years 
before  the  war,  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  development  of 
aerial  warfare ;  if  the  government  of  that  day  had  set  to  work 
with  that  knowledge  to  organize  the  defense  of  London,  1  , 
have  no  doubt  it  would  have  been  organized  on  lines  different 
from  those  which  now  prevail.  .  .  .  The  number  of  flyers 
is  very  great  and  the  number  of  machines  is  very  great 
.  .  .  and  though,  immunity  cannot  be  promised  for  the 
future,  I  have  every  hope  that  Sir  Percy  Scott  and  all  the 
other  naval  authorities  who  are  devoting  their  minds  to  this 
problem  will  be  able  to  diminish  the  dangers  in  the  future,  to 
increase  the  security  and  to  enable  His  Majesty's  lieges  to  i 
sleep  comfortably  in  their  beds."  i 

We  do  not  want  war — and  we  are  all  trying  our  "darnedest"  to 
prevent  war.    But  if  it  should  come,  and  hostile  aircraft  played  havoc  I 
over  our  undefended  cities,  you  will  be  partly  responsible  for  our 
defenselessness,  for  our  lack  of  aeroplanes — for  you  are  the  Govern- 
ment of  this  day. 

The  Chairman — There  will  be  further  discussion  dn  the  part  of 
delegates,  but  t.Se  attention  of  all  speakers  is  called  to  the  rule  adopted 
by  the  committee  of  arrangements,  limiting  all  speeches  to  five  min- 

190 


utes,  and  in  ca&e  of  need,  if  that  time  is  exceeded,  the  Chairman  will 
call  the  attention  of  speakers  to  it. 

Mrs.  E.  von  R.  Owen— It  is  with  real  diffidence  that  I  speak  to 
such  an  audience  as  this.  Certainly  one  of  the  things  we  have  learned 
from  this  conference  is  this,  that  the  giants  are  not  all  dead  yet,  and 
that  the  United  States  has  today  the  same  mighty  sons  she  has  had 
to  call  on  whenever  such  crises  have  arisen  in  our  history  as  this  which 
she  faces  today. 

I  am  representing  here  one  of  the  new  divisions  which  are  being 
formed  to  help  with  the  work  of  national  defense,  the  United  States 
Junior  Naval  Reserve.  I  have  already  a  list  of  gentlemen  who  am 
going  to  be  asked  to  serve  on  our  board,  because  they  have  talked  for 
us  already,  though  they  did  not  know,  probably,  that  we  existed. 

You  have  talked  about  building  ships,  about  coast  defenses,  about 
armies  and  about  navies.  We  are  the  ones  who  are  going  to  give  them 
to  you,  because  we  are  going  to  bring  up  the  boys  and  girls  to  give  you 
the  personnel  that  you  have  got  to  have.     (Applause.) 

Look  around  in  this  audience.  One  of  the  things  you  notice  in 
this  audience  is  that  most  of  us  are  gray  haired.  We  are  laying  the 
plans.  The  boys  and  girls  are  going  to  carry  them  out.  And  my  or- 
ganization, the  one  that  I  represent,  is  already  in  process  of  formulat- 
ing the  way  we  can  get  at  them.  Already  in  our  office  in  New  York 
the  applications  are  pouring  in  on  us.    I  myself  find  them  pathetic. 

Girls  do  not  sit  back  now  waiting  to  watch  the  boys  parade.  They 
want  to  help.  They  want  to  put  their  shoulders  back  of  the  wheel; 
the  same  great  activities  that  we  have  been  responsible  for,  we 
women,  since  the  da\ATi  of  history.  But  they  are  different  in  their 
modern  manifestations.  We  are  out  in  the  world.  We  have  got  a  stake 
in  the  community,  and  we  have  got  to  talk  about  it.  We  do  our  duty 
always.  It  was  not  a  woman,  remember,  who  wrote  "I  Didn't  Raise 
My  Boy  to  Be  a  Soldier!"     (Laughter.) 

A  man  wrote  the  lyric,  a  man  wrote  the  music,  and  the  only  time 
I  have  heard  it,  a  man  sang  it.  (Applause.)  No;  what  we  women 
say — and  we  know  what  it  costs  to  say  it — is  what  the  Spartan  women 
said,  "If  honor  demands  that  you  go,  come  back  with  your  shield  or 
upon  it."  (Applause.)  That  is  what  we  say,  and  that  is  what  we 
are  going  to  say  to  our  boys  and  girls,  simply  to  quote  our  great,  great 
man,  Abraham  Lincoln,  "We  here  highly  resolve  that  these  brave  men 

191 


shall  not  have  died  in  vain."  We  are  the  custodians  of  the  flame  cf 
iiberty.  We  will  keep  alive  the  democratic  idea  for  the  world.  (Ap- 
plause.) 

When  I  talked  a  while  ago  in  New  York,  a  woman  said,  "What  is 
the  good  of  all  that  spreadeagleism?  Get  down  to  facts."  Men  and 
women,  we  all  have  spread  eagles  in  our  hearts.  We  are  the  most 
sentimental  nation  in  the  world.  There  never  was  anything  done  in 
the  history  of  the  world  that  sentiment  was  not  at  the  bottom  of  it. 
We  love  our  country,  but  sometimes  we  are  almost  ashamed  to  say  so.  ^ 
There  is  not  one  of  us  who,  when  away  from  home  we  see  the  stars  and 
stripes,  cioes  not  have  a  little  cold  chill  go  down  his  back  and  tears 
come  into  his  eyes.  We  are  home  again.  Of  course  we  are  a  nation  of 
idealists.  We  have  up  at  the  end  of  the  avenue  a  not  altogether  ideal 
institution,  but  that  rests  with  us. 

If  it  is  not  ideal  it  is  because  you  men,  and  some  women,  have  sent 
representatives  there  who  ought  not  to  be  there.  (Applause.)  But 
also  those  men  represent  us,  and  if  we  care  enough  we  can  tell  them 
what  to  do  and  make  them  do  it. 

Now,  what  are  you  going  to  do  with  the  boys  and  girls?  We  are 
going  to  turn  the  boys  into  an  unofficial  lot  of  compulsory  military  and 
naval  cadets.  When  the  United  States  gets  ready  to  take  them  over 
they  will  find  these  little  creatures  ready.  It  is  not  necessary  that  they 
should  go  about  breathing  fire  and  slaughter.  They  will  find  that  they 
have  about  the  only  thing  the  Am.erican  people  need  to  make  them 
ideal,  discipline.     (Applause.) 

Now,  girls ;  girls  can  help,  and  we  are  telling  them  that  there  are 
certain  departments  of  the  national  defense  that  belong  to  them,  for  i 
which  they  are  responsible,  and  that  if  they  do  not  give  their  personal  \ 
service  to  their  country  as  their  brothers  do,  they  are  cowards  and 
recreants ;  and  we  do  not  have  to  tell  them  that.    I  wish  you  could  see  ] 
the  appeals  that  I  personally  get.    I  got  a  letter  the  other  day  from  a 
girl  who  is  a  stenographer.    She  said,  "I  never  have  been  able  to  do 
anything.    I  have  always  wanted  to  do  something.    Is  there  anything 
in  this  movement  that  I  can  do?" 

That  is  the  spirit  we  are  going  to  co-ordinate,  get  together  and 
make  really  coherent.  Girls  are  wireless  operators  in  these  days. 
Girls  are  chauffeurs.  I  hope  to  see  Miss  Boardman  tomorrow;  we  are 
already  in  correspondence.    One  of  the  purposes  that  we  shall  be  dedi- 

192 


cated  to  is  that  of  providing  an  organization  upon  which  Miss,  Board- 
man's  organization  can  call  in  time  of  trouble. 

Is  it  not  a  shameful  thing  that  we  have  only  27,000  in  the  Red 
Cross !  We  are  going  to  change  that,  and  we  are  not  only  going  to  be- 
come subscribers  for  the  Red  Cross,  but  we  are  going  to  have  a  band  of 
girls  and  women  ready  to  go  into  active  service  if  they  are  needed.  We 
have  the  biggest  task  of  all  of  them.  You  are  going  to  make  the  plans. 
Go  ahead.  We  are  going  to  do  what  the  women  have  always  done,  we 
will  bring  up  the  children  to  carry  on  the  nation.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  before  relinquishing  the 
chair,  I  should  like  your  instructions  to  submit  a  resolution  to  the  sub- 
committee on  resolutions  thanking  Mr.  Menken  and  his  staff  of  officers 
of  the  League  for  the  admirable  manner  in  which  this  convention  has 
been  authorized,  conceived  and  carried  on,  and  for  the  enterprise  which 
he  has  shown  in  gathering  together  so  remarkable  a  body  of  speakers. 
If  I  may  have  such  instructions  I  will  appoint  a  committee  to  submit 
such  a  resolution  to  the  committee  on  resolutions. 

It  was  moved  and  seconded  that  the  Chairman  be  so  instructed, 
and  the  question  being  taken  the  motion  was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — I  will  appoint  Admiral  Chester  and  General  Luke 
E.  Wright  on  that  committee. 

President  Menken — Mr.  Chairman,  I  want  to  say  this.  I  think  it 
will  contribute  a  great  deal  to  the  success  of  our  Congress  if  the  people 
present  can  enjoy  a  little  of  this  wonderful  Washington  atmosphere. 
We  have  a  very  interesting  and  important  meeting  tonight,  with  Sena- 
tor Phelan  and  Senator  Chamberlain  to  speak  to  us,  and  Mayor  Mitchel 
of  New  York  presiding,  and  Mr.  Marbury  of  Maryland  and  Miss 
Frances  A.  Kellor,  Executive  Officer  of  the  Americanization  Society,  to 
address  us.  Then  tomorrow  night  we  have  that  remarkable  galaxy  of 
speakers  at  the  banquet,  and  we  want  to  be  in  shape  for  those  things ; 
and  I  do  not  want  to  guide  your  action,  but  I  for  one  am  going  to  ad- 
journ to  get  some  air. 

(At  4:30  o'clock  p.  m.  an  adjournment  was  taken  until  8:15  o'clock 
p.  m.) 


193 


FIFTH  SESSION 

D.  A.  R.  Memorial  Hall 

Friday,  January  21,  1916 

Chairman — Hon.  John  Furroy  Mitchel, 
Mayor  of  New  York  City 

The  session  was  called  to  order  at  8:30  o'clock  p.  m.  by  Mrs, 
William  Cummings  Story,  President-General,  Daughters  of  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution. 

Mrs.  Story — There  have  been  many  occasions  when,  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  ninety  thousand  women  who  constitute  the  active  mem- 
bership in  the  Daughters  of  the  American  Revolution,  I  have  been  in- 
tensely proud  of  the  privilege  that  was  mine;  but  there  has  seemed  to 
me  hardly  any  occasion  when  a  gathering  so  appropriate  has  met  in  a 
place  so  properly  adapted  to  the  cause  of  patriotism. 

I  take  advantage  of  this  opportunity  to  say  one  word  in  relation  to 
the  building  in  which  we  are  now  assembled.  It  was  erected  by  the 
voluntary  contributions  of  American  women,  as  a  memorial  to  the 
spirit  of  the  men  and  women  who  achieved  American  independence. 
We  delight  in  calling  it  our  temple  of  patriotism,  and  you  can  fancy 
that  it  is  with  peculiar  pride  that  I  have  the  honor  of  representing  this 
society,  in  making  welcome  this  distinguished  audience  and  in  present- 
ing the  man  who  will  preside  over  the  deliberations  tonight. 

As  the  granddaughter  of  the  first  elected  Mayor  of  New  York  City, 
I  feel  that  perhaps  I  know  a  little  about  mayors,  and  it  has  never  been 
my  privilege  to  present  or  to  live  under  an  administration  where  the 
people  of  a  great  city  have  so  dearly  loved,  so  absolutely  trusted  their 
Mayor  as  in  the  case  of  the  Mayor  of  our  city  at  this  time.  (Ap- 
plause.) So  I  have  grasped  the  honor  that  has  fallen  to  me  tonight 
with  -great  appreciation,  and  it  is  with  very  great  pleasure  that  I 
present  you  to  his  honor  the  Mayor  of  New  York.     (Applause.) 

194 


Mayor  Mitchel — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  delegates  to  the  National 
Security  Congress,  drawn  from  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  United 
States,  we  are  gathered  here  in  the  Capital  city  of  this  Nation  to  dis- 
charge what  I  conceive  to  be  a  very  solemn  duty.  This  Congress  has 
one  fundamental  object,  one  prime  and  inspiring  purpose.  It  is  to 
bring  home  to  our  representatives  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
the  fact  that  the  American  people  insist  that  their  Congress  now  take 
steps  to  insure  the  safety  of  our  people,  and  the  perpetuation  of  our 
free  institutions  by  the  provision  of  full  and  adequate  measures  of 
national  defense.     (Applause.) 

Through  the  discussions  that  will  take  place  here,  in  the  papers 
that  are  here  presented,  it  is  our  intention  to  make  articulate  to  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  as  far  as  the  delegates  here  may  voice 
it,  the  will  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  upon  this  paramount  is- 
sue of  national  defense.  (Applause.)  The  East  and  West,  the  North 
and  South,  the  middle  district  of  this  country,  the  heart  of  our  great 
country,  are  all  represented  here,  to  say  to  the  Congress  that  the  people 
of  this  Nation  want  action  in  this  matter  and  want  it  now.  (Ap- 
plause.)    They  want  it  while  there  is  still  time  for  preparation. 

There  is  no  one  part  of  our  country  that  has  a  better  right  than 
any  other  part  to  be  heard  upon  this  question.  There  is  no  one  part  of 
our  country  that  properly  has  any  more  patriotic  concern  than  any 
other  part  for  the  national  defense.  But  while  all  parts  are  concerned 
as  one  Nation,  there  are  districts,  those  upon  the  sea  coast  of  the  coun- 
try, that  perhaps  are  more  directly  open  to  possible  attack;  and  the 
communities  in  these  districts  feel  at  this  time  a  deep  and  ever  grow- 
ing anxiety  that  springs  from  a  more  direct  appreciation  of  our  present 
prostrate  and  defenseless  state,  and  what  that  means  in  jeopardy  to 
chem,  to  their  prosperity  and  to  the  lives  of  their  citizens.  For  the 
greatest  and  the  most  vulnerable  of  those  communities,  the  city  of 
New  York,  I  am  here  to  speak  tonight  as  its  chief  executive,  and  to 
say  as  solemnly  as  I  can  that  the  city  of  New  York,  with  its  unbounded 
wealth,  its  wonderful  institutions,  its  six  millions  of  people,  as  an 
integral  and  vital  part  of  this  Nation,  demands  that  it  shall  enjoy,  in 
common  with  all  other  parts  of  the  country,  the  insurance  of  its  tran- 
quility and  safety,  through  the  immediate  establishment  of  adequate 
means  of  effective  national  defense.     (Applause.) 

195  .    _ 


The  present  defenseless  condition  of  this  country  has  no  doubt 
been  discussed  already  in  the  meetings  of  this  Congress,  and  no  doubt 
it  will  be  further  discussed  more  authoritatively  and  in  greater  detail 
than  I  could  present  it  to  you.  With  less  than  90,000  available  mobile 
troops  within  the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States,  with  inade- 
quate, scattered  and  incomplete  coast  defenses,  with  scarcely  more  than 
one-half  the  number  of  field  guns  necessary  to  equip  a  fighting  force  of 
500,000  men,  and  with  but  27  per  cent,  of  the  ammunition  necessary 
to  serve  even  those  guns  on  hand,  with  scarcely  sufficient  small  arms 
to  equip  a  first  line  of  defense  half  a  million  strong,  with  absolutely 
no  reserve  of  men,  munitions,  arms  or  ordnance,  with  a  Navy  once 
formidable,  but  today  largely  obsolete,  and  ranked  fourth  among  the 
powers,  our  situation  as  a  great  Nation  would  be  ludicrous  if  it  were 
not  pitiable. 

Considered  in  the  light  of  our  undeveloped  resources,  physical  and 
human,  and  in  the  light  of  our  duty  to  the  great  cause  of  democratic 
government,  to  civilization  and  to  posterity,  our  neglect  in  the  past  has 
amounted  to  a  national  crime.  It  has  brought  into  jeopardy  our 
national  peace,  and  those  institutions  of  popular  self-government  for 
the  effectuation  of  the  principle  of  human  liberty  for  whose  prepara- 
tion and  development  for  posterity  the  people  of  the  West  are  responsi- 
ble to  mankind. 

Two  years  ago  the  American  people  would  not  seriously  have  en- 
tertained the  statement  that  the  Nation  was  then  incapable  of  defend- 
ing its  territory  against  the  attack  of  any  first-class  power.  Today 
they  know  that  it  is  true.  They  have  learned  that  international  wars 
come  over  night,  and  that  preparation  is  essential  to  success.  But 
there  are  still  among  us  some  who  believe  that  men  could  be  organized 
and  trained  and  munitions  could  be  secured  between  the  outbreak  of  a 
war  and  the  arrival  of  an  attacking  force.  The  utter  absurdity  of 
this  is  manifest  when  we  realize  that  but  six  days  are  required  for 
transport  across  the  Atlantic,  while  twelve  months,  as  the  experience  of 
England  shows,  are  needed  to  turn  raw  recruits  into  efficient  soldiers, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  longer  period  required  to  train  efficient  oflficers. 
(Applause.) 

But  then,  someone  says,  our  Navy  remains  to  hold  off  attacking 
forces  from  our  shores.  My  friends,  let  us  not  forever  continue  to 
suppose  that  our  only  possible  enemies  will  be  found  among  second 

196 


or  third  class  powers.  Our  Navy  is  fourth  today  among  the  power?, 
and  shortly  will  be  fifth,  and  the  experts  tell  us  that  in  these  days  of 
high  speed  and  long  range  a  10  per  cent,  advantage  in  battle  strength 
gives  absolute  command  at  sea.  The  fact  is,  as  every  naval  and  mil- 
itary expert  knows,  that  today  we  could  scarcely  make  even  a  decent 
show  of  resistance.  Wherever  the  attack  might  be  directed,  our  sea- 
coast  territory  would  have  to  be  speedily  abandoned;  and  if  that  at- 
tack were  directed  in  the  neighborhood  of  New  York,  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered that  within  the  district  covered  by  a  150-mile  radius  from 
that  point  lie  practically  all  of  the  munitions  and  ordnance  producing 
plants  of  the  United  States. 

The  issue,  therefore,  which  the  people  of  the  United  States  must 
decide  is  between  the  policy  of  no  resistance,  of  reliance  upon  moral 
suasion  and  the  opinion  of  mankind  to  protect  our  people,  our  institu- 
tions and  our  territory,  upon  the  one  hand,  and  real,  substantial  prep- 
aration for  national  defense  upon  the  other.     (Applause.) 

How  effective  moral  suasion,  enlightened  opinion,  or  civilization 
are  as  a  means  of  defense  against  aggression,  one  would  think  that  the 
lessons  of  Europe  might  have  sufficiently  taught  this  nation  in  the 
last  two  years;  and  yet  there  remain  among  us  a  vociferous  minority 
of  well-meaning  idealists,  who  insist  on  closing  their  eyes  to  the  lessons 
of  even  contemporaneous  history,  and  to  the  fundamental  impulses  of 
human  nature  that  operate  even  more  elementally  in  the  maws  than 
in  the  individual. 

These  gentlemen  wish  us  to  remain  unarmed,  unprepared,  pros- 
trate, as  we  are  today.  They  see  no  danger  to  our  peace  in  our  growing 
prosperity  and  our  expanding  commercial  interests.  They  apparently 
believe  that  following  the  present  terrible  war  in  Europe  human  nature 
will  change  and  nations  will  no  longer  covet  the  prosperity  of  commer- 
cial rivals.  They  believe  that  good  will,  honest  intention,  and  a  just 
attitude  toward  others  will  constitute  a  shield  against  envy,  greed, 
resentment  and  aggression. 

Because  these  gentlemen  are  very  active,  very  outspoken,  very  per- 
sistent, it  becomes  the  duty  of  all  of  us  who  believe  that  the  insurance 
of  our  peace  and  liberty  demands  the  means  of  physical  defense,  to 
make  unmistakably  plain  to  the  Congress  the  temper  of  the  nation  in 
this  matter;  and  so,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  we  are  met  here  to  propose 

197 


and  to  demand  a  real  program  of  national  defense;  no  half  measures, 
no  mere  sop  to  public  opinion  as  a  matter  of  political  expediency,  but 
the  complete  national  preparation  that  alone  will  mean  permanent 
security.  I  believe  in  universal  male  military  training  after  the  plan 
of  Switzerland  or  Australia.  (Applause.)  I  believe  that  the  American 
people  must  and  will  come  to  this  sooner  or  later.  I  pray  that  they 
may  adopt  it  before  national  disaster  and  not  after.  (Applause.)  I 
am  as  much  opposed  to  militarism,  as  Europe  knows  it,  as  the  most 
ardent  pacifist,  but  I  do  believe  that  citizenship  in  a  democracy  carries 
with  it  a  fundamental  obligation;  that  mild  and  brief  citizen  training 
for  a  few  weeks  each  year,  during  adolescence  and  early  manhood,  is 
the  minimum  necessary  to  realize  the  condition  of  a  trained  citizenship 
in  arms.  Anythong  less  than  this  must  be  a  makeshift,  a  mere  tem- 
porary expedient,  a  perilous  temporizing  in  the  face  of  danger.  The 
time  to  solve  this  question  is  now,  when  the  attention  of  the  nation  is 
focused  upon  it,  and  its  solicitude  is  acute.     (Applause.) 

We  are  passing  today  through  a  great  crisis  in  our  national  life. 
The  issue  is  more  than  national ;  it  is  as  broad  as  the  human  race  itself. 
Into  our  hands  here  has  been  committed  the  heritage  of  democractic 
government.  It  is  our  trust  to  perpetuate  it,  to  develop  it,  to  transmit 
it  to  posterity,  a  serviceable  agent  for  the  advancement  of  civilization 
and  for  the  happiness  of  mankind.  Here  in  this  nation  and  country  of 
ours  the  efficiency  of  democracy  is  on  trial  today.  Here  under  our  free 
institutions,  through  one  hundred  and  thirty  years  of  effort  and  of 
progress,  we  have  developed  governmental  and  civic  efficiency. 

We  teach  our  citizens  a  sense  of  individual  civic  responsibility, 
and  they  respond  to  it.  During  the  greater  part  of  that  time,  due  to 
geographical  location  and  the  absence  of  hostile  motives  abroad,  we 
have  enjoyed  peace.  Now  that  science  has  obliterated  distance  and  our 
prosperity  and  commerce  supply  the  motive,  we  can  no  longer  count 
upon  an  effective  peace.  Democracy,  therefore,  must  meet  the  new 
cor.ditions,  and  through  its  elementary  sufficiency  for  self-preservation 
we  must  teach  our  citizens  that  with  civic  duty  goes  military  duty, 
and  that  both  are  obligations  on  which  the  life  of  the  state  depends. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  what  shall  it  avail  us  for  posterity  if  we 
build  up  democracy  here  to  the  highest  pinnacle  of  efficient  service 
ability  and  it  fail  in  the  primal  task  of  self-preservation?  That,  there- 
fore, is  the  great  issue  that  is  presented  to  the  American  people  today ; 

198 


can  they,  will  they,  make  democracy  efficient  to  preserve  and  to  perpeu- 
ate  itself?     (Applause.)  » 

And  now  it  becomes  my  grateful  duty  to  present  to  you  those  who 
will  address  you  this  evening.  The  committee  regrets  that  Mr.  Gom- 
pers  himself  could  not  be  here ;  but  he  has  sent  to  the  Congress  a  letter 
which  will  be  read  to  you  by  Mr.  Henry  J.  Howard,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Federation  of  Labor. 

Mr.  Howard  (reading)  : 

LETTER  FROM  SAMUEL  GOMPERS 

"American  Federation  of  Labor, 

"801-809  G  Street,  N.  W., 
"Washington,  D.  C.,  January  19,  1916. 

■'S.  Stanwood  Menken,  President  The  National  Security  League, 

"New  Willard  Hotel,  Washington,  D.  C. 
"Dear  Sir: 

"Since  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  be  present  at  this  meeting  of 
the  National  Security  League,  in  accord  with  your  request,  I  am  writ- 
ing you  in  regard  to  certain  fundamental  principles  that  ought  to  be 
presented  in  connection  with  the  subject  before  your  Congress. 

"In  considering  preparedness  and  national  defense  it  is  of  para- 
mount importance  to  have  in  mind  that  these  concern  the  citizens  of 
the  whole  nation  and,  therefore,  all  have  a  right  to  a  voice  in  the  de- 
termination of  plans  and  policies  that  shall  be  adopted  to  secure  these 
purposes.  Voice  in  determining  plans  and  policies  means  not  only  the 
right  to  pass  upon  them  after  they  have  been  formulated,  but  a  right 
to  representation  in  those  bodies  which  shall  deliberate  upon  and 
formulate  plans. 

"No  policy  can  be  truly  effective  that  is  not  representative  of  the 
thought  and  desires  of  the  people  generally.  It  is  in  keeping  with  the 
spirit  of  a  free  people  that  the  wage-earners,  who  constitute  the  great 
majority  of  our  citizens,  shall  be  represented  fully  in  the  determination 
of  matters  that  vitally  affect  their  welfare.  The  wage-earners  as  well 
as  our  citizens  generally  agree  that  under  present  conditions  every 
nation  must  have  some  definite  policy  of  national  preparedness  and 
some  means  for  national  defense.  It  is  true  that  many  efforts  to  at- 
tain these  purposes  have  been  attended  by  undesirable  developments 

199 


and  conditions.  In  some  countries  national  preparedness  and  defense 
have  been  perverted  into  militarism  and  navalism  and  have  foisted 
upon  those  countries  customs,  conditions,  influences  that  are  baneful. 
But  these  results  are  due  to  the  fact  that  policies  for  national  defense 
and  preparedness  v^ere  not  safeguarded  by  infusing  into  every  detail 
the  spirit  and  the  method  of  democracy.  These  experiences  must  have 
a  significance  and  a  lesson  for  us.  In  contrast  v/ith  these  experiences 
in  the  democratic  systems  which  have  been  adopted  in  Australia  and 
Switzerland.  The  fundamental  principles  of  these  systems  could  be 
adapted  to  meet  our  needs  and  conditions. 

"National  defense  and  preparedness  are  but  one  phase  of  national 
life.  Provisions  for  this  purpose  must  be  a  part  of  the  whole  plan  for 
national  development.  In  other  words  military  training  and  military 
institutions  must  be  a  part  of  the  life  of  the  people  rather  than  of  a 
nature  to  alienate  citizens  from  the  spirit,  the  ideals  and  the  purposes 
of  civic  life.  A  great  danger  comes  from  isolating  the  military,  from 
making  military  ideals  separate  and  often  in  conflict  with  those  of  the 
masses  of  the  people.  The  military  should  not  exist  as  something 
apart,  but  for  the  service  of  the  whole  nation.  The  basis  and  the  pre- 
requisite for  all  military  preparedness  and  national  defense  is  a  citizen- 
ship physically  strong,  well  developed  and  fit.  This  essential  can  best 
be  secured  by  making  physical  training  a  part  of  the  work  to  be  done 
at  our  public  schools.  Such  training  will  not  only  prepare  boys  for 
service  in  the  defense  of  the  nation,  but  will  make  them  efficient  in  all 
relations  of  life.  It  will  afford  to  all  equal  opportunities  for  better 
health  and  preparedness  to  serve  the  country.  The  naval  and  military 
institutions  of  our  country  which  give  a  special  training  to  those  who 

have  a  particular  fitness  and  desire  to  follow  military  or  naval  profes- 
sions, ought  also  to  be  open  to  all  who  possess  the  required  qualifica- 
tions. Such  a  provision  would  enable  men  from  all  walks  of  life  to 
enter  the  army  and  the  navy — a  condition,  which  in  itself,  would  be  in 
accord  with  the  spirit  of  democracy. 

"Wherever  the  spirit  of  democracy  is  absent,  there  the  accompany- 
ing evil  of  militarism,  military  castes,  fasten  deadly  clutches  upon  free- 
dom and  civic  opportunity,  and  obversely  where  the  spirit  of  democracy 
obtains  it  tends  to  the  abolition  of  military  castes  and  the  inherent 
vicious  dangers  of  militarism. 

200 


"In  addition  to  those  who  enter  the  regulary  army  and  the  navy  as 
a  profession  there  must  be  reserves  that  can  be  called  into  the  service 
of  the  country  quickly  to  meet  an  emergency.  It  is  necessary,  there- 
fore, that  there  should  be  opportunities  afforded  to  the  masses  of  the 
citizens  for  military  training.  However,  all  military  training  must  be 
safeguarded  to  protect  democratic  ideals  and  civic  institutions.  Not 
only  must  there  be  equal  opportunity  for  all  citizens  to  enter  military 
training  organizations  and  camps,  but  that  opportunity  must  be  at- 
tended by  such  provisions  as  to  make  it  an  equal  opportunity  for  both 
the  poor  and  the  rich.  A  fair  compensation  for  service  in  military 
training  camps  must  be  paid  as  a  substitute  for  wages  list.  In  these 
citizens  organizations  for  military  training  there  must  be  no  recogni- 
tion of  distinctions,  professions  or  for  any  advantage  or  position  that 
may  be  held  by  any  citizen  or  group  of  citizens. 

"In  order  to  insure  naval  preparedness  and  to  maintain  reserves 
for  that  service  it  is  imperative  that  high  standards  of  manhood  and 
efficiency  may  be  established  in  the  navy,  the  merchant  marine  and 
for  transport  service. 

"When  service  in  the  army  and  navy  and  in  training  schools  and 
training  camps  and  reserve  organizations  is  open  to  all;  when  these 
institutions  are  organized  upon  a  democratic  basis,  democratically  of- 
ficered and  administered;  when  there  is  equal  opportunity  for  all  for 
service  in  all  positions,  from  the  highest  officer  to  the  lowest  in  the 
ranks ;  and  when  the  commander-in-chief  of  both  army  and  navy  and  all 
military  organizations  within  the  country  is  an  elected  person  directly 
responsible  to  the  people,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  greatest  possible  pre- 
caution has  been  taken  to  secure  national  defense  and  national  pre- 
paredness, without  doing  violence  to  the  spirit  of  democracy  and  to  our 
Republic.  With  these  safeguards  the  dangers  of  developing  militar- 
ism will  have  been  reduced  to  the  smallest  possibility. 

"While  the  organized  labor  movement  deprecates  war  and  is  will- 
ing to  do  all  within  its  power  to  prevent  war,  yet  our  experiences  with 
the  practical  affairs  of  life  have  taught  us  that  we  can  secure  justice 
and  recognition  of  rights  only  when  we  are  prepared  to  defend  and 
protect  our  ideals  of  justice. 

"Those  who  understand  the  present  social  and  industrial  condi- 
tions and  the  forces  that  determine  relations  between  nations  and  who 
understand  human  nature,  realize  that  no  nation  can  afford  to  disarm 

201 


at  the  present  time  or  to  be  without  means  of  national  defense.  The 
great  problem  then  is  to  adopt  the  best  policies  and  the  best  means  to 
see  to  it  that  the  methods  by  which  we  insure  additional  defense  are  in 
harmony  with  democratic  ideals  and  are  of  a  nature  to  promote  the 
best  interests  and  the  welfare  of  our  citizens  in  all  relations  of  national 
life. 

"Yours  very  truly, 

(Signed)     "Samuel  Gompers, 
"President  American  Federation  of  Labor." 

Mayor  Mitchel — If  we  are  to  have  preparation  for  national  de- 
fense through  citizen  service,  we  must  have  good  and  loyal  citizens  to 
render  the  service.  There  is  probably  no  one  in  the  United  States 
who  knows  more  of  the  process  of  making  loyal  American  citizens  out 
of  the  immigrants  who  come  to  this  country  than  does  Miss  Frances 
Kellor,  whom  I  present  to  you  as  the  next  speaker.     (Applause.) 

AMERICANIZATION  AS  A  MEANS  OF  PREPAREDNESS. 

Miss  Frances  A.  Kellor, 

Executive  Officer,  Americanization  Society. 

Miss  Kellor — Preparedness  means  something  more  than  a  larger 
army  and  navy.  It  means  also  having  a  United  America  back  of  that 
army  and  navy. 

The  decision  we  are  called  upon  to  make  today  is  whether  America 
shall  emerge  from  this  v/orld-wide  struggle  as  a  nation  of  many  peo- 
ples or  whether  it  will  imperil  its  very  existence  by  remaining  half 
native,  half  alien,  half  free  and  half  slave  to  foreign  influences. 

We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  bitter  contest  in  which  the  forces  for 
weakness  are  contending  with  those  for  strength  in  terms  of  fortifica- 
tions, battleships  and  guns  amidst  the  sordid  influences  of  appropria- 
tions, sectional  selfishness  and  party  campaign  considerations. 

Shall  we  get  nothing  except  the  material  standards  of  prepared- 
ness from  the  mighty  struggle  in  Europe,  where  nations  are  contend- 
ing for  the  preservation  of  the  liberties  and  security  we  now  enjoy? 

What  will  it  avail  this  nation  to  build  battleships  and  a  merchant 
marine  if  we  do  not  at  the  same  time  create  a  nation-wide  loyalty  that 
will  prevent  explosions  wrecking  their  holds?     (Applause.) 

202 


Shall  we  strengthen  our  coast  defenses  and  leave  our  transporta- 
tion lines,  upon  which  they  depend,  to  be  manned  by  unskilled  work- 
men whom  Americans  have  not  shown  how  to  love  America,  and  in 
whom  dual  allegiance  still  persists?  Shall  we  conserve  our  resources 
in  mines,  quarries  and  fields  and  build  more  factories  and  man  them 
with  discontented  workmen  who  will  see  American  defense  only  in 
terms  of  profit  and  advantages? 

Shall  we  have  citizens'  training  camps  and  train  to  higher  ef- 
ficiency only  those  already  filled  with  patriotism,  or  shall  we  in  these 
same  camps  bring  new  and  old  citizens  together  and  bring  up  the 
ranks  in  discipline  and  efficiency  for  a  better  America? 

Can  we  become  a  really  strong  nation  if  Americanization  is  for 
native-born  men  and  women  only,  while  we  do  nothing  for  the  millions 
of  foreign-born  men  and  women  who  constitute  our  reserve  strength? 

These  and  many  other  similar  questions  must  be  included  in  any 
adequate  program  of  defense,  and  yet  in  no  council  of  government  or 
of  citizens  have  they  been  given  the  consideration  their  importance 
demands.  The  great  immediate  task  before  us  is  Americanization, 
the  welding  of  the  many  races  and  classes  in  this  country  into  one 
enduring,  steadfast  nation.     (Applause.) 

The  things  that  make  for  preparedness  in  peace  or  war,  that  make 
France  and  Germany  the  two  leading  contestants  in  the  present  war, 
are  as  much  social  and  economic  as  military  preparedness.  We  shall 
not  attain  this  until  we  have  Americanized  our  foreign-born  residents 
and  many  of  our  American-born  as  well.  We  cannot  do  this  by  legis- 
lation or  proclamation,  but  only  by  the  patriotic  action  of  each  and 
every  resident-  in  America  disciplined  for  national  service. 

The  lack  of  Americanization  is  immediate  and  definite.  We 
should  not  scatter  our  fire.    Americanization  means: 

1.  Putting  the  American  flag  above  all  others,  abolishing  dual 
citizenship,  and  pledging  opeti  allegiance  to  America. 

2.  It  means  American  citizenship  for  every  alien  within  our 
borders,  or  deportation  and  closing  our  doors  to  political  scouts  and 
birds  of  passage.  We  can  no  longer  endure  as  a  "polyglot  boarding 
house."  Citizenship  will  give  us  an  intelligent  body  of  voters,  for  it 
will  mark  the  end  of  "voting  the  hunkies"  by  ward  bosses.  This 
desecration  of  American  citizenship  cannot  exist  side  by  side  with  an 

203 


aggressive  effort  on  the  part  of  the  public  schools  of  the  country  to 
instruct  the  foreign-born,  adults  as  well  as  children,  in  the  real  mean- 
ing of  citizenship.  It  means,  finally,  economic  stability.  The  thou- 
sands of  immigrants  that  become  "birds  of  passage"  and  return  to 
their  own  country  because  they  have  never  been  able  to  make  any 
American  contact  except  through  their  pay  envelope,  will  be  enabled 
really  to  settle  their  homes,  their  affections  and  their  earnings  in 
America,  increasing  the  prosperity  of  the  immigrant  family  here, 
cementing  its  bonds  with  this  country,  and  also  contributing  to  the 
prestige  and  prosperity  of  the  American  nation. 

3.  It  means  one  language  for  all  America  and  the  elimination  of 
illiteracy.  Confusion  of  tongues  and  ignorance  of  American  institu- 
tions and  opportunities  are  foes  of  efficient  preparedness.  This  means 
the  end  of  "Little  Italys,"  "Little  Hungaries,"  the  end  of  filthy,  remote 
foreign  villages  on  the  outskirts  of  our  towns  and  cities,  inhabited  by 
foreign-speaking  men  and  women  with  no  way  of  learning  American 
standards  of  living  and  American  customs,  and  with  no  way  to  protest 
against  standards  of  living  which  in  many  cases  they  do  not  "lower" 
at  ail,  but  which  they  accept  only  because  they  are  too  ignorant  to 
protest  when  the  conditions  are  forced  upon  them.  There  are  today 
thousands  of  communities  where  decent  living  conditions  do  not  and 
cannot  prevail.  Our  war  contracts  are  starting  boom  towns  that  are 
a  menace  to  our  very  civilization  and  a  source  of  danger  in  time  of 
war.  It  means  a  higher  level  of  intelligence,  the  wiping  out  of  illit- 
eracy and  the  establishment  of  the  rule  of  the  English  language  and 
of  a  common  citizenship. 

4.  It  means  the  abolition  of  class  prejudices  and  of  racial 
hatreds,  and  of  the  intolerance  of  old  stock  for  new  stock,  which  stand 
in  the  way  of  United  America. 

5.  It  means  an  American  standard  of  living.  We  can  no  longer 
sacrifice  the  preservation  of  this  country  to  industrial  necessities.  So 
long  as  our  industrial  communities  are  made  up  of  large  groups  of 
un-Americanized  immigrants,  without  the  English  language,  without 
an  understanding  of  American  conditions,  too  helpless  to  bring  their 
grievances  to  the  attention  of  their  employers,  too  ignorant  to  under- 
stand or  trust  compromises,  if  compromises  are  offered;  too  ignorant 
to  force  them  in  legitimate  ways  if  they  are  not  offered,  able  to  un- 

204 


derstand  only  the  radical  agitators  addressing  them  in  their  own  lan- 
guage— just  so  long  will  the  industrial  history  of  America  be  blotted 
by  Ludlows,  Lawrences  and  Wheatlands.  The  road  to  American  citi- 
zenship, to  the  English  language,  and  understanding  of  American 
social  and  political  ideals  is  the  road  to  industrial  peace. 

6.  It  means  the  Americanization  of  women.  Now  women  auto- 
matically become  citizens  with  their  fathers  and  husbands,  although 
in  some  states  they  vote.  The  best  Americanization  agency  is  the 
home.  We  can  only  reach  foreign-born  women  in  their  homes,  and  we 
must  go  to  them.  They  are  now  isolated,  forgotten,  ignored,  and  con- 
stitute the  greatest  single  backwood  factor  in  the  progress  of  citizen- 
ship among  women. 

7.  It  means,  lastly,  not  America  first  and  safety  first,  which  are 
sectional  and  selfish  banners  under  which  no  man  can  fight  his  best, 
but  liberty,  justice,  honor  and  right  first. 

This  is  no  small  task.  The  figures  for  1910  tell  us  that  America 
has  about  thirty-three  nuUion  foreign-born  people  and  persons  of  for- 
eign-born parentage.  One  third  of  us  have,  therefore,  in  our  imme- 
diate environment  foreign  traditions  and  standards.  The  problem  is 
to  keep  the  best  of  these  and  make  them  serve  America.  No  nation  in 
the  civilized  world  would  think  itself  "prepared"  with  such  an  internal 
situation  and  yet  we  ofiicially  ignore  it.  I  am  here  to  appeal  to  the 
National  Security  League  for  co-operation  along  two  main  lines : 

1.  Is  there  not  some  way  in  which  the  waste  of  funds  and  dupli- 
cation of  effort  in  the  many  defense  organizations  can  be  avoided? 
If  this  conference  will  suggest  a  way  by  which  we  may  all  approve  a 
central  policy,  agree  as  to  the  meaning  of  preparedness,  adopt  stand- 
ards in  our  educational  work,  some  way  of  judging  of  the  returns  on 
our  expenditures  and  of  the  cost  of  collecting  funds,  of  the  value  of 
various  kinds  of  work  and  a  solution  of  similar  questions,  it  will  elim- 
inate one  of  the  weakest  factors  in  the  preparedness  movement.  Now, 
our  effort  is  likely  to  be  nullified  by  inefficiency,  waste,  decentralization 
and  over-organization. 

2.  I  have  outlined  the  task  of  Americanization.  Your  members 
are  idle  in  time  of  peace;  they  are  likely  to  substitute  talking  for 
action.  They  constitute  an  undisciplined,  undirected  army,  valuable 
as  they  may  be  as  individuals.     Signing  enrollment  cards  without 

205 


service,  paying  dues  without  any  obligations,  reading  literature  with- 
out a  sense  of  further  duty,  writing  letters  without  further  action  is 
a  poor  preparation  in  time  of  peace  for  efficiency  in  time  of  war.  Why 
not  set  every  member  to  work  in  his  own  community  training  citizens, 
teaching  English,  fighting  disease  and  bad  living  conditions  (which 
weaken  every  fighting  unit)  and  getting  the  immigrant  and  native- 
born  citizen  side  by  side  into  the  training  camp.  Clean  out  our  im- 
migrant colonies  and  bring  our  people  together. 

Every  industrial  community  in  this  country  is  a  laboratory  for 
such  work,  and  unless  the  process  of  Americanization  is  scientifically 
and  constructively  aided  in  such  communities  the  towns  and  cities  that 
are  growing  up  around  industries  are  not  going  to  be  American  in  any 
real  sense. 

During  the  last  year,  owing  to  the  development  of  munition  plants 
and  other  war  industries,  such  industrial  communities  have  been  pro- 
duced with  phenomenal  rapidity.  Men  are  flocking  by  thousands  to 
places  where  there  is  plenty  of  work,  but  no  houses,  no  community 
standards  of  any  kind.  One  town,  which  18  months  ago  was  a  corn- 
field, and  seven  months  ago  the  home  of  500  people,  is  today  the  home 
of  27,000 — at  a  conservative  estimate.  Fifteen  thousand  of  these  at 
least  are  foreign-born  workmen. 

There  are  not  many  exactly  like  that.  But  there  are  many  towns 
in  which  the  same  conditions  and  tendencies  are  prevailing  in  less 
spectacular  form.  A  very  moderate  illustration  is  a  small  town  in 
New  Jersey.  A  year  ago  it  contained  2,500  inhabitants,  of  whom  there 
were  59  foreign-born.  Today  its  population  numbers  3,500.  But  the 
number  of  foreign-born  residents  has  increased  from  59  to  900. 

Are  such  industrial  towns  and  cities  to  be  American  cities,  char- 
acterized by  American  standards  of  living,  American  housing,  Ameri- 
can respect  for  family  life  and  general  social  ideals?  Or  is  our  typical 
industrial  town,  with  its  great  foreign-born  population,  to  be  and  to 
remain,  as  one  authority  has  called  it,  "a  tool  room  attached  to  a 
work  shop?" 

One  thing  is  certain.  It  cannot  be  left  to  the  immigrant  popula- 
tion to  provide  American  standards  of  living  and  of  housing.  They 
cannot  do  it.    They  do  not  know  them.    They  may  be  made  to  observe 

206 


certain  standards.     But  thej-  cannot  create  the  standards.     In  many 
American  communities  now  it  is  left  to  them  to  do  so. 

It  is  a  mightj^  task.  When  a  conservative  little  American  town 
with  a  population  of  perhaps  500  and  with  schools,  courts  and  housing 
also  adapted  to  500  becomes  in  a  few  weeks  the  seat  of  a  new  industry, 
the  home  of  a  great  influx  of  immigrant  workmen  with  their  families, 
and  a  place  of  many  thousand  instead  of  several  hundred  inhabitants, 
the  task  of  making  that  town  an  American  town  instead  of  a  polyglot 
community  with  southern  European  standards  of  living,  taxes  every 
resource  in  American  life. 

Here  is  a  call  to  service  on  a  battlefield  of  peace  if  you  will  fur- 
nish the  soldiers.  I  assure  you  it  is  a  grim  fight  which  will  test  your 
loyalty,  endurance,  patience,  discipline  and  perseverance  to  the  utmost. 
and  will  tell  you  whether  America  can  rely  upon  you  in  the  field  as  well 
as  on  paper.  And  above  all  remember  it  is  the  average  American 
citizen's  attitude  toward  his  foreign-born  neighbor  which  will  deter- 
mine the  success  of  Americanization  as  a  national  task.  The  "immi- 
gration problem"  will  never  be  socially  and  economically  solved  by 
American  business,  by  Congress,  by  legislatures,  or  any  other  agency 
until  it  has  been  humanly  solved  by  the  American-born  neighbor,  fel- 
low-workman and  fellow  citizen.     (Applause.) 

Mayor  Mitchel — Because  of  an  engagement  which  calls  away  the 
next  speaker,  it  has  been  necessary  to  change  somewhat  the  order  of 
speaking. 

I  take  particular  satisfaction  in  being  privileged  to  present  to  the 
audience  the  Senator  from  Oregon.  He  is  a  man  who  has  served  his 
own  State  so  long  with  efficiency  and  particular  distinction  that  he 
Would  be  welcomed  here  among  us  if  he  came  merely  as  an  officer  of 
his  own  State.  But  he  comes  to  us  as  a  United  States  Senator  who 
has  had  the  privilege  of  presenting  to  the  National  Congress,  for  the 
first  time  since  the  days  of  George  Washington,  a  concrete  proposal 
for  general  citizen  training.     (Applause.) 

The  bill  which  Senator  Chamberlain  has  introduced  is  an  amalga- 
mation, if  I  may  call  it  that,  of  the  Swiss  and  the  Australian  systems. 
I  wish  that  it  could  become  law.     I  believe  that  it  would  solve  our 

207 


problem  (applause),  and  I  know  that  tliis  audience  will  be  most  grate- 
ful to  hear  from  the  author  of  that  bill. 

I  present  to  you  Senator  Chamberlain  of  Oregon.  (Great  ap- 
plause.) 

ADDRESS  OF  SENATOR  GEORGE  E.  CHAMBERLAIN. 

Senator  Chamberlain — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
and  delegates  to  the  National  Security  League:  I  assure  you  that  it 
is  a  very  great  privilege  as  well  as  a  pleasure  to  be  permitted  to  lend 
my  aid  to  the  work  you  are  doing  in  the  cause  of  national  prepared- 
ness. 

This  occasion,  this  subject,  and  this  audience  are  deserving  of  a 
carefully  prepared  address;  but  in  the  multitude  of  affairs  that  have 
devolved  on  me  during  the  past  few  weeks  I  have  found  it  impossible 
to  prepare  such  a  one.  What  I  shall  have  to  say,  therefore,  will  be,  in 
the  nature  of  things,  desultory ;  but  if  I  fail  to  speak  consecutively  and 
distinctly  I  want  you  to  feel  assured  that  my  heart  is  and  always  has 
been  in  the  movement  which  you  are  now  assisting  by  your  efforts. 
(Applause.) 

I  am  not  going  to  discuss  the  Navy.  I  want  you  to  remember, 
however,  that  while  it  is  conceded  that  our  Navy  is  deficient  in  many 
respects,  it  is  not  so  much  because  Congress  has  failed  in  the  past  to 
keep  it  up  to  a  reasonable  state  of  efficiency,  but  rather  because  the 
other  nations  of  the  earth  have  outstripped  America  in  the  race  for 
such  efficiency.  We  are  not  as  well  prepared  at  sea  as  we  ought  to  be. 
We  have  not  done  our  whole  duty,  but  I  do  hope  that  in  the  very  near 
future  our  Navy,  instead  of  occupying  the  fourth  place,  as  has  been 
stated  to  you  by  your  distinguished  Chairman,  will  occupy  at  least 
somewhere  near  the  first  place  amongst  the  navies  of  the  world. 
(Applause.) 

But  is  there  necessity  for  preparedness?  Ladies  and  gentlemen, 
when  many  of  us  who  are  now  here  were  younger  than  we  are  now 
America  occupied  a  place  of  isolation  amongst  the  powers  of  the  earth. 
It  was  not  necessary  for  us  to  be  then  prepared  for  a  war  of  defense. 
But  when  Dewey  left  Manila  Bay  he  destroyed  that  isolation  and 
placed  our  country  in  the  category  of  a  world-power.     (Applause.) 

208 


^ 


And  now  it  is  up  to  the  American  people  to  say  whether  they  will  con- 
tinue to  occupy  that  position  or  whether  they  will  take  a  place  amongst 
the  decadent  nations  of  the  earth.     (Applause.) 

If  there  had  been  no  war  in  Europe,  I  should  still  say  there  was 
necessity  for  preparedness  for  national  defense.  When  America  be- 
came a  world  power  it  was  her  duty  to  see  to  it  that  she  was  at  least 
the  equal  of  any  of  the  great  powers  of  the  earth,  and  to  prepare,  not 
for  aggression,  but  for  defense  against  one  or  all  comers.     (Applause.) 

Why  ought  we  to  have  been  prepared  even  before  the  war  in 
Europe?  Because  of  the  new  obligations  that  our  position  as  a  world 
power  had  cast  upon  us.  The  European  war  came  upon  us  almost  in  a 
night.  So  did  the  Spanish-American  War.  The  shot  that  sank  the 
Maine  in  the  Harbor  of  Havana  was  heard  around  the  world,  so  far  as 
America  was  concerned.  Whether  you  call  it  a  war  of  revenge  or  not, 
it  was  a  war  of  the  American  people;  and  the  act  of  a  single  individual 
or  power  might  have  involved  us  with  the  world.  We  can  never  tell 
today  what  the  morrow  may  bring  forth. 

So  the  new  obligations  which  this  unexpected  position  compelled 
us  to  assume  required  us  to  be  prepared  to  defend  that  position  and 
ourselves.  But  that  was  not  all.  American  brain  and  American 
energy  and  American  money  built  a  canal  which  absolutely  changed 
the  geography  of  the  world.  That  fact  alone  was  sufficient  to  have 
compelled  the  patriotic  American  to  have  seen  to  it  that  our  country, 
having  changed  that  map  of  the  world,  should  always  be  in  a  position 
where  no  other  power  on  the  face  of  the  earth  could  change  the  hand- 
writing of  America  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.     (Applause.) 

Nor  is  that  all.  The  ringing  message  of  Monroe  to  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  in  1823  served  notice  upon  the  powers  of  the 
earth  that  America  was  to  be  kept  intact  for  Americans.  (Applause.) 
There  was  no  pussy-footed  diplomacy  about  that  message.  (Great 
and  long-continued  applause.) 

In  it  he  said:  "The  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  inde- 
pendent condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  hence- 
forth not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  Euro- 
pean powers.  .  .  .  We  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of 
any  European  power,  we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere. 

209 


"But  with  the  governments  who  have  declared  their  independence, 
and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  con- 
sideration, and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any 
interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling,  in  any 
other  manner,  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light 
than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States." 

And  while  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  in 
force,  on  paper,  at  least,  during  nearly  a  hundred  years,  no  foreign 
power  has  very  strenuously  attempted  to  arouse  the  passions  of 
America  to  a  point  where  the  people  felt  it  necessary  to  defend  it  with 
their  lives  and  their  fortunes.  So  that  if  that  Doctrine  which  was 
announced  in  1823  was  intended  to  be  more  than  a  mere  formal  mes- 
sage to  Congress,  if  more  than  a  simple  notice  served  upon  the  power- 
ful nations  of  the  earth,  if  it  has  been  resurrected  and  given  new  vital- 
ity in  our  negotiations  with  the  Central  and  South  American  republics, 
if  we  intend  to  do  what  Monroe  said  we  ought  to  do,  if  we  intend  to 
carry  out  the  pledges  and  promises  that  within  the  last  ten  days  in  this 
very  hall  were  made  to  the  representatives  from  these  Central  and 
South  American  republics,  then,  leaving  out  of  consideration  the  war 
in  Europe,  it  is  our  duty  to  see  to  it  that  our  country  is  prepared  tc 
carry  out  the  obligations  with  all  that  implies  to  the  Central  and  South 
American  republics  (applause)  ;  not  so  much  for  their  protection  as 
our  own  and  for  the  purpose  of  redeeming  pledges  that  have  practically 
oeen  in  existence  between  the  United  States  and  these  countries  for 
uearly  a  hundred  years.     (Applause.) 

I  sometimes  fear  that,  like  the  old  hen  that  has  undertaken  to 
cover  more  chicks  than  it  is  possible  for  her  to  cover  with  her  limited 
equipment,  we  have  assumed  some  obligations  that  we  may  find  it 
difficult  to  carry  out.  I  know  that  we  cannot  carry  them  out  unless  we 
are  better  prepared  to  do  it  than  we  are  today.  Now  these  are  some 
of  the  obligations  that  necessitate  our  preparing  ourselves  for  defense. 

Let  us  see  if  there  are  other  dangers  that  have  appeared  since  this 
terrible  war  in  Europe.  Why,  I  think  I  remember  that  our  good  and 
canny  Scotch  friend,  Mr.  Carnegie,  publicly  stated  less  than  three 
years  ago,  that  there  could  never  be  any  more  war,  and  that  the  Kaiser  : 
had  maintained  the  peace  of  Europe  for  more  than  a  quarter  of  a 
century  and  would  always  do  it.     (Laughter.)     But  war  broke  out  in 

210 


almost  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  and  in  its  maelstrom  has  engulfed 
almost  all  the  nations  of  the  civilized  world.  I  sometimes  fear,  my 
friends,  that  we  as  a  great,  peace-loving  people  may  be  drawn  into  it 
before  it  is  all  over,  unless  we  are  going  to  adopt  the  policy  of  China 
and  let  everybody  have  a  piece  of  us  when  they  come  around  and  ask 
for  it.  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  there  is  no  peace  except  amongst  the 
dead — and  in  China.     (Applause.) 

But  as  a  result  of  this  war,  while  I  do  not  apprehend  an  invasion 
of  the  United  States  on  the  part  of  Germany  or  any  of  her  allies,  or 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  or  any  of  her  allies;  while  I  hope  and 
believe  we  are  going  to  keep  out  of  it,  who  can  say,  in  this  day  and 
generation,  that  the  whole  world  may  not  change  its  opinion  in  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  that  the  wholly  unexpected  may  happen  to  us  tomor- 
row. And  in  order  to  be  protected  against  the  morrow,  we  ought  to 
see  to  it  that  we  are  prepared  today.     (Applause.) 

Now  what  is  the  sense  of  secrecy  and  what  is  the  use  of  refusing 
or  failing  to  state  the  belief  that  is  in  us?  Is  it  that  we  are  afraid  of 
making  somebody  mad?  (Applause.)  There  is  too  much  of  tha: 
tendency  today.    We  did  not  have  it  in  the  older  days  of  the  republic. 

When  Madison  sent  his  message  to  Congress  in  1812,  calling  at- 
tention to  the  wrongs  being  perpetrated  against  the  American  people, 
he  had  no  fear  of  offending  Great  Britain.  Note  what  he  said  as  to 
these  outrages: 

"Under  pretended  blockades,  without  the  presence  of  an 
adequate  force  and  sometimes  without  the  practicability  of 
applying  one,  our  commerce  has  been  plundered  in  every  sea, 
the  great  staples  of  our  country  have  been  cut  oflf  from  their 
legitimate  markets  and  a  destructive  blow  aimed  at  our  agri- 
cultural and  maritime  interests.  .  .  .  And  to  render  the 
outrage  the  more  signal,  these  mock  blockades  have  been 
reiterated  and  enforced  in  the  face  of  official  communications 
from  the  British  government  declaring  as  the  true  definition 
of  a  legal  blockade  'that  particular  ports  must  be  actually  in- 
vested and  previous  warning  given  to  vessels  bound  to  them 
not  to  enter.' 

"Not  content  with  these  occasional  expedients  for  laying 
waste  our  neutral  trade,  the  cabinet  of  Britain  resorted  to 

211 


the  sweeping  system  of  blockades  under  the  name  of  orders 
in  council,  which  has  been  molded  to  suit  its  political  views, 
its  commercial  jealousies  or  the  avidity  of  the  British 
cruisers. 

"To  our  remonstrances  against  the  complicated  and 
transcendent  injustice  of  this  innovation  the  first  reply  was 
that  the  orders  were  reluctantly  adopted  by  Great  Britain  as 
a  necessary  retaliation  on  decrees  of  her  enemy  proclaiming 
a  general  blockade  of  the  British  Isles  at  a  time  when  the 
naval  force  of  that  enemy  dared  not  issue  from  his  own  ports. 

"She  was  reminded,  without  effect,  that  her  own  prior 
blockades,  unsupported  by  an  adequate  naval  force  actually 
applied  and  continued,  were  a  bar  to  this  plea;  that  executed 
edicts  against  millions  of  our  property  could  not  be  retalia- 
tion on  edicts  impossible  to  execute;  that  retaliation,  to  be 
just,  should  fall  on  the  party  setting  the  guilty  example, 
not  on  an  innocent  party  which  was  not  even  chargeable  with 
acquiescence  in  it.    .    .    . 

"Such  is  the  spectacle  of  injuries  and  indignities  which 
have  been  heaped  on  our  country  and  such  the  crisis  which  its 
unexampled  forbearance  and  conciliatory  efforts  have  not 
been  able  to  avert. 

"It  might  at  least  have  been  expected  that  an  enlight- 
ened nation,  if  less  urged  by  moral  obligations  or  united  by 
friendly  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  would 
have  found  in  its  true  interest  alone  a  sufficient  motive  to 
respect  their  rights  and  their  tranquillity  upon  the  high  seas; 
that  an  enlarged  policy  would  have  favored  that  free  and 
general  circulation  of  commerce  in  which  the  British  nation 
is  at  all  times  interested,  and  which  in  times  of  war  is  the 
best  alleviation  of  its  calamities  to  herself  as  well  as  to  other 
belligerents;  and  more  especially  that  the  British  cabinet 
would  not,  for  the  sake  of  a  precarious  and  surreptitious  in- 
tercourse with  hostile  markets,  have  persevered  in  a  course  of 
measures  which  necessarily  put  at  hazard  the  invaluable  mar- 
ket of  a  great  and  growing  country,  disposed  to  cultivate  the 
mutual  advantages  of  an  active  commerce. 


212 


"Other  councils  have  prevailed.  Oiir  rhoderatioii  and 
conciliation  have  had  no  other  effect  than  to  encourage  per- 
severance and  to  enlarge  pretensions.  We  behold  our  seafar- 
ing citizens  still  the  daily  victims  of  lawless  violence  com- 
mitted on  the  great  highv^ay  of  nations,  even  in  sight  of  the 
country  which  owes  them  protection.  We  behold  our  vessels 
freighted  with  the  products  of  our  soil  and  industry  or  re- 
turning with  the  honest  proceeds  of  them  wrested  from  their 
lawful  destinations,  confiscated  by  prize  courts  no  longer  the 
organs  of  public  law,  but  the  instruments  of  arbitrary 
edicts."    .    .    . 

President  Wilson  in  a  recent  note  to  the  same  country  has  called 
attention  to  outrages  of  a  similar  character  now  being  committed,  not 
only  without  provocation,  but  in  express  violation  of  every  rule  of  in- 
ternational law. 

Is  there  no  parallel  between  the  conditions  which  prevailed  in 
1812  in  our  second  war  for  independence  and  the  second  situation? 

When  Monroe  sent  his  message  to  Congress  in  1823,  there  was 
not  any  fear  of  offending  the  combined  nations  of  the  world.  And 
after  the  Civil  War,  when  the  President  of  the  United  States  served 
notice  on  France  that  she  must  get  out  of  Mexico,  there  was  not  any 
fear  of  offending  France.  (Applause.)  She  took  advantage  of  our 
own  troubles  here  and  went  there  in  defiance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  to  establish  a  monarchy  on  this  continent  of  ours.  We  served 
notice  on  her  in  unmistakable  language  that  she  must  get  out,  and  she 
did.  Remember,  too,  that  this  was  after  the  exhaustive  conflict  of  the 
Civil  War.     (Applause.) 

Lincoln  was  not  afraid  to  act  when  Sumter  was  fired  on.  It  was 
followed  by  a  war  where  brother  was  arrayed  against  brother  and 
father  against  son,  and  our  country  was  drenched  in  blood.  And  yet, 
my  friends,  if  we  had  been  prepared  when  that  war  broke  out,  instead 
of  covering  a  period  of  four  years,  almost  bankrupting  our  country 
and  compelling  us  to  carry  a  pension  roll  now  of  $160,000,000  a  year, 
it  would  have  been  ended  in  60  or  90  days.     (Applause.) 

But,  no !  We  had  gentlemen  in  those  days,  just  as  we  have  them 
now,  just  as  we  had  them  in  colonial  days,  just  as  we  had  them  in 
1812  and  in  1845,  and  down  to  this  very  good  time  of  ours,  who  were 

213 


afraid  of  cultivating  a  military  spirit,  and  who  therefore  refused  to 
vote  the  money  to  put  enough  men  in  the  field  to  defend  our  country 
and  its  institutions.  There  is  not  a  country  in  Europe  participating 
in  the  present  conflict  that  feels  kindly  to  us  today,  and  we  know  it. 
There  is  no  use  for  us  to  try  to  disguise  it.  Why,  some  of  our  good 
friends  are  complaining  all  the  time  about  the  expressions  of  love  on 
the  part  of  the  Germans  here  for  the  fatherland.  And  yet  some  of 
the  very  men  who  complain  most  and  talk  the  loudest  are  sympathizing 
with  the  allies.    There  is  no  question  about  that. 

So  the  Germans  are  mad  with  us.  Their  allies  are  mad  with  us. 
Great  Britain  is  mad  with  us,  and  her  allies  are  mad  with  us,  and  the 
only  true  friends  we  have  in  this  emergency  are  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
on  the  one  side  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  on  the  other.  (Laughter  and 
applause.)  And  these  allies  which  nature  has  furnished  us  cannot  be 
as  friendly  as  they  used  to  be  in  the  days  gone  by,  because,  as  the  dis- 
tinguished Chairman  has  said,  the  Atlantic  Ocean  can  be  crossed  in 
five  or  six  days. 

It  does  not  take  very  much  longer  to  cross  the  Pacific.  "But,"  say 
the  pacifists,  "what  will  our  navy  be  doing?"  Well,  I  think  some  of 
our  ships  will  be  going  to  the  bottom,  and  some  of  them  will  be  trying 
to  get  out  of  the  reach  of  the  big  guns  of  the  dreadnaughts  of  the 
other  powers. 

We  might  impede  their  progress,  but  we  certainly  cannot  stop 
them,  in  the  condition  in  which  we  now  are. 

Do  not  let  any  of  us  fool  ourselves  with  the  idea  that  any  of  the 
belligerent  powers  of  Europe  feel  too  kindly  toward  us  to  wage  an 
aggressive  war  on  us  after  the  present  war  is  over.  But  the  pacifists 
say,  "What  one  of  them  will  want  a  war  with  us  after  they  have  ex- 
hausted themselves  in  killing  one  another  over  there?"  Why,  at  the 
end  of  the  Civil  War,  after  we  had  exhausted  all  of  our  resources,  we 
had  the  most  powerful  army  in  the  world.  Ask  any  Civil  War  veteran 
about  it,  and  he  will  tell  you  that  there  was  not  an  army  in  the  world 
that  could  compare  with  the  army  of  the  United  States  after  the  Civil 
War  had  been  fought;  and  in  that  war  we  had  the  remarkable  spec- 
tacle of  two  armies  training  in  the  field,  and  two  years  had  elapsed  « 
before  they  really  knew  how  to  fight.  When  they  did  learn  the  terrible 
lesson,  and  when  they  did  become  a  compact  and  organized  army,  there 
was  not  a  power,  and  there  were  no  combined  powers,  in  the  world 

214 


that  could  have  defeated  them.     (Applause.)     And  they  were  ready  to 
go  down  to  Mexico,  and  France  knew  that.     (Applause.) 

So  much  for  the  European  side  of  this.  Our  pacifist  friends  ask, 
"Who  wants  to  fight?"  I  do  not  know  who  wants  to  fight,  but  we 
want  to  be  in  such  a  position  that  we  do  not  care  who  wants  to  fight, 
(Applause.)  We  serve  notice  on  the  world  here  and  now  that  there  is 
not  a  man  or  woman  or  child  in  America  who  wants  to  wage  an  ag- 
gressive war,  but  every  man  and  every  woman  and  every  child  ought 
to  believe  in  maintaining  such  an  army  and  such  a  reserve  as  will  if 
necessary  be  able  to  engage  in  a  war  of  defense.     (Applause.) 

Now  let  us  look  over  on  the  Pacific  side.  They  say  we  ought  not 
to  talk  about  these  possible  dangers.  Why  not?  If  we  believe  they 
exist,  let  us  talk  about  them.  There  is  too  much  of  a  disposition  now- 
adays to  conceal  the  truth  from  the  people.  I  venture  to  say  that  I 
could  if  necessary  ask  that  these  doors  be  closed  and  could  tell  any- 
thing in  confidence  that  affected  the  welfare  of  this  nation  to  this 
audience,  and  I  believe  no  one  would  go  out  of  here  and  open  his  or 
her  lips  about  it.  I  believe  in  taking  the  American  people  into  our 
confidence.  They  are  worthy  of  and  entitled  to  it.  (Applause.) 
With  that  feeling  in  my  heart  and  that  thought  in  my  mind,  I  call 
your  attention  to  the  Orient.  On  the  Pacific  coast,  where  I  live,  we 
look  across  the  water  and  see  a  powerful,  warlike  people  that  in  fifty 
years  have  developed  into  not  only  one  of  the  most  warlike  nations  on 
the  face  of  the  earth,  but  one  of  the  most  industrious  and  enterprising ; 
and  I  glory  in  the  magnificent  progress  they  have  made. 

I  have  in  my  heart  nothing  but  the  kindest  of  feeling  toward 
them.  I  like  to  see  this  great  people  progress  and  grow  great,  and 
so  do  the  American  people.  We  do  not  hate,  but  rather  love  them. 
And  yet  there  are  racial  differences  and  distinctions  which  will  always 
prevent  them  from  assimilation  by  our  people  either  socially  or  other- 
wise. Japan  does  not  like  us,  nor  does  China;  there  is  no  question 
about  that.  A  few  years  ago  we  had  the  humiliating  spectacle  of  a 
former  President  of  the  United  States  begging  California  not  to  dis- 
criminate against  but  to  admit  the  Japanese  to  the  schools  of  the 
Pacific  Coast,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  boys  18  or  20  years  of 
age  were  asked  to  be  admitted  into  the  schools  with  our  little  boys  and 
girls,  children  8  or  10  or  12  years  of  age. 

215 


The  California  people  did  not  submit  to  it.  They  would  rather 
be  driven  into  the  sea,  my  friends,  than  to  submit  to  it.  That  is  not 
because  they  hate  the  Japanese.  Far  from  it.  They  respect  the  Jap- 
anese. They  employ  them  in  their  families,  in  their  fields  and  in  their 
factories.  They  realize  that  the  Japanese  are  a  powerful  race,  a  splen- 
did people.  But  they  were  determined  to  control  their  own  domestic 
affairs. 

Then  a  short  while  ago,  when  the  Japanese  seemed  to  be  gaining 
too  strong  a  foothold  in  California,  and  were  driving  the  small  farmers 
out  of  business,  and  when  that  state  felt  compelled  to  pass  a  law  for- 
bidding aliens  from  acquiring  lands,  we  had  the  humiliating  spectacle 
of  a  peace-loving  Secretary  of  State  hurrying  across  the  Continent  to 
ask  the  California  legislature  not  to  do  anything  to  offend  Japan! 
Was  that  because  we  realized  that  we  were  unprepared  to  carry  out 
the  wishes  of  a  great  commonwealth  of  this  Nation? 

Let  us  be  in  a  position,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  where  we  can  insist 
upon  the  protection  not  only  of  the  Nation  but  of  the  States.  (Ap- 
plause.) California's  interest  is  yours.  Oregon's  interest  is  yours. 
What  injures  them  injures  you  to  the  same  extent,  although  you  may 
not  feel  it  immediately.  Let  us  stand  together,  my  friends,  and  see  to 
it  that  any  law  enacted  by  any  State  of  this  Union  for  the  protection 
of  its  people  shall  be  observed  by  all  the  powers  of  the  earth.  (Ap- 
plause.) A  few  of  my  friends  out  West  connected  with  labor  organ- 
izations have  protested  against  universal  military  training  as  proposed 
in  the  bill  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  me  for  that  purpose.  I  advised 
them  that  if  there  was  any  portion  of  our  people  that  ought  to  be  in 
favor  of  universal  training,  it  was  the  laboring  people  of  this  country. 

I  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  what  led  to  the  final  enactment 
of  the  Chinese  exclusion  laws  was  a  movement  started  by  the  laboring 
people  of  this  country  because  years  ago  cheap  Chinese  laborers  had 
been  taken  East  to  break  a  strike.  My  friends  had  forgotten  this.  If 
there  is  anything  that  the  laboring  people  have  to  fear,  it  is  not  the 
pauper  labor  of  Europe  in  Europe;  it  is  the  cheaper  labor. of  Europe 
and  the  Orient  coming  across  in  ships  and  competing  with  the  labor  in 
this  country.     (Applause.) 

One  thing  I  think  I  have  shown  you,  that  we  need  to  be  better 
prepared  for  our  country's  defense.     How  are  we  going  to  prepare? 


216 


Kow,  instead  of  going  about  and  criticizing  the  efforts  that  the  dis- 
tinguished Secretary  of  War  is  making  for  preparedness;  instead  of 
telling  the  people,  as  some  enthusiasts  have  done,  that  the  President 
has  an  unworkable  and  worthless  plan,  let  us  discuss  the  subject 
coolly  and  patriotically,  let  us  reason  together  and  try  to  help  devise  a 
plan  that  will  work  and  that  the  people  will  stand  for.     (Applause.) 

A  year  ago  the  President  was  opposed  to  any  and  all  military 
preparedness;  and  you  will  remember  he  sent  a  message  to  Congress 
speaking  of  the  delicacy  of  the  diplomatic  situation  then.  Now  they 
are  criticizing  him  in  some  quarters  for  changing  his  mind.  My 
friends,  it  is  only  a  fool  who  never  changes  his  mind.  (Applause.) 
May  we  not  conclude  from  the  fact  that  the  distinguished  President 
of  the  United  States  has  changed  his  mind  about  preparedness  for 
our  national  defense,  that  there  is  a  reason  for  it.  There  is  a  reason 
for  it,  and  everybody  who  stops  to  think,  and  everybody  who  reads, 
knows  that  there  is  a  reason  for  it;  and  therefore  I  beseech  you  not 
to  criticize  those  who  are  trying  to  do  something,  but  rather  help  them 
solve  what  is  admitted  to  be  a  most  difficult  problem.     (Applause.) 

This  continental  plan  of  Mr.  Garrison  does  not  meet  with  my 
entire  approval,  for  I  believe  the  only  true  solution  for  the  creation 
of  a  civilian  reserve  is  universal  training.  (Great  applause.)  But 
1  know  that  the  people  have  not  studied  the  question  sufficiently  to 
understand  whatnt  means  in  its  entirety;  but  until  there  is  a  statute 
requiring  universal  training  there  will  be  no  proper  reserve  to  draw 
upon  in  case  of  necessity.  It  may  be  that  the  plan  for  a  continental 
army  which  is  endorsed  by  some  of  the  most  distinguished  officers 
in  the  army,  can  be  hammered  into  shape.  It  can  be  given  a  trial, 
and  if  it  does  not  work,  the  American  people  will  know  it,  and  then 
they  will  be  more  nearly  prepared  to  adopt  some  better  system  of 
military  training. 

My  friend  Mr.  Gompers — and  he  is  a  good,  level-headed  man,  too, 
let  me  tell  you  (applause) — talks  about  the  democracy  of  such  a 
course  in  his  letter  just  read  to  you.  That  is  true,  for  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  measure  so  democratic  as  one  which  requires  universal  mili- 
tary service.  Under  such  a  plan  the  son  of  employer  and  employee,  the 
son  of  the  rich  man  and  the  son  of  the  poor  man,  must  stand  shoulder 
to  shoulder  and  serve  their  country  in  time  of  need.     If  such  a  law 

■         -      ■  217 


was  in  force  the  poor  boy  whose  widowed  mother  earns  her  living  with 
her  needle,  who  has  taught  him  that  his  first  love  must  be  to  his  God 
and  his  next  to  his  country,  will  not  be  called  upon  to  defend  the  son 
of  the  rich  lady  next  door  whose  fat  boy  was  not  raised  to  be  a  soldier. 
(Applause.) 

It  would  require  the  rich  man's  son  and  the  poor  widow's  son  to 
render  the  same  kind  of  duty  to  the  government  which  affords  them 
both  sustenance  and  support.  Thank  God  there  are  not  very  many 
mothers  in  this  country  who  did  not  raise  their  boys  to  be  soldiers 
when  their  services  were  needed.  And  I  venture  to  say  there  is 
not  a  mother  here  but  in  a  time  of  stress,  when  her  country  was  in 
danger,  would  send  not  only  an  only  son  but  would  send  all  her  sons 
if  she  had  more  to  the  front  to  protect  the  country  and  its  flag.  On 
the  21st  day  of  November,  1864,  President  Lincoln  wrote  this  to  a 
good  woman  up  in  Massachusetts.  I  suppose  all  of  you  have  seen  it, 
but  it  does  not  hurt  to  read  it  to  you  once  in  a  while. 

Executive  Mansion 

Washington,  November  21,  1864. 

Mrs.  Bixby, 

Boston,  Massachusetts: 
Dear  Madam — I  have  been  shown  in  the  files  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment a  statement  of  the  Adjutant-General  of  Massachusetts  that  you 
are  the  mother  of  five  sons  who  have  died  gloriously  on  the  field  of 
battle.  I  feel  how  weak  and  fruitless  must  be  any  words  of  mine 
which  should  attempt  to  beguile  you  from  the  grief  of  a  loss  so  over- 
whelming. But  I  cannot  refrain  from  tendering  to  you  the  consola- 
tion that  may  be  found  in  the  thanks  of  the  Republic  they  died  to  save. 
I  pray  that  our  heavenly  Father  may  assuage  the  anguish  of  your 
bereavement,  and  leave  you  only  the  cherished  memory  of  the  loved 
and  lost,  and  the  solemn  pride  that  must  be  yours  to  have  laid  so 
costly  a  sacrifice  upon  the  altar  of  freedom. 

Yours  very  sincerely  and  respectfully, 

(Signed)     Abraham  Lincoln. 

There  indeed  was  a  good  woman  who  had  never  raised  her  sons 
to  believe  that  they  were  not  intended  to  be  soldiers.  When  their  coun- 
try called,  five  of  them  went  out  and  laid  down  their  lives;  and  instead 

218 


of  being  sorry  for  what  she  did^she  glorified  in  the  fact  that  she  had 
had  five  sons  to  give  to  her  country. 

Now,  you  frequently  hear  the  charge  that  all  of  us  who  believe 
in  preparation  for  national  defense  are  influenced  by  munition  fac- 
tories. (Laughter.)  Think  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
who  advocates  preparedness,  being  influenced  by  the  munition  fac- 
tories; and  then  too  the  distinguished  officers  of  the  army — who 
have  a  record  in  this  country  for  fidelity,  honesty  and  efficiency — are 
likewise  charged  with  dishonesty  by  the  pacifists,  who  make  no  dis- 
tinction. The  purpose  of  this  charge  is  to  discredit  a  most  patriotic 
effort  to  place  our  country  in  a  position  of  self-defense.  My  friends, 
you  know  how  much  of  truth  there  is  in  these  infamous  charges. 

The  first  thing  to  do  so  far  as  our  land  defenses  are  concerned 
is  to  increase  our  army  to  a  reasonable  size — that  is  the  first  propo- 
sition; second,  take  proper  care  of  the  National  Guards  of  the  several 
states  as  the  next  line  of  defense  (applause)  ;  and  then  provide  for  an 
efficient  reserve  of  citizen  soldiery,  either  by  universal  training  or  by 
some  other  plan  which  may  prove  effective. 

When  we  have  done  this,  and  have  created  a  sufficient  navy  as  our 
first  line  of  defense,  there  will  be  no  danger  of  our  ever  being  invaded 
and  attacked  by  any  foreign  foe.  Then,  and  not  until  then,  my  friends, 
can  you  go  to  your  homes  and  feel  secure  that  the  morrow  will  not 
bring  to  you  and  to  your  families  the  destruction  that  has  visited  the 
continent  of  Europe,  and  stained  her  once  fertile  but  now  devastated 
fields  with  blood.     (Great  applause.) 

Mayor  Mitchel — Senator  Chamberlain  emphasized  the  duty  and 
the  advantages  as  well  as  the  obligation  of  the  United  States  under 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  We  are  now  to  hear  another  phase  of  that 
question — the  menace  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  if  unsupported  by  arma- 
ments; and  it  is  particularly  appropriate  today  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  has  just  proposed  to  the 
Pan-American  Congress  what  is  tantamount  to  a  Pan-American  fed- 
eration for  defense,  I  therefore  have  a  great  deal  of  pleasure  in 
presenting  to  you  a  distinguished  citizen  of  the  City  of  Baltimore, 
a  lawyer  of  experience,  at  the  head  of  his  profession  there — Mr.William 
L.  Marbury — who  will  speak  to  you  on  that  subject.    (Great  applause.) 

219 


Address  of  William  L.  Marbury,  Esq.,  of  Baltimore,  Md. 

Mr.  Marbury:  Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen — The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  so-called,  is  a  threat  of  war,  not  a  promise  of  peace, 
except  in  so  far  as  a  threat  of  war  may,  as  it  not  infrequently  does, 
serve  to  secure  peace. 

It  must  be  manifest  to  every  thinking  man  that  the  time  has 
now  come  when  it  is  necessary  to  the  safety,  perhaps  to  the  continued 
existence  of  the  United  States  as  an  independent  country,  that  our 
people  should  have  a  clearer  knowledge  and  understanding  than  they 
have  heretofore  had  of  what  this  "Doctrine,"  as  we  insist  upon  call- 
ing it,  actually  is,  and  what  our  continued  insistence  upon  it  may 
mean,  in  connection  with  the  question  of  our  preparedness  or  unpre- 
paredness,  to  maintain  it. 

What  then  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  a  "Doctrine"  at  all.  The  use  of  such 
a  mild  and  apparently  innocuous  term  as  "Doctrine"  for  the  purpose 
of  describing  one  of  the  boldest  and  most  defiant  declarations  of 
policy  ever  made  to  the  armed  governments  of  the  world  by  any  coun- 
try, has  had  the  unfortunate  effect  of  preventing  the  American  people 
from  realizing,  in  any  adequate  degree,  the  responsibility  and  risk 
which  were  assumed  in  the  adoption  of  such  a  policy  in  the  first 
instance,  and  the  even  greater  responsibility  and  risk  which  are 
involved  in  insisting  upon  it,  as  we  are  now  doing  in  the  midst  of  a 
world  in  arms,  and  at  a  time  when  the  passions  of  all  the  belligerent 
nations  are  aroused  to  a  pitch  of  intensity  from  which  they  may  not 
recede  for  many  a  year  to  come. 

As  I  have  said,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  announced  nearly  100 
years  ago,  was  a  threat  of  war,  and,  as  recently  reasserted  by  our 
Government,  and  now  insisted  upon  by  the  Legislative  as  well  as 
the  Executive  Department  of  the  Government,  is  still  a  threat  of  war. 
If  any  man  doubt  the  correctness  of  that  statement,  let  him  look  at  the 
facts. 

The  story  is  a  familiar  one  and  it  is  strange  that  its  true  signifi- , 
cance  should  have  remained  so  long  not  fully  realized. 

In  December  of  the  year  1823  James  Monroe  of  Virginia  was 
President  of  the  United  States. 

220 


After  a  long  revolutionary  struggle  with  the  mother  country,  the 
various  Colonies  of  Spain  in  Central  and  South  America,  including 
Mexico,  had  succeeded  in  throwing  off  their  allegiance  to  that  country 
and  established  themselves  as  separate  and  independent  republics, 
from  the  borders  of  Louisiana  to  the  Straits  of  Magellan. 

But  Spain  had  never  been  reconciled  to  the  loss  of  these  Colonies 
— her  imperial  dominion  in  the  New  World — and  there  were  other 
powerful  governments  in  Europe  who,  for  reasons  of  their  own,  were 
not  willing  to  see  the  forces  of  democracy,  even  in  another  hemis- 
phere, thus  triumph  over  the  monarchial  idea. 

This  sentiment  gave  rise  to  the  formation  of  what  was  known  as 
the  "Holy  Alliance"  between  the  governments  of  Prussia,  Austria, 
Russia  and  France,  for  the  purpose  of  reconquering  these  lost  Pro- 
vinces for  the  King  of  Spain. 

In  other  words,  they  planned  to  subjugate  Mexico,  Venezuela, 
Peru,  Chile  and  all  the  other  independent  republics  whose  governments 
had  received  recognition  at  the  hands  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
State,  and  bring  them  again  under  the  dominion  of  the  Spanish  crown. 

But  our  Government  could  not  fail  to  regard  with  anxiety  and 
alarm  the  prospect  of  such  a  terrific  overthrow  of  democracy  and 
overwhelming  triumph  of  monarchy  in  America  as  would  result  from 
the  successful  consummation  of  the  plans  of  that  great  coalition. 

Under  these  circumstances,  considering  that  the  future  welfare 
and  safety  of  the  United  States  were  involved,  and  not  from  any 
merely  sentimental  or  altruistic  motive,  President  Monroe,  in  a  mem- 
orable message  addressed  to  Congress,  gave  warning  to  all  the 
monarchies  of  Europe  that 

"We  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend 
their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous 
to  our  peace  and  safety." 
And  that 

"With  the  governments  who  have  declared  their  inde- 
pendence and  maintain  it"  (meaning  the  Central  and  South 
American  republics)  "and  whose  independence  we  have,  on 
great  consideration  and  on  just  principles  acknowledged,  we 
could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
them  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny  by  any 

221 


European  power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toivard  the  United  States." 
The  whole  world  understood  perfectly  well  what  that  language 
meant.    It  meant  a  threat  of  war. 

It  meant  that  if  any  European  government  disregarded  this 
warning,  it  would  have  the  United  States  to  fight.  It  did  not  mean 
that  we  would  plead  with  them  or  try  to  dissuade  them  from  their 
evil  course,  or  that  we  would  argue  with  them — it  meant  that  we 
would  fight. 

Now  the  policy  thus  announced  by  President  Monroe  nearly  100 
years  ago  has  been  adhered  to  steadily  and  stubbornly  by  our  Gov- 
ernment ever  since. 

It  is  only  within  the  last  few  months  that  we  have  reasserted  it 
with  the  utmost  emphasis  and  its  most  extreme  form. 

In  other  words,  we  have  repeated,  and  are  repeating,  this  threat 
of  war  against  the  mighest  monarchies  of  the  Old  World,  in  the  event 
that  they  shall  dare  for  any  cause,  however  justifiable  and  necessary 
such  cause  may  appear  to  them,  to  interfere  with  the  affairs  or 
attempt  to  control  the  destiny  of  any  one  of  the  Republics,  large  or 
small,  which  lie  to  the  south  of  us,  some  of  them  more  than  4,000 
miles  away,  and  we  will  continue  to  insist  upon  this  policy  and  to 
renew  this  threat  of  war  from  time  to  time,  because  we  deem  it  neces- 
sary for  our  security  to  prevent  any  of  these  warlike  nations  of 
Europe  from  planting  themselves  upon  our  continent. 

Even  Mr.  Bryan,  prince  of  pacifists,  while  Secretary  of  Stat 
justified  our  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Hayti  upon  the  grounc 
that  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Mon-r 
roe  Doctrine. 

But  could  any  course  be  more  perilous — more  fraught  with  dangei 
of  war — than  that  of  reasserting  this  policy — reiterating  this  threat 
— and  at  the  same  time  remaining  without  the  means  of  making  it 
good  or  defending  ourselves  against  its  possible  consequences? 

We  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  to  one  or  more  of  theJ 
great  powers  of  Europe  this  so-called  Monroe  Doctrine  of  ours  has] 
been  offensive  in  the  extreme — that  it  has  thwarted  their  natural  am- 
bition toward  expansion  in  the  New  World — roused  deep  resentment 
and  never  been  acquiesced  in  for  a  moment, 

222 


That  we  are  without  the  military  or  naval  strength  with  which 
to  enable  us  to  make  good  this  policy  or  to  protect  ourselves  against 
the  attacks  upon  us"  which  reassertion  of  it  may  at  any  time  provoke, 
no  man  can  doubt,  unless  he  is  willing  to  set  up  his  own  judgment 
against  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  military  and  naval  men  of  the 
civilized  world. 

How  then  dare  we  to  continue  to  insist  upon  this  policy? 

And  yet  we  will  continue  to  do  so  because  there  is  not  a  man 
in  public  life  from  one  end  of  the  United  States  to  the  other  of  any 
political  party  who  is  not  absolutely  committed  to  it,  or  who  would 
dare  say  a  word  in  favor  of  its  abandonment.  How  dare  we  continue 
thus  without  at  the  same  time  taking  proper  measures  to  increase  our 
military  and  naval  strength  to  such  extent  as  may  suffice  to  conform  to 
the  requirements  of  the  policy. 

It  is  true  that  when  James  Monroe  announced  this  policy,  we  did 
not  possess  any  army  or  navy  of  our  own  sufficient  to  maintain  it,  yet 
the  declaration  could  be  made,  and  was  made,  with  safety,  for  the 
reason  that  we  had  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain — a  country 
which  was  as  jealous  of  any  extension  of  the  power  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
as  we  could  be — which  placed  the  victorious  fleet  of  the  "Mistress  of 
the  Seas"  at  our  disposal  for  its  enforcement. 

When  Grover  Cleveland,  in  connection  with  the  Venezuela  bound- 
ary controversy,  reannounced  and  reaffirmed  the  Monroe  policy,  even 
against  Great  Britain  herself,  he  could  do  so  with  reasonable  safety, 
because  while  we  had  no  navy  to  match  that  of  Great  Britain,  that 
country,  under  the  conditions  then  existing  in  Europe — surrounded 
by  hostile  governments;  with  no  alliances  or  friendships  with  any  of 
them,  and  with  an  undefended  Canadian  border  of  3,000  miles — was 
not  likely  to  go  to  war  with  the  United  States,  the  only  friendly  coun- 
try left  in  the  world  to  her,  because  of  a  dispute  with  reference  to  a 
strip  of  land  in  the  jungles  of  South  America. 

In  other  words,  we  could  afford  to  assert  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
then,  because  we  were  protected  by  the  necessity  which  Great  Britain 
was  under  of  avoiding  any  quarrel  with  us  at  that  time. 

But  we  have  no  such  protection  to-day,  that  is,  no  protection  which 
we  can  have  any  assurance  will  outlast  the  present  war. 

Of  course,  so  long  as  this  war  continues,  it  will  be  scarcely  pos- 
sible for  any  one  of  the  combatants  to  turn  aside  from  the  death 

223 


grapple  in  which  he  is  engaged  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  us,  but 
we  must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  the  fact  that  notwithstanding  our 
rigid  neutrality — but  on  the  contrary  because  of  that  very  neutrality, 
and  our  inflexible  insistence  upon  it — we  have  made  enemies  of  every 
single  one  of  the  governments  engaged  in  this  world  war. 

So  that  when  the  war  is  over,  no  matter  who  is  the  victor,  the 
United  States  will  be  without  a  friend. 

It  will  be  the  richest  country  in  the  world,  its  wealth  enormously 
increased  by  vast  profits  made  out  of  the  dire  necessities  of  the  fight- 
ing nations — including  that  victor,  whoever  he  may  be;  with  the 
bitter  ill-will  of  that  victor,  as  well  as  of  the  other  combatants,  and 
with  practically  no  means  of  defending  itself  against  the  consequences 
of  the  wrath  naturally  provoked  by  the  threat  of  the  so-called  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  well  as  other  causes  of  offense  which  our  insistence  upon 
neutrality  may  have  given  rise  to. 

One  of  the  most  dangerous  delusions  with  which  the  American 
people  are  afflicted  at  this  time  is  the  idea  that  neutrality  means 
safety,  and  that  by  remaining  strictly  neutral,  and  boasting  of  it,  we 
can  be  sure  of  remaining  at  peace — of  keeping  ourselves  out  of  war 
—and  for  that  reason  need  not  make  any  special  preparations  for 
defense  in  case  of  an  attack. 

In  other  words,  that  neutrality  is  a  sufficient  substitute  for  mili- 
tary and  naval  strength — or  preparedness  against  war. 

The  truth  is  exactly  the  reverse. 

There  are  times  when  neutrality  is  the  most  perilous  policy  which 
a  country  can  adopt. 

It  may  be  the  proper  policy  from  a  moral  point  of  view,  and  again  5 
it  may  not.  ■  | 

But  it  may  be,  none  the  less,  a  policy  fraught  with  the  utmost  j 
peril  to  the  country  adopting  it. 

History  furnishes  many  illustrations  of  the  truth  of  this  state- 
ment. ^Perhaps  one  of  the  most  striking  is  that  supplied  by  the  experi- 
ence of  Prussia  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars. 

In  1805  Napoleon  was  approaching  the  climax  of  his  power. 

Having  assembled  a  mighty  army  for  the  conquest  of  England, 
and  finding  it  impossible  to  cross  the  Narrow  Seas  for  that  purpose,  he 
suddenly  turned  upon  the  then  allied  powers  of  Russia  and  Austria 

224 


I 


and  began  the  campaign  which  closed  with  their  complete  overthrow 
in  the  crowning  victory  of  Austerlitz. 

At  that  time  Prussia  possessed  a  powerful  army,  the  successor  to 
the  army  of  the  Great  Frederick. 

By  combining  with  the  allies,  Austria  and  Russia,  she  could 
probably  have  crushed  Napoleon  then  and  there  and  put  an  end  forever 
to  his  dream  of  world  empire. 

To  that  end  those  allies  made  every  appeal  to  her. 

They  pointed  to  the  fact  that  everything  in  Napeolen's  career  up 
to  that  time  indicated  determination  on  his  part,  and  that  of  France, 
to  dominate  the  whole  continent  of  Europe. 

They  pointed  to  his  disregard  of  treaty  obligations — his  ruthless 
treatment  of  weaker  countries,  and  all  the  various  signs — now  so  well 
known  to  history — which  indicated  his  boundless  ambition. 

But  their  appeals  were  in  vain. 

Prussia  had  a  King  who  sincerely  loved  peace  and  thought  it  safer 
to  remain  neutral. 

Doubtless  there  were  thousands  of  his  subjects  who  applauded  his 
conduct  and  congratulated  themselves  that  their  government  was  keep- 
ing them  out  of  war,  was  not  getting  them  mixed  up  in  it,  was  main- 
taining peace. 

Therefore  Prussia  stood  by — neutral,  but  unprepared;  infinitely 
better  prepared  than  the  United  States  is  to-day,  but  unprepared  to 
meet  the  terrific  assault  which  was  made  upon  her  the  very  next 
year,  when  the  French  Emperor,  with  an  army  at  his  back  intoxicated 
with  victory,  with  one  crushing  blow  destroyed  her  entire  military 
power  at  Jena — deprived  her  of  half  her  territory  and  kept  what 
remained  in  a  state  of  subjection  as  a  dependency  of  France  until  the 
battle  of  Leipzic  in  1813. 

Why  should  neutrality  guarantee  safety? 

In  a  war  like  this,  the  neutral  has  no  friends.  It  is  impossible 
for  him  to  have  any. 

On  the  one  side  the  Germans,  whatever  the  legal  aspect  of  the 
matter  may  be,  will  never  forgive  the  United  States  for  allowing  its 
citizens  to  supply  the  shot  and  shell  and  shrapnel  and  other  munitions 
with  which  the  German  soldiers  are  daily  being  slaughtered  from  the 
trenches  of  Flanders  to  the  Euphrates. 

225 


And  yet,  if  we  were  to  change  our  policy  in  that  respect  and  for 
bid  the  Allies  to  purchase  arms  and  munitions  from  us,  they  would 
certainly  regard  it  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  our  duty  as  a  neutral — 
an  effort  on  our-  part  to  neutralize  the  advantage  which  they  had 
secured  in  driving  the  German  Navy  from  the  seas,  and  the  actual 
result  of  such  a  policy  on  our  part  might  be  to  insure  the  success  of 
the  German  power  in  this  great  conflict. 

What  would  that  mean? 

Remember  that  the  conquest  of  England  would  mean  the  conquest 
of  Canada  and  the  planting  of  the  German  Empire,  with  perhaps  a 
million  men,  veteran  soldiers,  upon  our  northern  frontier. 

Would  that  be  safety  for  the  United  States,  the  richest  and  most 
defenseless  and  the  best  hated  nation  on  the  face  of  the  globe? 

What  then  shall  we  do? 

There  is  evidently  nothing  for  us  to  do  except  do  our  very  utmost 
to  strengthen  our  army  and  our  navy  to  such  an  extent  as  in  the 
opinion  of  those  best  competent  to  form  a  correct  judgment  will  be 
sufficient  to  enable  us  to  defend  ourselves  when  the  evil  day  comes. 

If  we  fail  to  do  so  in  time,  we  will  realize  what  the  ancients  meant 
when  they  said  "Whom  the  gods  would  destroy  they  first  make  mad." 

Democracy  has  come  to  its  hour  of  trial. 

The  first  duty  of  any  government  is  the  duty  to  exist. 

That  duty  cannot  be  performed  except  by  providing  itself  with 
the  means  of  defending  itself  against  any  and  all  attacks. 

A  government  which  does  not  have  the  intelligence  to  do  that, 
and  do  it  in  time,  even  although  it  be  a  government  "of  the  people 
and  for  the  people,"  will  surely  "perish  from  the  earth." 

I  say,  therefore,  if  we  are  to  insist  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we 
must  do  either  one  or  the  other  of  two  things. 

We  must  either  exert  every  energy  that  this  country  possesses 
and  spend  every  dollar  that  is  needed  to  increase  our  naval  and  military 
strength  without  a  moment's  delay  to  the  point  where  we  can  con- 
tinues to  make  this  threat  of  war  with  safety,  or  we  must  do  as  we 
did  in  the  beginning,  have  an  understanding  with  some  other  govern- 
ment or  governments  which  already  possess  this  military  and  naval 
power  by  which  we  will  have  the  support  of  that  power.. 

And  that  means  and  can  mean  but  one  thing,  and  that  is,  we  can- 
not maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  continue  our  policy  of  neutrality 

226 


at  the  same  time,  unless  we  are  prepared  to  build  ships  and  organize 
an  armj^  at  such  a  pace  as  was  never  dreamed  of  'til  now. 

I  do  not  undertake  to  say  which  we  ought  to  do. 

I  am  not  here  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  that  question. 

But  I  do  say  that  the  failure  .to  adopt  one  course  or  the  other 
is  to  expose  this  country  and  its  people — its  men,  women  and  children 
— to  ail  the  horrors  of  a  foreign  invasion  when  this  European  war  is 
over. 

God  help  the  public  men  entrusted  with  the  powers  of  this  Gov- 
ernment and  all  its  boundless  resources  who  shall  have  failed  to  provide 
our  people  with  protection  against  that  fate. 

It  is  so  easy  to  make  us  absolutely  safe. 

We  all  know  that  this  country  has  such  ample  means  of  every 
sort — men  and  money  and  all  the  facilities  for  building  ships  and 
making  arms — that  if  this  Government  should  make  use  of  its  re- 
sources it  could,  without  difficulty,  make  the  defenses  of  this  country 
so  strong  that  there  would  not  be  the  slightest  likelihood  that  anj 
nation,  or  combination  of  nations,  would  venture  to  attack  us. 

That  being  so,  it  seems  almost  incredible  that  our  Government 
would  hesitate.    Why  should  we  take  any  chances?  • 

Mayor  Mitchel — If  New  York  City  is  the  community  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  most  directly  interested  in  national  defense,  so  San 
Francisco  is  the  community  on  the  Pacific  coast  which  has  the  most 
direct  interest  in  that  question. 

We  have  heard  from  the  northern  part  of  the  Pacific  coast,  and  we 
are  now  to  hear  from  the  distinguished  Senator  from  California,  Mr. 
Phelan,  who  is  also  a  citizen  of  San  Francisco,  and  who  has  repre- 
sented that  city  as  its  Mayor,  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission 
that  drew  its  charter;  I  have  great  pleasure  in  presenting  to  you 
Senator  James  D.  Phelan  of  California.     (Applause.) 

THE  PACIFIC  PERIL 
James  D.  Phelan,  U.  S.  Senator  from  California 

Senator  Phelan:  Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen — I  was 
not  aware  in  what  capacity  I  was  called  here  to-night,  but  from  the 
introduction  of  your  chairman  it  is  unmistakable  that  I  am  expected 
to  consider  briefly  the  subject  of  preparedness  in  view  of  the  needs 
of  the  Pacific  coast. 

My  theme  is  "The  Pacific  Peril." 

227 


J 


I  did  not  have  the  advantage  of  listening  to  the  remarks  of  the 
Senator  from  Oregon,  Mr.  Chamberlain,  and  hence  I  may  possibly  tres- 
pass upon  his  preserves.     He,  as  Chairman  of  the  Military  Affairs 
Committee  of  the  Senate,  has  been  discussing  widely  the  subject  ol 
military  preparedness,  and  doubtless  he  touched  upon  the  subject  of 
naval  preparedness ;  but  this  I  do  know,  that  on  the  Pacific  coast  there 
is  inadequate  preparedness.     William  H.  Seward  long  ago,  after  the 
acquisition  of  Alaska  by  a  stroke  of  his  diplomacy,  said  that  the  Pacific 
would  be  in  the  future  the  theatre  of  the  world's  greatest  events.    It  is 
the  greatest  of  the  world's  oceans.    Upon  its  shores  dwell  the  greatest 
of  the  world's  populations;  and  our  Pacific  coast  is  one  of  the  most 
valuable  and  interesting  possessions  of  the  nation,  fronting  upon  the 
great  Pacific  Ocean.     The  pioneers  developed  the  land  and  laid  the 
foundations  for  American  institutions,  and  during  the  last  seventy 
years  a  hardy  and  vigorous  race  of  people  have  sprung  up  there,  who 
have  opened  the  matchelss  resources  of  the  country,  and  have  their 
homes  there,  and  are  not  in  any  respect  unlike  the  people  of  the  East. 
In  fact,  there  is  no  State  in  the  Union  which  seems  to  enlist  the 
interest  of  the  people  of  the  East  as  does  California,  for  the  very  rea- 
son that  her  population  has  been  recruited,  unlike  any  other  State, 
from  all  of  the  States  of  the  Union.    Therefore,  I  never  doubt  that  the 
people  of  the  East  are  interested  in  what  have  been  apparently  for  a 
long  time  local  problems,  not  the  least  of  which  is  the  Japanese  prob- 
lem.    In  the  same  period  of  time  there  has  grown  up  on  the  other 
shore  of  the  Pacific  a  nation  of  fighting  men.    When  Japan  conquered 
the  Russians  by  land  and  by  sea,  the  Japanese  at  once  aspired  to  a 
broader  national  life,  and  confidence  was  instilled  into  them  by  the 
very  success  of  their  arms.    It  is  vain  to  deny  that  in  strength  of  their 
armament,  although  they  are  as  you  might  say  only  sixty  years  old 
in  the  use  of  modern  weapons,  they  rank  to-day  as  first-class  powei:. 

The  question  has  arisen  in  California,  and  has  been  reflected 
throughout  the  Union,  whether  it  would  be  wise  to  admit  freely  the 
Japanese  to  the  Pacific  coast.  They  seek  the  Pacific  coast  as  a  region 
peculiarly  adapted  to  their  labor  and  manner  of  life.  But  if  they  were 
admitted  freely  to  the  Pacific  coast  we  know  that  they  would  crowd 
out  the  native  and  pioneer  population,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  in  an 
industrial  competition  they,  by  devoting  themselves  to  unremitting 
labor,  by  that  means  alone  will  succeed  over  the  white  man  unless 

•    228 


he  comes  down  to  their  standard  of  living.  And  as  it  seems  highly 
improbable,  from  the  character  of  the  population  in  California,  that  it 
will  ever  come  down  to  the  Japanese  standard,  living  without  families, 
in  hovels,  devoting  themselves  to  ceaseless  toil,  respecting  no  holidays, 
sustaining  no  church,  enjoying  no  theatre,  not  participating  in  the 
affairs  of  state  nor  looking  forward  to  the  day  when,  if  called  upon 
as  dutiful  citizens,  they  would  take  up  arms  in  behalf  of  this  coun- 
try. Their  loyalty  is  to  their  own  land.  They  are  of  a  race  that  is 
unassimilable,  and  their  only  purpose  has  been  to  go  there  in  large 
numbers  and  get  possession  of  the  soil,  either  in  fee  or  by  lease  hold. 
So,  when  interested  in  the  output  of  the  farm,  sharing  the  crop  or 
owning  the  land,  they  are  overwhelming  industrial  competitors.  If 
they  are  freely  admitted,  it  becomes  a  question  of  abandoning  the 
country  to  them  and  permitting  it  to  become  a  Japanese  colony,  and 
the  white  population  moving  somewhere  else,  to  less  favored  spots,  or 
else  holding  the  ground  and  resisting  what  might  be  called  a  peaceful 
invasion. 

Now  you  are  interested  in  the  Eastern  immigration  problem,  but 
compared  to  that  ours  is  a  much  more  dreadful  menace ;  and  no  Ameri- 
can citizen  would  submit  for  a  moment,  nor  would  any  administration 
of  the  Government  submit  for  a  moment  to  the  abandonment  of  Cali- 
fornia and  the  Pacific  slope  to  unassimilable  Orientals  who  would  mak« 
of  it  an  Oriental  colony,  just  as  they  have  done  with  our  territory  of 
Hawaii,  which  is  American  territory  only  in  name.  In  a  few  years 
the  natives  born  of  Japanese  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  will  out  vote 
the  white  American  population  and  control  the  territorial  government, 
and  there  is  no  law  to  stop  it.    They  were  born  upon  the  soil. 

So  a  few  years  ago,  when  Japan  objected  to  California  passing 
land  laws — which  is  a  soverign  right  of  California,  well  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  State,  about  which  there  is  no  dispute — we  found 
friction  created.  Those  laws  were  not  passed  in  the  spirit  of  hatred 
or  of  race  prejudice.  We  would  like  to  embrace  all  of  the  peoples 
of  the  earth  in  this  great  republic,  if  they  were  assimilable  and  would 
ultimately  make  a  homogeneous  people.  It  was  not  race  prejudice,  but 
simply  self-preservation,  self-defense,  the  first  and  the  best  of  all 
laws;  and  they  say  it  is  the  best  of  all  laws  because  lawyers  did  not 
make  it.     (Applause.) 

229 


Mow  what  answer  can  you  make  to  the  Calif ornians?  Can  you  ask 
them  to  abandon  their  land  laws,  which  refuse  ownership  in  fee  to  an 
alien  people  capable  of  crowding  them  out  if  given  an  interest  in 
the  soil?  Shall  you  say  to  Calif  ornians  that  they  shall  not  exercise 
that  power  which  they  enjoy,  that  they  must  yield  this  right  in  defer- 
ence to  the  wishes  of  the  Federal  Government,  which  fears  the  irrita- 
tion that  may  be  caused?  That  irritation  has  been  expressed.  Shall 
we,  as  a  Federal  Government,  alter  our  naturalization  laws  so  as  to 
admit  them  to  citizenship  and  the  suffrage,  and  have  a  permanently 
foreign  mass  in  the  body  politic?  Perhaps  there  are  fifty  thousand 
able-bodied  Japanese  in  California.  Shall  we  admit  them  to  citizen- 
ship, voting  with  a  solidarity  dictated  perhaps  from  Tokio?  Shall 
we  alter  our  naturalization  laws  and  give  them  the  equality  which 
they  demand? 

Unless  we  are  prepared  to  abandon  the  Pacific  coast  and  resign 
it  to  the  position  of  an  Oriental  colony,  we  must  be  prepared  to  meet 
the  demands  of  Japan.  When  the  Lusitania  was  about  to  be  torpedoed 
there  appeared  in  the  morning  papers  of  New  York  a  letter  which 
was  fair  notice  to  those  who  were  about  to  embark  that  there  was 
great  peril  in  the  voyage.  In  the  New  York  Sun  of  December  4th  last, 
there  appeared  a  letter  from  Count  Okuma,  the  Premier  of  Japan, 
which  I  construe  as  fair  notice  to  the  United  States  that  unless  the 
demand  for  equality  be  granted  there  will  be  very  grave  danger  of 
something  serious  happening.  What  does  he  say  of  equality?  Sub- 
stantially this:  The  white  races  have  always  assumed  a  superiority 
over  the  colored  races,  and  the  only  way  to  test  that  is  by  submitting 
to  the  survival  of  the  fittest  in  a  fair  and  open  field,  and  we  intend 
to  make  that  test,  and  believe  that  our  people  in  a  contest  of  that  kind 
will  show  that  they  are  entitled  to  equal  treatment  by  reason  of  their 
superiority.    He  says  he  wants  for  his  countrymen  a  "Pacific  outlet.'' 

And  that  is  just  the  very  point  I  make,  that  we  do  not  want  a 
test  of  that  kind  on  American  soil.  Our  people  have  been  brought 
up  to  civic  duties,  to  patriotic  service.  They  enjoy  "western  civiliza- 
tion." They  support  a  government  which  confers  upon  them  all  these 
rights,  with  correlative  duties  and  burdens — raising  mankind  to  a 
higher  standard.  We  do  not  want  to  submit  our  people  to  a  test 
whereby  merely  the  survival  of  the  fittest  shall  determine  who  shall 
last  longest  under  the  fewest  burdens  in  an  industrial  conflict.     I  do 

230 


I 


not  believe  we  would  meet  that  conflict  successfully,  because  our  people 
have  not  been  trained  during  hundreds  of  years,  as  the  Japanese 
have  been  trained,  to  this  ceaseless,  unremitting  and  patient  toil  which 
means  much  it  is  true  for  production,  but  little  else.  But  it  is  not 
with  production  of  wealth  that  we  are  concerned  in  this  country, 
so  much  as  in  its  equitable  distribution.  (Applause.)  We  might  build 
up  a  table  of  statistics  which  would  commend  themselves  to  masters 
of  finance,  but  they  would  not  mean  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of 
the  masses  of  the  people.  They  might  on  the  contrary  mean  the  sub 
jection  of  the  people  to  an  industrial  tyranny. 

In  a  country  like  ours,  where  every  man  is  invested  with  the 
right  to  vote — and  in  my  State  every  woman  (applause) — it  is  as  vital 
as  the  life  of  the  nation  itself,  that  the  standard  of  the  population 
be  kept  up,  that  in  education  and  in  morality  and  in  civic  duty  they 
be  equal  to  the  demands  put  upon  them  by  the  democratic  form  of 
government  where  they  determine  policies,  where  they  elect  their 
officials,  where  they  have  not  that  benign  system  of  a  king  or  emperor 
coming  down  from  the  gates  of  Heaven  by  hereditary  succession  to 
graciously  rule  over  them.     (Applause.) 

The  base  of  this  country  is  on  the  broad  shoulders  of  the  people, 
and  we  cannot  suffer  a  deterioration  of  our  population  without  break- 
ing down  the  temple  itself.  (Applause.)  So  we  cannot  yield  to  those 
demands.  They  are  peculiarly  matters  of  our  domestic  policy,  and  it 
is  an  impertinence  for  a  nation,  no  matter  how  strong  or  aggressive 
it  is,  to  demand  that  we  disturb  that  policy,  purely  domestic,  in  order 
to  admit  them  into  the  community  where  they  are  unbidden  and 
unwelcome  guests.  The  learned  men  of  their  nation,  traveling  for 
education  or  pleasure,  the  savants,  of  whom  there  are  many  of  the 
highest  class,  the  merchant  class,  are  free  under  our  laws  to  come; 
but  by  a  "Gentleman's  Agreement"  between  the  Emperor  and  the 
President,  mere  laborers  are  not  permitted  to  come.  And  yet  every 
year  there  has  been  an  increase.  They  come  in  over  the  border  per- 
haps, on  the  north  and  on  the  south.  We  take  the  ground  that  that  ob- 
ligation should  be  respected,  and  yet  it  rests  wholly  upon  the  will  of  the 
Emperor  of  Japan.  If  tomorrow  he  were  offended  at  anything  that 
might  be  said  or  done  in  this  country  he  could  revoke  it,  and  hordes 
of  these  people,  unbidden,  unwelcome,  undesirable,  would  enter  our 
Pacific  coast  ports,  and  there  is  no  law  to  stop  them;  and  the  last 

231 


treaty  with  Japan  which  was  forced  upon  this  country  seems  indeed 
to  tie  our  hands  unless  that  treaty  itself  be  abrogated. 

There  has  been  a  fear  of  Japan.  Theodore  Roosevelt,  President  of 
the  United  States,  said,  when  California  undertook  to  segregate  the 
Japanese  schoolboy — a  mature  person  is  the  Japanese  "schoolboy" — 
from  the  little  girls  in  the  schools,  that  he  would  use  the  whole 
power  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States  to  coerce  California 
should  she,  within  her  acknowledged  legal  rights,  undertake  the  regu- 
lation of  the  schools.  He  did  that  because  he  was  deeply  impressed, 
as  was  further  evidenced  by  his  participation  in  the  peace  of  Ports- 
mouth, with  the  fighting  ability  of  these,  men ;  and  he  knew  what  was 
an  open  secret,  that  we  were  not  prepared;  that  we  could  not  make 
an  issue  with  Japan  even  on  a  question  so  simple  as  that;  and  he  so 
influenced  the  Legislature  of  California  that  it  adjourned  meekly  and 
obediently  without  taking  any  action. 

Those  are  the  conditions  which  exist  on  the  Pacific.  Japan  is 
aggressive.  She  seeks  a  lodgment  on  the  Mexican  coast  below.  It  is 
rumored  to-day  that  her  troops  are  in  that  country.  She  has  had 
a  warship  in  the  waters  down  there,  presumably  crippled,  and  has  sent 
over  a  large  number  of  her  warships  in  order  to  take  the  crippled 
vessel,  so-called,  oif  the  shoals.  But  I  have  it  on  the  best  of  authority 
that  the  vessel  was  not  crippled  at  all,  and  that  at  the  very  time  Japan 
was  making  her  demand,  under  the  twelve  articles,  against  China,  and 
feared  American  protest,  which  was  made — and  that  fleet  was  over 
here,  I  verily  believe,  to  make  a  demonstration — but  happily  for  us 
(and  America  is  singularly  fortunate  in  all  its  affairs)  other  nations 
like  England  and  France  joined  in  the  protest  against  the  demands 
made  by  Japan  upon  China;  and  because  our  protest  was  so  fortified, 
that  fleet  withdrew  from  our  coast.  We  were  not  prepared  even  to 
meet  that  fragment  of  the  Japanese  fleet,  which  could  have  put  our 
cities  under  terrible  tribute  and  sailed  away. 

If,  indeed,  there  are  serious  days  confronting  us,  when  we  have 
reasonable  notice  that  Japan,  in  the  enforcement  of  her  demands  for  I 
the  equality  of  her  citizens  in  this  country,  might  undertake  to  make 
a  demonstration,  we  would  call  for  the  Atlantic  fleet  to  help  us,  saying 
that  the  Panama  Canal  was  constructed  for  the  very  purpose  of 
increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  American  navy,  duplicating,  we  were 
told,  its  usefulness;  and  yet  the  wily  enemy  would  have  blockaded 

232 


the  Canal  by  the  simple  explosion  of  a  stick  of  dynamite.  Or  we  would 
call  for  troops,  because  we  have  no  garrison  in  California  now.  What- 
ever troops  belong  to  our  posts  are  at  the  Mexican  frontier.  A  stick 
of  dynamite  would  be  equally  serviceable  in  destroying  the  railway 
facilities  through  the  mountain  passes.  We  believe  that  the  entire 
coast  is  known  to  the  enemy,  and  the  weakness  of  our  position  under- 
stood. So  there  is  an  absolute  need  for  preparedness  or  an  abandon- 
ment of  our  American  rights. 

I  was  at  Mount  Vernon  to-day,  and  there  I  saw  the  swords  of 
Washington,  live  in  numbdrn  bequeathed  to  his  nephews.  Washington 
said  in  the  will  and  the  swords  are  inscribed:  "Do  not  unsheathe 
these  swords  for  the  purpose  of  spilling  blood,  but  only  for  self- 
defense,  or  in  defense  of  your  country's  rights;  and  leave  them  un- 
sheathed until  those  rights  are  respected  and  protected."  (Great 
applause.) 

I  looked  to-day  upon  the  dome  of  the  Capitol,  and  there  I  saw  that 
image  supposed  to  personify  Liberty.  If  there  is  one  word  which 
expresses  the  aspiration  of  the  democracy  it  is  Liberty,  as  opposed 
to  imperialism  and  autocracy  and  tyranny;  and  yet  the  Liberty  on 
the  very  dome  of  our  Capitol  is  an  armed  Liberty.  She  is  full  pano- 
plied, symbolizing  that  while  liberty  is  precious  we  must  be  prepared, 
by  reason  of  the  armor  which  is  put  upon  her  and  the  protection 
which  has  been  put  into  her  hands,  to  meet  anyone,  any  power,  no 
matter  how  great,  who  would  violate  her.     (Applause.) 

Those  who  preach  peace  are  men  who  are  not  informed.  We  must 
regard  them  with  the  utmost  charity.  Some,  far  away  from  the 
madding  crowd,  invoke  religion  as  a  reason  why  we  should  not  hold 
our  neighbor  even  in  suspicion,  nor  arm  ourselves  for  protection 
against  him,  no  matter  what  may  be  his  vengeful  or  malicious  purpose. 
It  is  a  spirit  which  in  this  world  of  ours  will  lead  inevitably  to  national 
destruction,  because  the  nations  of  the  world  are  armed  nations,  and 
with  the  stupendous  development  of  this  country  we  merely  become, 
as  the  fruits  of  our  labor,  a  more  attractive  spoil. 

After  the  Civil  War,  when  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  violated  by 
the  establishment  of  Maximilian's  throne  in  Mexico,  our  troops  under 
General  Sheridan  marched  to  the  frontier;  and  because  they  were 
seasoned  troops,  fresh  from  victories,  the  Maximilian  establishment 
fell  to  pieces  without  striking  a  blow. 

233 


When  the  Germans,  in  the  pursuit  of  trade  expansion — perhaps 
the  very  purpose  of  Japan — sought  an  entrance  to  Venezuela  in  1902, 
our  fleet  then  was  mobihzed  in  Caribbean  waters  under  Admiral 
Dewey,  fresh  from  his  victories,  and  the  Geramn  menace  vanished 
into  thin  air.  That  was  simply  because  our  fleet  then  was  three 
times  as  strong  as  the  fleet  of  Germany,  and  was  due  in  no  respect  to 
any  expression  of  goodwill.  The  goodwill  followed  the  demonstra- 
tion of  our  strength.  So  long  as  we  are  strong  we  shall  not  be 
attacked;  but  so  long  as  we  allow  our  military  and  naval  establish- 
ment to  fall  below  the  standard  required^of  a  country  of  our  posi- 
tion in  the  world,  w  .h  its  manifold  interests  at  home  and  abroad,  we 
expose  ourselves  to  attack.  So  the  maintenance  of  a  high  standard 
of  army  and  navy  is  really  a  peace  measure,  and  not  a  war  measure. 

I  havp  no  toleration  with  the  men  who  look  upon  these  military 
establishments  as  menacing  the  liberties  of  the  country.  That  comes 
down  from  the  days  of  Rome,  where  a  degenerate  people  were  over- 
whelmed by  an  inferior  or  slave  population  unequal  to  Roman  citizen- 
ship and  where  the  state  was  weakened  at  its  foundations.  The 
military  finally  became  the  only  power,  so  corrupted  became  the  people. 
Shall  our  people  be  corrupted  by  the  infusion  of  an  inferior  strain? 
Our  hundred  million  of  American  citizens,  loving  their  country  be- 
cause their  country  loves  them,  will  always,  under  the  Constitution  and 
the  laws,  maintain  the  civil  power  above  the  military  power,  and  there 
certainly  shall  be  no  usurpation.  (Applause.)  It  is  an  idle  fear; 
it  is  not  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  needs  of  the  moment  to  say  that  at 
some  remote  time  the  military  may  attempt  to  usurp  the  civil  power. 
That  is  the  danger  they  express. 

Another  school  of  political  thinkers  say  that  the  munition  manu- 
facturers are  the  men  who  will  stir  up  conflict  for  the  very  purpose 
of  seUing  their  wares.  That  can  be  answered  by  saying:  "If  need 
be,  to  overcome  the  objection,  the  Government  itself  can  manufacture 
its  munitions."  (Applause.)  The  mere  threat  will  be  a  sufficient  dis- 
cipline for  those  who  do  manufacture  munitions  (applause),  because 
the  people  are  so  jealous  of  their  rights,  so  loving  peace  and  desiring 
to  preserve  it,  that  no  small  section  of  our  countrymen  engaged  in  the 
manufacture  of  armaments  and  munitions  would  dare  to  cross  the  will 
of  the  people  and  bring  down  upon  their  heads  their  wrath. 

234 


i  think  we  are  sufficiently  safeguarded  against  these  objections; 
but  I  do  know,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  that  our  country  is  not  suf- 
ficiently safeguarded  upon  the  Pacific  coast.  We  harbor  no  illwill 
toward  our  neighbors.  We  are  merely  stating  facts.  "The  Lord  made 
all  the  people  of  the  earth  of  one  blood,"  we  are  told  by  those  who 
invoke  Holy  writ.  "The  Lord  made  all  the  peoples  of  the  earth  of  one 
blood,"  but  "He  determined  the  bounds  of  their  habitations."  The 
Oriental  people  have  a  most  excellent  field  to  exploit,  and  they  may 
develop  lands  which  have  been  practically  untrodden.  There  is  no 
need,  in  the  crowding  of  populations,  that  they  should  come  to  this 
continent.  We  should  impress  upon  them  politely  arid  in  diplomatic 
language  that  their  field,  their  zone  of  influence,  is  in  Asiatic  waters, 
while  ours,  pursuing  the  work  of  creating  a  government  of  the  people, 
is  here  on  this  continent,  and  we  wish  to  be  let  alone.  In  the  spirit 
of  peace  we  beg  them  to  desist;  but  unfortunately,  as  the  world  is 
organized,  our  peaceful  talk  will  have  no  weight  in  the  family  of 
nations  unless  we  are  of  equal  strength.  That  is  the  fundamental 
idea.  Anxious  as  we  are  for  peace,  we  cannot  have  peace  unless  we 
are  strong.  Anxious  as  we  are  for  a  high  court  to  determine  in  a 
rational  way  the  questions  which  arise  between  nations,  just  as  be- 
tween individuals,  we  know  that  that  court  is  of  no  value  unless  it  has 
some  sanction;  and,  therefore,  in  the  enforcement  of  the  decrees  of 
the  court,  force  shall  have  to  stand  behind  it. 

That  demonstrates  perfectly  that  behind  all  governments  and  all 
courts — establish  them  upon  any  theory  or  give  them  any  jurisdiction 
— there  must  be  force  somewhere  to  compel  obedience  to  the  decrees. 
Preparedness  for  war  shall  avert  war,  and  on  the  Pacific  coast,  which 
heretofore  has  not  been  adequately  represented  in  Eastern  councils, 
I  merely  desire  to  leave  with  the  audience  the  thought  that  it  is  only  in 
the  spirit  of  preserving  American  institutions  and  preserving  the 
standards  of  our  population  that  men  and  women  of  all  classes  resent 
the  idea  of  a  Japanese  invasion,  whether  it  be  a  peaceful  invasion  or 
a  warlike  invasion.     (Great  applause.) 

(At  11:15  o'clock  p.  m.  an  adjournment  was  taken  until  to- 
morrow, January  22,  at  10:30  a.  m.) 


235 


SIXTH  SESSION 

New  Willard  Hotel 

Saturday,  January  22,  1916,  10:30  a.  m. 

Chairman — Justice  Henry  Stockbridge 
of  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals 

The  session  was  called  to  order  at  10:30  o'clock  a.m.  by  the 
Secretary,  Mr.  Herbert  Barry. 

Mr.  Barry — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  if  you  will  kindly  come  to 
order  we  will  begin  the  proceedings  of  this  session  of  the  Congress. 
It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  have  the  privilege  of  introducing  as 
the  presiding  officer  this  morning  Judge  Henry  Stockbridge,  of  the  ' 
Maryland  Court  of  Appeals,  who  evidences  by  his  presence  here  the 
interest  which  he,  in  common  with  all  of  us,  feels  in  this  vital  subject, 
and  we  will  proceed  with  the  program  under  the  guidance  of  the 
officer  whom  we  are  very  fortunate  to  have  with  us  today.    (Applause.) 

ADDRESS   OF   JUSTICE   HENRY   STOCKBRIDGE   OF   THE 
MARYLAND  COURT  OF  APPEALS 

Judge  Stockbridge — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  wish  to  assure  you 
that  I  am  deeply  sensible  of  the  honor  which  has  been  conferred  not 
upon  me,  but  upon  the  state  from  which  I  come,  in  the  selection  of 
one  of  its  citizens  to  preside  over  so  distinguished  a  gathering.  For" 
the  shortcomings  of  the  presiding  officer  your  kindly  consideration  is 
invoked.  He  will  make  you  one  promise,  and  one  promise  only,  namely, 
that  he  will  not  interfere  very  much  by  talking  himself  and  that  he 
will  hold  other  speakers  to  a  strict  time  limit.  In  that  way  we  shall 
be  enabled  to  hear  from  the  distinguished  gentlemen  who  will  address 
us  during  the  course  of  this  morning's  session. 

236 


One  word,  and  but  one  further  word.  The  queation  of  national 
preparedness  is  no  longer  within  the  realm  of  legitimate  debate.  The 
necessity  for  it,  the  need  of  it,  the  absolute  demand  of  this  country 
for  it,  is  certainly  clear;  and  yet  in  one  respect  we  may  possibly  find 
that  it  has  been  delayed  for  a  longer  time  than  we  might  wish.  It 
is  almost  impossible  to  pick  up  a  daily  paper  at  the  present  time  with- 
out finding  the  suggestions  of  A,  B,  C  and  D  as  to  the  extent  of  in- 
crease of  either  army  or  navy.  But  one  thing  we  should  bear  in  mind: 
We  are  fortunate  in  possessing  among  us  as  patriotic  men  as  are 
to  be  found  in  any  land  upon  this  globe.     (Applause.) 

Let  us  leave  to  those  who  have  made  this  question  a  matter  of 
life  study  the  working  out  of  details  (applause)  ;  let  us  not  seek  to 
hamper  their  efforts  by  criticisms  for  which  we  are  entirely  incom- 
petent, but  back  them  up  to  the  full  extent  of  our  power  and  ability, 
whether  it  be  moral,  physical  or  financial.     (Applause.) 

I  am  not  here  to  discuss  the  advisability  of  the  program  which 
has  been  put  forth  by  the  national  Administration.  I  am  not  here  to 
advocate  the  adoption  of  one  plan  as  against  another;  but  I  am  here 
to  voice  for  the  citizens  of  my  state  the  need  that  we  feel,  and  feel 
second  only  to  possibly  one  of  the  communities  of  this  country,  of  the 
urgency  of  the  present  demand.  (Applause.)  When  I  find  items  in 
the  daily  papers  that  the  aviation  corps  of  France  is  larger  than  the 
total  mobile  force  of  the  United  States,  when  I  see  that  even  far-off 
China  possesses  an  aroplane  far  ahead  df  our  ovsoi,  it  seems  to  me  it 
is  time  for  us  to  wake  up.  The  greatest  menace  that  we  have  probably 
is  a  dread,  an  inherent  dread,  of  militarism.  But  anyone  who  has 
studied  carefully  the  organizations  of  other  lands  will  see  that  there 
is  a  vast  difference  between  that  which  is  a  militarism  and  that  whcih 
is  the  proper,  normal  preparedness  of  a  great  nation.  It  is  a  failure 
to  draw  that  distinction,  which  is  today  the  greatest  stumbling-block 
in  the  halls  of  our  national  Congress.  Let  us  remove  that  feeling; 
let  us  urge,  insist  and  aid  them  in  the  study  of  a  system  like  that 
which  prevails  in  the  Swiss  republic.  Contrast  that  with  other  estab- 
lishments and  the  distinction  will  at  once  become  apparent. 

But  preparedness  means  a  little  more  than  a  military  force, 
whether  upon  land  or  sea.  It  was  with  sincere  gratification  that  I 
found  from  the  papers  of  this  morning  that  an  organization  was  per- 
fected of  the  railroad  men  of  this  country  for  the  purpose  of  utilizing 

237 


their  lines  for  the  rendering  mobile  and  the  transportation  from  point 
to  point  with  promptness  of  any  forces  which  might  be  needed. 

But  that  is  only  a  matter  of  detail.  In  our  manufactures,  in  our 
organizations  of  citizens,  in  our  financial,  or  manufacturing  interests 
we  want  the  same  preparation.  Why  should  the  railroads  of  this 
country  be  today  taking  these  steps,  and  yet  no  steps  be  taken  thus  far 
by  which  the  government  shall  have  an  option  upon  the  steamship  lines 
of  this  country  if  there  should  be  occasion  to  call  for  them? 

Far  better  to  have  those  matters  arranged  now  than  as  in  1898, 
when  for  lack  of  it  this  Government  paid  out  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  dollars  unnecessarily.  Time  was  consumed — valuable  time — un- 
necessarily'. But  a  steady,  a  continuous  readiness  is  our  best  guaran- 
tee of  a  lasting  and  a  profitable  and  a  happy  peace.     (Applause.) 

1  told  you  that  I  was  not  going  to  make  any  address  this  morn- 
ing. Official  duties  have  precluded  my  attempting  it,  even  if  I 
possessed  the  ability,  which  I  frankly  confess  I  do  not.  Accordingly, 
before  taking  up  the  regular  order  of  the  morning,  I  am  going  to  ask 
the  Secretary  to  read  a  couple  of  letters  which  he  has  received  and 
which  I  am  sure  will  be  of  interest  to  all  of  this  gathering. 

Mr.  Barry — We  have  a  letter  from  Honorable  Joseph  H.  Choate, 
the  Honorary  President  of  the  National  Security  League,  in  which  he 
expresses  his  regret  at  not  being  able  to  attend,  and  I  may  add  that 
at  a  recent  meeting  in  New  York,  a  very  large  gathering,  a  resolution 
was  passed  expressly  requesting  him  to  come;  not  that  he  would  not 
be  sure  to  come  in  any  event,  but  in  order  to  evidence  the  desire  tha^ 
all  would  have  that  he  should  preside  as  our  honorary  president,  and  as 
one  very  vitally  interested.  Unfortunately,  he  has  been  suffering  from 
ill  health,  and  is  unable  to  come,  but  he  has  sent  this  letter,  which,  as 
coming  not  only  from  our  president,  but  one  of  the  foremost,  if  not 
the  foremost,  citizen  of  our  country,  deserves  the  attention  of  every- 
one here  and  everyone  in  the  United  States.    The  letter  is  as  follows : 

"January  21,  1916. 

"My  dear  Mr.  Menken: 

"I  am  more  sorry  than  I  can  tell  you  that  I  am  unable  to  be  in 
attendance  at  the  National  Security  League  Congress,  and  to  take  part 
in  its  deliberations.  I  believe  that  we  have  actually  done  an  immense 
amount  of  good,  and  that  the  country  is  widely  aroused  to  the  necessity 

238 


I 


of  Congress  doing  a  great  deal  in  the  way  of  preparation  for  self-de- 
fense, which  I  regard  as  the  first  duty  of  every  nation,  as  well  as  of 
every  individual. 

"It  is  perfectly  apparent  that  neither  in  our  army,  or  in  our  navy, 
or  in  the  personnel  of  our  officers  and  men,  are  we  sufficiently  or  ade- 
quately prepared  for  the  defense  of  the  country  at  any  point  against 
any  attack  whatever.  We  want  a  fuller  army,  a  better  equipped  navy, 
more  officers  and  more  men.  Our  sea  coast  of  twenty-one  thousand 
miles,  our  sea  coast  cities,  which  are  liable  to  be  attacked  by  any  enemy 
provided  with  the  new  great  guns,  are  absolutely  exposed  and  defense- 
less against  any  attack,  and  we  are  bound  to  be  ready  to  protect  them. 
The  defense  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  of  the  Philippines  calls  for  a 
great  naval  force.  As  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  of  which  all  Americans 
are  so  proud,  everybody  knows  that  it  is  not  worth  the  paper  on  which 
it  is  written,  unless  supported  by  adequate  sea  power. 

"It  is  delightful  to  see  how  thoroughly  the  President  appears  to 
be  aroused  to  the  necessity  of  doing  something,  and  I  think  that  his 
proposed  tour  in  advocacy  of  preparedness  is  one  of  the  most  hopeful 
symptoms  of  the  day,  and  will  have  great  effect.  I  still  believe  with 
Washington  that  the  surest  way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  be  prepared 
always  for  war  to  the  extent  of  self-defense,  and  I  believe  that  his 
precepts  and  example  will  still  have  much  greater  weight  with  tho 
American  people  than  the  promised  utterances  of  Mr.  Bryan. 

"Wishing  you  every  success  in  the  Congress,  I  remain, 

"Yours  most  truly, 

"Joseph  H.  Choate. 

"S.  Stanwood  Menken,  Esq." 

Mr.  Barry — If  I  may  be  pardoned  for  interjecting  just  a  word, 
can  anyone  fail  to  see  the  contrast  between  a  man  like  Mr.  Choate,  a 
man  who  stands  pre-eminent  in  the  diplomatic  service  and  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States  and  who  puts  aside  all  partisan  considera- 
tions and  applauds  the  President,  although  of  another  party,  for  his 
part  in  this  great,  absolutely  essential  consideration,  outweighing 
everything  else — the  contrast  between  his  action  and  that  of  the  gen- 
tleman to  whom  he  refers,  who  wishes  "God  bless  you,"  and  then  goes 
out  to  knife  his  friend  and  to  knife  the  doctrine  that  underlies  all  our 
protection  ?     ( Applause. ) 

239 


The  other  letter  is  from  Colonel  Church,  who  is  also  unable  to  be 
present  by  reason  of  bad  health.  He  was  scheduled  to  present  a  paper 
and  address  the  meeting  on  the  subject  of  pension  expenses  and  pre- 
paredness, but  owing  to  his  unfortunate  illness  he  has  not  been  able 
to  be  present  nor  to  prepare  the  paper,  and  he  sends  this  letter,  which 
it  falls  to  my  pleasant  duty  as  secretary  to  read.     (Reading) ; 

"January  21,  1916. 
"Mr.  S.  Stanwood  Menken, 

"President  The  National  Security  League, 
"31  Pine  Street,  New  York  City. 
"My  dear  Mr.  Menken: 

"From  the  annual  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1915,  I 
gather  the  following  statistics : 

Expenditures  for  pensions,  1914-1915 $165,518,266.14 

Total  number  of  pensioners,  June  30,  1915.  .  748,147 

Reduction  in  the  number  of  pensioners  dur- 
ing the  year 37,092 

"Taking  one-half  of  these  last  as  representing  the  average  reduc- 
tion during  the  year,  we  have  a  total  of  766,693  to  whom  payment  was 
made  during  the  year. 

"Dividing  the  total  expenditures  by  this  number  indicates  an 
average  payment  of  $216  to  each  pensioner. 

"There  was  a  reduction  of  36,609  in  the  pensioners  of  the  Civil 
War,  and  an  addition  of  brothers,  sisters  and  children  of  94.  This 
leaves  a  net  reduction  in  the  surviving  pensioners  of  the  Civil  War  of 
36,515.  Multiplying  this  by  the  $216,  assumed  as  the  average  amount 
paid  to  each  pensioner,  gives  a  total  of  $7,887,240,  reduction  in  the 
annual  pension  charge. 

"It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  396,370  Civil  War  soldiers 
on  the  roll  June  30,  1915,  will  have  disappeared  within  ten  years  with 
a  few  straggling  exceptions.  This  will  relieve  the  Treasury  at  the 
end  of  that  time  of  a  burden  of  $86,615,920,  the  amount  of  saving  each 
year  increasing  steadily  meanwhile.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the 
present  annual  saving  of  $7,887,240  will  be  increased  in  a  year  or  two 
to  an  average  annual  saving  of  nine  or  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  that 
at  the  close  of  the  period  of  ten  years  or  less  the  annual  saving  will 
be  $86,615,920. 

240 


"Colonel  Brown,  or  someone  else  more  skilled  than  I  am  in  finance, 
should  be  able  to  tell  you,  with  the  aid  of  these  figures,  how  large  a 
bonded  debt,  including  interest  and  amortization,  this  saving  in  pen- 
sion payments  will  provide  for. 

"Kegreting  that  I  am  not  able  to  be  with  you  in  Washington, 
I  am 

"Sincerely  yours, 

(Signed)     "Wm.  C.  Church." 

The  Chairman — The  next  item  on  the  program  for  this  morning 
is  a  paper  by  Colonel  Amerman.  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  uniform 
donned  by  the  boys  of  this  country,  which,  whenever  seen,  commands 
our  respect.  It  cheers  us  to  see  the  little  fellows  sturdily  marching 
along,  marching  with  a  precision  which  a  good  many  so-called  military 
organizations  cannot  equal.  (Applause.)  In  my  ovm  city  we  have 
had  cxacasion  to  put  them  to  practical  tests,  and  on  no  occasion  have 
they  ever  failed  to  respond  to  any  demand  that  was  made  upon  them. 
I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  boy  scouts  of  America,  and  I  am  going  to 
ask  Colonel  Amerman,  as  the  chief  officer  of  that  organization,  to  tell 
us  something  of  it  and  its  possibilities,  and  what  it  means  for  our 
people. 

ADDRESS   OF   COL.   L.   W.   AMERMAN   OF  THE   UNITED 
STATES  BOY  SCOUTS 

Colonel  Amerman — Mr.  Chairman  and  members  of  the  National 
Security  League,  and  their  friends:  First,  I  want  to  call  your  atten- 
tion to  a  printed  error  in  the  program.  The  program  states  that 
Major-General  McAlpin  is  president  of  the  boy  scouts  of  the  United 
States.  Now,  General  McAlpin,  like  most  soldiers,  is  a  very  modest 
man,  and  he  asked  me  to  explain  to  you  that  there  were  two  boy  scout 
organizations  in  the  United  States,  one  a  pacifist  organization  known 
as  The  Boy  Scouts  of  America;  the  other  a  military  organization 
known  as  The  United  States  Boy  Scouts,  and  it  is  the  military  organ- 
ization of  which  General  McAlpin  is  president  and  chief  scout,  and  of 
which  I  have  the  honor  to  be  executive  officer. 

When  we  were  invited  to  speak  at  this  convention  your  president 
told  us  that  we  would  be  expected  to  speak  on  the  relation  of  the 

241 


United  States  Boy  Scouts  to  preparedness.  The  motto  of  our  organ- 
ization, which  was  founded  in  1909,  is  "SEMPER  PARATUS,"  always 
prepared,  and  we  are  still  trying  to  build  up  to  that  motto. 

From  the  very  first  there  has  been  no  question  in  the  minds  of  the 
officers  of  the  United  States  Boy  Scout  of  the  necessity  to  the  Nation 
of  not  only  a  first  and  second  but  a  third  line  of  defense.  On  this 
subject  there  is  no  room  for  argument;  so,  in  place  of  talking  over 
our  country's  need,  we  have  tried  to  meet  that  need.  This  object  we 
have  steadily  kept  in  view,  and  we  are  here  today  to  further  this 
object  by  laying  before  you  all  that  this  organization  of  the  United 
States  Boy  Scout  stands  for. 

Gentlemen,  as  the  twig  is  bent  the  tree  is  inclined.  Boys  who 
learn  to  love  their  country  will  fight  for  it  when  they  are  men.  If 
we  are  to  have  again  a  nation  of  Americans,  who  stand  solidly  on 
their  feet,  do  their  own  thinking,  and  look  every  one  in  the  eye,  we 
must  pay  more  attention  to  the  training  of  the  boy  in  patriotism  and 
loyalty  to  himself,  his  country,  and  his  flag.  Had  we  done  this  long 
ago  we  would  not  now  be  cursed  with  the  divided  allegiance,  "for  such 
we  must  call  it,  if  we  are  honest  with  ourselves,"  which  confronts  the 
Nation.  Let  us  then  look  over  the  situation  that  confronts  us  that 
we  may  be  the  better  able  to  discover  and  supply  a  remedy. 

We  occupy  a  unique  and  peculiar  position  among  the  nations  of 
the  earth;  we  have  come  to  be  a  conglomerate  Nation,  the  straight 
strain  of  the  American  blood  is  at  the  present  time  almost,  if  not 
quite,  in  the  minority  with  us;  peoples  from  all  parts  of  the  world 
(I  purposely  omit  the  word  civilized)  have  come  to  us,  and,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  our  newspaper,  been  swallowed  up  and  amalgamated  with  our 
great  American  civilization. 

Have  they?  I  can  only  speak  for  the  East,  and  speaking  for  the 
East,  I  say  they  have  not,  and  to  a  great  extent  it  is  our  own  fault 
that  they  have  not.  It  is  only  fair  that  we  should  make  some  allowance 
for  the  man  born  in  some  other  country,  coming  to  this  country  after 
reaching  the  age  of  manhood,  he  naturally,  and  properly,  has  a  very 
tender  feeling  for  the  land  of  his  birth,  and  upon  the  actions  of  this 
man,  in  time  of  stress,  we  must  not  be  without  charity. 

But  for  the  son  of  this  man,  born  on  this  soil,  no  such  allowance 
can,  or  should,  be  made.  If  he  does  not  loyally  support  this  country  he 
is  a  'traitor  to  both  himself  and  his  country,  for  this  is  his  country. 

242 


When  persons  calling  themselves  Americans  band  together  in  a  league 
and  endeavor  to  secure  signatures  of  other  so-called  Americans  to  a 
pledge  that  reads,  "I  being  over  18  years  of  age,  pledge  myself  against 
enlistment  as  a  volunteer  for  any  military  or  naval  service  in  inter- 
national war,  offensive  or  defensive,  and  against  giving  my  approval 
to  any  such  enlistment  on  the  part  of  others,"  it  is  time  for  all  true 
and  loyal  Americans  to  be  on  guard. 

Many  of  our  boys  are  the  sons  of  foreign-born  parents,  and  the 
constant  talk  and  enthusiasm  for  the  organization  and  the  American 
flag  vv^hich  these  boys  carry  into  their  homes  has  a  wonderfully  Amer- 
icanizing effect  upon  the  parents. 

In  the  days  to  come  our  country  may  need  soldiers  and  sailors, 
and  they  should  be  more  intelligent  and  efficient  and  more  patriotic 
than  those  of  other  countries.  There  is  no  question  that  the  average 
citizen  of  this  country  is  more  intelligent  than  that  of  any  other 
country  of  the  present  age. 

Where  are  these  soldiers  and  sailors  to  come  from?  We  are 
finding  it  a  difficult  matter  to  arouse  the  grown  men  of  our  country 
from  their  satisfied  feeling  of  safety  and  immunity  from  the  danger 
of  invasion,  and  when  aroused  it  takes  much  longer  to  train  him  than 
it  does  the  hof.  We  begin  with  the  boy  early,  while  he  is  filled  with 
energy  and  enthusiasm.  We  teach  them  love  of  country  and  how  to 
keep  clean  and  healthy  in  mind  and  body.  Our  aim  and  purpose  is 
the  creation  of  a  united  all  American  nation,  beginning  with  the  boy, 
and  the  making  over  of  the  boy  of  foreign  parentage  into  an  Ameri- 
can, first,  last  and  altogether.  To  accomplish  this  we  are  utilizing 
boyish  enthusiasm  for  the  military  and  naval  service,  to  teach  the 
boys  through  their  play,  with  the  assistance  of  competent  oflficers,  the 
military  tactics  and  drill  of  the  United  States  Army  and  Navy,  an?  tts 
the  navies  of  the  present  are  no  longer  composed  of  sailors  in  its 
generally  accepted  meaning,  but  of  navigators,  machinists,  mechanics, 
engineers  and  gunners.  All  of  these  drills  can  be  taught  on  land,  with 
the  exception  of  the  boat  drills,  which,  together  with  swimming,  we 
teach  our  boys  along  the  lakes  and  rivers  of  the  country.  We  follow 
strictly  the  United  States  Army  and  Navy  manuals  and  tactics,  in  so 
[far  as  they  may  be  applied  to  boys,  so  that  there  may  be  a  uniformity 
^th^ough'^nt  the  48  states  of  the  Union. 

243  '     '        " 


When  the  boy  has  signed  his  application  blank,  and  his  parent 
or  guardian  has  indorsed  thereon  his  or  her  consent  to  his  member- 
ship in  the  United  States  Boy  Scout,  we  swear  him  in  by  the  following 
oath  or  obligation: 

"On  my  honor  I  promise  that  I  will  do  my  best  to  do  my 

duty  to  God  and  my  country,  to  help  other  people  at  all  times, 

and  to  obey  the  Scout  Law." 

Following  this  plan,  within  a  few  years  the  United  States  of 
America  will  become  automatically  a  military  nation,  without  any 
political  upheaval  or  special  notice  being  taken  of  the  fact  that  our 
young  men  from  coast  to  coast  and  from  Canada  to  the  gulf  are  b^ing 
trained  in  their  play  to  military  or  naval  tactics,  to  the  maintenance 
and  sanitation  of  camps,  to  markmanship  with  the  rifle,  machine  gun 
and  coast  artillery  cannon,  wireless  and  field  telegraphy,  map-making 
and  aeronautics,  all  under  the  same  scheme  and  plan,  so  that  the  dif- 
ferent units  may  fit  into  one  harmonious  whole.  That  this  can  be 
done  we  know,  for  we  have  tried,  and  our  scouts  are  already  better 
soldiers  as  to  drill  and  military  manoeuvres  than  many  of  the  suburban 
military  companies. 

Should  the  Nation  need  these  young  men  within  a  few  years  for 
'ts  defense,  they  will  find  a  well-trained  body  to  depend  upon.  Should 
their  military  service  not  be  needed,  the  Nation  will  l^  the  better  by 
from  one  to  five  million  patriotic  young  citizens,  who  will  have  been 
taught  self-control,  self-respect,  honor  and  patriotism,  love  and  respect 
for  the  flag. 

The  boys  take  to  the  organization  wonderfully.  We  have  ten 
regiments  in  Greater  New  York  alone,  and  throughout  the  country 
approximately  at  the  present  time  200,000. United  States  Boy  Scouts. 
They  hold  reviews,  sham  battles  and  competitive  drills  with  all  the 
ardor  and  enthusiasm  that  is  to  be  expected  of  the  boy. 

The  organization  of  the  United  States  Boy  Scout  is  the  original 
organization  in  this  country,  and  the  only  entirely  American  one.  Its 
officers  and  directors  are  all  American-born.  It  is  not  connected  with 
any  church  or  religious  organization,  although  all  of  them  are  repre- 
sented among  our  scouts.  It  is  altogether  and  entirely  an  American 
Patriotic  Organization. 

No  matter  from  what  or  which  angle  you  may  choose  to  look  upon 
it,  the  work  of  this  organization  is  a  benefit  to  the  Nation,  a  benefit 

244 


to  the  boy  and  a  great  step  forward  toward  that  state  of  preparedness 
for  which  we  are  all  laboring. 

We  are  working  with  the  youth  and  the  parent;  you  are  working 
with  the  men.  That  we  are  heartily  in  accord  with  the  work  of  the 
National  Security  League  is  proven  by  our  presence  here.  Let  us 
work  together  and  preparedness  will  be  a  fact. 

The  Chairman — I  should  like  to  say  to  the  members  of  the  St. 
Louis  delegation  who  are  here  that  Mayor  Mitchel  of  New  York  will 
be  very  glad  to  see  them  at  this  time.  They  will  find  him  in  the  ante- 
room. 

In  any  gathering  of  Americans  where  patriotism  is  called  for  we 
expect  to  find  a  familiar  figure  in  the  person  of  that  distinguished 
statesman,  Elihu  Root.  (Applause.)  It  is  a  matter  of  profound 
regret  to  him  as  well  as  to  us  that  he  cannot  be  here  at  this  gathering. 
In  view  of  his  inability,  however,  he  has  written  a  letter  which  I  am 
going  to  ask  Mr.  Robert  Bacon,  the  former  Secretary  of  State,  to  read. 
(Applause.) 

Mr,  Bacon — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  is  a  very  great  pleasure,  as 
you  can  well  imagine,  and  an  honor  which  I  appreciate  very  highly,  to 
be  able  even  vicariously  to  speak  the  words  of  Elihu  Root.  Perhaps 
there  is  no  one  better  fitted  to  speak  on  the  question  of  military  or- 
ganization and  needs  than  one  who  has  devoted  so  many  years  to  its 
practical  direction,  and  I  am  sure  that  his  short  letter,  concise,  as  all 
his  statements  are,  will  prove  to  be  a  great  contribution  to  the  subject. 
(Reading)  : 

"The  National  Security  League, 

"Washington,  D.  C. 
"Gentlemen : 

"Mr.  Menken  has  asked  me  to  write  you  the  substance  of  some 
remarks  I  made  at  a  meeting  of  the  Governor's  Committee  on  National 
Defense  held  in  this  city  some  two  weeks  ago.  The  view  I  expressed 
related  to  the  part  which  the  National  Guard  of  the  states  can  prop- 
erly play  in  a  scheme  of  national  defense,  and  it  was  very  much  the 
same  that  I  see  Secretary  Garrison  expressed  yesterday  to  a  commit- 
tee of  Congress.  In  my  view  it  is  idle  to  talk  of  developing  the 
National  Guard  itself  into  an  adequate  army  for  national  defense,  and 
any  such  attempt  would  inevitably  result  in  the  failure  of  the  whole 

245 


movement  and  the  waste  of  all  the  energy  and  effort  devoted  to  it. 
The  National  Guard  are  primarily  state  troops  for  state  purposes,  and 
they  must  continue  to  be  so.  The  power  to  raise  them  and  to  train 
them  and  to  appoint  their  officers  rests  with  the  separate  states. 
Under  the  enlightened  policy  of  the  Militia  Act  of  January  21,  1903, 
they  have  been  fitted  to  render  most  useful  service,  primarily  in  coast 
defense  in  co-operation  with  the  national  army  in  time  of  war.  In 
time  of  peace  they  are  rendering  a  most  useful  service  by  training  in 
the  elements  of  military  service  a  great  number  of  young  Americans 
to  whom  the  President  may  turn  when  he  seeks  suitable  men  to  be 
appointed  officers  in  the  national  army.  The  idea,  however,  that  these 
forty-eight  diflferent  bodies  of  troops,  with  officers  appointed  by  forty- 
eight  different  governors,  can  be  made  the  basis  for  developing  an 
effective  mobile  national  army  is  quite  absurd.  An  effective  army 
must  be  built  up  on  the  principle  of  complete  unity  of  control.  This 
can  never  be  attained  by  developing  forty-eight  different  bodies  under 
officers  appointed  by  forty-eight  different  governors,  and,  up  to  the 
time  of  war,  under  the  direction  of  forty-eight  different  commanders 
in  chief.  This  characteristic  of  the  National  Guard  cannot  be  changed 
except  by  amending  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which,  if 
practicable,  would  require  many  years;  and  if  that  were  done  the  re- 
sult would  simply  be,  not  to  develop  an  army  upon  the  National 
Guard,  but  to  destroy  the  National  Guard  and  to  develop  an  army  on 
an  entirely  different  basis. 

"It  seems  perfectly  clear  to  me  that  any  effort  in  the  direction  of 
developing  the  National  Guard  into  the  required  national  army  of  de- 
fense will  be  worse  than  thrown  away  because  it  will  result  in  the  mis- 
carriage of  the  whole  effort. 

"Let  me  add  another  practical  observation :  The  proposal  to  create 
an  adequate  national  army  of  defense  involves  a  good  deal  of  a  shock 
to  many  Americans  who  do  not  fully  appreciate  the  reasons  for  the 
great  enlargement  of  our  military  forces.  Many  of  them  are  afraid 
of  militarism;  they  are  incredulous  as  to  the  necessity;  they  are  dis- 
inclined to  incur  the  expense.  The  progress  of  the  cause  in  which  you 
are  enlisted  requires  a  good  deal  of  education  and  many,  I  fear  alas! 
need  to  have  the  true  spirit  of  American  patriotism  reawakened  in 
them.  Now  do  not  postpone  your  practical  progress  toward  the  crea- 
tion of  an  adequate  army  until  the  end  of  this  campaign  of  education. 


Make  all  the  progress  that  you  can  in  the  right  direction  as  soon  as  you 
can.  There  are  good  things  in  Secretary  Garrison's  plan.  The  doing 
of  them  would  be  progress  in  the  right  direction.  Don't  lose  those  good 
things  even  though  you  may  find  that  you  can't  at  this  time  get  some- 
thing more  in  the  same  direction.  Get  those  good  things  into  law 
and  as  much  more  as  possible  as  soon  as  you  can  and  then  show  the 
people  of  the  country,  what  further  steps  ought  to  be  taken  and  can  be 
taken.  The  same  view  is  true  as  to  the  navy.  Building  up  the  military 
and  naval  establishment  to  the  point  where  they  ought  to  be  will  be 
slow  work,  and  we  ought  to  begin  without  further  delay.  The  people 
of  the  country  will  deal  with  their  representatives  for  all  inadequacies 
and  shortcomings  in  this  vital  matter.  But  in  the  meantime  let  us 
take  the  first  steps  on  any  sort  of  a  program  that  is  directed  toward 
the  goal  we  ought  to  attain — a  trained  and  always  available  national 
citizen  soldiery  under  the  instruction  and  administration  and  formative 
leadership  of  an  adequate  though  small  regular  army. 

"Very  respectfully, 

(Signed)     "Elihu  Root." 

The  Chairman — We  heard  from  Colonel  Amerman  of  the  first 
step  toward  the  efl"ective  training  of  the  boys  of  our  country.  For 
more  than  a  half  century  there  has  been  one  institution  in  this  coun- 
try which  has  made  a  special  point  of  training  all  who  came  within  its 
fold  in  military  tactics,  training,  esprit  de  corps.  As  far  back  as  the 
Civil  War  it  furnished  officers.  Some  were  to  be  found  upon  each 
side;  but  wherever  found,  they  showed  the  advantage  of  the  training 
which  they  received  at  the  Virginia  Military  Institute.  (Applause.) 
Touching  this  phase  of  the  preparation,  I  am  going  to  call  upon  Gen- 
eral E.  W.  Nichols,  the  present  superintendent  of  that  institution,  to 
tell  us  of  that  work. 

THE  VALUE  OF  MILITARY  TRAINING  IN  SCHOOL  AND 

COLLEGES 

Gen.  E.  W.  Nichols,  Superintendent, 
Virginia  Military  Institute,   Lexington,  Va. 

Gen.  Nichols  :  Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen  and  Fellow- 
Members  of  the  National  Security  League — As  the  announced  object  of 

247 


this  congress  of  the  National  Security  League  is  a  discussion  of  the 
vital  issue  of  preparedness,  I  know  of  no  better  way  of  addressing 
myself  to  that  phase  of  the  question  assigned  to  me  than  by  a  reference 
to  past  experience. 

I  invite  your  attention  then,  first,  to  "The  Military  School:  Its 
Past  Service  to  the  Nation,"  and  then,  if  time  and  your  interest  permit, 
I  wish  very  briefly  and  very  pointedly  to  address  myself  to  the  broader 
and  perhaps  more  intersting  topics,  "The  Military  School :  A  National 
Asset." 

In  treating  of  the  past  services  of  these  institutions  to  the  nation, 
I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  two  oldest — one  of  the  North,  Norwich 
University  in  Vermont,  and  the  other  of  the  South,  the  Virginia  Mili- 
tary Institute.  The  services  of  these  institutions  have  been  so  con- 
spicuous that  a  brief  outline  of  their  activities  during  the  war  periods 
of  our  national  history  will  be  suggestive  of  what  could  be  accomplished 
along  lines  of  preparedness,  especially  from  the  view  point  of  a  reserve 
corps  of  olficers,  if  a  proper  national  support  were  given  them  as  well 
as  the  numerous  other  institutions,  state-fostered  and  privately  sup- 
ported, scattered  throughout  the  country.  The  outline  as  given  will 
necessarily  suggest  their  value  as  a  national  asset. 

Norwich  University. 

The  American  Scientific  and  Military  Academy,  the  forerunner  of 
Norwich  University  which  was  incorporated  in  1834,  was  founded  by 
Captain  Aldon  Partridge,  a  West  Point  graduate,  in  1819.  Its  military 
and  academic  activities  have  extended,  therefore,  throughout  nearly  a 
century  in  time.  Under  Capt.  Partridge  the  development  of  the  system 
of  instruction  peculiar  at  that  time  to  the  United  States  Military 
Academy  of  which  he  was  not  only  a  graduate  but  for  many  years  a 
professor  and  later  a  superintendent,  was  continuous  and  progressive. 
Unfortunately  located  geographically,  its  patronage  was  never  large 
and  was  confined  in  great  measure  to  the  New  England  section;  and 
yet  its  graduates  became  in  time  widely  scattered  and  served  as  pio- 
neers in  the  development  of  foundations  similar  to  that  of  their 
alma  mater. 

In  our  various  wars  the  record  of  Norwich  University  men  and 
through  them  the  record  of  the  institution  that  fostered  and  trained 
them  has  been  most  praiseworthy. 

248 


In  the  Black  Hawk  War  nine  eleves  of  this  institution  served  as 
officers;  in  the  Seminole  War,  17;  in  the  Mexican  War,  50.  In  the 
Civil  War,  the  fratricidal  strife  of  '61-'65,  the  services  of  the  eleves 
and  graduates  of  Norwich  University  were  peculiarly  distinguished. 
For  the  Federal  land  forces  it  furnished  504  officers;  for  the  Con- 
federate forces,  34.  For  the  Federal  navy,  85  officers;  for  the  Con- 
federate navy,  3  officers  and  2  engineers;  a  total  for  the  armies  and 
navies  of  the  contending  forces  of  628  officers.  Of  this  number  9 
served  as  major-generals,  32  as  brigadier-generals,  70  as  colonels,  31 
as  lieutenant-colonels,  36  as  majors,  155  as  captains,  70  as  first  lieu- 
tenants, and  36  as  second  lieutenants.  This  is  indeed  an  honorable 
record.  But,  perhaps,  the  greatest  service  of  this  institution  during 
une  Civil  War  was  that  rendered  by  its  eleves  in  drilling  and  reducing 
to  discipline  the  hosts  of  recruits  placed  under  their  instruction.  All 
praise  then  tc  this  noble  institution  and  to  the  services  it  has  rendered 
to  our  now  happily  reunited  country.  It  has  weathered  many  a  storm 
in  its  long  history  and  is  prepared  to  render,  under  its  present  man- 
agement, a  continued,  if  not  a  greater  service,  to  the  nation. 

And  no  less  noteworthy  and  praiseworthy  has  been  the  service 
rendered  by  its  younger  Southern  sister,  the  Virginia  Military  In- 
stitute. 

Founded  in  1839  by  the  State  of  Virginia  and  fostered  through- 
out all  the  subsequent  years  by  that  Commonwealth,  this  institution 
has  a  record  of  achievement  along  lines  of  both  civic  and  military 
endeavor  that  is  somewhat  unique  in  the  history  of  American  institu- 
tions of  learning.  Like  Norwich  University  it,  too,  was  founded  and 
fostered  by  graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy.  The 
president  of  its  first  Board  of  Visitors  was  Col.  Claude  Crozet,  a 
graduate  of  the  Ecole  Politechnique  of  Paris,  a  soldier  under  Na- 
poleon and  later  a  professor  in  the  United  States  Military  Academy. 
Resigning  his  position  at  the  National  Academy,  Col.  Crozet  came  to 
Virginia  as  engineer-in-charge  of  one  of  the  State's  important  railroad 
developments.  While  a  resident  of  the  State,  the  Virginia  Military 
Institute  was  founded  and  he  was  appointed  a  member  of  its  first 
Board  of  Visitors.  Through  his  instrumentality  largely,  Col.  F.  H. 
Smith,  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  of  the  class  of  '33,  was  selected  as  its 
first  superintendent,  a  position  which  he  held  for  fifty  years  and  from 
which  he  retired  full  of  years  and  of  honor  in  1890.     Its  academic 

249 


and  military  staff,  in  its  early  history,  was  composed  almost  exclusively 
of  graduates  or  eleves  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy.  Major 
Thomas  H.  Williamson,  a  classmate  of  Gen.  Smith,  was  in  1841  elected 
professor  of  tactics  and  drawing  and  assigned  to  duty  as  commandant 
of  cadets;  in  1846,  Col.  William  Gilham,  class  1840,  U.  S.  M.  A.,  was 
elected  professor  of  physical  sciences  and  assigned  to  duty  as  com- 
mandant of  cadets,  thus  relieving  Major  Williamson,  the  duties  of 
whose  chair  had  become,  in  the  growth  of  the  school,  over-burdensome. 
In  1851  another  professor  was  required.  After  a  careful  consideration 
of  the  names  of  McClellan,  Reno,  Rosecrans  and  A.  P.  Stewart,  all 
graduates  of  West  Point  and  all  subsequently  distinguished  officers 
in  the  Civil  War,  Major  T.  J.  Jackson,  another  West  Point  graduate, 
who  later  became  the  distinguished  Southern  soldier,  Lieutenant- 
General  Stonewall  Jackson,  was  selected. 

Of  an  institution  founded  and  shaped  by  such  men  the  country 
might  well  expect  distinguished  services  and  such  services  have  been 
rendered. 

Though  only  seven  years  of  age  at  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican 
War,  the  records  show  that  this  institution  furnished  25  officers  to  the 
American  forces.  In  the  Civil  War,  '61-'65,  94  per  cent  of  its  living 
matriculates  were  engaged  in  military  operations,  many  on  the  Con- 
federate and  not  a  few  on  the  Federal  side.  A  large  per  cent  (45i/^) 
of  its  eleves  were  officers  in  the  Confederate  Army,  varying  in  rank 
from  major-gnerals  to  lieutenants.  The  record  of  this  institution 
shows  a  total  of  790  officers.  Of  this  number  there  were  three  major- 
generals,  17  brigadier-generals,  92  colonels,  107  majors,  306  captains 
and  221  lieutenants.  In  addition  to  this  number  there  were  fifteen  of 
its  graduates  who  served  as  officers  in  the  Federal  army,  including 
1  brigadier-general,  4  colonels,  3  majors  and  3  captains. 

Considering  the  fact  that  this  institution  had  been  in  operation 
only  twenty-two  years  and  that  the  number  of  its  matriculates  in  these 
years  totaled  less  than  1,000,  its  record  is  remarkable. 

It  is  worthy  of  note,  too,  that  from  the  eleves  of  this  institution 
«ere  drawn  a  chief  of  artillery,  an  adjutant-general,  four  chiefs  of 
artillery  to  army  corps,  a  chief  of  ordance  and  an  inspector-general. 

In  the  Spanish-American  War  many  of  its  alumni  responded  to 
a  call  to  the  colors.  Among  the  number  were  6  colonels,  2  lieutenant- 
eolonels,  9  majors  and  more  than  30  captains  and  many  lieutenants. 

250 


1 


To  the  National  Guard,  although  the  record  is  fdr  from  complete, 
this  institution  has  furnished  12  adjutant-generals,  2  inspector-gen- 
erals, 1  judge-advocate  general,  1  surgeon-general,  2  major-generals, 
7  brigadier-generals,  20  colonels,  10  lieutenant-colonels,  12  majors  and 
more  than  50  captains. 

To  the  United  States  Army  it  has  furnished  nearly  two  hundred 
officers  and  has  today  on  the  active  list  of  the  regular  army  more 
officers  than  perhaps  all  other  military  institutions  (civil)  in  the 
United  States  combined. 

As  astonishing  as  the  record  above  given  is  and  as  gratifying 
as  it  must  be  to  the  graduates  and  friends  of  the  institute,  there  is  an 
incident  connected  with  its  history  which  should  prove  particularly 
mteresting  and  suggestive  at  this  time.  When  Virginia  seceded  in 
April,  1861,  the  corps  of  cadets  was  ordered  by  the  Governor  of  the 
State  to  report  at  once  to  Richmond.  On  the  21st  of  April  they  left 
their  parade  ground  under  the  command  of  their  professor  of  natural 
and  experimental  philosophy  and  artillery  tactics.  Major  Thomas  J. 
Jackson,  who  later,  as  Lieutenant-General  T.  J.  (Stonewall)  Jackson, 
astonished  the  world  by  his  martial  prowess. 

In  a  few  days  the  corps  reached  Richmond  and  its  individual  mem- 
bers were  at  once  assigned  to  duty  as  drill  masters  of  the  recruits, 
which  were  ordered  to  assemble  there.  Colonel  William  Gilham,  their 
commandant,  was  placed  in  command  of  the  camp  of  instruction,  known 
as  Camp  Lee,  and  utilizing  in  full  measure  the  services  of  his  boy- 
soldiers,  he  was  enabled  in  a  few  months  to  whip  into  military  shape 
over  20,000  raw  recruits. 

A  historian  of  this  institution  has  well  said: 

"How  fortunate  was  the  South  to  possess  such  an  asset  as  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute!  Only  a  man  of  military  experience  can 
estimate  the  value  of  its  services  at  this  time.  Yet,  the  historian  has 
completely  ignored  its  work,  and  has  failed  to  grasp  the  real  reasons 
for  the  initial  success  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Virginia.  He  has 
failed  to  perceive,  in  his  scrutiny  of  the  natural  characteristics  of  the 
Southern  volunteers,  the  real  reason  for  their  superiority  over  the 
men  of  the  North  in  the  early  days  of  the  war  in  Virginia.  He  has 
failed  to  detect,  standing  there  all  along  the  Confederate  battle  line 
at  Manassas,  500  trained  young  officers,  and  the  200  drill-masters  of 


k 


251 


Camp  Lee,  who  poured  out  from  the  embattled  barracks  at  Lexington 
upon  the  first  call  to  arms!" 

Perhaps  the  historian  was  over-enthusiastic;  if  so,  then  pardon- 
ably so.  It  is  very  certain,  however,  that  the  early  successes  of  the 
Confederate  army  was  in  no  small  measure  attributable  to  the  services 
rendered  by  this  youthful  corps  in  the  beginning  stages  of  the  sectional 
conflict. 

Mindful  of  this  service,  when,  not  long  since,  war  was  threatened 
with  Mexico,  the  Governor  of  Virginia  at  the  suggestion  of  the  govern- 
ing authorities  of  this  institution  tendered  its  equipment,  its  officers 
and  cadets  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  services  similar 
to  those  rendered  the  Confederate  cause  fifty  odd  years  ago. 

In  discussing  this  phase  of  my  topic — "The  Military  School:  Its 
Past  Services  to  the  Nation" — I  have  selected  the  two  institutions, 
Norwich  University  and  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  because  of 
their  age  and  their  consequent  opportunities  for  service.  There  were, 
of  course,  and  now  are,  others  which  rendered  efficient  services  to  the 
nation  in  its  more  recent  wars.  But  the  limits  of  this  paper  preclude 
more  than  a  general  reference  to  them.  It  must  suffice  to  add  that  the 
two  institutions  selected  are  merely  typical  now  of  a  large  number  of 
similarly  organized  institutions — collegiate  and  academic — scattered 
throughout  the  country.  North,  South,  East  and  West;  and  that  the 
services  rendered  in  the  past  by  the  two  institutions  referred  to  is 
strikingly  suggestive  of  what  may  be  expected  of  the  many  now 
existing. 

I  may  now  address  myself  to  the  second  and  more  immediately 
interesting  phase  of  my  topic,  i.  e.,  "The  Military  School — A  National 
Asset. 

A  small  standing  army  is  an  accepted  military  policy  of  our  gov- 
ernment. This  policy  is,  perhaps,  economically  and  politically  sound, 
but  in  announcing  it  I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  favoring  a 
continuance  of  what  would  prove  to  be  in  the  event  of  hostilities  a  mere 
corporal's  guard.  One  hundred  thousand  men,  the  strength  of  our 
present  establishment,  from  which  are  to  be  drawn  at  least  fifty  thou- 
sand for  extra — territorial  service,  is  far  too  small.  Five  hundred 
thousand  is,  in  my  judgment,  a  safe  minimum  for  the  regular  estab- 
lishment and  in  this  view  I  am  supported  by  the  opinions  of  those 

252 


who  ought  to  know,  by  the  expert  soldiers  on  whose  judgment  we  may 
safely  rely. 

It  has  also  been  an  accepted  policy  of  our  government  to  rely,  in 
case  of  either  offensive  or  defensive  operations,  on  the-  citizen  soldier, 
volunteer  or  conscript. 

Accepting  these  two  policies,  first,  a  small  regular  army  and, 
second,  an  army  of  citizen  soldiers,  the  very  pertinent  question  arises 
— and  it  goes  to  the  very  basis  of  preparedness — from  what  source 
are  the  officers  to  command  these  troops  to  be  drawn? 

A  common  soldier  may  perhaps  under  an  intensive  training  sys- 
tem be  rendered  efficient  as  a  fighting  machine  in  a  year's  time.  But 
not  so  with  the  officer — ^his  training  takes  years.  The  West  Point 
graduate  spends  four  years  under  a  rigid  training  and  disciplinary 
system,  preceded  by  general  educational  courses  extending  throughout 
many  years.  And  yet  after  graduation  from  the  academy  he  is  unpre- 
pared to  command  men.  No  one  but  the  "youngster"  himself  just  from 
the  academy  thinks  he  is  qualified  for  important  command  and  even  he 
after  a  few  years  of  experience  with  troops  recognizes  his  earlier 
deficiencies.  No,  it  takes  time  and  training  to  develop  the  officer. 
England  has  learned  the  lesson  through  sad  experience,  and  now,  after 
eighteen  months  of  effort,  she  is  only  beginning  to  rectify  her  de- 
plorable error.  With  knowledge  and  with  bitter  experience  of  our  own 
past  before  us  shall  we  be  guilty  of  such  a  lack  of  foresight?  A  due 
.  regard  for  our  self-preservation  dictates  the  answer.  No ! 

From  whence  then  are  we  to  draw  our  officers  to  command  and  to 
discipline  the  raw  troops  on  which  it  seems  to  me  we  are  to  depend? 

The  question  presents  a  problem  as  yet  unsolved,  and  yet  it  is  a 
problem  which  admits  of  ready  solution,  and  this  in  a  rapid,  con- 
servative and  economical  way.  The  key  to  its  solution  lies  in  the  exist- 
ing military  colleges  and  secondary  schools  of  the  country.  And  the 
method  of  solution  is  found  in  Federal  aid  to  these  institutions.  And 
this  can  be  done  in  either  of  the  following  ways:  First,  extend  the 
policy  already  inaugurated  by  the  War  Department  in  their  dealing 
with  these  institutions.  This  department  has  been  generous  as  the 
law,  broadly  construed,  would  allow;  but  the  law  is  not  sufficiently 
generous  and  broad,  too  much  restricting  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his 
efforts  to  aid.  Let  the  law  be  amended  so  as  to  give  the  Secretary  a 
wider  discretion  in  utilizing  funds  placed  at  his  disposal  and  let  these 

253 


funds  be  larger.  Or,  secondly,  enact  laws  under  the  provisions  of 
which  a  direct  bonus  will  be  given  each  of  these  institutions  for  every 
officer  accepted  by  the  War  Department  for  the  reserve  officers'  corps. 

It  might  be  deemed  wise  to  combine  both  of  these  policies  as 
affording  a  broader  and  more  helpful  means  of  supplying  an  adequate 
corps  of  trained  reserve  officers — a  supply  now  sadly  wanting. 

At  this  point,  I  may  be  permitted,  for  the  sake  of  greater  explicit- 
ness,  to  present  a  letter  written  by  the  speaker  to  the  chairman  of  the 
committee  on  military  affairs  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  with 
memoranda  attached,  as  pertinent  to  the  subject  under  consideration. 
Both  letter  and  memoranda,  it  will  be  observed,  relate  primarily  to 
existing  laws  and  departmental  regulations  promulgated  thereunder. 

The  letter  and  memoranda  read  as  follows: 
Chairman  Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 

House  of  Representatives, 
Washington,  D.  C. : 

My  Dear  Sir — A  small  standing  army  is  an  accepted  policy  of  our 
Government.  In  case  of  offensive  or  defensive  operations  this  army  is 
a  nucleus  around  which  volunteer  troops  and  the  national  guard  is 
expected  to  assemble. 

How  is  this  increased  force  to  be  officered  when  assembled? 

This  question  is  now  agitating  the  press  and  the  public. 

Permit  me  to  suggest  for  your  consideration  the  accompanying 
memoranda.  The  policies  suggested  will,  I  think,  if  enacted  into  law, 
meet  the  demand  in  a  conservative  and  effective  way. 

Very  truly  yours, 

MEMORANDA. 
Reserve  Corps  of  Officers,  U.  S.  Army. 

A  basis  for  a  reserve  corps  of  officers  now  exists.  This  can  be 
developed  and  enlarged  satisfactorily  and  conservatively  in  the  follow- 
ing ways. 

(1)     Agricultural  and  Mechanical  Colleges: 

Modify  existing  laws  regarding  A.  &  M.  Colleges,  so  that 
a  certain  minimum  of  military  instruction  shall  be  given. 
This  minimum  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and 

^        '  254 


to  be  sufficiently  comprehensive  as  to  develop  efficient  reserve 
officers.  Require  all  graduates  of  these  colleges  to  attend  sum- 
mer encampments  for  a  period  of  years  in  order  to  secure  the 
benefit  of  the  intensive  training  they  afford. 

(2)  Honor  Military  Colleges:  ' 

Make  the  \a,w  and  regulations  based  thereon  regarding 
military  colleges  as  defined  and  selected  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment more  liberal.  This  can  be  done  in  either  of  two  ways,  or 
perhaps,  by  both,  as  follows: 

(a)  Give  each  of  the  ten  military  colleges  selected  an- 
nually by  the  War  Department  as  the  best  of  their  class  the 
right  to  appoint  ten  second  lieutenants  in  the  army  under 
such  restrictions  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe. 
This  will  afford  100  additional  officers  annually. 

(b)  Let  each  State  appoint  two  cadets  to  each  of  these 
institutions  on  the  same  basis  as  to  pay  as  now  exists  at  West 
Point. 

As  there  are  forty-eight  States,  two  cadets  from  each 
State  to  each  of  the  ten  military  colleges,  will  keep  960  young 
men  in  constant  training,  who,  on  graduation,  may  be  re- 
quired to  serve  as  reserve  officers. 

(c)  Require  of  this  class  at  least  one  year's  service  with 
the  colors  with  the  pay  and  allowances  of  a  second  lieutenant. 
This  should  be  a  year  of  intensive  instruction  in  the  command 
of  men. 

(3)  Honor  Military  Schools  (Secondary)  : 

Let  each  of  the  ten  military  schools,  the  best  of  their 
class,  send  ten  of  their  graduates  to  the  United  States  Mili- 
tary Academy  each  year  and  so  frame  the  law  that  other 
graduates  of  these  honor  academies  who  may  so  desire  may 
receive  appointments  to  the  honor  military  colleges. 

The  above  plan,  it  is  believed,  will  go  far  to  solve  the 
problem  of  an  efficient  reserve  corp  of  officers  as  it  will  foster 
and  develop  as  a  national  asset  the  military  colleges  and 
schools  of  the  country.  It  will  do  more — it  will  result  in 
propagating  a  knowledge  of  our  military  history  and  methods 


255 


and  tend  to  create  other  military  institutions  and  agencies  in 
the  various  States. 

It  will  incidentally  tend  to  foster  and  develop  the  Na- 
tional Guard  and  increase  its  efficiency. 

And  now  permit  me  just  a  word  in  conclusion,  nearly  three  hun- 
dred years  ago,  Cromwell,  in  an  order  to  the  armies  of  the  Common- 
wealth, concluded  with  the  significant  expression: 

"Trust  in  God  but  keep  your  powder  dry." 

I  submit  the  phrase  to  you  as  a  slogan  of  the  National  Security 
League — as  a  slogan  indeed  in  these  doubtful  times  of  the  nation.  Its 
first  clause  will  meet  the  views  of  the  extreme  pacifist,  while  the  last 
clause  will  meet  those  of  the  extreme  militarist.  But  both  of  these 
elements,  fortunately  small,  are  practically  negligible  in  shaping  our 
governmental  policies.  What  is  of  real  importance  is  that  the  two 
clauses,  when  combined — "Trust  in  God,  but  keep  your  powder  dry" — 
will  commend  itself  as  embodying  a  sound  policy  to  the  practical  think- 
ing men  of  the  country — men  who  want  peace,  yet  men  who  dare  to  be 
prepared  to  demand  it. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Huidekoper,  who  will  be  the  next  speaker, 
desires  a  few  moments  in  which  to  prepare  certain  matters,  and  in 
connection  with  the  remarks  of  the  last  speaker  I  beg  your  indulgence 
for  just  a  moment  while  I  call  attention  to  an  incident  which  came 
under  my  personal  ob«ervation  some  ten  months  past.  I  was  strolling 
through  our  coast  defenses  at  Sandy  Hook  with  a  guide  who  was  a 
former  member  of  the  United  States  army,  a  graduate  of  West  Point, 
though  now  engaged  in  civil  life.  We  got  to  talking  of  the  conditions 
in  this  country,  and  he  made  this  significant  remark,  "There  is  no 
class  of  American  citizens  to-day  who  so  ardently  desire  peace  as  the 
officers  of  the  American  army.  They  know  that  with  the  paucity  of 
men,  with  the  paucity  of  officers  to  drill  and  direct  those  men,  a 
declaration  of  war  means,  for  them,  death.  If  such  be  the  case,  what 
better  policy  can  be  adopted  than  that  which  has  just  been  suggested, 
by  General  Nichols,  of  making  the  schools  of  this  country,  the  schools 
where  are  gathered  some  of  the  best  and  the  brightest  of  the  rising 
generation,  schools  from  which  shall  be  drawn  a  reserve  corps  of 
officers,  suited  alike  to  command  if  occasion  calls  for  it,  and  drill  those 
who  may  be  recruited  in  time  of  emergency,  so  that  no  longer  shall 

256 


those  who  have  taken  up  for  their  life  work  the  maintenance  of  the 
American  position  feel  that  the  first  tocsin  in  a  war  sounds  for  them 
a  knell  of  death?     (Applause.) 

For  the  last  ten  years  there  has  been  one  whose  voice,  whose 
brain,  whose  pen,  have  been  constantly  employed  in  the  endeavor  to 
awaken  to  a  full  realization  of  the  conditions  which  confront  us  as  a 
nation — the  gentleman  whom  I  am  about  to  present  to  this  gathering. 
How  well  he  has  succeeded  as  the  result  of  that  study  is  amply  attested 
by  those  who  have  made  it  a  special  study.  In  his  latest  work,  where 
he  has  outlined  the  needs  of  the  present  time,  they  have  been  so  clearly 
set  before  the  people  of  this  country  that  they  have  been  adopted  by 
the  Army  War  Board  as  forming  the  truest  guide.  To  many  of  this 
audience  he  needs  no  introduction,  but  I  trust  I  may  be  pardoned  if 
I  quote  a  comment  on  his  latest  work,  which  appeared  in  the  January 
number  of  this  year  of  the  "London  Spectator,"  to  show  that  that 
appreciation  which  we  all  feel  for  him  is  not  caused  by  mere  personal 
or  partisan  affection,  but  that  it  arises  from  sterling  worth.  In  the 
review  of  the  book  published  jointly  by  General  Wood  and  Mr.  Huide- 
koper,  the  "Spectator"  speaks  of  it  as  follows: 

"We  have  never  seen  American  history  handled  more  candidly  by 
Americans  than  these  men  handle  it.    They  are  in  deadly  earnest." 

Now  for  a  word  in  particular  with  regard  to  Mr.  Huidekoper's 
examination  of  the  whole  of  American  History.  It  is  a  remarkable 
book.  The  "Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,"  by  General  Upton, 
has  long  been  the  standard  work  for  all  who  studied  American  military 
history,  but  Mr.  Huidekoper  has  improved  upon  and  amplified  that 
famous  work.  His  book  is  just  what  is  wanted  to  lay  the  facts  in 
detail  before  America.  We  sincerely  trust  that  they  will  be,  before  it 
is  too  late. 

It  is  with  unusual  pleasure  that  I  present  to  this  audience  Mr. 
Frederic  L.  Huidekoper  of  the  City  of  Washington.     (Applause.) 

MILITARY  HISTORY  AND  POLICY 
Frederic  L.  Huidekoper,  District  of  Columbia 

Mr.  Huidekoper:  Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen — I  have 
been  asked  to  speak  to  you  about  military  history  and  military  policy. 

257 


Of  military  history  we  have  an  abundance  of  extraordinarily  in- 
teresting material — much  more  than  could  even  be  alluded  to  in  the 
limited  time  at  my  disposal.  Military  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be 
disposed  of  in  a  fevi^  words,  for  the  very  good  reason  that  the  United 
States  has  never  possessed  a  military  policy  or  anything  approaching 
a  consistent  military  policy,  unless  an  unlimited  capacity  for  blunder- 
ing in  military  matters  can  be  termed  a  policy. 

I  desire  to  lay  particular  emphasis  upon  the  fact  that  our  his- 
torians and  the  writers  of  American  school  books  have  painted  in 
glowing  colors  the  successes  which  have  attended  our  former  wars, 
but  that,  almost  without  exception,  they  have  suppressed  with  studied 
care  the  disasters  which  we  have  so  often  suffered  and  the  blunders 
which  have  been  committed  so  frequently  owing  to  the  total  absence  of 
a  proper  military  policy. 

Prior  to  the  Revolution  the  American  colonies  possessed  no  thor- 
oughly organized  or  regular  military  force.  All  that  they  had  was 
militia,  Vv^hile  Great  Britain  furnished  the  regular  troops.  The  frontier 
conditions,  however,  made  most  of  the  able-bodied  men  good  shots, 
hardy  and  resourceful,  so  that  they  possessed  the  main  elements  of 
good  soldiers,  although  they  were  devoid  of  that  discipline  which  alone 
can  give  the  cohesion  that  typifies  a  dependable  military  organization. 

At  Fort  Duquesne  (July  9,  1755),  the  British  fought  in  mass 
formation,  whereas  the  Indians  used  the  open  or  skirmish  order  which 
most  of  the  nations  have  subsequently  adopted  as  the  best  method  of 
making  infantry  attacks.  Few  historians  have  appreciated  the  fact 
that  Braddock'?  defeat  was  in  reality  a  blessing  in  disguise.  It  bred 
in  the  American  colonists  a  contempt — often  unwarranted  to  be  sure 
— for  the  European  method  of  fighting  in  close  formation,  shook  their 
belief  in  the  invincibility  of  British  troops,  forced  them  to  rely  upon 
themselves  instead  of  trusting  supinely  to  England's  protecting  aegis, 
and  confirmed  in  them  the  conviction  that  they  could  successfully  with- 
stand British  regulars. 

Before  the  Revolution  the  Massachusetts  Bay  Colony  organized 
one-third  of  its  militia  into  "minute  men,"  who  held  themselves  in 
readiness  to  respond  to  a  call  to  arms  at  a  moment's  notice. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  all  the  Colonies  made  use  of  the  voluntary 
system  in  obtaining  troops  and  called  out  men  for  brief  periods  of 
service,  thus  inaugurating  the  system  of  short  enlistments  which  has 

258 


been  the  bane  of  our  military  service  from  that  day  to  this,  as  well  as 
the  origin  of  most  of  our  military  blunders  and  of  the  enormous  cost  of 
our  wars. 

A  fair  instance  of  the  detrimental  effect  exercised  by  this  pernici- 
ous system  is  to  be  found  in  the  attack  which  Benedict  Arnold  was 
forced  to  make  on  Montreal  on  December  31,  1775,  because  the  enlist- 
ments of  most  of  his  men  were  to  expire  next  day.  As  a  result,  Gen- 
eral Montgomery  was  killed,  Arnold  wounded,  the  majority  of  his 
troops  were  killed  or  captured,  and  his  invasion  of  Canada  ended  in 
hopeless  disaster. 

Our  military  history  teems  with  just  such  instances  as  this. 
Time  and  again  generals  have  been  compelled  to  act  against  their 
judgment  and  in  opposition  to  military  wisdom,  because  the  terms  of 
service  of  their  troops  were  on  the  eve  of  expiration.  As  examples 
of  this,  one  has  only  to  recall  McDowell  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run 
and  Hooker  at  Chancellors ville  in  1863.  In  other  cases,  generals  have 
found  themselves  unable  to  move  as  did  Scott  after  the  battle  of  Cerro 
Gordo  in  the  Mexican  War. 

During  the  Revolution  the  American  Colonies  were  banded  to- 
gether as  a  confederation — a  loosely-knit  political  organization  which 
by  its  very  nature  does  not,  and  cannot,  possess  those  elements  of 
unity  and  strength  which  must  be  despotically  used  by  the  central 
government  if  war  is  to  be  conducted  efficiently  and  with  the  minimum 
of  bloodshed  and  cost. 

This  was  one  of  the  principal  factors  which  made  it  impossible 
to  put  into  effect  a  comprehensive  or  consistent  military  policy.  As  a 
result,  temporary  expedients  caused  the  commission  of  every  known 
military  blunder.  Troops  were  almost  invariably  enlisted  for  short 
periods — so  short,  as  a  rule,  that  they  no  sooner  were  trained  into 
dependable  soldiers  than  they  nad  to  be  discharged — and  the  men 
naturally  preferred  service  in  the  militia — in  which  the  discipline  was 
obviously  lax — rather  than  in  the  Continentals  or  regulars  in  which  the 
discipline  was  much  more  strict. 

To  each  State  was  allotted  a  certain  quota  of  troops  to  be  fur- 
nished, but  the  central  government  was  powerless  to  enforce  its  de- 
mand. When  the  initial  enthusiasm  for  the  war  had  subsided — as  it 
always  does  within  a  short  time  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities — the 


i 


259 


states  resorted  to  bounties  to  obtain  men  and  ended  by  outbidding  the 
United  States  completely,  Virginia  paying  as  high  as  $750  per  man. 

In  consequence  of  the  dependence  placed  upon  raw  and  untrained 
troops  and  the  lack  of  co-ordination  between  the  central  government 
and  the  various  States,  the  largest  force  that  Washington  was  ever 
able  to  assemble  for  battle  was  only  17,000  men.  At  Trenton  (Decem- 
ber 26,  1776)  and  Princeton  (January  3,  1777)— when  the  fate  of  the 
American  cause  trembled  in  the  balance — his  effective  strength  was 
less  than  4,000. 

The  maximum  force  raised  by  the  Colonies  in  any  one  year, 
namely,  1776,  was  89,661,  whereas  the  British  had  only  about  42,000. 
The  combination  of  mismanagement  and  other  blunders  prolonged  the 
Revolutionary  War  for  seven  years,  and  we  must  distinctly  bear  in 
mind  that  the  only  two  military  events  which  had  a  direct  bearing 
upon  the  ultimate  expulsion  of  the  British  were  (a)  the  battle  of 
Saratoga  where  Burgoyne  surrendered  with  5,763  men,  and  (b)  York- 
town  where  Cornwallis  capitulated  with  7,973  troops. 

The  fear  of  "militarism"  caused  the  wise  plan  suggested  by 
Greene  and  the  reiterated  recommendations  of  Washington  to  go  un- 
heeded and,  as  a  logical  consequence,  our  first  war  was  attended  by 
an  extravagance  in  men  and  money  utterly  unjustifiable.  Of  regulars 
or  Continental  troops  231,771  and  no  less  than  164,087  militia  saw 
service,  a  total  of  395,858,  whereas  the  entire  British  force  from  first 
to  last  was  only  about  150,605 — in  other  words  the  Americans  used 
nearly  three  men  to  their  enemy's  one.  The  war  cost  the  United 
States  $370,000,000,  and  pensions  to  the  amount  of  $70,000,000  have 
been  paid  in  consequence  of  it. 

After  the  Revolution  Congress  gave  indication  of  its  future  course 
by  dispersing  all  of  the  Continental  army  except  80  soldiers  destined 
to  guard  the  public  stores. 

During  the  period  from  the  close  of  the  Revolution  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  War  of  1812,  the  only  notable  increase  made  in  the  army 
was  in  the  year  1798-99,  when  complications  with  France,  Spain  and 
England  were  brewing  but,  when  they  had  passed,  the  army  was 
promptly  reduced  to  less  than  3.300  men. 

The  Act  of  April  30,  1790,  laid  the  foundation  of  the  volunteer 
system  which  we  have  largely  followed  ever  since. 

260 


The  advent  of  Jefferson  was  a  signal  for  the  principle  of  depend- 
ence upon  a  citizen-soldiery  quite  similar  to  that  which  the  present 
administration  now  advocates. 

The  less  we  Americans  say  about  the  War  of  1812,  the  better, 
because  more  fiascoes  and  failures  happened  during  that  war  than 
during  almost  any  other  on  record. 

When  people  talk  of  the  impossibility  of  any  nation  invading  the 
United  States,  let  them  remember  that  on  August  24,  1813,  the  army 
defending  Washington  was  routed  at  Bladensburg  with  a  loss  of  only 
eight  killed  and  eleven  wounded. 

The  National  Capital  was  burned  by  1,500  British,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  more  than  100,000  militia  were  called  out  in  Pennsylvania, 
Maryland  and  Virginia  to  oppose  them. 

We  must  distinctly  remember  that  Lundy's  Lane  was  a  drawn 
battle  and  that  "the  only  decisive  victory  of  the  War  of  1812  before 
the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  -peace  was  at  the  battle  of  the  Thames 
where  the  force  of  British  regulars  dispersed  or  captured  numbered 
but  little  more  than  800." 

Americans  point  with  pride  to  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  but  our 
historians  have  carefully  glossed  over  the  true  facts.  On  the  left  or 
east  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  General  Pakenham,  with  the  flower  of 
Wellington's  peninsular  army,  attacked  Jackson's  entrenchments  over 
ground  as  smooth  as  a  glacis,  but  was  repulsed  with  frightful  carnage. 

Colonel  Thornton,  however,  routed  Morgan's  militia  on  the  west 
bank.  Just  when  the  Americans  across  the  river  were  cheering  over 
a  victory  still  unexampled  in  our  history,  just  when  the  advance  of  a 
skirmish  line  might  have  brought  about  the  capture  of  the  British 
army,  Jackson  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the  Kentuckians  "aban- 
don their  position  and  run  in  headlong  flight  toward  the  city."  Driving 
the  Louisianians  out  of  their  entrenchments  and  gaining  possession  of 
Morgan's  line,  Thornton  routed  Patterson's  battery,  but  the  debacle  of 
the  British  on  the  other  bank  and  orders  to  rejoin  the  main  army  com- 
pelled him  to  fall  back  and  to  re-embark  his  troops  at  the  close  of  the 
day — facts  which  are  carefully  suppressed  by  our  historians. 

During  the  War  of  1812  the  United  States  employed  56,032  regu- 
lars and  471,622  militia  or  volunteers  against  a  force  of  about  67,000 
British.  The  war  cost  $86,627,009,  while  the  pensions  amounted  on 
June  30,  1915,  to  $45,972,805. 

261 


In  1813,  began  the  first  of  our  Indian  wars  and  the  following 
figures  show  the  mismanagement  by  the  American  Government  with- 
out any  commentary  being  necessary: 


War  Regulars 

Creek    600 

About 
Seminole  1,000 

Black   Hawk 1,341 

Florida   12,539 


Vlilitia, 
Volun- 

eers,  etc. 

Opponents 

Cost 

43,921 

About  2,000 

Unestimated 

5,911 

"  1,000 
Between 

$8,004,236 

4,638 

800  &  1,000 
Between 

5,446,034 

48,152 

1,200  &  2,000 

69,751,611 

The  total  pensions  for  the  Indian  wars  amounted  on  June  30,  1915, 
to  $13,315,227. 

In  1820  a  reduction  in  the  army  was  contemplated  and  in  Decem- 
ber of  that  year,  Hon.  John  C.  Calhoun,  Secretary  of  War,  presented 
his  plan  in  conformity  with  a  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. In  it  he  summarized  better  than  anybody  else  has  ever  done 
the  essentials  in  the  organization  of  an  army,  which  have  been  now 
adopted  by  every  great  nation,  declaring  that : 

"To  give  such  an  organization,  the  leading  principles  in  its  forma- 
tion ought  to  be,  that  AT  THE  COMMENCEMENT  OF  HOSTILI- 
TIES THERE  SHOULD  BE  NOTHING  EITHER  TO  NEW  MODEL 
OR  TO  CREATE.  The  only  difference,  consequently,  between  the 
peace  and  war  formation  of  the  Army,  ought  to  be  in  the  increased 
magnitude  of  the  latter,  and  the  only  change  in  passing  from  the 
former  to  the  latter  should  consist  in  giving  to  it  the  augmentation 
which  will  then  be  necessary. 

It  is  thus,  and  thus  only,  the  dangerous  transition  from  peace  to 
war  may  be  made  without  confusion  or  disorder,  and  the  weakness  and 
danger  which  otherwise  would  be  inevitable,  be  avoided.  Tioo  conse- 
quences result  from  this  principle :  First,  the  organization  of  the  staff 
in  a  peace  establishment  ought  to  be  such  that  every  branch  of  it 
should  be  completely  formed,  with  such  extension  as  the  number  of 
troops  and  posts  occupied  may  render  necessary;  and,  secondly,  that 


262 


the  organization  of  the  tine  ought,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  be  such 
that  171  passing  from  the  peace  to  the  war  formation,  the  force  may  be 
sufficiently  augmented  without  addiyig  neio  regiments  or  battalions, 
thus  raising  the  war,  on  the  basis  of  the  peace  establishment,  instead 
of  creating  a  new  army  to  be  added  to  the  old,  as  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  late  war." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War  Congress  gave  an  admirable 
example  of  the  hasty  legislation  which  it  has  usually  enacted  on  the 
eve,  or  after  the  beginning,  of  hostilities.  It  authorized  President  Polk 
to  call  for  50,000  volunteers  "to  serve  the  twelve  months  after  they 
shall  have  arrived  at  the  place  of  rendezvous,  or  to  the  end  of  the  war." 

General  Zachary  Taylor  conquered  the  northern  provinces,  win- 
ning the  notable  battles  of  Monterey  and  Buena  Vista,  but  at  the  be- 
ginning of  1847  he  was  stripped  of  his  best  troops  who  were  destined 
to  re-enforce  General  Scott.  This  latter  general  captured  Vera  Cruz 
and,  on  April  18th,  gained  such  a  decisive  victory  at  Cerro  Gordo 
that,  as  he  expressed  it,  "Mexico  has  no  longer  an  army."  About  one 
month  later  at  Puebla,  his  progress  came  to  a  sudden  halt  because  the 
terms  of  enlistment  of  seven  out  of  his  eleven  best  regiments  were  on 
the  eve  of  expiring,  and  Scott  discovered  that  most  of  the  men  in- 
tended to  exercise  the  alternative  offered  to  them  upon  enlistment  and 
to  terminate  their  service  at  the  end  of  twelve  months.  In  the  midst 
of  a  hostile  country  and  only  three  days  march  from  the  capital,  with 
virtually  no  enemy  to  oppose  him,  Scott  was  unable  to  budge  for  more 
than  three  months  until  he  had  been  joined  by  re-enforcements — all 
of  them  raw  by  comparison  with  the  troops  which  had  left  him.  For 
three  months  his  situation  was  very  precarious  and  it  was  only  good 
luck  that  averted  a  calamity.  When  he  did  fight  his  way  into  Mexico 
in  August,  1847,  it  was  at  a  loss  for  which  there  was  no  justification. 

These  facts  our  historians  have  carefully  suppressed.  As  a  result 
of  the  mismanagement  by  the  government,  the  United  States  was  com- 
pelled to  use  in  the  Mexican  War  31,024  regulars,  73,532  militia  and 
volunteers  against  about  46,000  Mexicans,  at  a  cost  of  $88,500,208 ;  and 
the  pensions  up  to  June  30,  1915,  were  not  less  than  $49,618,948. 

At  the  end  of  the  war  Congress  promptly  reduced  the  army  to 
10,317  men  and  was  so  indifferent  to  our  military  needs  that,  at  the 
close  of  i860,  we  presented  to  the  world  the  spectacle  of  a  great  nation 
virtually  destitute  of  military  forces. 

263 


The  organization  of  the  50,000  volunteers  called  out  by  President 
Lincoln  on  May  3rd,  was  "tossed  over"  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury. Luckily  three  experienced  officers  were  detailed  to  assist  Mr. 
Chase,  and  their  decision  that  the  term  of  service  should  be  fixed  at 
three  years  alone  prevented  the  dissolution  of  the  Union. 

The  clamor  in  the  North  that  the  75,000  volunteers  called  out  on 
April  15th  for  three  months  should  be  led  to  battle  forced  General 
McDowell  to  fight  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  The  result  is  well 
known.  Some  of  the  Northern  troops  never  stopped  running  until  they 
got  to  Baltimore.  As  the  result  of  this  battle,  the  South  was  de- 
moralized by  victory  and  the  North  by  defeat,  and  nothing  further 
of  importance  occurred  that  year  notwithstanding  that  there  were 
437,105  more  Federal  troops  under  arms  than  Confederates.  Of  the 
military  legislation  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  it  may  be 
said  that  it  was  characterized  more  by  short-sighted  than  by  wise 
measures.  Broadly  speaking,  during  these  first  two  years,  especially 
during  1862,  "the  Government  and  the  Confederates  conducted  the  war 
on  contrary  principles.  The  Government  sought  to  save  the  Union 
by  fighting  as  a  Confederacy;  the  Confederates  sought  to  destroy  it  by 
fighting  as  a  nation.  The  Government  recognized  the  States,  appealed 
to  them  for  troops,  adhered  to  voluntary  enlistments,  gave  the  gov- 
ernors power  to  appoint  all  commissioned  officers  and  encouraged  therii 
to  organize  new  regiments.  The  Confederates  abandoned  State  sov- 
ereignty, appealed  directly  to  the  people,  took  away  from  them  the 
power  to  appoint  commissioned  officers,  vested  their  appointment  in 
the  Confederate  President,  refused  to  organize  war  regiments,  aban- 
doned voluntary  enlistments,  and,  adopting  the  republican  principle 
that  every  citizen  owes  his  cotmtry  military  service,  called  into  the 
army  every  white  man  between  the  ages  of  18  and. 85." 

At  the  end  of  1862  there  was  every  indication  that  the  Confed- 
eracy would  be  successful.  The  system  of  voluntarly  enlistments  em- 
ployed by  the  North  broke  down  completely  under  the  stress  of  war. 

On  March  3,  1863,  Congress  enacted  the  first  law  whereby  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  appealed  directly  to  the  people  to 
create  large  armies  without  the  intervention  of  the  authorities  of  the 
various  States  of  the  Union. 


264 


1 


During  July,  1863,  draft  riots  occurred  in  New  York  and  else- 
where, necessitating  the  sending  of  fully  10,000  regular  troops  to 
quell  them. 

In  the  first  week  of  July,  1863,  the  tide  turned  with  the  Union 
victories  of  Gettysburg  in  the  east  and  Vicksburg  in  the  west.  The 
influence  of  defective  legislation  on  General  Grant  is  best  told  in  his 
own  memoirs: 

"The  campaign  of  Vicksburg  was  suggested  and  developed  by  cir- 
cumstances. The  elections  of  1862  had  gone  against  the  prosecution 
of  the  war.  Voluntary  enlistments  had  nearly  ceased  and  the  draft 
had  been  resorted  to;  this  was  resisted,  and  a  defeat  or  backward 
movement  would  have  made  its  execution  impossible.  A  forward  move- 
ment to  a  decisive  victory  was  necessary.     *     *     * 

«-x  *  *  A  rapid  movement  west  was  made;  the  garrison  of 
Vicksburg  was  met  in  two  engagements  and  badly  defeated,  and  driven 
back  into  its  stronghold  and  there  successfully  besieged.  It  looks  now 
as  though  Providence  had  directed  the  course  of  the  campaign  while 
the  Army. of  the  Tennessee  executed  the  decree." 

It  was  not  until  March,  1864,  that  the  Federal  Government  con- 
centrated its  entire  power  in  the  hands  of  General  Grant  and  thence- 
forth it  was  only  a  question  of  wearing  out  the  Confederacy,  but  Con- 
gress was  obliged  to  enact  several  measures  before  it  finally  obtained 
laws  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  meet  the  grave  situation.  Between 
the  defective  military  legislation  and  the  blunders  committed  by  the 
Northern  generals  in  the  field,  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  was  immensely 
costly.  No  less  than  67,000  regulars  and  2,606,341  volunteers  and 
militia  had  had  to  be  employed  by  the  United  States  to  conquer  the 
military  forces  of  the  Confederacy  which  have  never  been  estimated 
to  exceed  1,500,000  and  which  were  probably  nearer  1,000,000.  The 
four  years'  struggle  cost  the  United  States  the  enormous  amount  of 
$5,371,079,778.28,  and  on  June  30,  1915,  $4,614,643,267  had  already 
been  paid  out  in  pensions  on  account  of  this  war,  with  the  end  not  yet 
in  sight. 

This  war  was  accompanied  by  short  enlistments,  bounties,  bounty 
jumping,  and  all  the  other  evils  that  invariably  accompany  the  per- 
nicious system  followed  by  the  North. 

Sixteen  months  after  the  close  of  the  war  the  Regular  Army  was 
increased  from  39,273  to  54,641  (Act  of  July  28,  1866) ,  owing  to  the 

265 


French  occupation  of  Mexico.  In  1867,  however,  the  French  forces 
were  withdrawn  and  two  years  later  began  a  series  of  Acts  by  which 
the  army  was  reduced  to  25,000. 

Few  Americans  appreciate  that,  while  nations  may  be  weakened 
internally  by  war,  they  are  never  externally  weakened  in  their  foreign 
relations.  The  French  evacuation  of  Mexico  and  the  alacrity  with 
which  Great  Britain  agreed  to  compromise  the  Alabama  claims  were 
due  solely  to  the  fact  that  the  United  States  was  strong  enough  to 
enforce  its  demands.  In  view  of  this  fact  the  arguments  of  the  pa- 
cifists or  pacificists — personally,  I  think  they  ought  to  be  termed 
"pussy-fists" — completely  fall  to  the  ground. 

After  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  there  is  little  of  interest  except 
the  creation  of  the  Board  of  Fortifications  and  other  Defenses,  better 
known  as  the  Endicott  Board  (Act  of  March  3,  1885),  which  made  its 
report  on  January  3,  1886,  thus  inaugurating  the  present  scheme  of 
coast  defenses. 

In  spite  of  the  lessons  of  the  past,  in  April,  1898,  the  Regular 
Army  consisted  of  28,183  officers  and  men,  in  other  words,  less  than 
four  one-hundredths  of  one  per  cent  of  our  estimated  population.  In 
this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  at  the  beginning  of  no 
decade  save  one  (1810)  have  we  possessed  as  many  as  one  trained 
soldier  to  each  1,000  of  inhabitants. 

Notwithstanding  the  recommendations  of  the  Endicott  Board  only 
151  guns  out  of  the  2,362  recommended  for  the  coast  fortifications  had 
been  placed  in  position.  Everything  was  in  chaos.  The  army  was  far 
too  small  and  there  was  not  a  sufficiency  of  arms,  ammunition  or  other 
supplies.    No  general  staff  existed  and  no  plans  had  been  formulated. 

The  Act  of  March  9,  1898,  appropriated  $50,000,000,  but  limited  it 
to  "national  defense"  so  that  nothing,  except  the  improvement  of  coast 
fortifications,  could  be  done  to  prepare  for  offensive  war.  Once  again 
Congress  indulged  in  its  proclivity  for  short  enlistments  and  fixed  the 
term  of  service  for  troops  at  two  years  instead  of  "for  the  war,"  as  it 
ought  to  have  done.  The  confusion  which  attended  the  embarking  of 
Shafter's  forces  at  Tampa  is  still  too  vivid  to  require  repetition  here. 
This  expedition,  numbering  16,887  officers  and  men,  embraced  the  very 
flower  of  the  Regular  Army,  as  well  as  the  pick  of  the  volunteer  regi- 
ments of  which  there  were  three — the  Rough  Riders,  the  71st  New 
York  and  the  2nd  Massachusetts. 


266 


In  Cuba  there  were  196,820  Spanish  veterans,  of  Which  36^82 
were  stationed  in  the  Province  of  Santiago. 

By  the  grace  of  God,  Santiago  was  captured,  notwithstanding  the 
blunders  made  and  the  outbreak  of  yellow  fever  in  the  American  army, 
which  luckily  was  unknown  to  General  Torral.  Far  different  would 
have  been  the  story  had  the  Spanish  commanders  been  of  the  stamp 
of  the  German  generals  of  to-day  instead  of  incapables  like  Blanco  and 
Linares.  "In  war  men  are  nothing — it  is  a  man  who  is  everything," 
said  Napoleon. 

The  campaigns  in  Porto  Rico  and  in  the  Philippines,  on  the  other 
hand,  where  ably  handled  by  General  Miles  and  General  Merritt. 

The  Spariish-American  War  is  the  only  one  in  which  the  United 
States  did  not  have  to  employ  at  least  two,  and  often  many  times  more, 
men  to  every  one  used  by  its  adversary.  In  this  war  the  United  States 
used  58,688  Regular  troops  and  223,235  volunteers  to  oppose  Spanish 
forces  numbering  about  228,160,  at  a  cost  of  $321,833,254.76,  and  the 
pensions  for  this  war,  taken  in  conjunction  with  those  paid  out  for  the 
Philippine  insurrection,  have  already  amounted  to  no  less  than 
$49,944,441. 

The  extraordinary  collapse  of  the  Spanish  resistance  was  very 
fortunate  for  the  United  States  since  in  September,  1898,  there  was 
every  indication  that  the  volunteer  system  would  have  broken  down 
completely  had  the  war  been  prolonged. 

The  volunteers  sent  to  the  Philippines  under  General  Merritt  had 
to  be  retained  in  service  after  their  term  of  enlistment  had  legalfer 
expired,  because  Congress  had  failed  to  supply  a  regular  army  suf- 
ficiently large  or  to  provide  any  troops  to  replace  the  volunteers  ol 
1898  whose  term  of  service  was  to  expire  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  unselfish  response  of  the  volunteers  who  went 
out  under  General  Merritt,  those  islands  would  have  had  to  be 
abandoned — facts  which  our  historians  and  the  writers  of  our  school 
books  have  carefully  suppressed. 

The  Philippine  insurrection  began  on  February  4,  1899,  but  it  was 
not  until  March  2nd  of  that  year  that  Congress  created  the  best  volun- 
teer force  we  have  ever  possessed.  In  consequence  of  the  delay  it  was 
not  until  October  11,  1899,  that  the  first  of  these  troops  reached 
Manila,  and  it  was  not  until  January  25,  1900,  nearly  one  year  after 

267 


the  insurrection  began,  that  the  last  regiment  arrived  in  the  Philip- 
pines. 

The  Philippine  War  ended  on  July  4,  1901,  but  in  the  preceding 
/ear  125  officers  and  2,403  men  participated  in  the  relief  of  the  Lega- 
tions at  Peking.  In  the  Philippine  War  the  United  States  was  com- 
pelled to  use  76,416  Regular  troops  and  50,052  volunteers,  against 
native  insurgents  whose  numbers  cannot  be  estimated  even  approxi- 
mately. This  war  cost  $170,326,586.11,  and  the  pensions,  taken  in 
conjunction  with  those  paid  for  the  Spanish- American  War,  amounted 
on  June  30,  1915,  to  no  less  than  §49,944,441. 

Our  past  history  shows  that,  as  a  result  of  a  mistaken  dependence 
upon  "citizen  soldiery"  and  unwise  retrenchment  in  time  of  peace,  our 
wars  have  been  most  unnecessarily  costly,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference 
to  the  table  on  page  276  of  my  latest  book,  "The  Military  Unprepared- 
ness  of  the  United  States"  (published  by  the  Macmillan  Company  in 
November,  1915).  This  table  also  shows  that  since  1790  our  pensions 
have  cost  four-sevenths  of  the  expenditures  made  for  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

Since  the  close  of  the  Philippine  War  military  legislation  has  been 
marked  by  several  measures  of  greater  or  less  merit.  The  Regular 
Army  was  reorganized  under  the  Act  of  February  2,  1901. 

An  improvement  in  the  Organized  Militia  was  effected  by  the  Dick 
Bill  of  January  21,  1903,  and  its  two  subsequent  amendments  (Acts  of 
May  27,  1908,  and  April  21,  1910). 

The  General  Staff  was  organized  by  the  Act  of  February  14,  1903, 
and  in  August  of  that  year  the  Army  War  College  was  created. 

On  January  31,  1905,  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board,  better 
known  as  "the  Taft  Board,"  was  appointed  by  President  Roosevelt  to 
revise  the  report  of  the  Endicott  Board  with  respect  to  fortifications. 
The  Taft  Board  rendered  its  report  on  February  1,  1906,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  our  coast  fortifications  has  been  made  in  conformity 
therewith. 

On  January  25,  1907,  the  artillery  was  separated  into  the  Coast 
Artillery  Corps  and  the  permanent  Field  Artillery  force. 

The  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  was  created  by  the  order  of  Feb- 
ruary 12,  1908. 

The  establishment  of  a  School  of  Fire  for  Field  Artillery  was 
made  on  June  3,  1911,  at  Fort  Sill,  Oklahoma. 

268 


In  August,  1912,  was  adopted  the  Report  on  the  Organization  of 
the  Land  Forces  of  tlie  United  States  under  the  direction  of  Secre- 
tary Stimson,  which  resulted  in  the  formulation  of  the  first  sound  and 
definite  military  policy  we  have  ever  possessed  but  which,  unfortun- 
ately, has  not  yet  been  put  into  operation. 

On  August  24,  1912,  Congress  created  a  reserve  for  the  regular 
army,  but  so  defective  were  the  provisions  that  this  force  amounts  at 
the  present  time  to  only  1,417  men.  ^ 

This  same  Act  created  the  Quartermaster  Corps  and  a  General 
Service  Corps,  but  most  unwisely  reduced  the  size  of  the  General 
Staff. 

On  June  9,  1913,  a  School  of  Musketry  was  established  at  Foi-t 
Sill,  Oklahoma,  and  on  April  25,  1914,  the  du  Pont  Bill,  providing  for 
the  raising  of  volunteers  in  time  of  actual  or  threatened  war,  became 
a  law.  No  other  military  enactment  in  our  history  has  been  so  thor- 
ough and  comprehensive  as  this  law.  Had  it  been  in  effect  in  April, 
1898,  most  of  the  disorders  and  blunders  committed  during  the  Span- 
ish-American War  would  have  been  avoided. 

On  November  1,  1915,  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Garrison,  issued 
an  outline  of  a  proposed  military  policy.  This  scheme  resembles  a 
bit  of  Gruyere  cheese.  It  contains  some  solid  material,  but  is  full  of 
holes.  The  Continental  Army  contemplated  therein  is  based  upon  an 
excellent  idea,  but,  in  my  opinion,  is  unworkable.  The  Organized 
Militia  as  such  is  relegated  to  one  of  the  last  lines  of  defense,  where 
it  propeily  belongs.  If  any  benefits  are  to  be  derived  from  the  teach- 
ings of  history  they  will  serve  to  corroborate  the  declaration  made  by 
Washington  in  a  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress,  dated  September 
24,  1776,  in  which  he  said:  "I'o  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is 
assuredly  resting  upon  a  broken  staff."  How  correct  he  was  a  refer- 
ence to  the  tables  contained  on  pages  279,  280  and  281  of  my  book 
will  abundantly  demonstrate,  since  they  show  the  places  and  dates 
where  the  militia  ran  away  or  deserted,  mutinied,  and  when  the  states 
defied  the  United  States  Government  by  refusing  to  furnish  their 
militia  to  its  service.  Even  Jefferson,  the  great  advocate  of  citizen- 
soldiery,  while  he  was  Governor  of  Virginia,  found  himself  at  his  wit's 
end  owing  to  his  inability  to  procure  the  necessary  militia  to  check  the 
British  inroads,  and  so  harrassed  by  their  refusal  to  respond  to  his 
calls,  their  insubordination,  mutinies,  desertions  and  utter  worthless- 

269 


ness,  that  he  vented  his  spleen  in  a  letter  dated  March  1,  1781,  to 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Delegates,  in  which 
he  said: 

"Whether  it  be  practicable  to  raise  and  maintain  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  regulars  to  carry  07i  the  war  is  a  question. 
That  it  would  be  burdensome  is  undoubted,  yet  it  is  perhaps 
as  certain  that  no  possible  mode  of  carrying  it  on  can  be  so 
expensive  to  the  public,  so  distressing  and  disgusting  to  in- 
dividuals as  the  militia." 

On  June  19,  1813,  fourteen  months  before  the  climax  of  the  War 
of  1812  was  reached  in  a  disgraceful  rout  at  Bladensburg,  he  wrote  to 
James  Monroe  that 

"It  proves  more  forcibly  the  necessity  of  obliging  every 
citizen  to  be  a  soldier.  This  was  the  case  with  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,  and  -must  be  that  of  every  free  state.  Where  there 
is  no  oppression  there  will  be  no  pauper  hirelings.  We  must 
train  and  classify  the  whole  of  our  male  citizens,  and  make 
militency  instruction  a  regular  part  of  collegiate  education. 
We  can  never  be  safe  till  this  is  done." 

The  whole  question  is  one  of  training.  One  week  in  camp  and 
about  seventy  hours  of  drill  and  instruction  per  annum  constitute  the 
training  of  the  Organized  Militia. 

How  long  would  they  stand  against  the  regulars  of  France,  Ger- 
many and  Japan? 

How  much  faith  would  the  officials  of  any  corporation  place  in  an 
agent  or  employee  whose  training  was  limited  to  one  week  and  seventy 
hours  of  work  a  year? 

Washington  summed  up  the  whole  question  in  a  nutshell  by  saying 
that  "To  expect,  then,  the  same  service  from  raw  and  undisciplined 
recruits  as  from  veteran  soldiers  is  to  expect  ivhat  never  did  and  per- 
haps never  will  happen." 

The  day  of  the  professional  army  has  passed.  Experience  has 
proved  that  a  nation  in  arms  is  the  sole  solution.  The  only  way  to 
obtain  such  a  result  is  by  exacting  compulsory  service  upon  the  part 
of  all  able-bodied  males.  This  is  no  more  at  variance  with  republican 
or  democratic  principles,  or  with  American  institutions  and  traditions 
than  is  the  payment  of  taxes  under  compulsion.  The  men  who  are  to 
defend  their  heritage  must  be  given  proper  training  and  all  the  force 

270  -    - 


of  the  nation  concentrated  in  the  central  government.  Otherwise  thert 
exists  a  weakness  of  alliances  which  the  present  European  war  has 
demonstrated  too  forcibly  to  require  elucidation  here. 

General  Henry  Lee  ("Light  Horse  Harry"),  a  distinguished  of- 
ficer during  the  Revolution,  epitomized  the  matter  admirably  when  he 
asserted  that  "A  GOVERNMENT  IS  THE  MURDERER  OF  ITS 
CITIZENS  WHICH  SENDS  THEM  TO  THE  FIELD  UNIFORMED 
AND  UNTAUGHT,  WHERE  THEY  ARE  TO  MEET  MEN  OF  THE 
SAME  AGE  AND  STRENGTH,  MECHANIZED  BY  EDUCATION 
AND  DISCIPLINE  FOR  BATTLE." 

What  can  we  do  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  this  state  of  affairs — a 
condition  characteristic  of  our  military  history  since  the  beginning  of 
our  national  career?    The  course  is  plain.    Every  one  of  us  here  should 
tvrite,  and  induce  all  his  or  her  friends  to  write,  to  the  two  Senators 
of  their  State  and  to  the  Representative  of  their  district  in  Congress, 
and  demand  that  the  United  States  be  given  adequate  protection  both 
on  land  and  sea.     We  must  also  impress  upon  the  members  of  our 
National  Legislature  that  we  inteiid  to  watch  their  vote  in  Congress  on 
measures  of  national  defense  during  the  present  session  and  that,  if 
they  fail  to  support  such  measures,  we  will  find  somebody  else  who  will. 
Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid  upon  the  fact  that  adequate 
preparation  for  war  has  never  yet  in  history  been  made  after  the 
beginning  of  hostilities  without  unnecessary  slaughter,  unjustifiable 
expense  and  national  peril.     It  is  only  in  the  years  of  peace  that  a 
nation  can  be  made  ready  to  fight.     All  the  things  so  imperatively 
needed  in  the  matter  of  national  defense  require  time.    Let  us  Ameri- 
cans therefore   remember  that   few  truths  have   ever  been   uttered 
greater  than  that  contained  in  Lord  Brougham's  splendid  motto: 
"Lose  not  the  opportunity;  by  the  forelock  take 
That  subtle  power  of  never-halting  Time, 
Lest  the  mere  moment's  putting  off  should  make 
Mischance  almost  as  grave  as  Crime." 
The  Chairman — It  has  been  sometimes  said  that  the  Navy  of  this 
country  was  its  first  line  of  defense  in  the  event  of  our  becoming  in- 
volved with  any  foreign  power,  but  that  first  line  of  defense  is  neces- 
sarily dependent  upon  the  coast  defenses  by  which  that  Navy  is  to  be 
supported,  and  I  am  going  to  call  upon  General  John  F.  O'Ryan  of  New 
York  to  tell  us  of  the  coast  defense. 

271 


COAST  DEFENSE 

John  F.  O'Ryan, 

Major  General  Commanding  New  York  National  Guard 

General  O'Ryan — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  No,  1 
do  not  know  a  thing  about  making  a  speech,  but  I  understand  from 
those  accustomed  to  doing  this  sort  of  thing  that  the  proper  form  of 
tactics  is  to  first  tell  something  funny  to  get  the  crowd  with  you,  so  1 
am  going  to  try  that  out.  I  heard  a  short  time  ago  a  little  anecdote 
that  illustrates  the  state  of  the  public  mind  on  this  subject  of  pre- 
paredness. 

An  American  visiting  in  England  said  to  a  witty  Englishman 
that  we  in  America  had  heard  of  the  Irish  question,  but  that  he  knew 
nothing  of  that  question  from  the  British  point  of  view,  and  he  asked 
this  Englishman  to  tell  him  all  about  it.  The  Englishman  said :  "Well, 
it  is  very  much  like  this :  You  see,  the  Irish  do  not  know  what  they 
want,  and  they  are  bound  to  have  it."  (Laughter.)  And  it  is  very 
much  that  way  with  this  matter  of  preparedness.  Everybody  is  for 
preparedness,  but  not  everybody  knows  what  it  is  all  about. 

I  have  been  asked  to  cover  the  subject  of  coast  defense  at  this 
Congress  of  the  National  Security  League.  I  assume  from  the  fact 
of  my  selection,  and  from  the  fact  that  those  attending  this  Congress 
are  largely  non-technical  men,  that  a  technical  discussion  of  the  service 
of  coast  artillery  was  neither  expected  nor  desired,  but  rather,  on  the 
contrary,  that  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  outline  in  a  broad  way  the 
comprehensiveness  of  the  problem  of  defending  our  coast  from  in- 
vasion. In  any  invasion  of  the  United  States  by  a  foreign  power,  other 
than  an  invasion  from  Canada  or  Mexico,  it  must  be  obvious  that  oui 
enemy  would  first  require  control  of  the  sea.  It  is  apparent,  therefore, 
that  the  first  line  of  our  defense  against  invasion,  and  therefore  the 
first  aspect  of  the  subject  of  coast  defense,  is  the  United  States  Navy. 
Until  our  Navy  is  defeated  and  destroyed,  or  defeated  and  the  rem- 
nants immobilized  in  harbors  protected  by  fortifications,  our  enemy 
would  not  risk  on  the  high  seas  its  expeditionary  forces.  The  first 
phase,  therefore,  of  a  foreign  war,  involving  attempted  invasion  of  the 
United  States,  other  than  from  Canada  or  Mexico,  would  be  a  naval 
war  for  the  dominion  of  the  seas.     If  our  Navy  is  adequate;  if  no 

272 


unforeseen  accidents  should  impair  its  power  and  effectiveness;  if  its 
forces  were  not  scattered  but  concentrated  and  well  led,  it  would  be 
successful  in  the  accomplishment  of  its  mission  to  gain  and  maintain 
control  of  the  sea,  and  thus  prevent  attempted  invasion.  It  is  prob- 
ably a  recognition  of  these  principles  which  has  caused  the  American 
public  to  manifest  such  interest  in  our  Navy  and  to  demand  that  L 
shall  be  maintained  on  an  adequate  basis.  It  is  probably  also  true 
that  an  unwarranted  belief  that  an  efficient  navy  will  make  unneces- 
sary the  maintenance  of  substantial  land  forces  has  been  the  cause  of 
apathy  on  the  part  of  the  public  toward  adequate  preparedness  of  the 
land  forces  for  war. 

It  should  be  known,  however,  that  the  navy,  to  fulfill  its  mission, 
should  be  supplemented  and  aided,  even  in  a  defensive  war,  by  harbor 
defenses  and  by  mobile  forces.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  correctness 
of  this  principle  it  will  be  necessary  to  invite  your  attention  to  some 
of  the  principles  governing  the  offensive  and  the  defensive  in  the  con- 
duct of  war.  In  all  public  discussions  on  the  subject  of  preparedness 
for  war  our  people  have  in  mind  preparedness  for  national  defense 
against  the  aggression  of  other  nations,  but  a  war  which  is  from  the 
political  point  of  view  a  defensive  war,  may  be  at  times  adequately 
waged  only  by  assuming  the  offensive  from  the  military  point  of  view. 
It  is  to  be  remembered  that  a  strict  conception  of  defense  is  the  ward- 
ing off  of  a  blow.  It  involves  as  its  characteristic  attribute  a  state  of 
expectancy,  a  state  of  preparation  which  awaits  the  blow.  It  should 
be  evident  that  little  in  the  way  of  affirmative  results  can  be  expected 
from  such  a  conception  of  war.  When  a  nation  engages  in  war,  even 
though  the  war  may  be  from  the  political  point  of  view  defensive,  it  is 
the  duty  of  that  nation,  on  the  ground  of  humanity,  if  for  no  other 
reason,  to  strike  at  the  enemy  with  all  its  might  with  a  view  to 
terminating  the  war  in  as  short  a  space  of  time  as  possible  and  upon 
terms  which  insure  the  rights  and  policies  of  the  nation  to  protect 
which  recourse  was  had  to  war.  In  a  strictly  defensive  warfare  we 
surrender  initiative  to  the  enemy.  To  the  enemy  we  surrender  the 
advantages  involved  in  surprise,  in  the  selection  of  the  theatre  of 
operations  and  the  attack  from  one  or  more  quarters.  The  defender 
also  concedes  to  the  aggressor  the  advantage  of  a  superior  morale, 
other  things  being  equal,  for  there  exists  in  every  efficient  army  en- 
gaged in  offensive  warfare  a  feeling  of  superiority  which  springs  from 

273 


a  consciousness  of  belonging  to  the  attacking  side.  Seldom  are  results 
of  any  consequence  gained  in  war  from  the  strictly  defensive  role. 
Therefore,  it  is  that  while  our  Navy  constitutes  the  first  line  in  the 
defense  of  our  coasts,  that  role  does  not  imply  that  the  navy  shall 
restrict  its  operations  to  our  own  coasts.  It  may  be  that  m.any  ad- 
vantages would  accrue  from  the  ability  of  our  Navy  upon  the  declara- 
tion of  war  to  immediately  assume  the  offensive.  Such  a  policy  might 
shift  the  theatre  of  operations  from  our  own  coasts  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  but  in  order  to  make  such  policy  possible  of  adoption  it  is  not 
only  necessary  that  our  Navy  have  greater  power  and  confidence  than 
the  enemy's  navy,  but  it  is  essential  that  the  coast  possess  some  other 
form  of  defense  to  prevent  occupation  of  harbors  and  raids  on  the 
coast  towns  by  hostile  squadrons  of  the  enemy's  fleet*  This  brings  us 
to  a  consideration  of  the  second  line  of  our  defense. 

At  the  time  of  the  Spanish-American  War  some  of  our  harbors 
were  inadequately  defended.  Public  opinion  was  strong  enough  to 
force  the  Navy  Department  to  send  two  cruisers  to  the  New  England 
coast,  where  they  were  fruitlessly  maintained  during  a  considerable 
period  of  the  war.  If  our  second  line  of  defense  is  inadequate  public 
opinion  in  time  of  war  would  be  so  strong  against  permitting  the  Navy 
to  be  footloose  and  to  seek  the  enemy's  navy,  that  we  can  imagine  the 
spectacle  of  our  naval  forces  being  divided  up  into  squadrons  for  the 
alleged  protection  of  sections  of  our  coast  line,  a  plan  that  would  bring 
the  theatre  of  naval  warfare  to  our  shores  and  give  the  enemy  an  op- 
portunity to  defeat  our  naval  forces  in  detail.  In  a  form  of  govern- 
'nent  such  as  ours  the  people  rule,  and  in  time  of  war  their  wishes, 
though  based  on  ignorance  of  strategy  and  tactics,  are  not  always 
«»xpressed  in  the  form  of  idle  supplications  to  the  authorities  in  control, 
but  rather  as  commands  to  be  as  they  have  in  the  past  been  heeded  and 
complied  with.  The  military  officer  who  formulates  war  plans  and  a 
military  policy  without  reference  to  this  important  factor  of  public 
opinion,  so  dormant  and  apathetic  in  time  of  peace,  so  loud,  insistent 
and  unreasonable  in  time  of  war,  shows  a  provincial  complacency  and 
a  disregard  of  the  lessons  of  military  history  which  unfits  him  for 
such  work.  In  the  War  of  1812,  in  pursuance  of  the  cry  raised 
throughout  the  land  of  "On  to  Canada,"  hastily  organized  armies,  un- 
prepared for  offensive  campaign,  were  launched  into  an  invasion  of 
Canada.    The  effort  failed.    In  the  Civil  War,  almost  before  the  work 

21^       - 


of  organizing  an  army  was  fairly  begun,  the  people  adopted  the  slogan 
"On  to  Richmond,"  and  Bull  Run  resulted.  It  is  as  much  a  part  of  the 
preparation  in  peace  for  the  contingency  of  war  to  sow  in  the  public 
mind  those  elementary  principles  of  the  conduct  of  war  which  are  to 
guide  our  future  action,  and  which  history  warns  may  be  disregarded 
by  our  people,  as  it  is  to  prepare  and  maintain  confidential  the  details 
of  the  plan  based  on  such  principles. 

It  was  the  widely  read  works  of  Bernhardi  and  other  writers,  dis- 
seminated throughout  the  German  Empire,  which  thoroughly  and  ef- 
fectively planted  in  the  minds  of  the  German  people  what  the  military 
accepted  as  a  maxim,  namely,  that  the  best  defensive  is  the  aggressive 
offensive,  once  war  is  determined  upon. 

Our  people  should  be  encouraged  in  their  pride  for  the  Navy,  but 
the  shortsightedness  of  entrusting  solely  to  this  agency  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  country  from  foreign  invasion  should  be  pointed  out  by 
those  whose  duty  it  is  to  study  and  recommend  the  military  policy  of 
the  country.  "Don't  place  all  your  eggs  in  one  basket"  is  a  homely  old 
motto,  understood  the  country  over,  in  mansion,  farm  and  shop.  Yet 
that  is  the  warning  applicable  to  the  policy  of  our  people;  and  ships, 
whether  battleships  or  ocean  liners,  are  like  eggs  in  many  respects. 
They  are  costly;  they  cannot  be  made  in  a  minute;  they  have  thin 
shells,  and  once  broken  are  practically  worthless.  Every  year,  in  spite 
of  the  great  advances  made  in  the  power  and  size  of  ships  and  in  the 
number  of  devices  designed  to  insure  their  safety,  we  are  compelled 
to  realize  the  inherent  weakness  of  marine  transportation.  The  mem- 
ory of  the  Titanic  is  fresh  in  our  minds.  No  one  would  have  believed 
that  such  a  ship  could  have  been  so  injured  as  to  remain  afloat  but  a 
few  hours  before  disappearing  forever  with  a  loss  of  over  1,500  human 
lives. 

The  war  abroad  has  furnished  many  lessons  illustrating  the 
frailty  of  ships  of  war. 

When  an  army  meets  disaster  it  is  possible  to  reassemble  its 
fragments,  reorganize  and  equip  them,  and  of  them  to  again  form  an 
army.  When  a  ship  meets  disaster  the  waters  swallow  it — it  is  gone 
forever.  A  modern  battleship  with  its  accessories  and  crew  represents 
an  investment  of  over  ten  millions  of  dollars.    If  that  ship  is  destroyed 

275 


by  gunfire,  or  by  a  mine,  a  derelict,  an  iceberg,  a  reef,  a  storm,  a 
collision,  a  torpedo  or  any  other  agency  of  destruction,  nothing  is 
salvaged  except  possibly  a  few  human  lives.  The  investment  is  not 
only  gone,  but  the  national  security  is,  to  the  extent  of  the  power  of 
that  ship,  irretrievably  lost;  for  such  ships  cannot  be  replaced  within 
the  period  of  duration  of  the  modern  war.  An  investment,  however, 
of  ten  millions  of  dollars  in  military  preparedness  would  provide  an 
agency  which  under  no  conceivable  circumstances  could  be  lost  in  toto. 
No  matter  what  reverses  might  be  met  by  a  military  force,  whether 
by  the  enemy  or  by  the  elements,  there  would  be  salvaged  a  nucleus 
not  only  capable  of  reorganization,  but  having  a  value  far  in  excess  of 
the  actual  money  value  of  the  tangible  military  property  in  its  posses- 
sion. 

Therefore  it  is  that  in  the  defense  of  our  coasts  it  is  essential  that 
the  first  line  represented  by  the  Navy  be  supplemented  by  fortifications 
so  placed  as  to  deny  the  enemy  access  to  important  harbors,  and  to 
preserve  them  as  havens  for  our  fleets  in  the  event  of  disaster  or  lack 
of  power  to  immediately  assume  the  offensive. 

So  rapidly  has  defensive  warfare  developed  during  the  past  year 
that  there  are  now  available  for  the  second  line  defense  of  our  coasts 
many  accessories  not  available  or  effective  until  the  present  time.  The 
first  of  these  which  naturally  occurs  to  the  mind  is  air  craft.  Before 
there  is  actual  contact  by  enemy  forces  with  our  coast  defenses, 
whether  in  strength  or  represented  by  raiding  parties  there  should  be 
available  in  our  system  of  coast  defense  means  for  observing  the 
approach  of  an  enemy,  and  of  reporting  such  observations  in  time  to 
anticipate  the  direction  of  the  attack.  Thus  there  should  be  included 
provision  for  aerial  reconnaissance  by  means  of  powerful  hydro-aero- 
planes in  numbers  sufficient  to  establish,  at  a  distance  of  one  hundred 
miles  from  our  coast  line,  a  cordon  of  flying  patrols  which  it  would  be 
impossible  for  an  enemy's  force  to  pass  without  observation.  These 
reconnaissance  aircraft  should  be  supplemented  by  war  planes  capable 
of  defeating  or  driving  back  any  aircraft  launched  from  the  enemy's 
ships  for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitering  our  coast  or  of  dropping  bombs 
upon  our  harbor  fortifications.  These  war  planes  should  be  supple- 
mented by  anti-aircraft  guns  so  installed  as  to  furnish  adequate  pro- 
tection to  our  harbor  defenses  from  the  assaults  of  the  enemy's  air 

276 


craft  which  might  elude  our  war  planes.  Before  ah  enemy's  fleet 
could  raid  our  coasts  or  come  under  the  fire  of  harbor  defenses  its 
ships  should  be  subjected  to  another  form  of  attack,  namely,  submarine 
attack.  Under  water  warfare  is  waged  by  mines  of  various  description 
and  by  submarine  vessels  and  self-propelled  torpedoes.  It  is,  of  course, 
contemplated  that  in  time  of  war  the  entrance  of  all  harbors  of  im- 
portance will  be  mined,  and  these  mine  fields  protected  by  adequate 
gun  power,  but  there  should  be  established  at  appropriate  bases  of 
operation  along  the  coast  stations  for  the  maintenance  of  coast  defense 
submarines  and  self-propelled  torpedoes.  There  has  already  been  de- 
veloped a  type  of  torpedo  which  has  a  wide  range  of  action  and  the 
movement  of  which  is  effectively  controlled  by  wireless.  These  auxil- 
iary types  of  coast  defense  are  quite  generally  in  an  early  stage  of 
their  development.  There  is  great  opportunity  here  for  American 
inventive  genius  and  imagination  to  find  a  wide  field  for  effective  use. 
The  human  mind  does  not  readily  abandon  old  conceptions  and  adapt 
itself  to  newly  created  conditions.  Probably  for  years  after  aerial 
warfare  has  become  the  dominant  factor  in  the  conduct  of  war  some 
there  will  be  who  will  continue  to  refer  to  air  craft  as  auxiliaries.  We 
have  installed  for  the  defense  of  our  harbors  a  series  of  fortifications 
which  are  probably  the  most  perfect  in  the  world.  The  machinery  of 
these  defenses,  although  in  the  early  stages  of  development  somewhat 
complicated,  have  in  recent  years  been  greatly  simplified  so  far  as  util- 
ization by  the  fighting  personnel  is  concerned.  I  believe  now  that  the 
functions  of  a  substantial  percentage  of  the  personnel  of  coast  artillery 
gun  crews  involve  little  more  than  unskilled  labor  of  the  simplest 
character.  Their  duties  are  so  simple  that  the  men  should  be  ade- 
quately trained  in  a  few  weeks  of  drill.  On  the  other  hand,  the  train- 
ing required  for  the  development  of  qualified  enlisted  specialists  is 
comprehensive  and  involves  time.  These  specialists  should  be  devel- 
oped in  time  of  peace.  There  is,  however,  an  aspect  of  the  work  of 
coast  artillery  troops  compared  with  that  of  mobile  forces,  which 
should  not  be  ignored  by  those  who  are  giving  consideration  to  the 
subject  of  preparedness. 

In  any  serious  discussion  of  a  military  subject,  the  object  of  which 
is  to  enligh'ten  the  public  concerning  the  problems  involved,  it  is  fitting 
that  exaggeration  be  avoided  and  that  a  true  conception  of  the  subject 

277 


be  presented  whether  or  not  that  conception  be  in  accordance  with  pre- 
vailing public  opinion.  I  believe  there  exists  in  the  public  mind  a 
belief  that  if  our  harbor  artillery  defenses  are  adequate  our  coast  is 
safe  from  invasion;  that  the  service  of  coast  defense  batteries  re- 
quires an  extremely  high  grade  and  very  technically  trained  personnel 
and  that  war  conditions  make  mandatory  three  so-called  shifts  of  men 
so  the  guns  may  ever  be  ready,  day  or  night,  to  repel  invasion.  Civil- 
ians introduced  for  the  first  time  to  a  view  of  coast  artillery  batteries 
with  their  position-finding  stations  are  greatly  impressed  with  their 
supposed  mechanical  complication  and  the  methods  in  use  to  control 
their  fire.  Civilians  accord  to  the  coast  artillery  a  respectful  awe 
based  on  its  technical  mysteries  which  is  the  basis  for  a  belief  that 
while  mobile  forces  may  be  improvised  to  meet  the  demands  of  war,  the 
coast  artillery  should  be  maintained  at  full  strength  in  time  of  peace. 
At  one  time  this  atmosphere  of  mystery  screened  the  field  artillery 
from  a  true  conception  of  its  functions  by  the  public  and  the  other 
arms  of  the  service. 

The  German  General  von  Hohenlohe  made  the  following  interest- 
ing comments  on  this  subject  in  its  application  to  the  German  field 
artillery  of  the  period  before  the  Franco-Prussian  War.  He  said: 
"The  gunners  were  regarded  among  us  more  as  a  species  of  skilled 
mechanics  than  as  soldiers.  This  was  in  part  their  own  fault.  The 
little  that  they  had  to  learn  more  than  other  soldiers  was  exaggerated 
by  them  into  a  great  science,  which,  being  surrounded  with  an  im- 
penetrable veil  of  mystery,  kept  soldiers  of  the  other  arms  so  much  the 
more  at  a  distance,  as  its  substance  appeared  wore  wearisome  by  the 
diffuseness  of  its  treatment.  The  gunner  of  those  days  took  pleasure 
in  a  mask  of  learning  under  a  veil  of  mystery,  which,  though  it 
estranged  the  other  arms  from  the  artillery,  yet  caused  them  to  en- 
tertain a  certain  respect  for  it  on  account  of  its  unknown  erudition. 
But  the  young  gunner,  when  he  had  lifted  the  veil,  and  know  that 
there  was  not  so  very  much  hidden  behind  it,  was,  after  he  had  recov- 
ered from  his  disillusion,  in  the  position  of  the  youth  who  unveiled' 
the  statue  of  Sais.  'What  he  saw  and  learnt  there  his  tongue  never 
told.'  And  he  also  found  a  pleasure  in  posing,  among  his  comrades 
of  the  other  arms,  as  a  member  of  the  scientific  arm,  and  as  'something 
peculiar." 

27S 


Perhaps  our  own  coast  artillery,  both  regular  and  militia,  have 
permitted  a  thin  veil  of  this  character  to  hamper  a  proper  public  con- 
ception of  their  functions. 

In  the  coast  artillery  the  soldiers  in  time  of  war  eat,  bathe,  sleep, 
drill  and  play  very  much  as  they  do  in  time  of  peace.  They  occupy  in 
time  of  war  the  same  immobile  positions  they  occupy  in  time  of  peace. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  in  war  the  men  stand  perpetually  at  their  guns 
looking  vigilantly  out  to  sea. 

There  are  many  agencies  to  provide  the  coast  artillery  garrisons 
with  notice  of  an  enemy's  approach.    Our  harbor  defenses  may  never 
fire  a  hostile  shot.     Their  mere  existence  upon  a  reasonably  efficient 
basis  should  insure  prevention  against  attack  by  naval  vessels,  but 
they   must   be  maintained  on  a   reasonably  efficient  basis.     Hostile 
forces  possess  more  available  means  of  gaining  possession  of  our  har- 
bors.    Our  harbor  fortifications  are  inadequately  protected  against 
land  assault  from  the  rear.     Their  defense  in  the  last  analysis  rests 
with  mobile  forces.     In  the  coast  artillery  there  are  no  serious  prob- 
lems of  health  or  sanitation  involved  in  their  existence  in  time  of  war, 
and  the  military  world  for  them  continues  to  revolve  very  much  the 
sam.e  as  it  does  in  time  of  peace.    With  the  mobile  forces,  however, 
all  this  is  different.    Once  a  command  enters  upon  a  campaign  its  per- 
sonnel resort  to  the  primitive  life.     They  must  fight  nature  and  the 
elements  as  well  as  the  enemy.    It  is  difficult,  sometimes  impossible,  to 
keep  clean.    The  soldier  is  attacked  by  insects  and  vermin ;  unsheltered, 
he  is  often  compelled  to  face  most  severe  weather  conditions.     In  his 
combat  functions  he  is  often  required  to  act  singly  and  alone,  or  in 
small  groups,  and  without  the  encouraging  influence  and  shelter  of 
massive  masonry.    As  the  strain  upon  his  morale  is  greater,  so  must 
the  character  of  his  training  be  more  extensive  and  rigid.    The  mere 
existence,  however,  of  adequate  harbor  defenses,  reasonably  well  man- 
ned, will  in  themselves  tend  to  insure  the  denial  to  the  enemy  of  the 
harbors  they  are  constructed  to  defend,  at  least,  so  far  as  naval  attack 
is  concerned.     This  is  true  because  the  history  of  combat  between 
naval  forces  and  harbor  fortifications  indicates  the  many  advantages 
held  by  the  latter  force  over  the  former.     In  the  fighting  for  the 
possession  of  Port  Arthur  the  participation  of  the  Japanese  fleet  was 
confined  in  the  main  to  long  range  bombardment  of  the  harbor,  docks 
and  forts.    At  Santiago  our  powerful  fleet  kept  well  out  of  range  of 

279 


the  inl'erior  defences  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  and  it  was  neces- 
sary to  send  a  mobile  army  to  Cuba  for  the  land  capture  of  the  city  and 
its  harbor.  When  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish  army  insured  the  capture 
of  the  city  by  the  American  forces  the  Spanish  fleet  was  forced  out 
into  the  open  and  was  defeated  in  the  naval  battle  of  Santiago.  One 
shot  from  a  shore  battery  into  the  vitals  of  a  warship  may  result  in 
the  serious  damage  or  destruction  of  the  ship.  On  the  other  hand, 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  construction  of  land  fortifications,  it  is 
difficult  for  naval  guns  to  inflict  on  them  much  damage.  Serious  dam.- 
age  can  only  be  hoped  for  with  a  great  expenditure  of  ammunition, 
and  with  a  fleet  far  from  its  base  of  operations  ammunition  expendi- 
ture is  a  serious  factor,  for  the  fleet  may  be  called  upon  suddenly  to 
fight  its  opponent's  squadron.  The  attack  of  the  Allies'  fleet  upon  the 
harbor  defenses  of  Sebastopol  made  little  impression  on  the  fortres-5. 
The  great  bombardment  of  Gibraltar  by  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets 
was  almost  without  result,  while  the  floating  batteries  of  the  Allies 
were  almost  all  destroyed.  The  failure  of  the  attempt  of  the  allied 
fleets  to  force  the  Dardanelles  in  the  face  of  the  shore  batteries  con- 
structed for  its  defense  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  The  ver- 
dict of  history  supports  the  view  held  by  experts  that  it  is  not  in  ac- 
cordance with  correct  principles  of  strategy  or  tactics  to  risk  valuable 
warships  in  combat  with  harbor  defenses. 

But  the  defense  of  harbors  is  only  one  of  the  incidents  affecting 
the  successful  defense  of  the  coast  against  invasion.  It  is  quite  gener- 
ally conceded  that  once  the  enemy  has  gained  control  of  the  sea  so 
that  he  may  launch  an  expeditionary  force,  he  may  at  will  disembark 
his  forces  on  some  stretch  of  coast  line  protected  from  the  prevailing 
winds  and  out  of  the  range  of  harbor  defenses.  This  is  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  convoying  warships  are  able  to  ward  off  our  submarine 
and  aerial  attacks  and  dominate  with  their  guns  such  mobile  forces  as 
may  be  sent  to  oppose  the  landing  operations.  Obviously  it  is  not 
practicable  to  construct  a  picket  fence  of  shore  batteries  around  the 
entire  coast  line  of  the  United  States.  Hence,  with  the  destruction  or 
immobilization  of  our  fleet  the  defense  of  our  coast  will  rest  in  the  last 
analysis  upon  the  sufficiency  of  our  mobile  forces,  to  promptly  meet  and 
defeat  an  expeditionary  force  which  has  been  landed  and  which  at- 
tempts to  leave  the  zone  covered  by  the  guns  of  its  fleet.  There  can 
be  little  question  of  the  inestimable  value  of  every  practical  device  for 

280 


of  dollars  of  investment.  In  recognition  of  this  it  is  probable  that 
terrorizing,  damaging  and  destroying  the  warships  and  transports  of 
an  enemy  engaged  in  landing  operations.  Air  craft,  floating  mines, 
self-propelled  torpedoes  and  coast  defense  submarines  are  essential, 
and  we  should  develop  them  to  the  highest  degree  of  efficiency.  The 
personnel  which  may  have  to  use  them  in  war  should  be  trained  in 
time  of  peace.  To  bring  about  that  unity  of  control  and  concert  of 
action  which  is  essential  in  the  attainment  of  military  results,  all  of 
these  auxiliaries  should  be  under  the  control  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
Corps. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  monitor  type  of  floating  battery 
has  appeared  in  the  war  abroad,  in  an  improvised  form  at  least.  Con- 
sideration should  be  given  to  this  agency,  not  as  an  ocean-going  war 
vessel,  but  as  a  mobile  battery  for  harbor  defense.  The  greatest 
obstacle  to  be  met  by  coast  artillery  in  the  defense  of  harbors  is  fog. 
Sea  fog  cannot  be  penetrated  at  night  by  searchlights,  and  in  the  day 
time  fog  acts  as  an  impenetrable  screen  against  artillery  observation 
and  fire.  Fortunate  it  is  that  fog  also  constitutes  a  menace  to  naviga- 
tion, else  the  value  of  artillery  as  one  of  the  agencies  of  harbor  defense 
would  be  greatly  minimized.  Were  our  harbors,  however,  provided 
with  several  batteries  of  the  heaviest  type  mounted  on  floating  self- 
propelled  and  heavily  armored  hulks,  such  batteries  could  maintain 
night  positions  of  obvious  tactical  advantage  to  the  defense.  No  re- 
quirement for  speed  being  involved,  they  could  be  provided  with  ample 
steel  wire  protection  against  submarines  and  floating  mine  attack.  No 
requirement  for  extended  sea  cruising  capacity  being  involved,  they 
could  be  armored  in  such  manner  as  to  be  invulnerable,  while  their 
own  gun  power  could  be  of  the  first  magnitude.  Such  vessels  would 
not  be  popular  in  the  navy.  They  would  be  uncomfortable  places  for 
the  crews.  They  would  furnish  no  opportunity  for  seeing  the  world. 
They  exist  for  "business"  only.  If  adopted  they  should  probably  be 
assigned  to  the  coast  artillery,  for  they  would  be  essentially  harbor 
defense  batteries  possessing  marine  mobility. 

While  the  installation  of  powerful  batteries  and  effective  fire  con- 
trol system  is  essential  for  the  protection  of  harbors,  so  that  their  very 
existence  may  insure  relief  from  attack,  it  is  true  that  the  practical 
mind  rebels  against  conditions  which  make  unavailable  for  the  defense 
of  the  coast  line  artillery  installations  representing  so  many  millions 

281 


there  will  be  developed  a  plan  for  giving  mobility  to  certain  types  of 
relatively  heavy  guns  now  installed  in  some  of  our  harbor  defenses,  so 
that  it  will  be  practicable  by  telephone  command  to  lift  upon  specially 
designed  cars  certain  types  of  guns  and  mortars  with  their  carriages 
and  to  rapidly  transport  the  same  by  rail  to  selected  positions  under 
cover,  from  which  fire  could  be  directed  against  landing  operations 
within  the  zone  of  fire.  By  such  a  plan  the  sphere  of  combat  influence 
of  harbor  defenses  might  under  normal  conditions  be  extended  laterally 
so  as  to  cover  a  front  of  perhaps  200'  miles  of  coast  line.  What  can  be 
done  along  these  lines  will  readily  be  conceived  by  reference  to  the  gun 
power  of  the  great  German  and  Austrian  howitzers  which  battered  to 
pieces  the  Belgian  fortifications  in  the  present  war  abroad.  The  moral 
effect  of  one  shot  from  such  a  gun  fired  at  expeditionary  forces  en- 
gaged in  the  hazardous  mission  of  effecting  a  landing  may  well  be 
imagined.  The  landing  of  large  bodies  of  troops  from  transports  un- 
der the  fire  of  such  a  gun  would  be  impracticable.  It  is  this  type  of 
gun,  powerful  but  mobile,  which  insures  the  defense  of  the  Belgian 
coast  against  the  landing  of  allied  forces  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
German  army. 

Throughout  the  history  of  nations  there  has  ever  been  a  tendency 
of  nations  in  time  of  peace  to  resort  to  the  construction  of  formidable 
fortifications  as  an  adequate  means  of  defense  in  time  of  war.  Again 
and  again  throughout  the  pages  of  military  history  will  be  found 
evidences  of  the  principle  that  these  supposed  havens  of  refuge  and 
supporting  points  for  offensive  action  have  proved  illusory.  If 
military  history  teaches  anything  it  teaches  not  only  that  eternal 
vigilance  is  the  price  of  liberty,  but  that  this  vigilance  must  be  supple- 
mented by  power — the  power  constituted  of  the  martial  spirit  of  a 
people  determined  to  be  free — a  power  made  effective  by  organization 
and  training  of  the  people  in  land  warfare.  The  coast  artillery  and  all 
other  mechanical  devices  for  impeding  the  advance  of  an  enemy 
against  our  shores  and  into  our  country  are  in  the  last  analysis  but 
auxiliaries  and  aids  to  the  might  of  the  nation,  represented  by  its 
mobile  land  forces.  These  auxiliaries  are  important.  They  should  be 
supported  and  developed,  but  the  support  and  development  should  not 
be  at  the  expense  of  the  proper  development  and  support  of  the  main 
reliance  against  invasion — the  army  constituted  of  the  people. 

Such  an  army  can  be  adequately  and  economically  provided  for 

282 


by  Congress  at  its  present  session  under  the  powers  conferred  upon 
it  by  the  Federal  Constition.  There  has  been  much  criticism  of  the 
existing  militia  system,  a'nd  some  of  the  criticism  is  warranted.  But 
these  criticisms  have  been  made  the  basis  for  advocating  the  most  im- 
possible plans  for  the  national  defense.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that 
the  present  system  gives  to  the  Federal  Government  inadequate  control 
of  the  militia.  The  answer  to  this  problem  will  be  found  in  the  mes- 
sages of  Washington  to  Congress.  He  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  based  upon 
all  his  experience  with  the  inefficient  militia  of  the  Revolution,  and 
after  a  careful  study  of  the  subject,  made  by  that  distinguished  sol- 
dier of  the  Revolution,  General  Henry  Knox,  who  was  his  Secretary  of 
War,  that  Congress  had  the  power  to  provide  for  organizing  and  dis- 
ciplining the  militia  on  a  basis  "which  would  meet  every  military 
exigency  of  the  United  States."  Congress,  under  its  power  to  organ- 
ize the  militia,  has  the  power  to  prescribe  the  number  of  officers,  their 
tenure  of  office  and  their  qualifications.  It  matters  little,  therefore, 
what  official,  Fedeial  or  State,  possesses  the  power  to  appoint,  so  long 
as  the  War  Department  may  prescribe  the  qualifications.  The  power 
to  appoint  under  a  proper  system  would  become  in  effect  merely  the 
power  to  nominate,  subject  to  qualification.  So  fat  as  the  training  of 
the  militia  is  concerned,  the  training  would  be  effected  by  the  officers 
of  the  militia,  aided  by  officers  of  the  army.  If  the  officers  of  the 
militia  of  the  United  States  under  a  system  prescribed  by  Congress 
have  been  required  to  qualify  in  accordance  with  standards  prescribed 
by  the  War  Department,  then  it  insures  proper  training,  particularly 
when  the  Constitution  provides  that  this  training  shall  be  "according 
to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress."  As  General  Wood  has  re- 
peatedly said,  if  Congress  had  adopted  the  plan  to  provide  for  an 
effective  militia,  as  recommended  by  Washington  and  Knox,  there 
would  have  been  no  war  of  1812,  or  if  there  had  been,  Canada  would 
now  be  a  part  of  the  United  States.  The  system  recommended  by 
Washington  and  Knox  has  been  adopted  by  Switzerland  and  Australia. 
None  of  these  systems  have  any  relation  whatever  to  a  large  standing 
army.  They  are  all  three  militia  systems,  Australia  going  so  far  as  to 
provide  in  its  organic  law  that  there  shall  be  no  regular  army. 

Congress  should  adopt  such  a  system  and  make  of  the  militia  what 
the  Constitution  contemplated — a  national  force — and  the  regular 
army  should  constitute  the  training  personnel.    The  demands  of  these 

283 


functions  would  provide  adequate  promotion  for  the  officers  of  the 
Army. 

With  an  adequate  Navy,  supplemented  by  an  adequate  system  of 
coast  defense,  involving  the  utilization  of  all  the  auxiliaries  mentioned, 
the  whole  supplemented  by  an  adequate  national  mobile  land  force 
composed  of  the  citizenry  properly  organized  and  trained  to  arms, 
there  need  be  little  concern  over  the  possibility  of  invasion  of  the  con- 
tinental limits  of  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman — I  am  going  to  take  the  liberty  at  this  point  to 
depart  a  little  from  the  program  of  the  morning  and  ask  Mrs.  William 
Alexander,  the  President  of  the  National  Special  Aid  Society  of  New 
York,  to  come  to  the  platform.  I  know  that  she  will  not  occupy  an 
undue  amount  of  time,  although  we  would  be  glad  to  hear  from  her  a 
good  deal  more  than  that. 

Mrs.  Alexander — Mr.  Chairman,  having  attended  all  the  sessions 
of  this  Congress  and  having  followed  its  proceedings  with  the  most 
sympatheticrinterest,  and  having  a  year  ago  started  in  New  York  the 
Special  Relief  Society,  I  feel  that  to  those  who  have  followed  the  de- 
fense movement  from  its  inception,  and  to  those  of  us  who  are  here  at 
this  Congress,  the  fact  has  been  made  clear  that  it  is  the  duty  of  all 
to  co-operate  rather  than  to  disassociate  our  efforts.  I  felt  so  strongly 
that  there  should  be  union  of  all  the  societies  for  preparedness  that  I 
took  the  liberty  of  getting  them  to  form  themselves,  so  to  speak,  into 
a  clearing  house. 

The  relief  work  that  was  begun  in  Paris  by  Americans  was  a  great 
lesson  to  us.  It  became  doubly  effective  as  it  was  systematized  by  the 
clearing  house  that  was  formed  to  take  charge  of  all  the  relief  work. 

As  far  as  it  is  possible  in  a  country  like  ours  we  hope  to  establish 
some  similar  system.  Work  must  be  found  for  certain  classes  of 
woijien,  not  sporadic  in  character.  Continual,  constructive,  perpetual 
discipline,  drill  and  cohesion  must  be  the  watchwords  of  the  com- 
munity, because  we  sometimes  seem  to  forget  that  united  we  stand  and 
divided  we  fall. 

The  Chairman — In  view  of  the  hour  it  has  seemed  wiser  that  the 
address  of  the  last  speaker  on  the  program  should  be  postponed  until 
another  session. 

(At  1:15  o'clock  p.  m.  an  adjournment  was  taken  until  2:15 
o'clock  p.  m. 

284 


SEVENTH  SESSION. 

Saturday,  January  22,  1916 — 2:45  p.  m. 
Chairman — Franklin  Q.  Brown,  of  New  York. 

This  session  was  called  to  order  at  2 :45  o'clock  p.  m.  by  the  Secre- 
tary, Mr.  Herbert  Barry. 

Mr.  Barry — I  desire  to  introduce  the  presiding  officer  for  this 
session,  Mr.  Franklin  Q.  Brown,  the  Chairman  of  our  Finance  Com- 
mittee. I  may  say  that  in  that  responsible  position  he  himself  is  able 
to  answer  an  inquiry  that  was  addressed  by  Congressman  Kitchin  as 
to  whether  any  of  these  defense  societies,  including  our  own,  received 
funds  from  munition  makers  or  others  interested  in  armaments,  and 
Mr.  Brown  can  say  that  we,  so  far  as  we  know,  have  not  received  one 
dollar  from  any  interested  source.  I  only  wish  that  Mr.  Kitchin,  with 
whom  I  had  some  correspondence  on  this  subject  and  to  whom  I  gave 
thai  statement,  had  been  equally  ready  with  his  response  to  our  ques- 
tion whether  he  would  support  and  indorse  the  statements  and  prin- 
ciples enunciated  by  George  Washington  on  this  subject  of  prepared- 
ness. 

Mr.  Brown — Fellow  delegates,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  So  much 
has  been  said,  and  so  ably  said,  at  this  Congress  on  the  subject  of  pre- 
paredness that  I  feel  that  any  extended  remarks  from  me  at  this  time 
would  be  superfluous ;  but  if  it  were  necessary  the  spirit  is  willing  and 
the  flesh  is  not  weak  in  respect  to  this  subject. 

Judging  from  the  enthusiasm  which  has  been  evidenced  at  the 
meetings  of  the  National  Security  Congress,  the  same  old  spirit  which 
prevailed  when  the  cradle  of  liberty  was  rocked  and  the  old  bell  rang 
out  our  independence  is  again  awakened,  and  "still  lives,  forever 
young," 

I  firmly  believe  that  we  are  voicing  the  views  and  wishes  of  90 
per  cent,  of  the  right  thinking  people  of  this  country  in  the  appeal  we 
are  making  for  immediate  and  definite  action  by  Congress. 

285 


The  element  of  time  is  of  the  greatest  consequence.  Able  technical 
experts  have  explained  to  us  at  length  the  necessity  for  immediate 
action  on  account  of  there  being  such  a  vast  amount  of  work  to  be  done 
even  in  "preparation  for  preparedness,  and  I  believe  that  any  policy 
of  retardation  is  not  only  unrepresentative  but  contrary  to  what  we 
believe  to  be  the  temper  of  the  American  people  today.  I  want  to  in- 
clude the  women  in  these  statements  with  reference  to  the  American 
people  in  this  work  just  as  much  as  the  men,  as  they  are  working 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  us. 

We  are  nearing  the  end  of  this  most  successful  convention,  and 
it  is  the  earnest  hope,  and  I  know  that  I  voice  the  sentiment  of  the 
Executive  Committee  of  the  National  Security  League,  that  when  we 
return  to  our  homes  we  will  spread  the  propaganda  and  the  informa- 
tion gained  at  this  Congress  where  it  will  do  the  maximum  amount  of 
good,  and  will  urge  more  vigorously  than  ever  the  necessity  of  holding 
up  the  hands  of  those  who  are  laboring  for  national  preparedness  as  a 
national  duty.  Let  us  here  and  now,  in  this  city  of  Washington,  pledge 
ourselves  that  we  will  indorse  that  policy  to  the  end,  never  relaxing 
our  efforts  until  proper  results  are  obtained.     (Applause.) 

We  have  had  to  make  a  slight  change  in  our  program  today,  as 
Captain  Fortesque  has  not  arrived,  and  Mr.  William  Barclay  Parsons 
left  yesterday,  his  paper  already  having  been  presented.  I  shall  have  to 
ask  your  indulgence  for  a  few  moments  on  account  of  a  few  practical 
matters  which  we  have  to  introduce  before  we  hear  the  speakers. 
First,  I  want  to  apologize  on  behalf  of  the  committee  for  the  necessity 
of  using  this  room,  which  is  so  much  smaller  than  the  main  hall.  You 
undoubtedly  had  all  become  accustomed  to  using  the  other  room,  and 
possibly  it  seemed  more  like  home  to  you;  but  we  were  notified  that 
it  was  necessary  for  the  management  of  the  hotel  to  have  that  room 
this  evening  on  account  of  the  banquet  that  is  to  be  held  there.  That 
is  the  explanation  of  the  matter.  We  have  here  a  telegram  which  I 
have  been  requested  to  read,  addressed  to  Mr.  S.  Stan  wood  Menken. 
It  says: 

"Rumored  here  that  peace-at-any-price  element  propose 
to  add   a  new  stripe  to  the  flag,   the  color  to  be  yellow.    . 
(Laughter.)     We  know  you  will  do  all  in  your  power  to  pre- 
vent this." 


286 


i  am  sure  there  are  no  yellow  stripers  in  this  organization.  (Ap- 
plause.) 

It  would  seem  to  be  almost  an  act  of  supererogation  on  my  part  to 
really  introduce  the  speaker  who  is  to  address  you  next.  You  all  know 
who  he  is.  You  all  know  that  he  occupied  the  very  responsible  office 
of  Secretary  of  War  during  the  years  1911  to  1913,  but  you  perhaps 
do  not  know  that  he  first  created  a  regular  co-ordinated  United  States 
Army.  In  fact,  the  credit  should  be  given  to  this  gentleman  for  hav- 
ing developed  a  real  United  States  regular  Army  while  he  was  the 
incumbent  of  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War.  It  gives  me  great  pleas- 
ure to  present  the  Honorable  Henry  L.  Stimson.     (Applause.) 

THE  INDIVIDUAL'S  DUTY  TOWARD  PREPAREDNESS. 

Henry  L.  Stimson, 

Former  Secretary  of  War,  New  York. 

Mr.  Stimson — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen :  I  am  afraid 
that  was  rather  a  large  contract  that  the  Chairman  has  given  me  credit 
for  having  achieved.  What  was  done  at  that  time  was  the  organization 
of  the  different  regiments,  that  formerly  existed  without  any  relation 
to  each  other,  into  what  is  in  a  military  sense  known  as  a  tactical  or- 
ganization, or  team — but  this  is  only  by  way  of  disclaimer. 

You  have  heard  so  many  eloquent  addresses  at  this  Congress  on 
the  general  subject  and  the  general  duty  of  preparedness  that  I  have 
determined  to  take  up  simply  the  practical  question,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
of  the  relation  which  this  Congress  of  ours  has  to  the  immediate  duty 
before  us  in  relation  to  the  Army. 

It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  two  clearly  distinct  functions  which 
this  Congress  is  performing  in  respect  to  military  policies  and  that 
we  should  keep  them  sharply  separated.  The  first  is  by  a  general  dis- 
cussion of  the  various  topics  connected  with  preparedness  to  lay  the 
foundations  for  a  broad  campaign  of  education  on  that  subject  among 
the  people  of  the  United  States.  The  object  of  this  campaign  should  be, 
according  to  my  view,  to  awaken  the  American  people  to  their  duty  of 
cij;izenship ;  to  submit  themselves  to  the  inconvenience  of  military 
training  in  order  that  they  may  take  part  in  the  defense  of  their  coun- 
try; and  to  establish  a  definite  and  adequate  system  through  which 

287 


sueh  training  may  be  given  and  the  citizens  when  trained  may  be  or- 
ganized for  defense.  The  other  function  of  the  League  is,  by  our  voice 
and  action,  in  the  shape  of  resolutions  here  adopted,  to  assist,  so  far  as 
possible,  in  the  practical  work  of  getting  legislation  at  this  Congress 
which  will  tend  to  remedy  the  immediate  defenseless  condition  of  this 
country.  In  some  respects  these  functions  may  conflict  with  each  other 
or  at  least  there  is  danger  that  in  pursuing  the  one  we  may  uncon- 
sciously do  harm  to  the  other.  We  are  all  in  favor  of  preparedness,  I 
assume,  but  many  of  us  have  diflierent  views  as  to  the  details  which  it 
should  follow  and  the  extent  to  which  it  should  go.  While  a. discussion 
of  these  differences  will  do  no  harm  to  a  great  educational  campaign, 
but  on  the  contrary  may  add  to  its  interest  and  intelligence,  we  should 
be  careful  lest  an  undue  insistence  upon  them  here  and  now  may  pre- 
vent us  from  getting  together  sis  to  the  fundamental  and  immediate 
things  which  are  necessary  in  the  way  of  legislation  at  the  present 
time.  By  being  over-insistent  as  to  matters  which  are  not  really  of 
importance  at  the  present  time,  we  may  be  merely  lending  aid  and 
comfort  to  the  real  enemies  of  preparedness  who  are  seeking  to  pre- 
vent the  passage  of  any  remedial  legislation.  In  what  I  have  to  say 
this  afternoon,  I  shall  try  to  keep  this  difference  in  view  and  point 
out,  so  far  as  I  can,  the  matters  upon  which  I  think  we  can  all  agree 
and  urge  upon  our  representatives  in  the  national  legislature. 

The  first  line  of  distinction  which  presents  itself  is  that  between 
our  regular  army  and  our  citizen  soldiery — between  the  men  who 
make  military  service  their  regular  work  in  peace,  as  well  as  war,  and 
the  men  upon  whom  the  nation  proposes  to  call  for  defense  only  in 
case  of  emergency  or  war;  whether  they  be  national  guardsmen,  vol- 
unteers or  a  continental  army.  It  has  been  the  time-honored  policy 
of  the  United  States  to  place  its  dependence  upon  both  classes  of 
soldiers,  and  I  assume  that  we  are  substantially  united  in  believing 
that  this  policy  must  continue.  To  be  sure,  during  the  past  few 
months  I  have  heard  a  few  people  argue  that  we  should  raise  our 
regular  army  up  to  a  size  sufficient  to  enable  it  to  defend  the  country 
without  any  help  from  citizens  and  thus  dispense  with  all  need  of  any 
other  force.  I  am  not  in  favor  of  such  a  proposition,  and  I  assume 
that  the  bulk  of  my  hearers  are  not.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  not.  a 
practical  possibility.  Not  only  is  it  totally  at  variance  with  the  his- 
toric policy  of  this  country  to  maintain  a  professional  standing  army 

288 


I 


of  such  a  size,  but  it  is  in  flat  opposition  to  the  march  of  democratic 
ideals  throughout  the  world.  The  modern  armies  which  are  fighting 
in  Europe  consist  not  of  professionals,  but  of  trained  citizens  who 
have  been  called  from  their  peaceful  pursuits  to  fight  for  their  re- 
spective countries.  To  suggest  that  our  great  and  free  Republic  place 
its  entire  reliance  upon  a  regular  army  would  be  to  revert  to  the 
military  ideals  of  Frederic  the  Great  rather  than  those  of  modern 
democracy. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  always  shall  need  a  small  regular  army 
not  only  to  serve  as  a  nucleus  and  training  corps  for  our  citizens, 
but  to  be  what  we  call  our  first  line  or  emergency  defense,  both  against 
internal  disorder  and  against  invasion  and  also  to  perform  the  ex- 
peditionary service  occasion  for  which,  in  our  development  as  a  great 
power  in  the  world,  has  become  increasingly  frequent. 

Now,  bearing  in  mind  these  distinctions,  it  seems  to  me  quite 
easy  to  clarify  our  minds  to  some  extent  as  to  the  proposed  legislation 
now  pending  before  Congress.  So  far  as  legislation  respecting  our 
regular  army  is  concerned,  we  ought  to  have  no  serious  difficulty  to 
keep  from  quarreling  either  with  each  other  or  with  the  steps  which 
Secretary  Garrison  is  urging  upon  Congress.  There  is  no  possible 
manner  of  doubt  that  our  regular  army  today  is  much  too  small  for 
the  functions  which  our  policy  throws  upon  it.  While  the  country 
itself  has  been  increasing  and  its  military  needs  still  rapidly  increas- 
ing, the  number  of  regulars  within  the  United  States  has  actually 
been  diminished.  Fifty  odd  companies  of  coast  artillery  have  been 
sent  out  of  the  country  to  garrison  our  foreign  posts  and  the  same 
is  true  of  a  number  of  mobile  organizations.  Three  years  ago,  when 
1  was  Secretary  of  War,  we,  for  the  first  time,  created  a  tactical  or- 
ganization of  the  United  States  army  within  this  country.  Previously 
the  United  States  had  never  had  an  army  in  time  of  peace.  It  had 
a  number  of  regiments  and  squadrons  and  batteries,  but  no  army. 
We  then  organized  these  forces  into  three  divisions  of  infantry  and 
one  of  cavalry,  giving  to  each  such  division,  for  the  first  time,  its 
organization  of  line  and  staff  officers  and  attempting  to  give  its  proper 
quota  of  troops,  including  auxiliaries.  The  organization,  however, 
v(^as  necessarily  very  imperfect  because  we  did  not  have  the  requisite 
troops.     Many  of  the  brigades  were  skeletonized  in  consequence  and 

289 


one  of  the  principal  results  of  the  work  was  that  it  furnished  a  pattern 
according  to  which  future  additions  of  the  army  could  be  filled  in. 

Now  this  is  just  what  Secretary  Garrison  is  trying  to  do.  His 
recommendations  in  respect  to  the  regular  army  are  for  sufficient  new 
organizations  to  bring  this  skeleton  army  up  to  its  proper  basis.  In 
other  words,  to  give  us  three  complete  divisions  of  infantry  and  one 
of  cavalry,  instead  of  skeleton  divisions,  and  to  make  good  the  further 
gaps  that  have  been  created  by  the  organizations  which  have  recently 
been  sent  out  of  the  country.  It  is  a  sound  plan  and  an  intelligent  plan. 
It  is  based  upon  the  elementary  military  axiom  that  a  military  force 
should  be  a  balanced  team  and  not  a  lot  of  heterogeneous  units,  and  it 
is  also  an  attempt  to  carry  out  continuously  a  previous  sound  military 
policy  of  the  Department,  based  upon  the  report  of  the  General  Staff 
in  1912  on  the  organization  of  our  land  forces. 

Personally,  I  think  our  regular  army  now  should  be  made  larger 
still.  I  should  be  glad  to  see  four  infantry  divisions  within  the 
United  States,  as  has  been  recently  recommended  by  the  War  College, 
instead  of  three.  I  have  no  doubt  Mr.  Garrison  himself  would  be  only 
too  glad  to  have  such  increases  on  his  plan.  I  should  also  be  glad  to 
see  a  much  larger  number  of  artillery  regiments  added  than  Mr.  Gar- 
rison has  asked  for  because  the  present  war,  above  all  things,  has 
brought  out  the  fact  that  our  former  calculations  as  to  the  requisite 
proportion  of  artillery  for  our  army  was  too  small. 

But  that  is  not  the  practical  issue.  What  is  proposed  in  Con- 
gress and  what  is  likely  to  happen  is  that  Mr.  Garrison  will  be  refused 
even  the  regiments  for  which  he  has  asked  and  that  instead  a  sop  will 
be  thrown  to  the  sentiment  of  the  country  by  merely  authorizing  the 
Department  to  enlist  enough  more  men  to  bring  our  existing  regi- 
ments up  to  full  strength.  It  would  undoubtedly  be  a  good  thing 
to  bring  existing  regiments  up  nearer  to  full  strength  than  they  now 
are,  but  to  make  that  an  excuse  or  a  cover  for  refusing  to  add  the 
new  regiments  now  requested  to  our  little  army  would,  in  my  opinion, 
be  a  very  wrong  and  a  very  foolish  thing.  It  would  be  only  too  easy 
hereafter,  in  a  moment  of  shortsighted  economy,  to  reduce  the  num- 
ber of  enlisted  men  in  the  United  States  Army.  Such  a  program 
would  leave  us  just  where  we  were  before,  so  far  as  any  permanent 
increase  of  our  regular  army  strength  is  concerned.  It  would  utterly 
fail  to  perfect  our  present  divisions  or  to  furnish  the  new  officers  and 

290 


new  organizations  which  have  become  so  necessary.  What  I  wish 
to  make  clear  is  that  Mr.  Garrison's  proposal  is  a  sound  initial  step. 
It  is  very  much  more  sound  and  intelligent  than  these  counter-plans 
which  are  proposed  in  Congress  and  it  would  be  a  foolish  and  un- 
patriotic thing  on  our  part  by  opposing  this  plan  to  lend  strength 
to  the  others.  The  thing  to  do  is  to  insist  upon  this  as  a  first  step, 
and  then,  if  possible,  to  get  more. 

Only  last  week  there  was  a  massacre  of  American  citizens  over 
the  Mexican  border  and  many  of  our  people  have  been  clamoring  to 
have  the  Lnited  States  army  sent  over  as  a  punitive  expedition.  It  ia 
conceivable  that  at  almost  any  time  the  hands  of  our  Government 
may  be  forced  by  some  such  emergency,  yet  at  the  present  day,  with 
the  great  bulk  of  our  army  massed  along  the  Mexican  border,  we  have 
only  20,000  troops  there  available  for  such  an  expedition  and,  under 
sober  calculation  the  Mexicans  have  far  more  armed  men  and  trained 
troops  available  for  a  punitive  expedition  into  our  territory  than  we 
into  theirs. 

The  same  argument  is  true  of  the  other  legislation  proposed  by 
the  War  Department  for  the  regular  army.  They  ask  to  have  our 
present  imperfect  enlistment  law  amended  both  in  order  to  encourage 
enlistments  and  to  provide  for  a  regular  army  reserve.  This  is  highly 
important.  Even  if  we  should  be  authorized  to  increase  our  regulars 
today  it  is  doubtful  whether  we  could  do  so  under  the  present  law. 
Men  will  not  readily  enlist  for  seven  years,  four  of  which  must  be 
spent  with  the  colors,  and,  under  that  law,  we  have  succeeded  in 
accumulating,  as  I  am  informed,  less  than  1,500  reservists. 

For  years  the  Department  has  recommended  that  the  period  with 
the  colors  be  shortened  and  that  the  Department  be  given  discretionary 
authority  to  discharge  men  into  the  reserve  as  soon  as  they  become 
proficient.  Such  amendments  are  the  very  keystone  of  the  military 
arch,  as  recommended  by  our  military  advisers.  They  should  not  be 
withheld  from  us. 

Finally,  the  Department  has  asked  for  legislation  increasing  the 
number  of  our  regular  army  officers  and  for  money  with  which  to 
accumulate  additional  war  material  in  the  shape  particularly  of  field 
artillery  and  ammunition.  It  is  needless  to  debate  upon  these  neces- 
sities. They  have  been  fully  discussed  in  the  daily  press.  No  one  who 
has  in  mind  the  needs  of  our  army  disputes  these  needs. 

291 


On  the  side,  therefore,  of  our  problem  which  deals  with  our  regu- 
lar army,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  the  duty  of  this  League  to  earnestly 
support  the  recommendations  of  the  War  Department  which  have  been 
made  along  the  foregoing  lines  and  to  do  all  they  can  to  get  them 
enacted  into  law.  If  Congress  can  be  persuaded  further,  well  and 
good;  but,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  the  recommendations  involve  no  step 
which,  if  taken,  may  in  the  future  have  to  be  retraced. 

The  perennial  difficulty  which  confronts  us  in  respect  to  any  in- 
crease in  our  regular  army  is  its  expense.  Our  regulars  cost  very 
much  more  than  any  other  soldiers  in  the  world.  Roughly  speaking, 
each  regular  costs  this  nation  a  thousand  dollars  a  year.  Therefore, 
to  increase  our  regular  army  by  the  comparatively  insignficant  num- 
ber of  50,000  additional  men,  means  a  difference  to  our  budget  of 
$50,000,000  a  year.  Part  of  this  is  due  to  our  wasteful  methods  and 
our  failure  to  stop  the  enormous  leakage  that  goes  on  in  different  ways 
through  our  failure  to  have  in  this  country  any  national  budget  system 
such  as  exists  in  practically  all  other  civilized  nations.  But  making 
all  due  allowance  for  such  wastage,  I  should  say  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  expense  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  cost  of  living  and 
the  rate  of  wages  in  this  country  is  so  high  and  that  when  we  depend 
upon  a  professional  army  like  our  regular  army,  we  are  bidding 
against  the  highest  labor  market  in  the  world.  We  are  defending 
our  country,  in  other  words,  upon  a  basis  of  pay  instead  of  a  basis 
of  duty  and  patriotism.  It  would  be  impossible  for  even  the  United 
States  to  maintain  a  defense  of  adequate  size  upon  such  a  policy. 
It  would  not  only  be  a  departure  from  democratic  ideals,  but  it  would 
cost  far  too  much.  That  is  another  reason  why  the  real  and  ultimate 
defense  of  this  country  in  any  serious  war  must  depend  upon  its 
citizen  soldiery. 

When  we  reach  this  question  of  our  citizen  soldiery,  we  reach  a 
question,  upon  the  discussion  of  which  the  great  war  in  Europe  has 
had  the  most  profound  effect. 

Four  years  ago  when  it  became  my  official  duty  to  study  this 
question,  I  hardly  dared  dream  that  the  time  would  ever  come,  within 
my  lifetime,  when  the  American  people  would  seriously  consider  the 
institution  in  this  country  of  any  system  of  universal  military  train- 
ing. The  searching  test  of  the  European  war  has,  however,  put  its 
finger  squarely  upon  this  weak  spot  of  our  American  democracy.    Ji> 

292 


our  national  development  thus  far  we  have  focused  our  attention  UpoA 
the  rights,  the  privileges,  the  benefits  which  we  have  expected  to  get 
from  free  government  and  we  have  paid  scant  attention  to  the  duties 
or  the  obligations  or  the  sacrifices  which  were  correlative  to  them.  But 
now,  for  the  first  time,  we  are  beginning  to  realize  how  far  we  have 
fallen  behind  other  nations  in  this  respect.  For  the  first  time  there 
has  been  made  clear  to  us  the  superior  strength  and  patriotism  which 
have  been  developed  in  nations  which  hitherto  we  have  been  inclined 
to  regard  with  little  admiration  or  even  respect.  For  the  first  time 
we  have  had  revealed  to  us  in  blinding  light  the  fact  that  men  of  other 
nations  for  years  have  been  willing  to  give  towards  the  building  up 
of  the  efficiency  of  their  nation,  a  measure  of  time  and  personal  effort 
which  we  have  been  unwilling  to  give. 

We  are  beginning  to  realize  the  true  meaning  of  the  proposition 
that  manhood  suffrage  postulates  manhood  services  and  that  the  man 
who  has  a  right  to  participate  in  the  making  of  his  own  government 
is  bound  by  the  highest  obligation  of  honor  to  share  in  the  burden  of 
defending  it.  And  so  today  we  find  an  increasing  number  of  our 
people  who  believe,  as  I  believe,  that  this  problem  of  national  defense 
will  never  be  permanently  solved  until  it  is  distributed  among  the 
whole  people  by  some  system  of  universal  liability  to  military  training; 

Instead  of  ourselves  performing  the  most  vital  duty  of  citizenship 
we  hav©  been  hiring  other  men  to  do  it  for  us.  Even  during  the  Civil 
War,  when  we  recognized  the  obligation  of  general  service  by  the 
Draft  Act,  we  ruined  its  application  by  instituting  a  system  of  bounties 
and  permitting  the  purchase  of  substitutes.  We  have  permitted  the 
most  priceless  obligation  of  the  man  to  the  State  to  be  traded  in  and 
bartered  for  like  the  wares  of  a  huckster.  Other  democracies  have 
been  more  consistent  and  intelligent  and  today  they  are  reaping  the 
advantage  of  their  action  not  only  in  their  national  security  but  in 
the  stability  of  character  which  their  training  has  given  to  the  indi- 
vidual. Not  only  do  we  see  a  regenerated  Republic  of  France;  not 
only  do  we  see  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  rendering  yeoman 
service  in  the  defense  of  the  British  Empire,  but  we  find  small  neutral 
countries  like  Switzerland  vindicating  their  rights  and  duties  as  neu- 
trals, with  the  aid  of  their  trained  citizens  in  a  way  which  we  might 
well  envy. 


293 


But  we  must  remember  that  this  revival  of  patriotism,  this  seilsd 
bf  the  individual  duty  of  defense  which  is  sweeping  over  the  country, 
is  recent.  It  was  not  in  evidence  fifteen  months  ago  when  the  members 
of  the  present  Congress  were  elected.  Its  full  force  may  not  be  yet 
felt  in  legislation.  Therefore,  it  is  quite  likely  that  the  chief  function 
of  this  League  will  be  to  continue  the  campaign  of  education  and,  at 
the  present,  merely  to  endeavor  to  prevent  the  taking  of  any  false 
steps  in  legislation  in  this  respect,  steps  which  subsequently  would 
have  to  be  retraced  perhaps  with  difficulty. 

If  Congress  is  not  ready  yet  to  sanction  universal  training,  the 
measures  which  are  enacted  should  be  those  which,  so  far  as  they  go, 
are  in  accord  with  this  great  fundamental  duty  and  which,  as  time 
passes  and  experience  ripens,  will  lead  most  naturally  to  the  establish- 
ment of  such  a  system. 

One  of  the  propositions  which  is  being  seriously  urged  before 
Congress  is  that  we  should  pay  our  State  Militia  from  the  national 
treasury  and  should  attempt  to  develop  them  into  our  Federal  Citizens 
Army  which  they  still  retain  their  legal  character  as  a  State  force. 
I  served  nearly  ten  years  in  the  National  Guard  and  I  have  the  warm- 
est appreciation  of  what  it  has  accomplished  in  the  way  of  discipline 
and  efficiency  under  most  adverse  circumstances.  Four  years  ago, 
when  it  was  clear  that  no  other  force  of  federal  reserves  could  be 
obtained  from  Congress,  I  reluctantly  gave  my  approval  to  a  pay  bill 
in  order  to  obtain  the  advantages  of  training  and  discipline  which 
the  bill  provided.  Further  study  of  the  subject  and  of  the  situation 
evoked  by  the  war  have  made  it  clear  to  me  that  such  legislation 
would  be  a  mistake. 

Under  the  Federal  Constitution  the  National  Guard  or  Organized 
Militia  is  primarily  a  State  force  instead  of  a  National  Reserve  and 
I  do  not  believe  that  any  effective  National  Citizens  Army  can  be 
created  out  of  a  force  dominated  by  forty-eight  separate  sovereignties. 
History  and  statistics  show  this  beyond  peradventure.  For  nearly 
fifteen  years  strenuous  efforts  have  been  made  by  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, as  well  as  by  the  State  authorities,  to  increase  the  numbers 
of  the  guard,  yet  it  has  remained  nearly  stationary.  At  present  it 
numbers  only  129,000.  The  ratio  of  its  enlistments  to  our  population 
is  so  far  below  that  in  other  English-speaking  countries  as  to  make  it 
clear  that  some  fundamental  defect  is  at  work.     Five  young  English- 

294 


men  and  six  young  Canadians  voluntarily  enlist  in  the  unpaid  citizen 
soldiery  of  those  countries  in  times  of  peace  to  one  j^oung  American 
in  our  Guard.  And  in  many  parts  of  the  country  the  attitude  of  tha 
very  class  of  the  community  upon  which  the  Guard  should  especially 
rely  is  bitterly  antagonistic  to  it. 

It  seems  to  me  that  these  defects  can  be  traced  directly  to  the 
fact  that  the  National  Guard  is  in  fact  a  State  military  force  which 
we  are  also  requiring  to  do  duty  for  the  national  government.  So 
long  as  such  forces  exist  the  States  are  tempted  to  slur  their  police 
duties  and  to  rely  wholly  upon  citizen  soldiery  for  that  purpose.  In- 
stead of  organizing  forces  of  paid  policemen  for  this  primary  duty 
of  preserving  order,  our  States  have  fallen  back  upon  their  militia. 
In  this  way  every  petty  riot  is  treated  as  an  insurrection.  Upon  a 
force  of  citizens  with  deadly  weapons  in  their  hands  is  thrown  a  duty 
which  could  be  better  performed  by  a  policeman  and  a  club. 

What  is  even  worse,  there  has  gradually  grov/n  up  among  our 
laboring  classes  the  feeling  that  the  only  soldiers  with  whom  they  are 
practically  acquainted  represent  a  different  class  of  the  community  and 
are  maintained  for  the  purpose  of  being  used  against  them.  Instead 
of  regarding  the  militiamen  as  a  citizen  training  to  perform  his  duty 
of  defending  the  country  in  case  of  real  war,  the  labor  man  has  come 
to  regard  him  as  a  representative  of  capital,  being  trained  as  a  poUce- 
man  against  labor.  However  faulty  this  view  may  be,  it  is  vigorously 
held  and  has  been  encouraged  by  our  dual  system  of  militia  and,  in 
great  sections  of  the  country,  has  developed  an  unwillingness  to  un- 
dergo any  military  training  whatever  on  the  part  of  the  very  people 
who  have  most  to  gain  from  such  training  and  upon  whom  the  country 
should  most  rely. 

Finally,  this  liability  to  State  police  duty  has  tended  to  shape  the 
term  of  enlistment  and  the  training  of  our  militia  to  the  disadvantage 
of  their  function  as  national  troops.  Instead  of  being  trained  through 
brief  but  continuous  periods  of  intensive  work  with  the  colors  and 
thereafter  being  left  comparatively  free  as  reservists,  the  militia  are 
held  to  comparatively  long  periods  with  the  colors  under  a  system 
of  weekly  armory  drills,  a  system  which  is  not  only  the  least  effective 
way  of  teaching  a  man  to  be  a  soldier,  but  also  tends,  from  the  length 
of  time  during  which  it  imposes  a  continual  though  slight  obligation 
upon  him,  to  discourage  enlistments. 

295 


The  National  Guard  is,  other  than  the  regular  army,  our  only 
present  force  of  even  partially  trained  soldiery.  Nothing  should  be 
done  to  discourage  its  work,  but,  on  the  contrary,  everything  to  stimu- 
late and  encourage  it.  But  such  encouragement  should  be  in  the  direc- 
tion of  transferring  it  wholly  into  the  service  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment and  not  of  perpetuating  it  in  its  present  status.  Into  any  system 
of  citizen  soldiery  which  we  shall  adopt  for  our  Nation,  there  should 
be  opportunity  for  the  guard  to  come  either  as  organizations  or  indi- 
viduals, whenever  the  necessary  adjustments  with  their  States  can  be 
made.  None  of  the  present  help  which  they  receive  should  be  with- 
drawn from  them,  at  least  until  such  an  opportunity  is  offered  and 
until  the  working  of  a  new  and  better  system  is  assured.  But  to  take 
steps  which  still  further  revert  upon  our  country  a  system  which  is 
fundamentally  defective  and  impossible  is  to  be  blind  to  the  clearest 
lessons  of  our  past.  Particularly  to  grant  Federal  pay  to  the  individual 
militiaman  for  his  weekly  service  rendered  to  the  State,  seems  to  blur 
the  great  lesson  which  is  emerging  from  the  European  war.  It  is 
to  yield  again  to  the  theory  that  we  can  induce  men  to  serve  their 
country,  not  as  a  duty  of  patriotism,  but  for  pay.  And  it  will  in- 
evitably tend  to  hinder  and  retard  the  introduction  of  what  we  regard 
as  the  true  and  ultimate  system  of  universal  liability  by  creating  a 
new  vested  interest  based  upon  a  contrary  and  antagonistic  principle. 

The  other  proposition  for  a  citizens'  army  is  the  one  proposed  by 
the  War  Department  for  the  establishment  of  a  force  of  Federal  vol- 
unteers under  the  name  of  the  Continental  Army.  It  has  seemed  to 
me  that  the  criticisms  which  have  been  levelled  at  this  proposition  have 
referred  mainly  to  items  which  are  matters  of  detail  rather  than 
matters  of  substance.  As  a  result  we  are  in  danger  of  losing  sight  of 
the  sound  foundations  upon  which  such  a  plan  may  rest.  The  length 
of  the  training  and  whether  it  should  be  in  one  period  or  in  three,  for 
example,  are  matters  as  to  which  we  may  have  many  differences  of 
opinion,  but  it  is  also  a  matter  in  which  we  will  have  to  be  guided 
largely  by  experience  and  which  in  new  legislation  should  be  left,  as 
far  as  possible,  to  the  discretion  of  the  executive  officers  in  charge 
so  that  it  can  be,  from  time  to  time,  modified  and  changed. 

The  force  proposed  will  be  organized,  trained,  disciplined  and  con- 
trolled by  a  single  authority  instead  of  forty-eight,  and  that  single 
authority  will  be  the  authority  in  which,  under  the  Constitution,  is 

296 


vested  the  duty  of  preparing  for  war.  This  is  the  fundamental  and 
basic  principle  upon  which  the  organization  of  a  national  army  must 
rest,  and  it  is  one  which  we  have  never  had  in  owr  militia  and  never 
can  have  so  long  as  they  remain  militia  and  are  governed  by  the  militia 
restrictions  of  the  Constitution. 

In  the  second  place,  and  by  reason  of  this  fact,  it  will  be  possible 
to  apply  to  the  training  of  such  a  force  the  methods  of  intensive  train- 
ing which  have  proved  so  effective  in  our  manoeuvre  camps  where  we 
have  been  learing  that  a  body  of  raw  recruits  can,  within  a  few  weeks, 
be  brought  to  a  stage  of  efficiency  excelling  the  possibilities  of  a  simi- 
lar body  under  weekly  drills  extending  over  several  years. 

Finally,  such  a  force  if  established  would  be  easily  capable  of  ex- 
pansion with  the  growing  of  public  sentiment  in  its  favor  until,  if 
desired,  it  became  universal  and  compulsory. 

These  principles  are  the  outgrowth  of  bitter  American  history. 
The  need  of  their  application  can  be  read  in  the  records  of  many 
unnecessary  defeats  and  many  fruitless  expenditures. 

General  Upton,  our  foremost  military  writer,  proposed  in  his 
book  in  1880  such  a  force  of  national  volunteers,  to  be  officered  and 
trained  by  the  Federal  Government  in  time  of  peace  and  distributed 
among  the  Congressional  districts. 

The  General  Staff  and  the  Army  War  College  have  suggested  the 
organization  of  such  a  force  in  their  reports  of  1912  and  1915. 

What  is  of  principal  importance  to  those  of  us  who  believe  that 
eventually  the  permanent  security  of  this  country  must  rest  upon  some 
universal  system  like  that  in  Switzerland  or  Australia,  is  that  this 
proposal  lies  directly  on  the  road  to  such  a  system  and  is  not  a  side 
track  from  which  we  must  sooner  or  later  turn  back. 

The  features  which  I  have  enumerated  are  features  in  those  sys- 
tems and  the  elements  of  the  Swiss  and  Australian  systems  which  the 
War  Department  plan  lacks,  such  as  preliminary  training  in  rifle  shoot- 
ing in  the  schools,  are  elements  which  can  be  added  as  fast  as  they 
become  politically  possible  without  essential  change  in  the  plan  pro- 
posed. 

Taken  as  a  whole  and  having  regard  to  its  essence  rather  than  its 
details,  I  believe  that  the  proposition  of  the  Continental  Army  is  sound 
and  is  in  accord  with. the  concensus  of  the  views  which  have  been 
developed  by  our  experts. 

297 


Whether  the  men  of  such  a  force,  when  discharged  from  the  color?, 
will  be  capable  of  taking  their  positions  in  the  first  line  of  defense 
or  will  be  merely  a  partially  trained  reserve  ready  for  the  field  only 
after  further  training,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  will  depend  wholly  upon 
the  amount  of  time  and  training  which  the  nation  shall  decide  to  give 
to  them  at  the  colors  under  the  plan  finally  worked  out  and  adopted. 
All  we  can  say  at  this  time  is  that  under  the  method  proposed  such 
training  as  is  given  will  be  given  under  the  most  favorable  conditions 
for  producing  effective  results,  and  further,  that  the  period  decided 
upon  can  be  varied  and  expanded  according  to  future  need  with  a 
minimum  of  distui lance  to  the  establishment. 

In  these  respccto  the  system  should  far  exceed  in  efficacy  and 
flexibility  anything  which  the  country  has  ever  had. 

Under  the  spur  of  the  dread  conflict  going  on  across  the  Atlantic, 
we  are  keenly  alive  now  to  the  perils  of  defenselessness  and  the  need 
of  preparation.  Let  us  not  forget,  however,  that  this  feeling  is  only 
too  certain  to  subside  with  the  cause  which  gave  it  birth.  If  there  is 
one  thing  which  is  taught  us  by  our  history,  it  is  that  in  normal  time 
of  peace  we  never  have  thought  of  preparing  for  war.  The  only  times 
in  which  rational  measures  of  defense  will  be  considered  are  times  like 
these.  Let  us  make  sure,  therefore,  to  do  our  best  towards  accomplish- 
ing in  this  direction  for  our  beloved  country  while  such  progress  is 
possible.  A  heavy  responsibility  rests  on  the  shoulders  of  him  who, 
through  pride  of  opinion,  or  any  other  motive,  endeavors  to  block  the 
only  steps  which  are  practically  possible. 

The  Chairman — I  am  requested  to  announce  that  a  patriotic 
citizen,  whose  name  is  not  given,  has  contributed  the  sum  of  $250  to 
start  a  fund  for  printing  and  distributing  the  papers  read  at  this 
Congress.  You  know  there  is  always  a  little  joker,  and  there  is  a 
little  postcript  here.  It  says,  "All  who  desire  to  contribute  are  re- 
guested  to  communicate  with  Mr.  Henry  L.  West,  the  Executive  Secre- 
tary, in  the  adjoining  room.     (Applause.) 

I  believe  it  is  impossible  for  the  human  mind  to  comprehend  the 
horrors  of  modern  warfare,  and  when  we  consider  that  these  horrors 
are  produced  largely  through  unpreparedness,  it  seems  to  me  that  we 
border  on  criminality  if  we  do  not  anticipate  such  conditions.  We  are 
very  fortunate  in  having  with  us  today  a  gentleman  who  has  had  actual 

298 


experience  in  the  trenches,  who  can  talk  by  the  book  as  to  the  situjl- 
tion  of  unpreparedness,  and  who  is  an  authority  as  well  as  a  writer 
on  such  matters.  It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  introduce  to  you 
Captain  Granville  Fortesque.     (Applause.) 

ADDRESS   OF   CAPTAIN   GRANVILLE  FORTESQUE 

Captain  Fortesque — Ladies  and  gentlemen:  I  cannot  tell  you 
how  deeply  I  feel  in  addressing  you  this  afternoon.  I  cannot  make 
known  to  you  the  secret  emotions  that  stir  me.  I  am  going  to  try  to 
say  a  few  words  which  I  hope  will  have  some  little  effect  in  this  move- 
ment for  preparedness,  because  I  cannot,  no  matter  how  eloquent  I 
may  be,  picture  to  you  what  I  have  seen,  the  wrath  of  war.  I  have 
seen  two  nations — three  nations — the  victims  of  unpreparedness,  and, 
believe  me,  it  is  only  in  the  ratio  of  unpreparedness  that  the  horror 
of  war  can  be  measured.  I  was  fortunate,  or  unfortunate,  enough 
to  be  in  Belgium  when  this  present  conflict  opened.  I  went  to  Liege. 
I  was  there  during  the  first  attacks.  I  have  seen  the  fleeing  multi- 
tudes. I  have  seen  the  women,  the  children,  pushed  out  before  this 
nameless  terror.  And  why?  Why  was  Belgium  attacked?  Because 
Belgium  was  unprepared.  Do  you  think  those  German  legions  would 
have  come  through  at  that  point  if  there  had  been  force  enough  there 
to  resist  them?  Do  you  think  they  would  have  pushed  on  over  that 
country  and  crushed  it,  and  then  through  to  France,  if  they  had  not 
known  that  that  was  the  weak  spot — the  defenseless  spot?  And  it 
is  always  the  defenseless  spot  which  is  open  to  attack.  Let  us  Ameri- 
cans remember  that. 

From  what  I  saw  there  I  can  add  another  lesson  to  Mr.  Huide- 
koper's  many  examples.  The  first  point  is  on  the  militia  soldier  as  in 
contra-distinction  to  the  regular  soldier.  I  will  give  you  an  instance. 
An  instance  which  came  under  my  personal  observation.  I  saw  the 
defense  of  Liege.  I  saw  the  ninth  regiment  of  the  line  and  the  four- 
teenth regiment  of  the  line,  men  who  fought  like  lions  against  tre- 
mendous odds,  who  stood  up  to  the  last  minute,  giving  every  ounce 
of  fight  that  there  was  in  them,  because  they  were  trained  and  dis- 
ciplined fighters,  and  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  it  was  the  force 
developed  in  those  trained  and  disciplined  fighters  that  saved  France. 
(Applause.)     You  all  know  the  heroic  defense  of  Liege.     I  do  not 

299 


hiave  to  recount  the  stories  of  splendid  heroism;  how  they  went  jjack 
only  foot  after  foot,  when  pressed  by  enormous  artillery  superiority. 

Now  I  am  going  to  show  you  another  picture.  From  Brussels 
I  went  down  through  the  valley  of  the  Meuse  to  Namur.  The  same 
kind  of  men — they  were  Belgians — were  entrusted  with  the  defense 
of  Namur.  When  I  went  there  dozens  of  officers  were  sitting  out  in 
front  of  the  cafes.  On  inquiry  I  found  out  that  these  were  more  or 
less  irregular  troops,  gardes  civique  and  others,  who  had  not  yet 
come  under  the  regular  service  discipline.  What  happened?  Two 
hours  and  a  quarter  after  the  first  German  gun  was  fired  at  Namur, 
the  city  surrendered.  Why  was  not  the  defense  at  Namur  as  efficient 
and  as  effective  as  the  defense  of  Liege?  Simply  because  there  you 
had  militia  forces  operating,  and  not  the  trained  and  disciplined 
regular  forces  of  the  Belgian  Army. 

In  my  earlier  experience  in  the  war,  I  got  into  Germany,  and  I 
met  a  German  officer  who  said  that  he  marched  at  the  head  of  his 
regiment  over  the  main  street  through  Namur,  and  it  was  carpeted 
with  the  cast-off  tunics  and  blouses  of  soldiers  who  had  deserted  their 
posts.  I  will  give  you  an  instance  from  my  own  individual  experience, 
something  I  saw  with  my  own  eyes.  The  morning  the  Germans 
marched  into  Bruges,  I  was  sitting  at  breakfast  at  that  famous  restau- 
rant— I  have  forgotten  the  name  of  it  for  the  moment;  it  is  starred 
in  Baedeker — watching  the  Germans  coming  in  to  take  possession 
of  Bruges.  A  splendidly  dressed  gentleman  in  civilian  clothes  came 
down  the  stairs,  and  he  was  met  by  the  proprietress,  who  said  to  him 
in  French,  "The  breakfast  is  not  yet  ready,  Colonel,"  and  he  replied, 
also  in  French,  "No  more  Colonel,  if  you  please,  Madame."  That  is 
to  impress  upon  you  that  in  time  of  war  you  can  put  your  faith  only 
upon  a  trained  and  disciplined  regular  force. 

The  second  point  I  want  to  bring  out  is  the  necessity  of  bringing 
the  Red  Cross  organization  under  our  military  organization.  I  should 
like  to  see  the  Surgeon  General  of  the  Army  today  at  the  head  of  the 
Red  Cross  and  in  complete  control  of  the  American  Red  Cross. 
(Applause.)  The  reason  I  give  for  this  is  the  fact  that  during  the 
early  days  of  the  war  I  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  how  much  the 
wounded  suffered.  Of  course  you  all  understand  that  it  is  impossible, 
it  is  practically  impossible,  in  time  of  peace  to  have  a  medical  or-^ 
ganization  commensurate  with  the  demands  of  war. 

300 


It  would  be  open  to  objection  from  the  economic  point  of  view  and 
from  the  point  of  view  of  creating  such  a  force  which  might  draw 
from  other  forces.  It  is  impossible  to  have  an  adequate  medical  force, 
in  time  of  peace,  to  meet  the  demands  of  war.  This  was  unfortunately 
true  in  the  early  days  in  France,  and  I  know  that  there  was  an  officer 
of  the  general's  rank  who  was  moved  from  point  to  point,  and  refused 
at  six  different  hospitals,  because  they  had  not  the  proper  authority 
to  have  him  entered  into  any  one  of  these  hospitals,  and  for  that  reason 
the  Red  Cross  should  be  a  part  of  the  military  organization. 

There  can  be  no  difficulty,  there  can  be  no  political  objection, 
about  having  the  Red  Cross  organization  of  the  United  States  now 
incorporated  into  the  regular  organization  of  American  defensive 
forces. 

In  Russia  I  had  another  point  very  strongly  impressed  upon  me, 
and  that  was  the  difficulty  of  the  supply  of  officers.  We  know  that 
we  cannot  make  trained  soldiers  in  less  than  six  months,  even  under 
the  most  intensive  training.  An  officer  should  have  at  least  two 
years  special  training  in  his  class. 

When  it  comes  to  the  test  of  war,  you  have  not  got  the  chance  of 
creating  officers,  men  who  are  responsible  for  the  intelligent  direction 
of  troops.  I  cannot  say  that  I  see  how  it  is  quite  possible  to  create 
officers  of  trained  mind,  such  as  we  now  have  in  the  General  Staff. 
Those  men  have  worked  up  through  their  experience  and  through 
their  service,  and  so  have  proved  themselves  to  have  the  right  on  the 
positions  which  they  now  hold.  But  as  for  the  thousands  of  under 
officers  who  fill  such  important  positions  in  this  war,  I  do  not  see  how 
it  is  possible;  because,  believe  me,  it  is  the  company  officer  who  is 
the  responsible  unit  for  victory  at  the  present  time.  The  commanding 
officer  makes  his  plans,  and  he  makes  his  arrangements,  and  his  whole 
battle  plan  is  put  into  effect  and  given  over  and  entrusted  to  the 
battalion  and  company  commanders  for  execution.  The  whole  re- 
sponsibility of  the  execution  of  the  plan  rests  with  those  men,  and 
if  they  are  not  trained  men  who  know  their  business,  his  plan  is  going 
to  fail. 

Therefore  there  is  one  other  point  that  I  am  bringing  out,  and 
that  is,  let  us  increase  West  Point,  if  possible,  or  better  than  that, 
have  thi  ee  more  institutions  similar  to  West  Piont,  and  I  have  enough 
faith  in  the  American  people  to  know  that  we  are  not  going  to  create 

301 


a  military  caste  in  this  country.  You  have  seen  the  men  who  come 
out  of  West  Pofnt;  you  all  know  them.  They  are  regular  Americans, 
that  is  what  they  are  (applause),  of  the  best  type;  and  that  is  what 
we  want.  We  have  got  to  have  them.  These  other  things  will  come 
in  time,  but  let  us  get  that. 

Most  of  my  friends  here  that  I  talk  to  about  the  war  put  this 
question.  They  say,  "All  right;  you  talk  about  preparedness.  Whom 
are  we  going  to  fight?"  I  hope  and  pray  we  are  not  going  to  fight 
anyone  (applause)  ;  but  that  is  not  the  answer.  It  is  against  war. 
I  have  seen  enough  of  it.  Anybody  who  has  seen  it  and  knows  the 
horrors,  they  want  to  avoid  it.  The  only  way  you  can  avoid  it  is  to 
be  ready  for  it.  When  you  organize  a  police  force,  do  you  have  to 
specify  which  particular  gang  of  crooks  and  burglars  you  are  protect- 
ing yourself  against?  (Applause.)  And  believe  me,  my  friends,  I 
ask  of  you  not  to  confound  valor  with  effectiveness. 

We  speak  of  the  spirit  of  Concord.  Splendid  spirit;  fine!  They 
have  the  same  spirit  of  Concord  in  Serbia — at  least  they  had  it,  and 
where  are  they  now  ?  You  cannot  fight  machine  guns  with  pitch  forks. 
(Applause.) 

The  last  thing  I  am  going  to  say  is  this:  Something  has  been 
said  by  someone  here  to  this  effect,  that  the  only  effective  measure 
of  defense  is  universal  service.  (Applause.)  That  is  so  obvious  that 
it  needs  no  repetition.  I  can  tell  you  from  what  I  have  seen  in 
England.  There  is  an  example  for  us — a  pitiful  example.  You  read 
through  the  illustrated  papers  and  see  the  accounts  of  that  fighting, 
the  thousands  of  splendid  gentlemen  being  killed  day  after  day  because 
they  did  not  listen  to  the  call  of  Lord  Roberts.  It  was  a  voice  in  the 
wilderness  telling  them  to  prepare,  to  prepare,  to  prepare;  and  they 
did  not  prepare.  Why?  Because  they  had  to  fight  the  politicians. 
(Applause.)  Oh,  the  misery  that  England  is  suffering  today  is  due 
to  wrong  headed  and  misinformed  politicians.  So,  my  friends,  that  is 
the  fight  we  have  got  to  make,  all  of  us.  Any  man  who  is  worthy  of 
being  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  has  with  that  worth,  intrinsically, 
the  duty  of  fighting  for  the  United  States.  And  do  you  think  that 
all  these  Kycks  that  you  see  up  on  Fifth  Avenue  at  half  after  12 
o'clock — why,  I  thought  I  was  in  Lemberg.  (Laughter.)  There  they 
were,  just  the  same  thing,  exactly.  I  might  have  shut  my  eyes  and 
thought  that  I  was  back  in  Lemberg,  when  I  saw  them  going  by, 

302 


Do  you  think  they  have  any  patriotism?  Do  you  think  they  have  any 
of  the  feeling  that  we  have  for  this  country?  Why  should  they? 
Why,  they  come  from  all  those  foreign  countries  to  escape  all  that. 
They  come  here  to  escape  all  that  the  best  citizenship  means.  (Ap- 
plause.) 

And  so  I  am  going  to  tell  you  this,  just  to  define  what  unpre- 
paredness  meant  in  a  last  particular  instance  which  I  had  the  chance 
of  seeing.  It  was  so  pitiful  that  you  really  felt  as  if  you  might  want 
to  put  up  your  arms  and  say  "Don't  try  it."  It  was  down  in  the 
Dardenelles.  There  is  no  more  splendid  page  in  British  history  than 
the  fighting  over  the  crags  and  precipices  of  Gallipoli.  There  was  the 
point  of  individual  valor  doing  everything  it  possibly  could — every- 
thing. They  pushed  these  men  up.  No  question  of  their  bravery. 
Bravery  was  a  byword ;  self  sacrifice  an  eagerly  sought  privilege.  The 
unflinching  courage,  the  unwavering  devotion  to  duty,  the  uncom- 
plaining suffering  of  the  British  Army  in  the  Dardenelles  can  only 
get  from  us  the  highest  terms  of  praise  and  respect.  (Applause.) 
But  those  men  failed  because  they  were  unprepared. 

I  can  tell  you  that  if  Britain  had  had  the  120,000  casualties 
which  they  lost  in  Gallipoli  to  put  into  the  fight  of  the  18th  of  Feb- 
ruary, at  the  time  of  their  first  naval  demonstration,  they  would  be 
in  Constantinople  today. 

I  wish  that  you  could  have  been  with  me  as  I  stood  looking  out 
of  the  window  of  my  flat  in  London  when  the  Zeppelins  came;  and, 
my  friend,  the  Zeppelin  is  only  in  the  first  stage  of  its  development. 
I  calculated  it  out,  and  they  travelled  a  thousand  miles  in  that  raid. 
I  expect  to  see  Zeppelins  over  New  York  in  ten  years — commercially, 
perhaps.  But  if  you  could  see  this  great,  luminous  oval,  about  aa 
large  as  a  surface  car,  floating  in  the  liquid  atmosphe're  of  the  city, 
with  great  sheaves  of  the  searchlight  played  on  this  menacing  oval; 
and  then  in  the  distance  you  hear  the  deep  detonations  of  the  bombs 
that  they  drop;  and  then  suddenly  the  explosion  of  the  anti-air  craft 
gun ;  and  then  the  breaking  shrapnel.  If  you  could  have  seen  all  that 
I  am  sure  your  imagination  would  have  been  stirred,  as  my  imagina- 
tion was  stirred.  That  was  a  glimpse  into  the  war  of  the  future. 
And  then  this  great  globe  passed  over  London,  dropping  death  and 
destruction  on  innocent  civilians.     That  was  war. 


i03 


ft 


Finally,  when  a  shrapnel  burst  almost  off  the  nose  of  this  giant, 
the  phosphorescent  Zeppelin,  it  disappeared;  and  then  back  to  the 
west  of  London  a  red  flame  arose — it  was  more  a  haze,  a  great  red 
reflection  that  seemed  to  spring  out  of  the  blackness — ^the  city  burn- 
ing; and  in  front  of  that,  silhouetted  against  this  blood  red  flame, 
was  the  dome  and  the  cross  of  St.  Paul.  And  there,  with  all  that  that 
cross  typified,  yet  the  warships  of  the  enemy  had  come  into  the  heart  of 
the  country,  fighting  and  dropping  death  and  the  worst  type  of  de- 
struction on  a  sleeping  populace.  That  is  what  unpreparedness  will 
bring.     (Great  applause.) 

The  Chairman — As  we  all  know,  the  sudden  outbreak  of  this 
war  in  Europe  tested  the  metal  and  nerve  of  many  Americans  who 
happened  to  be  abroad  at  that  time,  and  attached  to  the  American 
legation  in  Paris  was  a  young  gentleman  who  worked  there  indefatig- 
ably  for  some  four  or  five  months.  He  studied  the  whole  situation, 
went  up  into  Belgium,  I  am  told,  and  travelled  through  France  ex- 
tensively, was  in  the  trenches,  and  has  come  back  prepared  to  give 
us  an  account  of  his  experiences  there.  Many  of  us  have  already  read 
his  book,  "The  Notebook  of  an  Attache,"  and  I  now  have  the  pleasure 
of  introducing  to  you  Mr.  Eric  Fisher  Wood,  who  will  speak  of  the 
Swiss  and  Australian  systems  and  their  applicability  to  the  United 
States.     (Applause.) 

THE   SWISS    AND    AUSTRALIAN    SYSTEMS    AND    THEIR 
APPLICABILITY  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

Eric  Fisher  Wood,  New  York, 

Author  "The  Note  Book  of  an  Attache." 

Mr.  Wood — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  Military  train- 
ing, preparedness,  has  one  end,  and  one  end  only. 

The  sole  object  of  military  training  is  to  produce  efficiency  in 
battle.  It  is  an  axiom,  in  all  the  armies  of  the  world,  that  it  takes 
more  than  one  year  of  training  to  fit  troops  for  the  firing  line.  It 
is  axiomatic  not  only  in  the  armies  of  Japan  and  Russia,  of  Germany 
and  France,  of  Austria  and  Italy,  but  in  those  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States. 

304" 


Military  experts  agree  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  present 
war  the  British  territorial  battalions  were  superior  to  our  own  militia 
regiments.  They  had  certainly  received  the  equivalent  of  more  than 
for  mouths  training.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  the  desperate  need  of  re- 
inforcements in  Flanders,  no  territorial  battalion  could  be  fitted  to 
withstand  the  test  of  fire  until  it  had  received  eight  months  additional 
training.  The  first  territorial  battalion  to  see  service  did  not  do  so 
until  it  had  spent  eight  months  in  a  training  camp. 

Troops  which  have  received  less  than  one  year's  training  are  worse 
than  useless.  Their  addition  to  a  weak  army  only  tends  to  make  that 
army  weaker. 

I  repeat  that  it  is  axiomatic  that  troops  cannot  be  made  fit  for 
battle  unless  they  receive  more  than  one  year  of  training.  In  the 
monarchial  system^  of  Europe,  the  government  takes  over  each  able- 
bodied  man  from  one  to  three  years,  in  order  that  he  may  be  made 
into  an  efficient  soldier.  These  years  are  a  dead  loss  to  the  individual, 
since  they  come  at  a  period  when  his  life  work  should  already  have 
been  begun. 

The  democratic  system  of  Switzerland  and  its  counterpart  in 
Australia  are  in  strong  contrast  to  these  monarchial  systems.  In 
Australia  the  individual  spends  only  about  eight  weeks  in  military 
service  after  he  has  reached  his  twenty-first  year.  In  Switzerland 
the  individual  spends  less  than  twenty  weeks  in  military  service  after 
he  has  reached  his  twenty-first  birthday. 

This  is  made  possible  because  in  Australia  and  in  Switzerland 
every  boy  receives  the  equivalent  of  more  than  one  year's  military 
training  as  a  part  of  his  education.  It  is  given  to  him  at  the  learning 
age.  It  is  a  distinct  gain  for  the  individual.  It  serves  as  a  vehicle 
of  education,  like  mathematics  or  the  languages.  As  a  vehicle  of 
education,  military  training  is  unsurpassed.  It  cultivates  civic  con- 
sciousness. It  teaches  truthfulness,  self-restraint,  self-control,  disci- 
pline, obedience.  It  makes  men  sound  in  mind  and  body.  It  teaches 
patriotism.  It  is  the  only  vehicle  in  school  education  which  teaches 
patriotism.  Hence  in  the  Swiss  and  Australian  systems  military 
training  is  not  a  loss  to  the  individual,  but  an  incalculable  gain. 

When  the  adoption  of  military  training  was  under  discussion  in 
Australia,  the  women  of  the  country  violently  opposed  it  and  almost 
defeated  its  enactment  into  law.    Within  two  short  years,  however, 

305 


they  had  become  its  most  ardent  advocates,  for  even  that  brief  time 
had  been  sufficient  to  bring  out  such  a  marvelous  improvement  in 
their  sons  as  to  demonstrate  its  great  educational  value. 

In  Svi'itzerland,  every  boy  is  obliged  to  undergo  training  in  rifle 
practice,  in  gymnastics  and  in  drill,  so  that  he  may  develop  into  a  good 
citizen  and  a  good  soldier.  When  he  arrives  at  the  age  of  nineteen, 
he  is  a  trained  and  equipped  individual  soldier,  ready  to  be  amalga- 
mated into  the  national  army  and  become  an  efficient  cog  therein. 

In  the  summer  of  this  twentieth  year  he  is  given  from  two  to 
three  months  intensive  training  in  the  field,  so  that  the  man  already 
trained  and  equipped  as  an  individual  soldier  may  be  organized  into 
the  army. 

At  twenty-one  he  has  become  a  full-fledged  active  member  of  the 
battalion  of  his  township  or  ward.  He  serves  as  a  member  thereof 
for  eleven  years,  and  during  that  time  he  must  each  year  devote 
fourteen  days  to  drill  and  rifle  practice',  at  periods  selected  by  himself. 
Every  Swiss  man  of  twenty-one  or  over,  thus  spends  a  total  of  only 
about  twenty  weeks  in  military  service,  in  order  that  his  nation  may 
be  safe  from  attack. 

During  the  eleven  years  that  he  is  enrolled  in  the  local  battalion 
he  is  at  all  times  liable  for  instant  service  in  defense  of  his  native 
land. 

The  Swiss  system  is  organized  for  defense  only,  and  no  Swiss 
soldier  may  be  sent  out  of  his  country  on  military  duty  unless  he 
specifically  volunteers  for  such  foreign  service. 

For  successful  military  aggression  the  monarchial  system  is 
necessary.  Aggressive  monarchs  need  great  standing  armies,  wait- 
ing ready  to  be  hurled  upon  the  prey  at  an  opportune  moment.  They 
must  be  ever  ready  to  rush  into  the  enemy's  country. 

The  Swiss  system  of  obligatory  training  and  service  enables 
Switzerland  to  put  into  the  field  within  her  own  borders  a  defensive 
army  of  nearly  half  a  million  trained,  equipped  and  organized  men. 
On  that  day,  eighteen  months  ago,  when  Germany,  France  and  the  rest 
of  Europe  plunged  into  conflict,  Switzerland  was  a  nation  of  peace- 
loving  civilians.  Twenty-four  hours  after  France  and  Germany  de- 
clared war,  150,000  confident  Swiss  warriors  stood  upon  her  borders, 
trained,  equipped  and  organized  for  defense,  and  300,000  reinforce- 
ments were  on  the  march. 


306 


The  Swiss  are  great  treaty  makers.  They  make  as  many  treaties 
as  possible.  They  have  succeeded  in  having  their  neutrality  guaran- 
teed by  most  of  the  nations  of  Europe.  They  are  good  diplomats  and 
arbitrators. 

The  Swiss  nation  promotes  peace  conferences,  and  the  Swiss 
individual  is  a  great  believer  in  pacific  texts.  In  many  a  Swiss  moun- 
tain home  hangs  the  text  "Peace  on  earth,  good  will  to  men";  and 
under  it  hangs  the  army  rifle,  which  is  to  be  found  in  every  Swiss 
household.  The  text  upon  the  wall  serves  as  a  reminder  of  the  re- 
ligious principles  of  the  father  of  that  Swiss  family,  and  as  a  greeting 
to  all  peacefully  minded  men.  The  rifle  is  no  way  contradicts  the 
text,  and  yet,  for  those  to  whom  the  text  may  be  "but  a  mere  scrap 
of  paper,"  the  meaning  of  the  rifle  is  unmistakable.     (Applause.) 

The  Swiss  army  is  the  most  democratic  institution  in  the  world. 
Every  individual,  no  matter  what  his  antecedents,  must  begin  as  a 
private  in  the  ranks,  and  consequently  every  officer  has  at  one  time 
been  a  private.  Every  individual,  be  he  a  farmer's  boy,  or  the  son 
of  a  banker,  must  stand  on  the  same  footing.     (Applause.) 

Switzerland  and  Australia  offer  us  for  adoption  a  defense  system 
which  has  not  only  been  successful,  but  is  economical.  The  cost  of 
the  Swiss  system  is  about  $1.60  per  capita  of  population.  Our  in- 
effective system  costs  us  about  $2.40  per  capita. 

In  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  is  necessary  that  the 
United  States  adopt  such  a  system  of  universal  obligatory  service,  let 
us  put  aside  all  prejudiced  and  preconceived  ideas  and  consider  four 
questions,  taking  them  one  at  a  time. 

First,  "Is  it  probable  that  we  shall  have  wars  in  the  future?" 
Are  we  living  in  an  epoch  when  wars  occur  with  any  frequency?  Or 
are  wars  of  such  rare  occurrence  as  to  make  them  unlikely  happenings? 

We  are  living  in  what  is  probably  the  greatest  military  epoch  in 
all  history.  In  the  last  two  decades  every  great  nation  in  the  world 
has  been  engaged  in  at  least  one  war  to  the  finish ;  Russia  and  Japan, 
Turkey  and  the  Balkans,  France  and  Germany,  Austria,  Italy  and 
Great  Britain,  China  and  Persia,  the  United  States  and  Spain,  each 
and  every  one  has  been  involved  in  one  war  which  was  prosecuted 
(or  will  be  prosecuted)  until  one  side  is  or  was  reduced  to  exhaustion. 

Moreover,  during  the  last  two  decades  Russia,  Great  Britain, 
Turkey,  the  Balkans  and  Japan  have  been  engaged  not  merely  in  one, 

307 


but  in  two  such  contests.  A  history  of  the  latter  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  and  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth  century  indicates 
that  nations  are  more  frequently  resorting  to  arms  than  ever  before 
in  the  world's  history. 

I  repeat,  we  are  living  in  the  most  military  epoch  of  all  history. 
During  the  Waterloo  campaign,  which  terminated  the  last  world  war, 
the  combined  armies  of  Napoleon  and  the  Allies  numbered  less  than 
200,000.  Today  more  than  one  hundred  times  as  many  men  are  in 
arms.     Twenty-five  million  seasoned  troops  are  alligned  in  battle. 

Some  of  our  pacifist  friends  maintain  that  when  this  war  is  over, 
the  combatants  will  be  too  exhausted  to  think  of  attacking  any  other 
enemy. 

But  this  is  NOT  true.  Armies  are  never  so  effective  and  nations 
are  never  politically  so  powerful  as  immediately  following  long  wars. 
Practice  makes  perfect.  Greece  was  never  stronger  than  after  Salamis 
and  Marathon.  Rome  was  never  more  powerful  than  after  the  Second 
Carthagenian  War.  Holland's  golden  epoch  followed  thirty  years 
of  war  with  Spain.  When  this  war  is  over,  many  nations  will  be  in 
excellent  condition  to  attack  us. 

But  before  any  nation  attacks  us  three  conditions  must  prevail: 
We  must  possess  something  which  the  other  nation  needs ;  there  must 
be  a  certain  degree  of  race  antipathy;  and  there  must  be  a  dispute — 
a  causus  belli. 

But  all  these  three  conditions  will  prevail  at  the  end  of  the  present 
hostilities.    They  even  prevail  at  the  present  moment. 

We  possess  several  things  which  every  nation  needs. 

The  weakness  and  vacillation  which  we  have  displayed  in  recent 
years  have  made  us  frankly  despised  by  all  the  virile  nations  of  the 
world;  and  to  be  despised  is  the  most  dangerous  form  of  all  race 
antipathies  for  the  despised  nation. 

And  what  of  disputes?  We  have  commenced  disputes  with  Ger- 
many, Austria,  Great  Britain  and  Japan.  Those  disputes  have  dragged 
along  for  more  than  a  year.  They  will  continue  to  drag  along  until 
the  end  of  the  present  war.  Then,  and  then  only,  when  the  hands  of 
our  antagonists  are  free,  will  they  be  settled.  The  situation  is  exactly 
similar  to  one  in  our  ovra  history.  In  1862,  when  our  entire  attention 
had  to  be  given  Jo  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  France  ventured 
to  invade  Mexico  in  order  to  protect  her  citizens  from  attack  by  the 

808 


I 


irresponsible  savages  who  at  that  time  inhabited  that  territory.  But 
in  1865,  she  renounced  Mexico  and  dreams  of  colonial  empires,  and 
abandoned  Maximilian,  for  even  Nationeon  III  dared  not  oppose  the 
veteran  and  disengaged  army  which  marched  down  Pennsylvania 
Avenue  on  May  23,  1865.  (Applause.)  Just  as  France  then  started 
a  controversy  with  us  while  we  were  entirely  engaged  at  home,  so  we 
today  have  started  controversies  with  Germany,  with  Austria,  with 
Great  Britain  and  with  Japan.  These  controversies  have  dragged 
along  for  over  a  year  and  will  drag  along  for  several  years  longer — 
they  will  finally  be  settled.  France's  controversy  with  us  over  Mexico 
was  strung  out  for  three  years.  It  was  settled  quickly  enough  when 
we  were  free  to  act.     (Applause.) 

In  answer  to  the  question,  "Is  it  probable  that  we  are  to  have  wars 
in  the  future?"  I  think  we  may  heed  the  words  of  the  Father  of 
our  Country,  who  said:  "The  United  States  ought  not  to  indulge  a 
persuasion  that  contrary  to  the  order  of  human  events  they  will  for- 
ever keep  at  a  distance  those  painful  appeals  to  arms  which  occur 
so  frequently  in  the  world's  history." 

And  now  for  the  second  question.  "Granting  that  we  are  to  have 
wars  in  the  future,  would  it  be  possible  for  any  foreign  nation  to  land 
troops  in  America?"  Even  if  we  ARE  to  have  wars  in  the  future, 
we  still  need  no  army  if  invasion  is  impossible. 

The  only  things  which  intervene  between  us  and  an  invasion  are 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  and  the  navies  which  we  maintain  upon 
them. 

In  ancient  history  seas  were  almost  impassible  barriers.  When 
Xerxes  wished  to  invade  Greece  he  preferred  to  march  his  armies 
around  the  Aegean  Sea,  rather  than  to  attempt  to  transport  them 
across  it.  Exploits  like  the  Roman  destruction  of  Cathage,  which 
was  carried  out  across  the  Mediterranean  Sea  rarely  met  with  success. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  however,  seas  ceased  to  be  barriers,  and  over- 
seas campaigns  were  frequently  and  victoriously  carried  out.  The 
Venetian  State  ruled  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  the  Norsemen 
invaded  France  and  Scotland,  and  William  the  Conquerer  subjugated 
England. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  the  eighteenth  century  that  broad 
oceans  ceased  to  be  barriers,  and  became  highways  of  communication. 
Thus,  even  in  the  days  of  slow  sailing  ships,  and  of  voyages  around 

309 


the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  the  English  sailed  10,000  miles  to  cdnqtier 
unprepared  India  of  ancient  civilization,  an  unprepared  country  some 
thirty  times  as  large,  both  in  area  and  population,  as  the  England 
of  that  day.  Since  that  time  no  distance  has  ever  been  great  enough 
to  protect  any  country  from  invasion.  The  English  and  the  French, 
the  Dutch  and  the  Spanish  voyaged  across  the  Atlantic  to  conquer 
the  Americas.  Africa,  Australia  and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  were 
long  since  invaded  v^^ith  forces  sufficient  to  make  certain  their  sub- 
jugation. 

With  every  decade  the  oceans  become  less  and  less  barriers  and 
more  and  more  highways,  until  today  it  is  easier  to  transport  large 
bodies  of  troops  by  sea  than  by  land.  It  would  be  far  easier  to  trans- 
port a  large  army  from  Europe  to  America  than  from  our  Atlantic 
seaboard  to  our  Pacific  coast. 

Seventeen  years  ago  England  maintained  an  army  of  several 
hundred  thousand  men  in  South  Africa.  Sixteen  years  ago,  the 
United  States  maintained  an  army  in  the  Philippine  Islands  sufficient 
to  subjugate  an  unprepared  nation  of  8,000,000  inhabitants.  Fourteen 
years  ago  the  Allies  transported  an  army  to  China  in  sufficient  num- 
bers to  awe  that  country  of  three  hundred  million  population. 

In  the  present  war  the  Allies,  in  the  face  of  hostile  submarines, 
warships  and  coast  defense,  transported  to  the  Dardanelles  an  army 
of  many  hundred  thousand  men,  disembarked  it  upon  a  rocky  coast  and 
maintained  it  there  for  six  months.  The  first  instalment  of  126,000 
men  was  landed  at  one  time  from  ninety-eight  steamships.  That  army 
was  defeated,  not  on  account  of  its  distance  from  its  base  of  supplies, 
but  because  of  the  prepared  and  Germanized  Turkish  field  army  and 
the  prepared  and  Germanized  forts  which  opposed  it. 

Let  us  now  consider  our  third  question.  "What  is  the  maximum 
attack  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  against  us?"  Even  if  we  are  to 
have  wars,  and  if  we  can  be  invaded,  we  do  not  need  a  large  army  if 
that  invasion  would  be  a  mere  demonstration  involving  only  a  few 
thousand  men. 

The  truth  is,  that  any  one  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe  could 
in  less  than  one  month  land  from  one  to  five  hundred  thousand  troops 
upon  our  Atlantic  seaboard.  And  any  one  of  them  could  in  each  month 
thereafter  land  as  many  more  as  reinforcements.     Japan  could  land 

310 


one  hundred  thousand  troops  upon  our  Pacific  coast  in  three  weeks, 
and  could  land  as  many  more  each  month  thereafter. 

Our  general  staff  possesses  accurate  calculations  to  this  effect. 

There  is,  however,  nothing  mysterious  about  their  estimates.  Any 
one  may  verify  them  for  himself  in  any  public  library. 

Let  us  examine  a  single  case.  Germany's  case,  for  instance. 
Lloyd's  Register  shows  that  Germany  possesses  merchant  ships  to  the 
amount  of  over  5,000,000  gross  tons.  It  is  customary  in  great  armies 
to  allow  three  gross  tons  of  ship  bottom  for  the  transportation  of  one 
soldier,  his  equipment,  ammunition,  and  all  necessary  reserve  supplies. 
Three  gross  tons  are  specified,  not  only  in  the  German  field  service 
regulations,  but  in  those  of  the  Japanese  and  American  service. 
Five  million  tons  of  ship  would  therefore  carry  more  than  a  million 
and  a  half  men. 

It  is,  of  course,  not  to  be  expected  that  under  actual  war  conditions 
the  simultaneous  moving  of  such  a  large  number  would  be  possible. 
In  the  first  place,  German  field  service  regulations  prescribe  that  only 
ships  of  2,000  tons  or  over  shall  be  used  to  transport  troops,  and  the 
German  merchant  marine  includes  only  4,000,000  gross  tons  of  such 
ships.  Moreover,  it  is  evident  that  in  spite  of  her  wonderful  system 
of  mobilization  of  industries,  Germany  could  not  at  once  gather  to- 
gether all  of  her  merchant  marine.  However,  even  a  third  of  her 
ships  of  over  2,000  tons  could  transport  half  a  million  troops  to 
America  in  about  two  weeks,  for  there  is  no  ship  of  that  size  in  the 
German  marine  which  cannot  cross  the  Atlantic  in  twelve  days  or 
less. 

Admiral  Dewey  has  said  that  there  are  but  few  places  from  East- 
port,  Maine,  to  Cape  Henry,  where  large  hostile  forces  cannot  be 
landed  upon  our  coast. 

We  are,  therefore,  forced  to  conclude  that  it  is  certainly  physically 
possible  for  single  foreign  nations,  unopposed  by  an  adequate  navy 
or  opposed  by  an  inadequate  one,  to  land  up  to  500,000  trained,  equipped 
and  organized  veteran  troops  in  the  United  States  in  very  much  less 
than  a  month,  and  back  them  up  with  as  many  more  fresh  troops  each 
month  thereafter.  And  in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  the  present  war, 
Germany  marched  a  million  men  to  France  within  a  few  days  after 
war  began,  it  is  silly  to  suppose  that  an  enemy  would  ever  do  less 
than  his  best  against  America. 

311 


We  must  face  the  fact  that  if  our  navy  were  to  be  destroyed,  the 
United  States  could  easily  be  invaded. 

And  what  of  our  navy?  A  thousand  damning  facts  may  be  cited 
to  prove  that  it  is  today  inefficient.    To  cite  only  a  few  of  the  thousand : 

It  takes  nearly  a  year  to  manufacture  a  torpedo.  We  have  at 
present  a  manufacturing  capacity  which  enables  us  to  make  only 
enough  torpedoes  so  that  each  torpedo  tube  in  our  navy  could  fire 
one  torpedo  every  six  months. 

Great  Britain  can  duplicate  the  effective  part  of  our  navy  once 
every  year.    Germany  can  probably  do  as  well. 

Our  professional  naval  experts  say  that  the  navy  of  the  United 
States  ranks  only  fourth  or  fifth  in  point  of  effectiveness  among  the 
navies  of  the  world. 

Admiral  Fiske  declared  before  a  congressional  committtee  that  it 
would  take  from  three  to  five  years  to  put  what  navy  we  now  have 
in  proper  condition  for  battle. 

Moreover,  one  can  never  absolutely  count  upon  a  navy  alone,  no 
matter  how  large  it  may  be,  to  maintain  sea  control.  The  battles  of 
Salamis  and  against  the  Armada  were  won  against  odds  of  two  to  one. 
In  a  single  day  the  Merrimac  deprived  the  Union  of  sea  control,  and 
the  next  day  the  Monitor  won  it  back  again.  (Applause.)  When 
England  launched  the  first  dreadnaught  every  other  navy  in  the  world 
became  obsolete,  until  they  also  possessed  dreadnaughts. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  we  must  conclude  that  the  invasion  of  the 
United  States  on  a  large  scale  is  well  within  the  realms  of  possibility. 

And,  finally,  our  fourth  question:  "Is  invasion  a  thing  to  be 
dreaded,  to  be  guarded  against  at  any  cost,  however  great?" 

Americans  have  a  hazy  notion  that  war  is  terrible,  but  their 
ignorance  of  what  it  is  in  reality  is  utter  and  most  discouraging. 
They  do  not  grasp  the  vital  difference  between  the  war  of  history 
and  romance  and  that  other  war  which  is  hell.  They  do  not  bring 
home  to  themselves  a  single  one  of  the  basic  truths  of  warfare. 

For  instance,  they  do  not  appreciate  that  it  is  not  the  soldier  boy 
who  suffers  most  in  war  times,  but  the  civil  population  of  an  invaded 
and  desolated  land. 

They  do  not  realize  that  for  the  victor  war  is  a  glorious  enter- 
prise, and  that  since  the  beginning  of  history  easy  conquests  have  ever 
been  the  most  profitable  of  all  business  entures. 

312 


They  do  not  realize  that  the  result  of  all  battles  is  pre-determined ; 
for  battles  are  but  the  tests  that  decide  which  of  two  systems  of 
national  preparedness  is  the  most  thorough  and  comprehensive. 

They  do  not  realize  that  nothing  which  has  not  been  prepared 
and  organized  in  advance  is  of  any  use  in  war  time,  and  that  invasions 
are  merely  the  penalties  for  unpreparedness.     (Applause.) 

They  do  not  realize  that  wars  are  made  up,  not  of  glorious  deeds, 
but  of  technical  executive  details. 

They  do  not  realize  that  a  captain  is  not  a  leader  of  charges,  but 
the  expert  executive  of  a  thousand  mundane  details,  one  of  which  is 
feeding  one  hundred  and  fifty  hungry  men  on  21  cents  a  day  each. 
Every  captain  in  the  United  States  Army  is  supposed  to  know  how 
to  do  that,  and  keep  his  men  fat  and  happy. 

Americans  do  not  realize  that  it  is  not  the  principal  duty  of  the 
medical  corps  of  the  army  to  care  for  the  wounded,  but  to  take  care 
of  army  sanitation.  Wars  are  not  won  by  the  numbers  of  the  enemy 
that  one  kills  in  combat,  but  by  the  numbers  of  one's  own  men  that  the 
medical  staff  is  able  to  save  from  death  and  disease  by  proper  sanitary 
preparedness.  In  our  own  war  with  Spain  we  lost  twenty  men  by 
disease,  due  to  the  unpreparedness  of  our  sanitary  corps,  for  every 
Spaniard  killed. 

And,  above  all,  Americans  do  not  realize  all  that  invasion  involves. 
The  American  idea  of  invasion  is  purely  theoretical.  Our  country  has 
not  been  devastated  by  warfare  for  more  than  fifty  years.  Few 
Americans  are  alive  today  who  saw  the  ruin  which  followed  Sherman's 
mai'ch  to  the  sea.  Few  have  looked  upon  the  actual  visage  of  war, 
except  those  whom  chance  has  throvm  into  the  present  European  con- 
flict. But  we  who  have  seen  France  and  Belgium  during  the  past  year 
know  all  too  well  what  invasion  entails.     Seeing  is  believing. 

We  have  seen  proud  cities  of  yesterday  today  lying  in  heaps  of 
brickdust  and  black  ashes.  We  can  visualize  New  York  or  Washington 
in  ruins.  We  know  how  Washington  must  have  looked  when  the 
British  finished  with  it  in  1814. 

We  have  seen  the  industries  of  whole  nations  blotted  out  of  ex- 
istence. We  have  seen  nations  of  happy  artisans  and  formers  reduced 
in  a  week  to  a  starved  mob  of  hopeless  creatures,  deprived  of  the 
fruits  of  generations  of  faithful  toil. 

We  have  seen  the  aged  wandering — cold,  hungry  and  unprotected 

813 


— through  devastated  villages.    We  have  seen  the  counterpart  of  every 
woman  in  this  hall  with  the  look  of  a  hunted  animal  in  her  eyes. 

I  think  we  may  decide  together  that  an  invasion  is  indeed  to  be 
dreaded  and  carefully  to  be  guarded  against ;  that  war,  even  for  peace- 
loving  Americans,  is  not  only  possible  but  probable;  that  the  invasion 
of  our  coasts  presents  no  unsurmountable  difficulties  while  our  fleet 
of  ships  remains  as  inadequate  as  it  now  is;  and  that  an  attacking 
enemy  could  within  a  few  weeks  land  an  army  of  sufficient  size  to 
overwhelm  our  feeble  forces  and  overrun  our  Atlantic  or  Pacific  States. 

How,  then,  may  we  hope  to  meet  successfully  such  an  attack? 
Only  by  opposing  numbers  with  like  numbers,  speed  with  like  speed, 
quality  with  like  quality  at  the  point  of  attack.  Today  eight  separate 
great  nations  each  possess  an  army  numbered  in  millions — not  poten- 
tial and  latent  millions,  but  millions  of  trained,  equipped  and  organ- 
ized veterans.  If  we  are  to  be  a  nation  among  nations,  we  too  must 
cease  to  think  in  thousands  and  begin  to  think  in  millions. 

How  can  we  acquire  an  army  which  shall  render  us  safe  from 
attack — an  army  which  will  enable  us  to  be  pacifists  by  choice,  instead 
of  pacifists  who  must  be  submissive  by  necessity?  Shall  we  build 
up  an  army  after  the  Prussian  system,  which  takes  over  ever  grown 
man  for  two  years  of  his  adult  age? 

Or  shall  we  have  a  system  of  universal  obligatory  military  train- 
ing and  service  after  the  democratic  system  of  Switzerland  and  Aus- 
tralia? Universal  training  and  service,  if  adopted  by  the  United 
States,  would  pay  for  itself  twice  over.  First,  through  its  educa- 
tional value;  second,  in  protecting  us  from  possible  invasion.  In  the 
United  States,  a  million  boys  reach  the  age  of  nineteen  each  year; 
two-thirds  of  them  are  fit  for  military  service;  with  universal  service 
after  the  Swiss  system  we  would  very  soon  be  able  to  match  millions 
with  millions;  and  these  millions  would  be  effective,  if  our  system 
was  under  the  supervision  of  our  competent  professional  experts  of  ] 
national  defense. 

And  it  must  be  under  their  direction.    We  have  had  enough  of  the  \ 
professional  politician,  who  muddles  the  affairs  of  our  national  defense.  ; 

The  catastrophe  at  the  Dardanelles  was  in  no  way  the  fault  of 
British  generals  nor  of  the  brave  young  Indians  and  Australians  who 
fell  there  to  the  number  of  120,000.  No  man  there  but  had  undergone 
two  years  of  military  training. 

314 


No;  the  disaster  on  Gallipoli  was  due  to  the  blunder  of  one  single 
well-meaning  politician;  of  one  who  did  not  know;  of  one  who  con- 
founded words  with  knowledge.  One  hundred  and  twenty  thousands 
of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  world  laid  down  their  lives  to  expiate  the 
blunder  of  one  well-meaning  politician.  We,  too,  have  many,  many 
politicians  of  like  calibre. 

Is  there  any  worse  fate  to  be  lead  in  the  greatest  military  epoch 
of  history  not  by  history  makers,  but  by  historians?  Is  there  any 
worse  fate  than  to  be  lead  by  men  who  will  not  lead? 

Yes,  there  is  a  worse  fate  for  a  nation  than  to  have  leaders  who 
will  not  lead.  That  is  for  a  nation  to  be  so  supine  that  it  will  not 
bustle  and  shove  and  push  those  leaders  forward,  no  matter  how  much 
they  struggle  and  protest  and  utter  platitudes.  Let  us  remember  that 
in  national  emergencies  battles  have  sometimes  been  won  without 
great  leaders.    Valmy  was  so  won,  and  Leipsic  was  so  won. 

The  most  dangerous  enemies  of  our  country  are  not  the  well- 
seasoned  troops  who  will  oppose  us  in  our  next  conflict,  but  the  well- 
meaning  anti-preparationists  who  wrongly  style  themselves  pacifists, 
and  the  professional  politicians  with  whom  our  country  is  now  over- 
ridden. 

We  must  face  the  fact  that  the  fate  of  our  nation  depends  not 
upon  the  battlefield  of  our  next  war,  but  upon  the  civic  battles  of 
the  next  year. 

No  sacrifices  made  AFTER  the  beginning  of  our  next  war  can 
avail  to  save  us.  If  sacrifices  are  to  save  us,  they  must  be  made  here 
and  now. 

In  Europe  today  the  Germans  have  surrounded  their  conquered 
provinces  with  entrenchments,  which  are  screened  off  by  barbed-wire 
entanglements.  When  our  blood-brothers,  the  British,  or  the  soldiers 
of  our  sister  republic,  France,  attack  these  trenches  the  way  is  led 
by  a  daring  band  of  volunteers,  who  plunge  forward  to  cut  the  en- 
tanglements in  the  way,  so  that  the  main  armies  may  follow  on  to 
victory.  What  these  volunteers  do  not  dare,  no  one  dares.  Where 
they  fail,  all  must  fail. 

We  here  today,  delegates  of  the  National  Security  League,  are 
such  a  band  of  volunteers.  What  we  do  not  dare,  no  one  dares.  What 
we  do  not  dare  for  preparedness,  no  man  will  dare.  Where  we  fail, 
all  must  fail.     (Applause.) 

315 


There  is  no  man  or  woman  in  this  hall  today  who  would  not  dia 
for  our  country.  But  today  we  can  do  more  for  our  country  by  living 
for  her  than  we  can  by  dying  for  her  in  our  next  war.     (Applause.) 

We  are  among  the  barbed-wtre  entanglements.  Let  us  cut  our 
way  through.  It  is  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  every  citizen 
to  defend  his  country.  But  today  war  is  waged  in  a  manner  so  scien- 
tific and  so  intricate  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  untrained  man  to 
defend  his  country.  Therefore,  military  training  should  be  universal. 
To  be  universal  it  must  be  compulsory.  Therefore,  let  us  here  and  now 
pass  an  unequivocal  resolution  indorsing  universal  obligatory  military 
training  and  service.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — As  this  is  the  last  session  of  the  Congress  where 
there  will  be  an  opportunity  for  general  discussion,  I  think  it  is  emin- 
ently fitting  that  the  meeting  should  now  be  turned  over  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  National  Security  League,  Mr.  Menken.  (Applause.)  I 
should,  however,  be  derelict  in  my  duty  if  I  did  not  tell  you  that  the 
success  of  the  National  Security  League  is  in  a  very  large  measure 
due  to  the  untiring,  unselfish  and  patriotic  efforts  of  Mr.  Menken. 

A  Delegate — Three  cheers  for  Menken! 

(The  audience  rose  and  cheered  Mr.  Menken.) 

Mr.  Menken — I  thank  you  more  than  I  can  say.  The  success  of 
the  Security  League  is  due  to  the  necessity  of  the  issue  and  the  patriot- 
ism of  the  American  people. 

We  are  here  to  attend  to  a  definite  matter  of  business,  the  report 
of  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  and  I  want  to  say  that  we  are  here 
to  vote  in  a  definite  manner,  according  to  the  rules  laid  down  by  the 
Committee  on  Scope  of  this  Congress,  and  I  beg  to  call  upon  General 
Luke  E.  Wright,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  to  report 
as  to  the  deliberations  of  that  committee.  Are  you  ready  to  report, 
General? 

General  Wright — Mr.  President,  the  committee  is  ready  to  report 
and  has  placed  its  report  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary,  who  has  been 
requested  by  me — he  is  younger  and  has  a  better  voice  than  I  have — 
to  read  it. 

The  Chairman — The  Secretary  has  the  report.  The  Secretary 
is  Mr.  Eric  Fisher  Wood. 

Mr.  Wood — The  Committee  on  Resolutions  has  instructed  me  to 
read  the  draft  of  four  resolutions  which  they  have  ground  out.    These 

316 


resolutions  were  compiled  from  about  fifty  resolutions  which  were 
handed  in  yesterday.  The  committee  began  its  deliberations  at  I 
o'clock  and  was  in  continuous  session  until  12:30  a.  m.  The  committee 
is  composed  of  General  Luke  E.  Wright,  ex-Secretary  of  War,  Chair- 
man; Henry  L.  Stimson,  ex-Secretary  of  War,  New  York;  Robert 
Bacon,  ex-Secretary  of  State,  New  York;  Willet  M.  Spooner,  Milwau- 
kee; Charles  F.  MacLean,  Albany;  S.  M.  Ballou,  Hawaii;  F.  M.  Jencks, 
Baltimore;  William  S.  Moorhead,  Pittsburgh;  Charles  B.  Warren, 
Detroit;  General  Maxwell  Van  Zandt  Woodhull,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington; 
Franklin  Q.  Brown,  New  York ;  L.  T.  Golding,  St.  Joseph,  Mo. ;  General 
Charles  H.  Cole,  Boston;  Eric  Fisher  Wood,  Secretary  of  the  Con- 
gress, New  York;  S.  Stanwood  Menken,  President  National  Security 
League;  Herbert  Barry,  Secretary  National  Security  League;  Henry 
A.  Wise  Wood,  Chairman  Conference  Committee;  Judge  Randall  J. 
LeBoeuf,  Albany;  C.  Willing  Hare,  Philadelphia;  General  George  H. 
Harries,  Omaha. 

That  makes  nineteen  members  in  all.  Seventeen  members  at- 
tended the  final  conference  last  night,  and  their  vote  for  the  resolutions 
which  I  will  now  read  was  unanimous. 

Be  It  Resolved,  by  the  National. Security  League,  That  the 
defense  of  the  United  States  must  depend  upon  an  adequate  navy 
and  a  national  army  founded  upon  a  system  of  universal  obliga- 
tory military  training  and  service.  This  system  must  be  WHOLLY 
under  the  discipline  and  control  of  the  national  authorities.  We 
deprecate  all  steps  which  tend  to  obstruct  or  postpone  the  adop- 
tion of  such  a  universal  system.     Be  it  further 

Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the 
efforts  of  Secretary  Garrison  to  obtain  an  increase  in  the  regu- 
lar army,  the  correction  of  our  faulty  enlistment  law,  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  adequate  regular  army  reserve,  and  the  accumula- 
tion of  an  adequate  supply  of  ammunition,  artillery  and  material; 
but  we  believe  that  in  addition  to  the  proposed  quota  of  coast 
I  artillery  and  auxiliary  troops,  the  mobile  regular  army  within 
"  the  United  States  should  comprise  at  least  four  complete  infantry 
divisions,  as  recommended  by  the  War  College  report  of  1915.  Be 
it  further 

Resolved,  by  the  National  Security  League,  That  it  recom- 
mends the  authorization  by  Congress  of  a  Council  of  National 

317 


Defense,  as  set  forth  in  House  Resolution  No.  1833,  of  the  first 
session  of  the  63d  Congress,  commonly  known  as  the  Hobson  Bill, 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  more  harmonious  co-operation  be- 
tween the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  the  Government 
with  respect  to  the  national  defenses.     Be  it  further 

Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  recommends 
the  establishment  of  a  navy  adequate  to  conserve  the  national 
interests,  in  conformity  with  the  following  recommendations: 

That  the  personnel  of  the  navy  be  increased  in  conformity 
with  the  requirements  of  the  fleet,  as  interpreted  by  the  General 
Board  of  the  navy; 

That  there  be  established  for  the  navy  a  General  Staff,  simi- 
lar to  the  General  Staff  of  the  army,  as  is  customary  in  all  other 
navies  of  the  world; 

That  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the  program 
of  July  30,  1915,  of  the  General  Board  of  the  navy,  and  urges  its 
immediate  adoption  by  Congress. 

General  Wright — Mr.  President,  I  move  the  adoption  of  the 
resolutions. 

(The  motion  was  seconded.) 

Mr.  Menken — You  have  heard  the  motion.  The  Chair  recognizes 
General  MaxweU  Van  Zandt  WoodhuU.  Now,  wait  one  minute.  General ; 
I  want  to  say  this:  We  are  going  to  apply  the  rules,  and  you,  as  an 
old  soldier,  in  common  with  everyone  else,  will  recognize  the  wisdom 
and  necessity  of  that.     Speakers  are  limited  to  five  minutes. 

General  W^oodhull — I  did  not  know  that  that  limitation  would 
apply  here. 

General  Wright — I  move  that  we  hear  the  General  for  five  min- 
utes.   I  am  sure  anything  he  says  will  be  all  right. 

General  Woodhull — I  move  the  adoption  of  the  first  resolution 
with  the  addition  of  the  words,  following  the  word  "service"  in  the 
first  line,  "the  regular  army  and  a  reserve  army,  to  be  raised  by 
conscription." 

Mr.  Wood  in  his  excellent  speech,  every  word  of  which  I  endorse, 
has  shown  the  reason  for  this  amendment.  The  danger  to  this  country 
is  that  we  may  be  invaded  before  we  can  avail  ourselves  of  the  oppor- 
tunities offered  by  the  Australian  and  the  Swiss  systems,  and  we  must 
prepare  for  invasion  almost  at  any  moment  after  this  war  ends,    Mr. 


I 


Wood  is  perfectly  right — a  nation  is  always  stronger  after  a  war  than 
during  a  period  of  war. 

He  refers  also  to  the  position  of  affairs  in  Mexico  at  the  end  of  the 
war  of  the  rebellion.  It  so  happened  that  at  that  time  I  was  adjutant- 
general  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Our  army  was  ordered  to 
Louisville,  at  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Mississippi  River,  and  we 
were  kept  in  camp  there,  and  Sheridan  was  sent  to  the  line  of  the 
Rio  Grande  with  the  cavalry  arm,  and  it  was  common  talk  that  we 
were  held  at  Louisville  to  be  sent  down  the  Mississippi  River  and 
cross  the  Rio  Grande  and  drive  the  French  out  of  Mexico. 

That  is  the  condition  that  every  European  nation  is  in — ready 
for  war ;  and  the  moment  this  war  is  over  they  will  be  ready  to  attack 
us,  because  we  shall  have  what  they  want — money.  The  European 
nations  will  be,  all  of  them  to  a  certain  extent,  bankrupt,  and  even 
Great  Britan  will  want  money.  Even  Great  Britain  will  want  the 
Panama  Canal.  You  cannot  defend  the  Panama  Canal  with  the 
present  army  or  navy  or  any  army  or  navy  that  has  been  recommended ; 
even  the  army  recommended  by  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
He  does  not  give  you  more  than  half  the  troops  needed  in  this 
emergency  to  defend  the  Panama  Canal  and  also  to  take  care  of  offen- 
sive movements  against  the  United  States. 

This  resolution  will  read,  as  amended  by  me,  and  my  amendment 
has  not  changed  the  spirit  of  the  resolution,  it  is  only  having  the 
boldness  to  say  what  we  mean: 

"Be  It  Resolved,  by  the  National  Security  League,  That 
the  defense  of  the  United  States  depends  upon  an  adequate 
navy  and  a  national  army,  founded  upon  a  system  of  universal 
obligatory  military  training  and  service,  the  regular  army 
and  a  reserve  army  to  be  raised  by  conscription." 
A  Delegate — I  should  like  to  ask  General  Woodhull  if  he  was 
resent  at  the  last  meeting  of  the  committee. 

General  Woodhull — I  was  not  able  to  be  present  at  the  last 
eeting,  and  I  ought  not  to  be  here  today.    I  have  been  ill. 

General  Wright — Of  course,  a  committee  of  this  character  has 

submitted  to  it,  in  the  form  of  resolutions,  a  very  large  number  of 

extremely  interesting  thoughts  by  gentlemen,   all  of  whom  have  a 

common  purpose.     Now,  we  wrestled  with  the  various   suggestions 

I  made  in  written  form  to  us  for  twelve  hours  or  more,  and  gave  to  it 

319         ~  ~ 


the  very  best  that  we  had,  and  we  believe  that  the  resolutions  as 
adopted  embody  as  a  general  proposition  the  underlying  ideas  which 
all  of  us  had.   . 

General  WoodhuU's  criticism,  I  submit  with  all  deference  to  him, 
is  rather  verbal  in  character.  In  other  words,  the  resolution  which 
the  committee  reports  call  for  compulsory  universal  service.  If  I 
were  called  upon  to  define  conscription,  that  is  the  way  I  would  define 
it.  Well,  I  confess  frankly  that  I  do  not  like  that  word;  not  because 
there  is  anything  wrong  in  it,  but  under  the  mal-education  of  the 
American  people,  who  have  been  brought  up  with  an  immense  amount 
of  misconceived  belief  in  the  voluntary  system,  they  have  rather  a 
prejudice  against  a  "conscript,"  a  fellow  that  is  dragged  in  by  his 
ears,  and  hence  the  committee  thought  that  that  word  was  unneces- 
sary. In  other  words,  phraseology  sometimes  amounts  to  something, 
I  heard  just  now  my  friend — and  we  are  friends — refer  to  "the  wa 
of  the  rebellion."  Now,  it  always  makes  me  mad  when  I  hear  th 
Civil  War  spoken  of  as  the  war  of  the  rebellion. 

Mr.  William  A.  Ketcham,  from  Indianapolis,  arose. 

Mr.  Ketcham — One  of  them  says  "the  war  of  the  rebellion,"  and 
the  other  says  "the  war  between  the  states,"  and  the  expression  of 
each  of  them  is  offensive  to  the  other  one. 

The  question  on  the  original  motion  was  moved.  The  motion 
was  seconded. 

The  Chairman — Under  the  rules,  the  question  must  be  put  with- 
out discussion. 

Mr.  Owen  Miller,  a  delegate  from  St.  Louis,  arose. 

Mr.  Miller — Do  I  understand  you  are  going  to  put  that  motio: 
without  giving  an  opportunity  for  discussion? 

The  Chairman — ^We  will  hear  you,  if  you  have  anything  to  say;] 

Mr.  Miller — In  the  first  place,  I  was  under  the  impression  thai 
the  time  limit  was  five  minutes.    I  may  be  mistaken,  but  that  was  m^ 
impression. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  want  to  say  that  I  hold/  a  very  unique 
position  in  this  convention.  I  am  probably  the  only  man  present  as 
a  delegate  to  this  convention  that  comes  from  those  people  that  work 
for  a  living  in  the  way  of  wages.     (Cries  of  "Oh,  no.")     I  do  not  say 

320 


that  you  gentlemen  do  not  work  for  a  living,  but  I  say  I  come  from 
that  class  of  people  in  the  nation  that  earn  their  living  as  wage- 
earners.  That  is  who  I  represent  here,  and  I  am  altogether  alone. 
(Cries  of  "No,  no!"  "We  are  all  wage-earners,")  Perhaps  I  am  mis- 
taken; but  there  are  not  many  here  who  represent  that  class  of  peo- 
ple, I  am  very  sure  of  that. 

Mr.  President,  these  people  are  just  as  much  interested  and  just 
as  much  patriotic  as  anybody  can  be.  The  great  American  Federation 
of  Labor,  at  its  last  convention  at  San  Francisco,  where  I  was  a  dele- 
gate, discussed  this  question  one  whole  afternoon,  and  there  was  no 
three-minute  rule,  either.  That  was  on  a  resolution  which  would  have 
put  the  convention  on  record  as  being  opposed  to  preparedness.  That 
resolution  was  voted  down  by  practically  a  unanimous  vote,  and  in  that 
debate  this  thought  came  out :  that  this  whole  movement  of  prepared- 
ness was  being  backed  financially  by  the  people  interested  in  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions,     (Cries  of  "Nonsense,"  "Rot,"  and  hisses.) 

Mr.  Wood — Name  one. 

Mr.  Miller — Name  who? 

Mr.  Wood — Name  the  backer  that  is  interested  in  munitions. 

Mr.  Miller — I  have  not  made  the  statement  that  that  was  so. 

Several  Delegates — No,  he  did  not  say  that. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Miller  is  going  to  have  his  five  minutes 
uninterrupted.  He  is  only  stating  what  other  people  say,  not  his 
own  opinion. 

Mr.  Miller — That  is  right. 

The  Chairman — We  ought  to  have  more  delegates  from  the  same 
body  that  Mr.  Miller-  comes  from, 

Mr.  Miller — I  do  not  say  that  these  statements  are  true — I  do 
not  say  that.  But  I  say  this:  that  that  is  the  idea  that  very  largely 
permeates  the  minds  of  many  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

I  introduced  a  resolution  that  would  put  this  convention  upon 
record  as  being  utterly  opposed  to  that  idea,  and  furthermore  favoring 
the  establishment  of  plants  by  the  United  States  Government,  and  the 
operating  of  them  by  the  United  States  Government,  for  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions  and  the  building  of  ships  of  war.  There  was 
not  one  word  said  about  that  resolution — not  a  single  word.  I  know 
this:    that  if  this  convention  had  adopted  a  resolution  declaring  its 

821 


policy  to  be  in  favor  of  that  resolution,  it  would  have  dravm  the  teeth 
of  these  people  who  are  trying  to  oppose  this  idea  of  preparedness  in 
the  nation.  It  would  have  killed  their  hostility,  and  I  am  sorry  that 
the  committee  failed  to  insert  at  least  something  like  that  in  their 
report.  The  report  is  a  magnificent  one.  The  personnel  of  that  com- 
mittee alone  guaranteed  that  we  were  going  to  have  that  kind  of  a 
report,  and  they  deserve  all  the  commendation  in  the  world  for  the 
industry  they  displayed  in  preparing  this  report ;  but  I  do  regret  that 
they  failed  to  insert  anything  of  that  kind. 

Now,  I  want  to  tell  you  one  thing  more.  We  are  in  favor  of  uni- 
versal service.  (Applause.)  We  want  it  to  commence  in  school,  like 
they  do  in  Switzerland.  But  when  we  are  called  upon  to  give  our  sons 
to  shed  their  blood,  we  want  the  sons  of  the  rich  also.  (Cheers.)  We 
cannot  forget  something  that  we  all  remember,  that  during  the  Civil 
War — I  will  not  call  it  the  war  of  the  rebellion — under  the  draft  act, 
the  rich  man  did  not  have  to  go  to  war,  nor  did  his  son  have  to  go 
to  war. 

The  Chairman — Your  time  has  expired. 

A  Member — Just  one  second.  May  Mr.  Miller  have  three  minutes 
more,  by  general  consent? 

(Cries  of  "Yes,  yes."    "Go  on.") 

Mr.  Miller — I  do  not  want  much  more.  Gentlemen,  many  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  of  America  are  altogether  under  a  false 
impression  as  to  the  attitude  of  labor.  (Applause.)  I  want  you  to 
disabuse  your  minds  of  that  prejudice  as  much  as  you  can.  I  want 
to  tell  you,  however,  why  we  are  in  some  instances  of  that  opinion. 
We  want  the  Government  to  do  the  work  for  the  supplying  of  munitions 
and  the  building  of  war  ships.  Why?  Because  we  know  that  certain 
factories  in  this  country,  certain  institutions,  certain  great  corpora- 
tions, employ  their  men  twelve  hours  a  day  and  seven  days  a  week,  and 
pay  them  the  smallest  possible  wages.  We  know  that  if  the  Govern- 
ment has  charge  of  the  building  of  these  ships  and  the  manufacture 
of  these  munitions  the  people  who  work  for  the  Government  will  get 
fair  treatment,  fair  wages  and  fair  play.  We  know  also,  just  as  well 
as  any  of  your  speakers,  that  history  has  proven  that  preparedness 
ifi  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  true  what  has  been  said  of  our  unpre- 
paredness  in  the  Colonies.    We  could  not  raise  a  regular  army  here. 

322 


but  finally,  to  settle  the  war,  it  required  regular  forces  sent  over  from 
France. 

In  our  war  of  1814,  or  1812,  we  were  disgraced  by  the  burning 
of  our  capitol,  and  we  had  no  preparedness  to  meet  it.  There  were 
only  a  few  English  soldiers  who  came  here  at  that  time.  The  onb'' 
regular  soldiers  we  had  here  were  a  few  marines  up  in  Bladensburg, 
Maryland.  But  as  soon  as  they  got  up  against  a  regular  force  at  Fort 
McHenry,  they  were  driven  back. 

If  General  Scott  had  had  50,000  men  in  the  Civil  War  that  war 
would  not  have  lasted  six  months.  We  know  these  things,  and  we  are 
ready  to  meet  you  on  a  fair  and  square  basis.  I  hope  you  will  not 
take  anything  that  I  have  said  as  personal.  I  respect  and  admire 
every  member  of  this  Congress.  They  are  all  good  citizens  that  have 
done  much  good  in  this  world,  and  because  they  may  have  a  few  dollars 
more  than  I  have,  or  higher  positions,  there  is  no  reason  why  I  should 
less  respect  them. 

Mr.  Bernard  J.  Rothwell  of  the  Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce 
arose. 

Mr.  Rothwell:  On  behalf  of  the  Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce 
I  should  like  the  opportunity  of  saying  a  few  words  in  favor  of  the 
resolution.  Mr.  Chairman  and  ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  have  heard, 
as  you  all  have  heard,  with  admiration,  the  resolutions  proposed  by  the 
committee,  reported  by  them;  but  there  is  one  step  further  that  I  feel 
that  this  congress  should  go.  We  have  heard  during  the  last  two  days 
a  great  deal  in  regard  to  universal  military  service,  and  we  have 
all,  I  think,  subscribed  to  it;  but  little  has  been  said  about  universal 
civic  sacrifice  which  should  accompany  that.  War,  of  course,  gives 
rise  to  the  noblest  emotions  humanity  is  capable  of,  but  unfortunately 
it  also  gives  rise  to  some  of  the  basest  and  most  sordid  motives  that 
humanity  is  capable  of.  Your  son  and  my  son  will  go  to  war,  and  I 
shall  say,  "God  bless  you.  Give  your  life  to  your  country";  and  you 
will  say  the  same.  But  now  on  the  other  side  come  those  who  may 
profit  by  war,  and  it  is  right  that  they  should  profit  legitimately;  but 
if  my  son  and  your  son  offer  on  the  altar  of  their  country  the  sacrifice 
of  their  lives,  the  others — and  perhaps  we  are  among  them — should 
offer  some  sacrifice  of  their  profits.  With  that  object  in  view  I  wish 
to  submit  the  following  resolution  to  be  added  to  the  resolutions  sub- 
mitted by  the  committee: 

323 


"Whereas,  the  misfortune  of  war  would  demand  from  the  young 
manhood  of  the  nation  the  supreme  offering  of  life  itself,  therefore 
be  it  resolved  that  a  fundamental  factor  in  the  problem  of  prepared- 
ness is  the  intensive  mobilization  of  the  productive,  industrial  and 
commercial  forces  of  the  United  States  as  would  insure  in  time  of  war 
the  contribution  of  their  fullest  resources  at  a  restricted  profit,  to  be 
regulated  by  the  Government." 

Mr.  MiiiLER — I  second  the  motion  to  adopt  that  amendment. 

Several  Members — Let  us  have  it  read  again. 

General  Wright — It  would  be  proper  to  pass  on  the  motion  for 
the  adoption  of  the  resolution,  and  then  let  this  resolution  be  con- 
sidered. 

The  Chairman — As  a  matter  of  parliamentary  inquiry,  I  should 
like  to  inquire  whether  there  has  been  a  second  to  General  Wood- 
hull's  amendment,  referring  to  the  use  of  the  word  "conscription." 

General  George  H.  Harries  of  Omaha,  Neb. — It  was  seconded. 

A  Delegate — May  I  ask  a  question? 

The  Chairman — Yes. 

The  Delegate — I  desire  to  ask  if  the  Committee  on  Resolutions 
has  taken  into  consideration  that  there  is  legislation  pending  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  looking  to  what  I  have  been  informed 
is  a  step  in  the  direction  of  the  forming  of  a  citizens'  army?  Do 
they  desire  it  understood  that  this  conference  is  opposed  to  that  or 
in  favor  of  it,  as  a  temporary  step?  It  is  diffcult  for  me  to  under- 
stand from  the  resolutions  which  position  they  take  as  to  pending 
legislation  in  Congress. 

The  Chairman — ^We  went  through  with  that.  Is  there  any  objec- 
tion to  the  adoption  of  the  amendment. 

Mr.  Parker  Sloane  of  New  York — I  move  to  lay  General  Wood- 
hull's  resolution  on  the  table. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the  motion 
was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — General  Woodhull's  amendment  is  laid  on  the 
table.  Now  we  have  the  amendment  proposed  by  Mr.  Rothwell,  sec- 
onded by  Mr.  Miller,  which  I  will  ask  the  secretary  to  read,  and  I 
want  to  say  here  that  I  personally  proposed  a  resolution  relative  to 
ownership  by  the  Government  of  munitions  plants,  and  the  building  of 
government  owned  navy  yards,  and  after  this  is  put  I  shall  call  upon 

324 


the  chairman  of  the  subcommittee,  Mr.  Franklin  Q.  Brown,  to  tell 
what  happened  with  these  resolutions.    I  want  to  know,  too. 

Mr.  Brown — Mr.  Chairman,  I  should  like  to  know  whether  this 
resolution  last  offered  by  Mr.  Rothwell  was  as  an  amendment  to  this 
resolution  offered  by  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  or 
if  he  would  be  wilhng  to  have  it  offered  as  a  separate  resolution. 

Mr.  Rothwell — I  am  quite  willing  to  have  that  done.  Whether 
it  is  offered  as  a  separate  resolution  or  not,  I  do  not  care. 

The  Chairman — Then  we  will  hold  it  for  a  moment.  Will  you 
be  good  enough  to  tell  us  what  happened  to  the  resolution  as  to  govern- 
ment owned  navy  yards  and  munition  plants,  Colonel  Brown? 

Mr.  Brown — Do  you  refer  to  the  one  introduced  by  our  friend 
Mr.  Miller? 

The  Chairman — No,  I  refer  to  the  one  that  I  personally  offered, 
I  suppose  that  at  1  o'clock  in  the  morning  it  was  buried  or  over- 
looked in  the  committee? 

Mr.  Brown — All  the  resolutions  were  given  due  consideration  by 
the  Committee.  I  am  going  to  try  to  make  an  omnibus  statement  here, 
and  then  I  will  make  on  in  more  detail,  if  desired. 

Many  resolutions  which  were  offered,  as  you  can  very  well  imagine, 
v/ere  not  at  all  germaine  to  the  issue,  and  some  of  them  reminded  me 
of  a  resolution  that  was  offered  when  I  had  something  to  do  with  the 
First  National  Defense  Congress  at  Tampa,  which  was  substantially 
that  Congress  be  directed  to  declare  war  on  Spain  because  of  the  fact 
that  yellow  fever  existed  in  the  City  of  Havana,  Cuba.  There  were 
many  of  them  which  had  great  merit,  but  we  thought  that  they  were 
more  matters  of  detail  and  did  not  concern  the  work  of  the  Com- 
mittee. 

Mr.  Wood,  I  think  you  have  those  resolutions,  or  such  as  we 
thought  were  worthy  of  further  consideration.     Have  you  not? 

Several  Members — Never  mind;  do  not  go  into  that. 

The  Chairman — Now  I  put  the  question  on  the  resolution  for 
universal  service.    Are  you  ready  for  the  question? 

A  Delegate — I  desire  to  ask  what  is  the  effect  of  the  resolution. 
Is  it  in  opposition  to  the  pending  legislation,  or  is  it  in  favor  of  it? 

Mr.  Brown — No;  that  was  not  the  intention  in  the  slightest. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Wood,  will  you  read  the  resolution  again? 

(The  resolution  was  again  read  by  Mr.  Wood,  the  secretary  of 

325     . 


the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the  reso- 
lution was  agreed  to.) 

The  Chairman — It  seems  to  be,  and  is,  unanimous. 

Mr.  Ketcham — I  do  not  belong  to  this  league,  but  I  am  here 
at  the  request  of  the  Governor  of  Indiana,  and  I  was  recognized  as 
belonging  to  the  league,  and  I  have  attended  these  meetings,  and  if  I 
am  rightfully  here  I  do  not  intend  to  have  it  said  that  that  was 
unanimous,  when  I  voted  no  so  that  the  chairman  could  have  heard  it. 

The  Chairman — We  will  credit  you  as  voting  no,  and  I  hope  that 
the  Governor  of  Indiana  will  vote  yes. 

Mr.  Ketcham— The  Governor  of  Indiana  will  stand  with  me  on 
that  vote. 

Judge  LeBoeuf — Mr.  Chairman,  am  I  to  understand  that  the 
matter  which  Mr.  Wood  has  just  read  was  referred  to  the  committee? 
The  motion  is  upon  the  adoption  of  the  report  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman — No ;  we  are  taking  it  up  resolution  by  resolution. 

Judge  LeBoeuf — No,  the  pending  motion  is  to  adopt  the  report 
of  the  committee. 

General  Wright — That  is  right. 

Mr.  Ketcham — I  call  for  a  division  of  the  question  on  each  reso- 
lution.   I  think  we  are  entitled  to  that. 

The  Chairman — Well,  we  will  put  it  that  way.  Now,  in  order 
to  have  no  misunderstanding,  we  have  got  to  take  care  of  Indiana 

Mr.  Ketcham — You  need  not  take  care  of  Indiana,  Indiana  will 
take  care  of  herself,  Mr.  Chairman.     (Laughter.) 

The  Chairman — Now  coming  back  on  the  universal  service  para- 
graph, how  do  you  vote?    All  those  in  favor  please  say  "aye." 

General  Wright — That  has  already  been  voted  upon. 

Mr.  Ketcham — I  vote  no,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  it  will  not  simply 
be  me,  when  you  get  out  of  here,  or  Indiana.    There  are  others. 

Mr.  Wood — The  second  resolution  is  as  follows: 

"Be  it  resolved  that  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the 
efforts  of  Secretary  Garrison  to  obtain  an  increase  of  the  regular 
army,  the  correction  of  our  former  enlistment  laws,  the  establishment 
of  an  adequate  regular  army  reserve  and  the  accumulation  of  an  ade- 
quate supply  of  ammunition,  artillery,  and  material,  but  we  believe 
that  in  addition  to  the  proposed  quota  of  coast  artillery  and  auxiliary 
troops,  the  mobile  regular  army  within  the  United  States  should  com- 

326 


prise  at  least  four  complete  infantry  divisions  as  recommended  by  the 
War  College  report  of  1915." 

It  was  moved  and  seconded  that  the  resolution  be  adopted,  and 
there  were  cries  of  "question." 

The  Chairman — All  those  in  favor  of  this  resolution  reported 
by  the  committee  will  please  say  "aye." 

(The  "ayes"  responded.) 

The  Chairman — All  those  opposed  will  please  say  "no." 

(The  "noes"  responded.) 

The  Chairman — It  seems  to  be,  and  is,  carried — unanimously. 

Mr.  Ketcham — I  voted  for  it,  Mr.  Chairman.     (Great  applause.) 

Mr.  Wood  read  the  following  resolution: 

"Be  it  further  resolved  by  the  National  Security  League  that  it 
recommends  the  authorization  by  Congress  of  a  council  of  national 
defense,  as  set  forth  in  House  Resolution  No.  1833." 

The  Chairman — What  is  your  pleasure? 

Mr.  Sloane — I  move  its  adoption. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the 
motion  was  unanimously  agreed  to. 

Mr.  Wood  read  the  following  resolution: 

"Be  it  further  resolved  that  the  National  Security  League  recom- 
mends the  establishment  of  a  navy  adequate  to  conserve  the  national 
interest,  in  conformity  with  the  following  recommendations: 

"That  the  personnel  of  the  Navy  be  increased  in  conformity  with 
the  requirements  of  the  fleet  as  interpreted  by  the  General  Board  of 
the  Navy; 

"That  there  be  established  for  the  Navy  a  General  Staff,  similar  to 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Army,  as  is  customary  in  all  other  navies 
of  the  world; 

"That  the  National  Security  League  endorses  the  program  of 
July  30,  1915,  of  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  and  urges  its  im- 
mediate adoption  by  Congress." 

Mr.  Sloane — I  move  the  adoption  of  the  resolution. 

Mr.  Ernest  Hamlin  Abbott  of  New  York — May  I  inquire 
what  the  recommendation  of  the  General  Board  of  1915,  mentioned 
in  the  resolution,  was? 

Mr.  Wood — In  a  general  way,  the  recommendation  of  the  Gen- 
eral Board  of  1915  was  meant  to  be  a  step  towards  putting  our  navj' 

327 


back  in  its  original  position  of  second  in  the  world.  It  recommended 
the  immediate  laying  down  of  four  battleships  and  four  battle 
cruisers,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  auxiliary  ships.  The  resolution 
which  was  finally  substituted  for  it  by  Secretary  Daniels  calls  for 
only  two  battleships,  two  battle  cruisers,  and  for  practically  no  auxili- 
ary ships — certainly  not  enough. 

The  question  was  called  for,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the 
motion  was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Rothwell's  resolution  is  the  next  one,  sec- 
onded by  Mr.  Miller. 

Mr.  S.  T.  Hubbard  of  New  York — Before  proceeding  with  that, 
I  think  the  regular  order  is  now  on  the  adoption  of  the  report  as  a 
whole. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Hubbard's  point  is  well  taken. 

General  Wright — I  move  the  adoption  of  the  report  as  a  whole, 
in  its  entirety. 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the 
motion  was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Wood,  will  you  now  read  Mr.  Rothwell's 
resolution? 

Mr.  Wood  read  as  follows: 

"Whereas,  the  misfortune  of  war  would  demand  from  the  young 
manhood  of  the  nation  the  supreme  offering  of  life  itself;  therefore, 
be  it, 

"Resolved,  That  a  fundamental  factor  in  the  problem  of  prepared- 
ness should  be  such  intensive  mobilization  of  the  productive,  industrial 
and  commercial  forces  of  the  United  States  as  would  insure,  in  time 
of  war,  the  contribution  of  their  fullest  resources  at  a  restricted  profit, 
to  be  regulated  by  'the  Government." 

The  Chairman — Is  there  any  discussion  upon  this  resolution? 
If  not,  the  chair  will  put  the  question. 

(The  question  was  taken  and  the  motion  was  agreed  to.) 

Mr.  p.  H.  W.  Ross — Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  here  a  very  short  reso- 
lution which  I  submitted  to  a  very  distinguished  member  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Resolutions,  who  informed  me  that  with  the  permission  of 
the  chairman  of  the  committee  it  might  be  laid  before  you.  The  reso- 
lution is  as  follows : 

"Whereas  not  only  the  physical  resources  of  America's  manhood 

828 


and  virility  should  be  rendered  mobile  and  utilized  to  the  best  possible 
advantage  for  the  National  Security  of  the  Republic  through  the  media 
of  our  army,  navy,  merchant  marine,  national  guards,  railroads  and 
other  means  of  assembly  and  co-ordination,  but  also  practical  use 
be  made  of  the  strategical  advantages  wherewith  nature  has  endowed 
our  country ;  be  it, 

"Resolved,  That  Congress,  having  already  appreciated  the  value 
of  the  Panama  Canal  as  a  means  of  swiftly  mobilizing  our  national 
naval  defense,  be  respectfully  urged  to  utilize  such  coastal  waterways 
as  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  Canal,  for  example,  in  like  efficient 
manner  as  the  Imperial  German  Government  has  the  Kiel  Canal,  which 
has  been  of  incalculable  benefit  to  the  national  security  of  that  coun- 
try, so  that  our  war  vessels  may  be  swiftly  and  safely  moved  for  the 
protection  and  defense  of  such  cities  as  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore, 
for  example,  without  incurring  the  dangers  of  almost  certain  destruc- 
tion if  such  movement  were  made  in  the  open  sea  and  subject  to 
superior  concentration  of  enemy  force." 

The  motion  was  seconded,  and  there  were  cries  of  "No,  no,"  and 
"Lay  it  on  the  table." 

Mr.  Spooner — Mr.  President 

Mr.  Ross — I  should  like  to  say  a  few  words,  if  I  may,  on  the 
propriety  of  this  motion.  I  should  like  to  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  the 
development  of  the  naval  power  of  the  second  greatest  nation  in  the 
matter  naval  power  until  this  recent  conflict  has  been  obtained  as 
much  as  possible  by  the  intelligent  development  of  the  natural  re- 
sources of  the  country.  In  particular  the  widening  of  the  Kiel  Canal 
has  created  a  condition  of  absolute  safety  for  the  German  marine  up 
to  the  present  moment.  The  point  I  wish  to  make  is  this,  that  if  this 
country  should  ever  be  afflicted  by  war,  and  if  any  of  our  vessels  were 
chased  into  any  one  of  the  harbors  along  our  coast,  it  would  be  easily 
possible  for  them  to  go  along  to  some  other  port  by  some  inland  water- 
way or  canal,  and  so  our  vessels  would  not  have  to  either  stay  in  the 
harbor  into  which  they  were  chased  or  come  out  into  the  open  again 
Sind  possibly  be  defeated  by  superior  force. 

I  cannot  think  of  anything  more  but  the  barest  statement  of 
these  facts,  and  the  rest  I  leave  to  your  common  sense. 

Mr.  Spooner — Mr.  President,  I  wish  to  say  that  the  Committee 
on  Resolutions  considered  this  resolution,  or  a  resolution  similar  to  it, 

829 


d 


and  that  we  came  to  the  conclusion  that,  as  to  matters  of  detail,  we 
were  not  fit  to  advise;  that  we  wished  in  our  resolutions  to  show 
allegiance  for  one  of  the  principles  of  our  organization,  and  that  is 
that  men  shall  provide  the  plans  who  know  how  to  provide  the  plans; 
and  therefore,  with  the  greatest  respect  for  the  resolution,  and  for 
the  high  purposes  which  inspired  the  gentleman  in  offering  it,  I  move 
to  lay  it  on  the  table. 

Admiral  Chester — I  second  that  motion. 

The  question  was  taken,  and  the  motion  was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — The  Rochester  Chamber  of  Commerce  took  a 
vote  on  the  question  of  obligatory  universal  service,  and  the  vote  was 
672  to  21  in  favor  of  it. 

Mr.  Wood  read  the  following : 

"As  the  result  of  this  Congress  it  can  be  announced  that  upon 
invitation  of  Mayor  Kiel  and  the  citizens  of  St.  Louis,  and  with  the 
co-operation  of  Mayor  Mitchel  of  New  York,  a  national  defense  con- 
ference of  mayors  and  mayors'  representatives  will  be  held  in  St. 
Louis  on  March  3  and  4.  The  nucleus  of  this  gathering  will  be  the 
committee  appointed  by  mayors  of  more  than  seventy-five  cities  that 
co-operate  with  the  National  Security  League  in  its  work  of  securing 
adequate  preparation  for  national  defense." 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Wood  has  another  resolution,  I  believe. 

Mr.  Wood — The  joint  committee  of  the  American  Society  of  Civil 
Engineers  passed  the  following  resolution: 

"Whereas,  we  believe  that  the  United  States  has  definitely  adopted 
the  following  policies: 

"To  sustain  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 

"To  retain  guardianship  or  control  over  all  territories  it  now 
holds, 

"To  protect  the  rights  of  its  citizens  to  freedom  of  travel  and 
traffic  on  the  high  seas,  and 

"To  protect  the  rights  of  all  people  within  its  borders  in  the  pur- 
suit of  legitimate  business. 

"And  whereas,  we  believe  that  these  policies  are  just,  wise  and 
beneficient,  not  only  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  but  to  all 
peoples  of  the  world,  and  are  without  purpose  of  territorial  expansion 
or  unfair  quest  of  commercial  advantage;  and 

"Whereas,  the  terrible  events  of  the  last  two  years  have  indefinitely 

380 


deferred  the  hope  of  establishing  and  maintaining  the  rights  of  na- 
tions and  peoples  by  peaceful  means  alone,  and  have  forced  the  con- 
viction that,  as  yet,  no  nation  can  safely  maintain  its  rights,  however 
firmly  rooted  in  justice,  M'ithout  the  aid  of  effectively  developed  physi- 
cal force;  and 

"Whereas,  the  United  States  has  not  maintained  its  army  and 
navy  establishments  on  a  basis  to  meet  the  test  of  a  great  war,  whiclt 
has  so  long  appeared  remote,  but  which  it  is  now  perceived  may  at  any 
moment  become  a  reality ;  and 

"Whereas,  patriotism  and  self-preservation  demand  that  these 
establishments  be  placed  as  promptly  as  possible  on  a  basis  of  strength 
and  efficiency  which  will  enable  them  to  cope  adequately  with  the  task 
which,  in  support  of  our  national  policies,  they  may  at  any  moment 
have  to  perform;  therefore,  be  it, 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  this  annual  meeting  of  the  Ameri- 
can Society  of  Civil  Engineers  that  our  national  policies,  both  at  homo 
and  abroad,  imperatively  demand  not  only  adequate  enlargements  of 
our  army  and  navy  establishments,  but  also  a  thorough  and  efficient 
plan  of  moblization  of  these  industrial  and  transportation  resources 
of  the  country  which  are  essential  to  the  creation  and  operation  of 
these  establishments ;  and  be  it  further 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  this  meeting  that  the  adequacy 
of  the  army  and  navy  establishments  for  properly  supporting  our  na- 
tional policies  should  be  determined  by  the  experts  of  the  government 
who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  dealing  with  such  problems,  and  who, 
by  reason  of  their  technical  knowledge,  experience  and  patriotism, 
command  the  fullest  measure  of  confidence,  and  be  it  further 

Resolved,  That  a  copy  of  these  resolutions  be  sent  to  the  National 
Security  Congress  to  convene  to-morrow  at  Washington,  through  the 
chairman  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  National  Engineering  So- 
cieties on  a  Reserve  Corps  of  Civilian  Engineers. 

January  19,  1916. 

The  Chairman — What  is  your  pleasure?  I  presume  that  a  reso- 
lution relative  to  this  report  of  the  Engineering  Society,  which  repre- 
sents the  product  of  the  labors  of  the  best  engineering  talent  of 
America  over  a  period  of  about  twelve  months,  would  take  the  form 
not  of  adoption,  but  approval  or  disapproval  of  the  resolution.  Do 
I  hear  a  motion? 


331 


It  was  moved  and  seconded  that  the  resolution  read  be  heartily 
approved  of,  and  the  question  being  taken,  the  motion  was  agreed  to. 

The  Chairman — The  chair  recognizes  Mr.  C.  Willing  Hare  of 
Philadelphia. 

Mr.  Hare — Mr.  Chairman  and  gentlemen,  I  have  the  following 
resolution  relative  to  the  co-ordination  of  the  various  organizations  to 
read,  aiming  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  our  naval  and  military 
service : 

"Be  It  Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  immediately 
endeavor  to  avoid  the  overlapping  of  the  efforts  and  energy  of  these 
organizations  by  seeking  effective  means  of  unifying  and  co-ordinating 
their  activities." 

It  was  moved  and  seconded  that  the  resolution  be  adopted,  and 
the  question  being  taken,  the  motion  was  agreed  to. 

Admiral  Chester — Mr.  President,  the  congress  at  its  session  yes- 
terday afternoon  ordered  a  special  committee  to  consider  the  form  of 
a  resolution  of  thanks  to  the  officers  of  the  association.  It  seemed  to 
me  that  no  resolution  of  thanks  was  necessary  before  this  audience, 
because  I  think  every  face  here  shows  how  completely  the  association 
has  been  thankful  to  the  president  of  this  association,  but  I  must  say 
that  I  am  a  very  old  man,  and  have  lived  in  Washington  a  great 
many  years  and  have  attended  a  great  many  congresses  in  that  time, 
and  we  say  here  that  the  sun  never  sets  without  it  sets  on  some  con- 
gress in  convention  in  Washington,  but  this  to  my  mind  has  been  the 
most  important,  the  most  successful  and  the  most  patriotic  conven- 
tion that  has  ever  met  here,  and  I  propose  the  following  resolution: 

"Resolved,  That  the  National  Security  League  of  the  United 
States  assembled  in  congress,  at  the  National  Capital,  on  the  22nd 
day  of  January,  1916,  recognize  with  a  profound  sense  of  their  obli- 
gation to  the  cause  of  adequate  preparedness  for  the  national  defense, 
the  masterly  executive  ability,  earnest  and  protracted  labor  exerted  in 
the  organization  of  the  congress,  on  the  part  of  Mr.  S.  Stanwood 
Menkin,  president  of  the  National  Security  League,  and  his  able  and 
efficient  corps  of  officers. 

"Resolved,  That  the  congress  extend  to  him  and  to  them,  its  hearty 
congratulations  and  cordial  thanks  for  the  success  of  the  important 
meeting  of  so  many  brilliant  women  and  distinguished  men,  which 

332 


must  have  a  beneficent  result  on  the  formation  of  public  opinion  in 
favor  of  upholding  the  nation's  position  as  a  v\^orld  power. 

(Signed)     George  Hahn, 

Colby  M.  Chester, 
Chas.  C.  Curtis, 
C.  Willing  Hare. 

Mr.  J.  W.  Hubbell  of  Philadelphia  here  assumed  the  chair. 

Mr.  Hubbell — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  you  have  heard  the  resolu- 
tion prepared  by  your  committee.  The  modesty  of  the  chairman,  as 
well  as  propriety,  at  this  moment  renders  it  necessary  for  someone 
else  to  present  the  resolution  for  adoption.  It  is  my  fortune  to  accept 
that  task.  Unless  there  are  remarks,  I  will  put  the  motion  on  its 
adoption. 

Mr.  Ell  Torrance  of  Minneapolis — I  have  travelled  fifteen  hun- 
dred miles  to  attend  this  congress.  I  have  come  from  the  snow  fields 
of  Minnesota.  The  people  of  that  great  state,  the  last  to  join  the 
sisterhood  of  states  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  is  com- 
posed of  a  hardy  and  patriotic  people.  I  am  here  as  one  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  those  people.'  I  am  proud  to  represent  them,  and  I  am 
proud  to  be  a  member  of  this  congress.  I  shall  carry  home  with  me 
most  pleasant  recollections,  and  I  shall  undertake  to  inspire  my  people, 
so  far  as  I  can,  with  the  patriotic  sentiment  that  has  been  announced 
in  this  congress.  (Applause.)  I  am  happy  to  second  this  resolution. 
From  beginning  to  end  the  arrangements  have  been  complete  and  in 
every  way  praiseworthy,  and  if  the  rest  of  you  return  to  your  homes 
as  happy  and  as  greatly  benefited  as  I  have  been,  it  will  be  a  con- 
tinuing pleasant  memory  as  long  as  you  live.     (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — Are  there  any  further  remarks  concerning  the 
resolution?  If  not,  all  those  who  favor  its  adoption  will  signify  it 
by  rising.  The  resolution  seems  to  be  and  is  unanimously  carried. 
(Applause.) 

Mr.  J.  H.  Beek  of  St.  Paul — Mr.  Chairman,  just  a  moment  before 
we  break  up.  I,  too,  came  fifteen  hundred  miles  to  attend  this  con- 
vention, and  the  weakness  of  this  convention,  if  there  is  any,  is  that 
these  splendid  papers  have  been  delivered  to  people  who  did  not  need 
to  be  converted.  I  want  to  use  the  ammunition  that  has  been  made 
here  to  convert  the  whole  state,  because  the  congressional  delegation 

333 


from  that  state  needs  converting.  I  want  to  use  those  same  things 
and  make  this  convention  more  effective  than  it  has  been,  more  effective 
than  any  I  have  ever  attended.  In  order  to  make  it  still  more 
effective  we  v/ant  the  proceedings  of  this  convention  published  in  full 
in  book  form,  without  change  so  far  as  adding  or  striking  anything 
out  is  concerned,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  If  the  funds  of 
the  Security  League  will  not  permit  of  the  publication  of  them,  then 
the  books  could  be  sold.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  profits  will  be  more 
than  enough  to  pay  for  them.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  is  the  inten- 
tion to  publish  these  proceedings  or  not 

The  Chairman — It  is.  They  will  pe  published,  and  we  hope  they 
will  be  used  to  bring  as  many  Congressmen  into  the  fold  of  prepared- 
ness as  are  now  against  it. 

(At  5:45  o'clock  p.  m.  the  congress  adjourned.) 


334 


EIGHTH  SESSION. 

NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

Banquet  at  the  New  Willard  Hotel, 

Saturday,  January  22,   1916. 

The  congress  closed  with  a  banquet  in  the  hall  of  the  New  Willard 
Hotel,  at  which  were  present  450  delegates. 

Seated  on  the  dais  were  Col.  Franklin  Q.  Brown  of  New  York, 
Major-General  George  Barnett,  U.  S.  M.  C. ;  Major  George  Haven  Put- 
nam of  New  York,  Hon.  George  von  L.  Meyer,  former  Secretary  of  the 
Navy;  Hon.  John  Purroy  Mitchel,  Mayor  of  New  York  City;  Repre- 
sentative Lemuel  P.  Padgett,  chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Naval  Affairs ;  Hon.  George  W.  Wickersham,  former  Attorney  General 
of  the  United  States;  S.  Stanwood  Menken,  president  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  League;  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  former  Secretary  of 
War;  Representative  John  J.  Fitzgerald,  chairman  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations;  Hon.  Robert  Bacon,  former  Secretary  of 
State ;  Hon.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Senator  from  Massachusetts ;  General 
Luke  E.  Wright,  former  Secretary  of  War;  Major-General  John  F. 
O'Ryan,  commanding  the  National  Guard  of  New  York ;  Major-General 
Hugh  F.  Scott,  U.  S.  A.;  Representative  A.  P.  Gardner  of  Massachu- 
setts, and  Col.  G.  Creighton  Webb. 

\  At  the  conclusion  of  the  menu  this,  the  last,  session  of  the  con- 
gress was  called  to  order  by  the  president,  S.  Stanwood  Menken,  at 
9 :30  o'clock  p.  m. 

The  Chairman:  Ladies  and  Gentlemen — We  of  the  Security 
League  are  happy  to-night,  because  we  believe  that  we  have  done  some 
service  toward  preparedness.  (Applause.)  We  feel  that  we  have  in 
reality  laid  the  groundwork  of  a  campaign  that  means  much  toward 
the  salvation  of  the  country,  and  that  we  have,  through  the  papers, 
and  deliberations  that  have  been  conducted  here,  enabled  the  people 
to  approach  soberly  a  subject  of  the  deepest  moment. 

335 


We  have  claimed  and  we  do  maintain,  that  we  of  the  Security 
League,  and  all  advocates  of  preparedness,  whether  in  this  league  or 
any  other  organization,  are  the  true  conservatives,  because  we  are  too 
conservative  to  allow  any  gambling  with  our  country's  future.  (Ap- 
plause.) 

I  hope  that  as  you,  who  come  here  as  delegates  from  other  com- 
munities than  that  from  which  I  come,  go  to  your  home  districts,  you 
will  take  with  you  that  very  keynote  of  conservatism,  recognizing  the 
fact  that  the  problem  of  preparedness  is  a  difficult  one,  a  many-sided 
one,  and  one  that  requires  the  best  thought  and  the  most  honest 
patriotism  that  we  possess.  You  must  also  be  fair,  and  recognize  the 
fact  that  it  is  a  problem  which  is  going  to  be  very  difficult  for  the 
administration  to  solve,  no  matter  how  willing  it  may  be,  and  that  we 
must  be  patient  if  we  are  to  achieve  success.     (Applause.) 

I  feel  that  I  should  be  remiss  if  I  did  not  say  a  word  of  warn- 
ing as  to  the  danger  of  allowing  your  enthusiasm  to  injure  the  cause. 
We  must  be  the  most  careful  and  sane  advocates  of  our  cause,  or  we 
will  defeat  our  own  purposes.  (Applause.)  And  then  again,  we  must 
remember  that  we  are  always  subject  to  the  danger  of  having  a  spirit 
of  jingoism  attributed  to  the  most  worthy  of  our  purposes,  and  that 
too  must  be  avoided. 

One  of  my  great  burdens  in  life  has  been  listening  to  toastmasters 
who  thought  they  were  the  orators  of  the  occasion.  (Laughter.)  I 
shall  not,  if  T  can  help  it,  be  guilty  of  falling  into  the  same  error. 
There  are,  however,  just  one  or  two  things  which  I  have  been  asked 
to  impress  further  upon  you.  One  of  the  committees  ask  that  the 
typewritten  document  upon  the  table  before  you  be  given  some  care- 
ful consideration,  and  be  handed  to  willing  recipients  who  will  be 
stationed  at  either  end  of  the  hall.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  appeals 
merit  response. 

We  move  along  by  stages  in  this  campaign  for  preparedness. 
First  we  started  in  New  York  last  June  with  a  limited  conference. 
Then  we  had  our  great  and  inspiring  meeting  in  Chicago  a  couple  of 
months  ago,  and  now  we  have  had  these  glorious  three  days  in  our 
Capital,  but  we  are  going  to  move  West,  and  this  invitation  that  has 
been  received  from  St.  Louis  must  be  accepted  by  you  all,  because  we 
want  to  show  not  alone  that  we  are  appreciative  of  the  hospitality  that 
we  know  will  be  extended  to  us  there,  but  that  we  recognize  that  the 

836 


cause  must  be  kept  growing  and  growing,  and  that  each  successive 
move  must  be  a  greater  one.     (Applause.) 

And  so  as  you  leave  here,  having  gone  to  the  Capital,  and  I  hope 
having  to  a  large  degree  captured  it,  let  the  cry  be  "On  to  St.  Louis  and 
across  the  Mississippi."     (Applause.) 

When  the  initial  work  of  the  Security  League  began,  there  were 
six  men  who  signed  the  call ;  and  I  want  to  say  that  it  was  an  extremely 
difficult  matter  to  get  those  few  to  be  pioneers  in  what  now  is  a  move- 
ment that  numbers  45,000  enrolled  members,  and  how  many  unen- 
roUed  it  would  be  difficult  to  state.  We  trust  it  is  a  majority  of  the 
nation.  (Applause.)  One  of  the  very  first  to  respond  was  a  gentleman 
whom  we  of  New  York  know  to  have  been  a  leader  in  every  movement 
for  public  benefit  for  his  generation ;  and  I  want  you  to  regard  it  as  a 
distinct  privilege  to  meet  and  to  listen  to  our  dear  friend  and  great 
leader.  Colonel  George  Haven  Putnam.    (Applause.) 

ADDRESS  OF  MAJ.  GEORGE  HAVEN  PUTNAM,  OF  NEW 

YORK 

Major  Putnam — Mr.  Toastmaster,  Senator  Lodge  and .  fellow 
citizens:  I  use  the  term  citizens  advisedly,  instead  of  the  more  con- 
ventional ladies  and  gentlemen,  because  we  are  here  engaged  in  citizen's 
work,  and  the  ladies  are  citizens,  entitled  to  protection  as  such,  and 
entitled  and  bound  to  use  their  influence  as  citizens,  and  I  hope  that 
they  will  shortly,  in  the  near  future,  be  entitled  to  back  up  their  in- 
fluence with  their  votes.     (Applause.) 

Before  I  give  you  my  own  words,  I  have  been  asked  to  read  some 
verses  which  are  pertinent  to  our  present  purpose.  They  are  the 
work  of  a  man  who  half  a  century  ago  showed  that  he  was  ready  when 
the  country  called,  who  fought  his  part  pluckily  through  the  four 
years  of  the  Civil  War — my  good  veteran  friend,  Colonel  Archibald 
Hopkins,  well  known  in  this  community. 

GET    READY. 
By  Archibald  Hopkins. 
Oh,  sons  of  Revolutionary  sires. 
Kindle  once  again  their  patriotic  fires; 
Rouse  up  the  whole  broad  land 
To  take  a  manly  stand 
Ere  patriotism  withers  and  expires. 

337 


Sons  of  men  who  bravely  fought  with  Grant  and  Lee, 
For  the  right  as  they  were  taught  the  right  to  see, 

Can  it  be  you  will  not  fight 

For  your  country  when  she's  right? 
Were  you  taught  your  country's  foes  to  fear  and  flee? 

Are  you  so  absorbed  in  money-making  greed 
That  you  do  not  see  or  feel  your  country's  need? 

Will  you  wait  the  hostile  roar 

Of  guns  along  your  shore? 
Will  you  wait  until  you  see  your  country  bleed? 

Peace,  peace  and  only  peace,  so  many  cry ; 
For  peace  no  price  to  pay  can  be  too  high. 

To  such  a  slavish  creed 

None  but  cowards  will  give  heed. 
There  are  many  things  for  which  the  brave  will  die. 

War,  with  all  its  grisly  terrors,  we  detest — 
Its  hideousness  can  never  be  expressed; 

But  our  country  can  depend 

That  her  life  we  will  defend 
With  the  lives  of  all  our  bravest  and  our  best. 

When  the  hurricane  is  raging  round  the  world, 
When  so  many  blazing  war-flags  are  unfurled. 

Why  should  we  think  that  we — 

We  only — shall  not  see 
The  frightful  bolts  of  death  among  us  hurled? 

Let  us  spare  no  pains  then,  no  expense. 

In  preparing  for  the  most  complete  defense. 

At  such  a  time  to  fail. 

At  such  a  time  to  quail, 
Shows  us  lacking  both  in  courage  and  in  sense. 


838 


Sad  indeed  will  be  our  lot,  if  unprepared 

To  meet  the  storm  of  war  our  breasts  are  bared ! 

If  we're  ready,  none  will  dare 

Front  our  eagle,  high  in  air; 
If  we're  ready,  there  is  no  one  need  be  scared. 

It  is  folly  to  rely  on  volunteers, 

And  has  proved  a  broken  reed  in  all  the  years. 

The  democratic  way 

Is  for  the  law  to  say 
Each  man  must  take  his  turn  among  his  peers. 

Bid  every  growing  youth  in  all  the  land 
Beneath  the  flag  at  least  a  year  to  stand; 

Each  will  be  a  better  man 

If  trained  on  such  a  plan, 
Which  will  quickly  meet  defense's  full  demand. 

Then,  every  man  must  rally  to  the  flag; 
Then,  none  can  shirk  his  duty  or  can  lag; 

Then,  the  land  will  rest  secure 

On  a  basis  firm  and  sure. 
And  preparedness  will  be  no  empty  brag. 

Equal  rights  the  country  guarantees  to  all; 
Equal  rights  for  equal  duties  plainly  call, 

And  if  any  man  may  choose 

Duty's  summons  to  refuse, 
The  country's  surely  riding  for  a  fall. 

For  us  our  country  always  must  be  first; 
We  have  taken  her  for  better  or  for  "worst" ; 

And  we  wish  to  make  it  clear 

That  we  want  no  hyphens  here 
Who  their  duty  of  allegience  have  reversed. 


389 


We  talk  and  keep  on  talking  of  our  rights; 
Can  we  not  attain  those  more  unselfish  heights 

Where  duty  is  the  word 

Which  is  more  often  heard — 
Our  duty  to  our  country  days  and  nights. 

Our  duty,  our  dear  country  to  defend, 
Whatever  form  of  peril  may  impend; 

Our  duty  to  prepare 

On  land  and  sea  and  air 
For  any  foe  the  doubtful  fates  may  send. 

Fellow  citizens,  nearly  one  liundred  years  ago  Francis  Lieber, 
the  great  German  jurist  and  great  American  jurist  and  citizen,  said: 
"There  is  no  right  without  a  corresponding  obligation,  and  no  obliga- 
tion without  a  corresponding  right." 

The  citizen  has  a  right  to  look  to  his  government  for  the  protec- 
tion, in  the  first  place,  of  his  life ;  secondly,  of  his  property ;  thirdly, 
of  rights  which  are  beyond  property  and  which  may  even  be  more 
valuable  than  life. 

The  citizen  looks  to  his  government  to  protect  the  honor  of  the 
nation  in  which  he  as  a  citizen  shares.  If  the  nation  fails  to  fulfill 
its  obligation,  each  citizen  feels,  or  ought  to  feel,  humiliated.  But 
the  demand  is  reciprocal.  If  the  citizen  has  the  right  to  demand  this 
service  from  the  government,  the  government  has  the  right  to  demand, 
and  must  be  assured  of  securing,  the  service  from  each  citizen  of 
the  land  that  that  citizen  is  able  and  qualified  physically  and  mentally 
to  give.  And  no  nation  deserves  to  exist,  and  no  nation  can  exist, 
unless  that  reciprocal  obligation  between  the  government  and  the 
citizen  is  fairly  well  recognized. 

Now,  our  nation  has  a  pretty  large  property  to  defend,  with  its 
territories,  its  valuable  coast  cities,  tempting  the  aggressor.  It  has  a 
territory  to  defend.  It  has  theories  and  policies  to  maintain,  some- 
thing to  say  about  the  rights  of  men,  to  influence  for  representative 
government  throughout  the  world.  It  has  assumed  certain  specific 
obligations.  Take,  for  instance,  the  so-called  Monroe  Doctrine — no 
doctrine  at  all,  of  course,  but  a  policy,  and  called  on  the  other  side  of 

340 


the  Atlantic  a  mere  assertion,  a  piece  of  Yankee  bluff.  But  in  that 
Monroe  Doctrine  we  Americans  have  undertaken  to  see  that  justice 
is  done  in  this  hemisphere.  It  is  a  pretty  big  contract.  We  have  said 
to  Eureopean  states:  "If  any  of  your  citizens  have  suffered  griev- 
ances in  the  South  American  or  Central  American  countries,  in  the 
West  Indies  or  in  Mexico,  you  will  not  be  at  liberty  to  take  the  usual 
measures  for  securing  the  redress  of  such  grievances,  whether  they 
be  against  property  or  against  life."  Now,  what  is  the  necessary 
concomitant  to  that?  If  we  will  not  allow  England,  France,  Germany 
of  Spain,  which  have  had  many  real  and  many  alleged  grievances 
on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  to  redress  those  grievances,  we  have 
accepted  for  ourselves  the  obligation  of  seeing  that  those  grievances 
are  redressed. 

Now,  if  we  are  to  take  such  an  obligation  we  must  see  that  we  are 
in  a  position  to  fulfill  it.  (Applause.)  The  American  asserts  a  good 
deal,  but  if  he  is  not  willing  to  maintain  his  assertions  he  had  better 
begin  to  learn  how  to  keep  quiet,  and  that  is  not  an  easy  thing  for 
an  American  to  learn. 

It  seems  to  me  elementary  that  we  shall  have  to  ao  one  of  two 
things.  If  the  peace-at-any-price  men  should  be  listened  to,  if  their 
doctrines  should  prevail,  there  is  no  reason  why,  in  order  to  be  con- 
sistent, we  should  continue  to  expend  a  single  dollar  on  forts,  on 
army  or  on  navy.  There  is  no  sense  in  a  half  preparedness,  that  means 
a  great  expenditure  and  no  result.  There  is  no  consistency  from 
the  pacifist  point  of  view  in  a  half  preparedness. 

I  cannot  get  my  pacifist  friends  and  opponents — and  many  of  my 
opponents  are  my  personal  friends — to  bring  this  thing  to  a  logical 
conclusion.  I  cannot  get  them  to  say  that  we  ought  to  chuck  the 
guns  at  present  in  the  forts  into  the  ocean — $40,000,000  worth  of  guns, 
and  no  men  behind  them,  and  no  ammunition  for  them!  The  people 
have  been  pacified  by  seeing  the  guns,  and  they  think  they  are  pro- 
tected; but  they  ought  to  be  chucked  into  the  ocean  if  we  are  to  be 
consistent.  The  ships  should  be  thrown  on  the  scrap-heap.  The 
army — the  little  army,  that  dear  little  army  that  wanders  up  and 
down  the  continent  and  now  and  then  gets  almost  lost  altogether 
(laughter) — should  be  told  to  go  home.  There  is  no  sense  in  spending 
money  on  an  army  that  does  not  do  what  an  army  is  expected  to  do. 

A  movable  army  of  32,000  men  for  100,000,000  people,  and  ten  or 

341 


twelve  thousand  miles  of  coast  to  look  after!  It  does  not  do  any 
good,  and  it  might  just  as  well  go  home  and  look  after  its  wives  and 
its  children.     That,  at  least,  would  be  a  consistent  policy. 

Then,  of  course,  we  shall  have  to  abrogate  all  treaties  which 
mean  that  the  nation  is  under  obligations  to  do  anything  with  organized 
force.  We  have  no  business  to  make  promises  if  we  do  not  intend  to 
fulfill  them.  Then  we  shall  have  to  get  out  of  that  troublesome  Monroe 
assertion  of  obligation.  We  shall  have  to  chuck  it  upon  The  Hague 
court,  or  upon  Guatemala  or  some  other  state  that  will  do  its  duty 
about  it.  (Laughter.)  But  unless  we  are  prepared  to  make  our 
word  good,  we  must  not  go  on  making  assertions,  making  claims, 
saying  we  must  be  heard  in  the  adjustment  of  the  world's  issues — 
and  we  ought  to  be  heard.  We  have  something  to  say,  and  when  the 
settlement  of  this  war  comes  we  ought  to  have  something  to  say  with 
clearness  and  with  force  in  behalf  of  the  peoples  that  will  need  our 
word  and  our  influence,  in  behalf  of  the  smaller  states,  to  see  that 
they  are  not  again  to, be  trampled  upon;  in  behalf  of  representative 
government,  the  ideals  for  which  the  republic  has  stood.  We  have  a 
lot  we  want  to  say.  What  is  the  good  of  saying  it  if  we  cannot  back 
it  up  ?    How  much  shall  we  be  listened  to  if  we  cannot  back  it  up  ? 

But  all  that  goes.  Under  the  pacifist  theory  we  must  give  up 
being  a  member  at  all  of  the  world's  family  of  nations.  We  must 
shrink  back  into  our  shell,  stay  quiet,  and,  under  a  theory — an  impos- 
sible theory — grow  rich  in  looking  after  our  poor  personal  interests! 

We  should  not  be  permited  to  live  quietly  in  our  shell.  We  may 
chuck  our  duties  as  much  as  we  like,  but  the  instant  we  tell  the 
peoples  of  this  world  that  we  do  not  propose  to  do  anything  to  protect 
our  property  or  our  lives  or  our  rights  or  our  obligations,  we  are 
throwing  ourselves  open  to  invasion,  to  aggression,  to  domination. 
We  are  putting  ourselves  in  the  position  in  which  poor  Cihna  has  been 
for  a  couple  of  centuries ;  and  China  has  four  hundred  millions  of  people 
— some  of  them  very  good  people,  as  any  of  us  who  have  done  business 
with  Chinese  merchants  will  realize.  But  they  have  lacked  one  great 
thing,  the  essential  thing  if  a  nation  is  to  maintain  its  dignity  and  its 
independence :  They  have  no  national  sense.  They  have  not  been  willing 
to  make  sacrifices  for  maintaining  a  national  ideal  or  national  inde- 
pendence. As  the  result,  as  our  history  tells  us,  poor  China  has  been 
the  jelly-fish,  and  the  European  sharks  that  ought  to  have  known 

342 


better  have  nibbled  off  pieces  of  this  jelly-fish  as  they  have  found  it 
convenient.  They  have  nibbled,  they  have  humiliated,  they  have 
marched  three  or  four  times  to  the  capital  and  burned  it  and  looted  it, 
and  then  have  gone  off  again,  leaving  the  people  humiliated. 

Is  America  willing  to  look  forward  to  the  role  of  China.  I  was 
talking  with  a  pacifist  the  other  night,  discussing  the  subject  with 
him — an  able,  eloquent  man — and  he  said,  "Well,  after  all,  China  has 
existed."  The  retort  came  naturally  in  the  words  of  the  poet,  "Better 
fifty  years  of  Yankee-land  than  a  cycle  of  Cathay."  Americans  would 
not  call  that  existence,  and  they  would  not  be  patient  with  it. 

We  should  not  be  permitted  to  exist.  The  aggression  would  surely 
come.  It  is  merely  a  question  of  generations  as  to  which  nation  hap- 
pens to  be  the  aggressor.  In  one  decade  one  state  goes  mad  behind 
some  ambitious  ruler  and  strives  for  a  world-domination.  A  century 
ago  it  was  France  that  did  that  very  thing,  and  it  was  Napoleon  who 
was  attempting  to  impress  French  imperial  domination  over  Europe 
and  the  world.  Back  of  that  it  was  Spain.  For  the  moment  we  are 
growling  at  the  Hohenzollern  because  he  is  the  one  who  is  threating 
Europe  and  devastating  Europe  for  the  sake  of  securing  a  world 
imperial  domination.  But  the  blame  will  not  rest  there.  It  is  there 
for  the  moment.  Other  nations  will  be  seized  with  the  same  passions 
and  the  same  greeds.  Human  nature  is  very  much  the  same.  It  is  a 
product  of  opportunity.  What  we  want  to  do  is  to  withdraw.  Let 
me  tell  you  what  we  are  looking  forward  to,  those  of  us  who  are 
peace  men — and  I  am  a  peace  man;  I  am  a  vice-president  of  a  peace 
society.  I  am  a  director  in  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  They 
elected  me  to  both  posts  when  I  had  been  working  for  some  time  on 
behalf  of  armament.  I  questioned  the  wisdom  of  their  course.  They 
said:  "It  is  all  right.  We  approve  of  what  you  are  doing.  We  are 
organizing  here  to  maintain  peace." 

We  peace  men  have  been  looking  forward  in  our  peace  councils 
to  a  world  league,  a  league  of  world  nations,  to  come  together  as  quickly 
as  possible  after  this  miserable  war  is  over,  perhaps  with  a  court  at 
The  Hague.  That  court  should  have  the  responsibility  of  adjusting 
issues  that  arise  between  the  states ;  and  it  must  be  in  a  position,  says 
our  league,  to  enforce  its  decisions.  Its  relation  to  those  states  would 
be  very  similar  to  that  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  our  forty-eight  inde- 
pendent states.     The  decisions  of  our  Supreme  Court  are  accepted — 

343 


and  why?  Because  we  know  that  the  organized  power  of  this  nation 
is  behind  the  court,  and  that  if  they  were  not  accepted  and  if  the 
power  were  not  organized  to  enforce  those  decisions,  there  would  not 
be  any  nation.  John  Marshall  understood  that  when  he  planned  the 
organization  of  the  court. 

That  is  something  to  look  forward  to.  It  is  a  dream  today;  it  is 
a  dream  tomorrow.  It  will  be  a  realization  a  little  while  later.  That 
is  the  way  the  world  moves:  First,  something  foggy  and  indistinct; 
then  it  takes  shadowy  shape,  gets  men  behind  it,  comes  into  force, 
and  accomplishes  what  had  before  been  thought  impossible.  Behind 
this  world  court  there  must  be  an  organized  world  police,  naval  and 
military,  to  which  each  state  will  contribute  in  proportion  to  its  popu- 
lation, its  resources,  its  trade  obligations,  its  political  relations  and  ob- 
ligations. The  constribution  of  the  United  States  to  that  world 
police — the  contribution  of  a  nation  of  one  hundred  million  people, 
of  great  wealth,  of  large  assertions — will  have  to  be  an  adequate, 
creditable,  dignified  contribution.  We  must  not  be  content  simply 
with  sending  enough  ships ;  we  shall  have  to  send  the  best  ships  there 
are,  or  as  good  as  any.  We  must  not  be  content  with  only  having  so 
many  troops  available  for  call ;  they  will  have  to  be  first-class  troops — 
as  good  as  we  boys  were  in  1865  when  we  marched  home  again. 
(Great  applause.)  We  were  pretty  good  troops  then,  though  I  do 
not  fancy  that  we  could  do  much  today. 

Our  share  is  not  a  mere  matter  of  arithmetic;  it  is  not  simply 
a  question  of  what  it  is  dignified  for  the  United  States  to  do.  This 
government  will  have  to  furnish  a  great  deal  larger  contingent  in 
ships  and  in  organized  troops — trained  troops,  skilled  troops — than 
anything  that  is  now  specified  in  measures  pending  in  Congress;  any- 
thing that  we  have  ventured  to  suggest  for  an  immediate  policy,  be- 
cause policies  have  to  work  gradually.  Your  chairman  is  perfectly 
right:  The  nation  has  got  to  have  this  condition  brought  home  to  it; 
and  through  the  work  of  voters,  or  organizations  like  this,  the  de- 
cision of  the  nation  to  do  certain  things  is  brought  home  to  Congress 
and  the  influence  comes  to  the  Executive. 

I  believe — and  I  have  known  Washington,  in  and  out,  for  more 
than  half  a  century — that  administrations  and  congressmen  are  all 
glad  to  know  what  citizens  are  thinking.  It  is  not  always  easy  to 
find  out.    The  papers  are  not  the  final  guide.    But  through  the  kind 

344 


of  correspondence  that  comes  in  to  congressmen  from  all  parts  of  the 
country,  perhaps  initiated,  perhaps  crystallized  by  an  organization 
like  this,  a  meeting  like  this  within  a  mile  of  the  capitol,  the  personal 
word  that  we  can  have  with  our  congressmen,  we  are  doing  what  it 
is  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  the  American  citizen  to  do. 
This  is  our  government.  The  Congress  and  the  President  himself, 
there  by  our  votes,  are  there  to  express  the  will  of  the  people;  and  as 
contingencies  arise,  as  fresh  issues  come  up,  we  have  the  right  and 
we  have  the  duty  to  give  to  them  our  expression  of  opinion,  for  them 
to  weigh  to  help  guide  their  decision;  and  for  my  own  part  I  am  con- 
fident that  they  are  glad  to  have  it.  We  are  bullying  nobody.  We  are 
calling  upon  our  official  servants  to  listen  to  what  we  believe  to  be  es- 
sential for  the  dignity  and  the  safety  of  the  nation.     (Applause.) 

The  peace-at-any-price  men  take  the  ground  that  if  a  nation  is 
only  righteously  inclined,  and  has  no  aggressive  purposes  of  its  own, 
it  will  be  perfectly  safe,  it  will  be  let  alone.  That  does  not  deal  with 
the  question  of  obligation,  to  which  I  have  referred.  They  have  not 
yet  told  us  whether  or  not  we  are  to  give  that  up.  But  modern  history 
shows  us,  current  history  shows  us,  that  freedom  from  desire  for 
aggression  is  not  itself  a  final  safety.  China  has  never  had  any  desire 
for  aggression,  nor  had  Belgium.  Treaties  are  not  a  final  safety. 
This  war  has  shown  treaties  torn  up,  as  "scraps  of  paper."  Distance 
does  not  protect.  China  is  a  long  way  from  the  European  powers 
that  have  nibbled  at  China.  The  ocean  now  is  a  good  deal  narrower 
than  it  was  in  Washington's  time,  when  he  told  us  to  protect  our 
coast,  or  otherwise  we  could  not  protect  our  rights.  The  ocean  is  to- 
day a  pathway,  not  a  barrier.  Specific  ways  given  in  print  by  staff 
officers  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  have  shown  plans — I  have  the 
volumes  in  my  own  office — for  getting  control  of  our  coast  cities; 
"and  when  New  York  and  Boston  and  Washington  are  taken,"  says 
one  of  these  staff  officers,  "the  republic  will  crumble."  Well,  you  and 
I  do  not  believe  that  the  republic  would  crumble.  I  wonder  what  Chi- 
cago would  say  to  that!  (Laughter.)  I  think  Chicago  is  perfectly 
able  to  get  along  without  Boston  or  New  York  or  Washington.  Why, 
even  Denver  would  have  something  to  say,  and  San  Francisco,  if  it 
came  to  that. 

But  we  do  not  intend  to  leave  our  coast  cities  open  to  any  such 
humiliation.     The  capture  of  New  York  and  the  imposition  of  an 

345 


indemnity  such  as  we  have  seen  these  staff  officers  mention  glibly, 
something  like  a  thousand  millions  of  dollars — I  do  not  want  to  pay 
anj^thing  like  my  share  of  that.  (Laughter.)  The  publishing  busi- 
ness has  been  very  bad  for  a  number  of  years.  That  alone  would 
pay  the  cost  of  preparedness,  which  is  like  the  ordinary  insurance 
that  the  merchant  pays  for  his  warehouse,  and  that  the  nation  ought 
to  pay  for  all  its  properties  and  obligations.  This  question  of  our 
coast  cities — these  great  cities,  which  form  a  temptation  to  the  aggres- 
sor— makes  one  feel  as  if  we  were  ready  to  be  parties  to  a  crime. 

Supposing  in  the  wicked  city  of  New  York — I  am  not  sure  of  what 
would  happen  in  Washington,  but  suppose  in  the  wicked  city  of  New 
York — a  citizen  should  leave  his  purse  on  the  outer  ledge  of  his 
window,  and  the  purse  should  disappear  before  morning,  and  the 
citizen  should  go  to  the  captain  of  police  and  say,  "This  is  a  bad 
district,  I  have  had  my  purse  stolen" ;  and  when  he  got  no  satisfaction 
from  him  he  said,  "I  am  going  to  complain  to  his  honor,  the  Mayor. 
I  know  what  his  honor,  my  Mayor,  would  tell  him.  He  would  tell  him 
with  a  good  deal  of  feeling  and  emphasis  (and  the  police  captain 
would  put  it  more  bluntly  than  his  honor  would),  "You  have  no  right 
to  tempt  the  milkman  and  the  errand  boy  and  my  patrolman  (laughter) 
in  that  way."  That  is  true.  He  would  be  pdrticeps  criminis.  You 
have  no  right  to  leave  New  York,  with  all  those  millions  of  dollars' 
worth  of  property,  dangling  there  as  an  opportunity  before  some  needy 
and  greedy  nation — and  there  are  needy  and  greedy  nations  on  this 
earth.  We  cannot  allow  the  bullies  among  the  nations  to  have  all  the 
organized  force.  Supposing  that  course  were  taken.  All  these  peace- 
ful states  would  be  open  and  unarmed  on  one  side  of  the  world,  and 
the  bullies,  with  the  organized  force  behind  them,  would  be  on  the 
other.  How  do  you  thing  that  world  would  adjust  itself?  If  we  have 
a  righteous  standard  to  maintain,  if  we  have  theories  of  republican 
government  to  uphold,  we  have  got  to  be  prepared  to  maintain  and  to 
uphold. 

I  remember  an  experience  in  Andersonville.  I  was  not  in  Ander- 
Bonville  myself,  because  at  the  time  I  was  a  prisoner,  I  was  an  officer 
and  I  did  not  get  into  Andersonville;  but  a  number  of  my  men  were 
in  Andersonville.  Several  of  them  got  out,  and  the  others  never  did. 
Andersonville,  a  great  stockade  in  Georgia,  had  at  one  time  from  ten 
thousand  up  to,  for  a  few  weeks,  thirty  thousand  prisoners.     The 

346 


misery  was  great;  the  suffering  was  awful.  They  were  dying  from 
starvation,  from  the  hot  sun  shining  on  their  heads,  and  from  the 
decay  of  the  ground,  which  was  all  rotten,  and  the  sadness  of  the 
dead  and  dying  men  about  them  was  enough  to  take  their  spirit  away ; 
and  in  addition  to  that,  in  that  stockade  at  the  time  my  men  told  me 
about,  there  was  anarchy;  there  was  pandemonium. 

Not  one  of  you  men  or  women  here  know  what  it  is  to  have  been 
in  pandemonium,  in  anarchy.  That  is  hell  as  nearly  as  one  can  realize 
hell.  Finally  one  or  two  of  the  sergeants  got  together  and  they  made 
up  a  vigilance  committee,  and  they  went  out  and  saw  Captain  Wirtz. 
Wirtz  was  the  only  one  that  we  hanged  after  the  war.  We  picked 
up  a  good  many,  two  or  three,  and  we  theatened  to  hang  two  or 
three  and  we  meant  to  hang  them — but  Wirtz  was  the  only  one  we 
hanged.  They  said  to  him:  "Captain,  we  want  to  do  a  little  hanging 
in  the  prison;  will  you  lend  us  some  rope?"  I  don't  care,"  said  Wirtz. 
"1  have  no  objection  to  a  few  more  Yankees  being  hanged,  and  I  will 
give  you  the  rope."  They  got  the  rope  and  they  went  back  and  had  a 
court-martial,  and  so  many  men  were  condemned  to  die,  and  they 
hanged  two  or  three  and  they  put  the  others  under  sentence  of  death — 
some  fifteen  or  twenty — and  suspended  sentence.  What  happened? 
There  was  peace  and  there  was  justice  in  the  stockade. 

You  cannot  have  peace  and  justice  unless  you  have  force  behind 
the  right.  Any  peace  that  is  not  peace  with  justice  is  a  rotten  peace 
that  no  American  ought  to  be  satisfied  with,  that  no  right-minded 
American  will  be  satisfied  with. 

I  have  been  in  the  big  public  schools  in  England — I  know  them 
a  little  better  there,  I  had  more  leisure — and  I  know  the  difference 
between  a  well-ordered  school  and  a  badly  ordered  school,  order  being 
that  part  of  the  discipline  which  is  taken  care  of  by  the  boys  them- 
selves. The  big  fellows,  the  upper  classmen,  are  responsible  for  keep- 
ing order  and  doing  justice,  seeing  that  the  little  boys  are  not  trampled 
upon  and  that  their  lives  are  not  made  a  burden  to  them.  If  any  one 
bullies  a  little  boy,  two  or  three  of  the  big  boys  get  them  and  knock 
their  heads  together,  and  that  ends  it.  You  do  not  know  that  there 
is  any  head-knocking,  but  that  is  what  happens.  That  ends  it.  That 
does  not  need  to  be  done  very  often.    The  boys  do  not  allow  bullying. 

You  go  into  a  badly  disciplined  school,  where  the  captain  turns 
aside  when  he  sees  a  row  going  on,  a  big  boy  pounding  a  little  one, 

347 


and  says,  ''No,  I  will  not  interfere;  I  am  too  proud  to  fight  you  know. 
(.Laughter.)  It  is  all  right.  I  will  use  my  moral  influence,  but  I  will 
not  interfere."  And  while  he  is  using  this  moral  influence  the  little 
boy  does  not  get  much  relief  or  comfort,  and  that  condition  prevails 
until  somebody  gets  that  bully  and  knocks  his  head  for  him,  and  then 
it  is  all  right  again.  That  is  the  discipline  as  it  is  in  the  schools 
among  boys;  as  it  was  in  Andersonville  prison,  and  it  always  will  be 
under  such  conditions  which  make  the  old-time  devil  that  is  in  all 
men  come  to  the  top,  as  it  will  with  all,  except  a  very  small  percentage 
of  men,  under  great  pressure. 

We  have  got  something  to  say — this  great  nation,  the  leader 
among  neutral  nations  today,  the  leader  among  nations  having  re- 
publican principles  to  enforce,  standing  as  we  have  always  stood  for 
the  rights  of  people,  for  the  highest  ideals  of  representative  govern- 
ment— we  have  got  something  to  say  and  something  to  do  in  this 
world  of  ours,  as  well  as  merely  maintaining  our  own  conditions  at 
home,  and  our  own  theories  of  action  here.  And  we  do  not  own  this 
republic.  My  pacifist  friends  say,  "Oh,  we  will  take  the  chance  of 
war;  it  is  not  likely  to  come."  I  say,  it  is  not  your  chance  to  take. 
Your  generation  does  not  own  this  republic.  It  is  a  sacred  trust, 
handed  down  for  us  to  maintain  without  indignity,  without  dishonor, 
with  its  obligations  fulfilled,  with  its  influence  assured,  wanting  noth- 
ing in  the  way  of  aggression,  wanting  a.  great  deal  in  the  way  of 
proper,  righteous  influence  and  service  for  the  American  ideal;  and 
we  have  got  to  hand  down  to  those  who  come  after  us  that  trust, 
strengthened  and  extended;  and  with  proper  measures — dignified, 
orderly,  common-sense  measures — for  organizing  our  resources — the 
great  resources  of  men  and  material  in  this  country — for  maintaining 
our  ideals,  for  holding  to  the  theory  that  we  have  no  desire  for  ag- 
gression, that  we  are  here  for  defense  and  for  righteousness,  m  that 
way  will  the  ideals  of  the  republic  be  maintained  and  handed  down 
as  an  influence  for  the  better  through  generations  to  come.  (Great 
applause.) 

The  Chairman — Mr.  Putnam  has  said,  or  attempted  to  say, 
what  the  Mayor  of  New  York  would  reply  under  certain  conditions, 
I  propose  that  the  Mayor  of  New  York  shall  speak  for  himself,  and 
I  want  to  introduce  to  you  the  first  citizen  of  our  metropolis,  the 
Honorable  John  Purroy  Mitchel.     (Applause.) 

348 


ADDRESS  OF  HON.  JOHN  PURROY  MITCHEL, 
Mayor  of  the  City  of  New  York. 

Mayor  Mitchel — Mr.  Toastmaster  and  ladies  and  gentlemen: 
The  Congress  of  the  National  Security  League  is  drawing  to  a  close. 
This  will  be  its  last  session,  as  I  understand.  There  has  been  dis- 
played in  these  meetings  a  very  fine  spirit.  The  plans  for  defense 
have  been  discussed  and  views  have  been  exchanged.  As  the  Toast- 
master  says,  we  hope  that  there  will  be  some  concrete  results  of  this 
Congress.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  things  that  we  can  hope  for. 
One  is  that  these  meetings  will  make  more  articulate  to  the  people 
of  the  country  themselves  their  own  views  and  their  own  demands 
in  this  matter.  The  second  is  that  those  views,  in  the  spoken  word 
of  this  conference,  will  impress  themselves  upon  our  representatives 
in  Congress. 

I  believe  that  no  one  who  reads  the  press  of  the  country  today, 
or  who  has  met  people  from  the  various  parts  of  our  country,  could  fail 
to  understand  that  the  American  people  are  in  earnest  in  this  matter. 
They  are  in  earnest,  but  as  yet  they  are  not  fully  aroused,  nor  are 
they  quite  articulate  in  their  demands.  This  Congress,  these  con- 
ferences, the  meetings  which  are  taking  place  and  which  are  planned 
throughout  the  country,  are  not  so  much  to  create  opinion  as  to 
express  opinion,  and  to  make  apparent  to  everyone,  to  the  government 
and  the  Congress,  the  real  feelings  of  the  people  in  this  question. 

It  is  a  tremendous  responsibility  that  rests  upon  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  today — a  responsibility  which  it  seems  to  me  is 
not  quite  fully  realized  by  some  of  our  representatives  at  the  present 
time.  It  is  a  solemn  thought,  is  it  not,  that  perhaps  the  destinies  of 
this  nation,  as  well  as  the  whole  future  of  democratic  government,  are 
being  determined  in  the  session  of  Congress  now  being  held  in  the 
national  capitol;  because  it  may  be  that  in  accordance  with  the  de- 
cisions reached  this  year;  it  may  be  that,  dependent  upon  the  adoption 
of  adequate  measures  this  year  or  upon  the  rejection  of  those  meas- 
ures, will  depend  the  future  of  this  country.  And  on  the  future  of 
this  country  and  of  the  other  twenty  republics  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere depends  the  whole  future  of  democratic  government  through- 
out the  world.     (Applause.) 

The  issue   is   vital,   the   responsibility    is   tremendous,    and   the 

349 


American  people  will  never  forgive  the  men  who  may  be  responsible 
for  national  disaster.     (Applause.) 

The  people  have  naturally  been  slow  to  realize  completely  either 
what  our  present  defenseless  condition  really  is  or  the  full  significance 
of  it;  naturally,  because  of  the  inaccurate  teaching  of  the  military 
history  of  the  United  States.  (Applause.)  I  believe  that  constitutes 
one  of  the  greatest  defects  in  our  system  of  public  education.  The 
children  have  been  taught  to  believe  that  this  is  a  great  fighting 
nation  that  has  never  been  conquered;  that  it  has  met  every  ad- 
versary with  success;  that  the  men  all  know  how  to  fight,  and  on  a 
moment's  notice  would  be  ready  to  fight,  and  could  meet  the  attack 
of  any  nation  with  complete  success.  We  know  that  quite  the  con- 
trary is  the  fact;  that  the  people  of  this  country  have  never  been 
really  prepared  to  fight;  that  they  have  never  had  to  meet  the  attack 
of  any  prepared  first-class  power  that  was  not  already  sufficiently 
engaged  elsewhere;  that  the  volunteer  system  has  failed  wherever  it 
was  called  into  use,  and  that  it  has  had  to  be  called  into  use,  of  cour.se, 
in  every  war  in  which  this  country  has  been  plunged.  That  is,  it  has 
failed  as  a  system.  The  nation,  of  course,  has  been  successful;  but  it 
has  been  successful  despite  that  system,  and  not  because  of  it. 
(Applause.) 

It  required  the  experience  of  Europe  during  the  past  year  and  a 
half  to  rouse  the  people  of  our  country  to  even  a  partial  realization  of 
what  our  present  condition  is  and  what  it  means.  Slowly  they  have  been 
coming  to  understand  that  what  they  took  for  sufficient  preparation 
has  been  really  complete  defenselessness.  During  the  last  year  and  a 
half  a  great  many  plans  have  been  discussed  and  suggested  for  prepa- 
ration. Now  we  have  several  before  the  Congress.  Every  one  of 
*us  hope  and  trust  that  one  of  those  plans  will  be  adopted  and  put  into 
effect.  But  I  have  been  asked  to  refer  briefly  this  evening  to  the  only 
concrete  experiment — I  can  hardly  call  it  a  plan — that  has  been  put 
into  effect  since  the  opening  of  the  discussion  of  this  matter. 

Last  year,  through  the  initiative  and  the  genius  of  one  of  our 
greatest  army  officers,  General  Leonard  Wood  (applause),  the  Platts- 
burg  experiment  was  initiated.  It  was  an  experiment.  When  it  was 
suggested  and  planned,  nobody  knew  how  many  men  could  be  induced 
to  go  there;  I  think  one  hundred  or  so  were  expected.  If  the  thing 
had  been  suggested  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  struggle  in  Europe, 

350 


that  expectation  would  have  been  extreme,  because  people  were  not 
thinking  in  those  terms.  But  when  the  camp  was  organized,  on  the 
first  morning  there  were  assembled  upward  of  1,200  men,  as  enthus- 
iastic, as  sincere,  as  earnest  and  as  representative  a  body  as  has  ever 
been  gathered  together  in  the  United  States.  A  great  many  people 
have  thought  that  the  Plattsburg  experiment  was  undertaken  by  some 
of  the  men  who  went  there  as  a  sort  of  grandstand  play,  for  self- 
advertisement,  if  you  will.  But  I  want  to  say  to  you  that  I  have  never 
seen  a  group  of  men  go  about  daily  work  with  so  little  ostentation,  with 
such  a  serious  purpose,  with  such  an  manifest  intention  to  make  good 
if  they  could,  and  to  demonstrate  the  possibilities  of  an  experiment,  as 
those  men  who  went  to  work  at  Plattsburg.  (Applause.)  It  was  a 
remarkable  spirit.    It  was  the  spirit  of  genuine  Americanism  at  work. 

Some  people  had  the  impression  that  it  was  a  good  deal  of  a  sum- 
mer vacation.  Nobody  who  attended  the  camp  went  away  with  that 
idea.  It  was  interesting  enough,  it  was  pleasant  enough,  and  it  was 
healthful  enough,  but  it  was  not  a  vacation.  The  work  began,  as  it 
does  with  regular  troops  in  camp,  a  little  after  five  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  It  went  on  through  one  continuous  succession  of  calisthenic 
exercises,  drill,  afternoon  work  that  was  optional — either  cavalry, 
artillery  or  engineering — and  continued  into  the  evening  with  lectures 
which  lasted  often  until  9  o'clock.  And  some  of  those  men  were  so 
earnest  in  their  desire  to  really  learn,  to  take  away  from  the  encamp- 
ment something  that  might  be  valuable  to  them  and  to  their  country 
in  the  future,  that  I  saw  company  after  company,  at  the  request  of 
the  men,  drilling  under  their  respective  captains  after  dark,  out  in 
the  roadway,  in  order  to  perfect  the  men  who  were  not  quite  up  to 
the  standard.     (Applause.). 

It  is  difficult  to  appraise  accurately  the  value  of  that  experiment. 
It  is  difficult  to  interpret  it  in  concrete  results.  Nobody  is  so  foolish 
as  to  believe  that  the  men  who  took  that  month  of  training  at  Platts- 
burg are  qualified  to  lead  troops  in  the  field  because  of  that  training. 
Some  of  them  were  qualified  by  experience  and  training  before  they 
went  there,  but  nobody  believes  that  those  four  weeks  made  efficient 
officers  out  of  raw  recruits.  But  we  do  know  that  those  men  have 
been  put  upon  the  road  to  become  efficient  officers  if  they  continue 
their  training.  We  do  know  that  a  demonstration  has  been  made  to 
the  American  people  of  what  can  be  done  by  intensive  military  train- 

351 


ing  of  citizens,  and  we  do  know  that  there  has  been  a  demonstration 
of  genuine  American  spirit  that  seems  to  have  extended  itself  to 
some  degree  over  the  whole  country.  (Applause.)  While  we  are 
waiting  for  more  complete  and  comprehensive  plans,  which  must 
come,  it  is  the  intention  to  continue  the  Plattsburg  experiment  on  a 
broader  scale,  and  the  provisional  regiment  has  organized  itself  to 
continue  this  work  into  the  future  years.  (Applause.)  Next  year 
we  plan  to  put  into  the  encampment  at  Plattsburg,  and  other  en- 
campments in  the  East,  not  less  than  15,000  men.  (Applause.)  I 
have  not  a  doubt  that  at  least  90  per  cent  of  the  men  who  served  last 
summer  will  go  back  to  Plattsburg  and  continue  this  course  of  train- 
ing there  another  season,  and  I  heard  only  the  other  day  that  more 
than  a  hundred  of  those  who  went  to  Plattsburg  from  New  York 
have,  at  their  own  election,  organized  drills  in  the  armories  during  the 
winter  and  are  trying  to  carry  forward  in  that  way  the  training 
they  got  at  Plattsburg. 

And  then,  too,  one  of  the  results  of  that  work  has  been  to  recruit 
the  ranks  of  the  National  Guard.  (Applause.)  Now,  some  people  were 
of  the  opinion  that  in  the  Plattsburg  experiment  there  was  something 
antagonistic  to  the  National  Guard.  Nothing  could  be  further  from 
the  truth.  The  one  is  complementary  to  the  other.  Encampments 
such  as  Plattsburg  can  be  made  to  recruit  the  National  Guard,  and 
can  work  side  by  side  with  them.  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  some  forty 
men  have  joined  the  Seventh  Regiment  out  of  the  Plattsburg  encamp- 
ment, and  quite  a  considerable  number  have  joined  others  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  organizations  of  the  state.  And  may  I  say  to  you  that 
while,  with  all  others  who  have  thought  carefully  upon  this  ques- 
tion— National  Guard  officers  as  well  as  those  of  the  Regular  Army — 
I  am  strongly  in  favor  of  the  federalization  of  the  National  Guard  upon 
a  basis  fair  to  it,  we  should  not  in  all  this  discussion  lose  sight  of 
the  admirable  work  that  has  been  done  and  is  being  done  by  the 
efficient  organizations  in  the  National  Guard. 

I  believe  that  this  Congress  has  already  expressed  itself  in  favor 
of  universal  male  military  training.  It  always  has  seemed  to  me  that 
the  only  real  solution  of  our  problem  lies  in  that  course — in  asking 
every  citizen,  as  a  part  of  his  obligation  of  citizenship,  to  give  enough 
of  his  time  and  effort  as  a  physical  tax  to  preparing  himself  to  take 
part  in  the  defense  of  his  country  if  need  be. 

852 


We  have  in  this  country — more  acutely,  perhaps,  in  New 
York — what  we  sometimes  call  the  problem  of  immigration.  What 
we  mean  is  the  problem  of  Americanizing  the  people  who  come  to  our 
shores.  They  come  either  to  escape  from  something  at  home  or  to  seek 
an  opportunity  here.  When  they  come  to  America  they  find  that 
America  is  not  merely  an  opportunity,  that  it  also  is  an  obligation; 
and  they  have  learned  to  respond  to  the  civic  obligation  of  citizenship. 

I  believe  that  in  this  process  of  Americanizing  the  people  who 
come  to  us  from  other  countries  the  obligation  of  brief  citizen  service 
would  play  a  great  and  a  valuable  part,  and  when  we  are  discussing  the 
whole  problem,  let  us  think  of  that  element  and  that  value  of  citizen 
training,  together  with  its  value  as  a  means  of  defense. 

I  have  even  heard  people  suggest  the  question,  "Are  we  really  a 
patriotic  people  today?"  I  suppose  the  question  is  suggested  because 
we  hear  so  much  of  the  hyphen,  so  much  question  as  to  whether  it 
is  worth  while  for  the  American  people  to  make  themselves  capable 
of  resisting  attack.  Personally,  I  have  no  misgiving  upon  that  score. 
I  believe  that,  with  a  very  exceptions,  we  can  rely  upon  the  mass 
of  our  foreign-born  population  as  true  and  loyal  American  citizens. 
(Applause.)  I  do  feel,  however,  that  the  obligation  of  that  brief 
service  of  training  would  go  a  long  way  toward  inspiring  all  our 
citizens,  native-born  as  well  as  foreign-born,  with  the  real  enthusiasm 
for  country  and  love  of  country  that  we  call  patriotism.     (Applause.) 

It  is  in  that  relation  that  I  said  last  night  that  is  seems  to  me 
that  the  efficiency  of  democracy  itself  is  on  trial  in  this  country  today. 
We  have  demonstrated  our  capacity  for  self-government.  We  have 
developed  efficient  institutions  in  nation,  in  state  and  in  city;  but  we 
have  not  yet  demonstrated  here  the  fact  that  democracy  is  capable 
of  self-preservation.  It  will  avail  us  nothing,  it  will  avail  posterity 
nothing,  that  we  have  built  up  democracy  here  to  the  greatest,  the 
highest  state  of  serviceability  known  anywhere,  if  at  the  same  time 
the  democracy  that  we  have  constructed  shall  fail  in  a  crucial  test 
for  self-preseration.     (Applause.) 

And  so,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  people  of  this  country,  and  par- 
ticularly their  Congress  today,  must  meet  that  issue,  must  answer 
that  question,  must  determine  whether  a  democracy  can  be  made 
efficient  for  self-defense  and  for  self-preservation.     (Great  applause.) 

At  this  point  the  lights  were  extinguished  and  pictures  of  George 

353 


Washington  and  Woodrow  Wilson  were  projected  on  the  screen,  to- 
gether with  quotations  from  Washington's  writings  and  the  Ameri- 
can flag. 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  records  of  this  Con- 
gress would  be  absolutely  incomplete  if  we  did  not  in  public  pay 
tribute  to  one  who  is  primarily  responsible  for  the  existence  of  the 
Security  League,  and  who  has  done  more  than  anyone  else  to  forward 
the  movement  for  preparedness.  It  was  the  startling  statements  and 
eloquence  in  debate  of  the  Honorable  Augustus  P.  Gardner  (great 
applause)  that  led  to  the  organization  of  the  League.  Mr.  Gardner, 
I  think  you  ought  to  step  to  the  platform.     (Great  applause.) 

I  want  to  say  that  Mr.  Gardner  not  only  started  the  preparedness 
movement,  but  he  gave  a  keynote  to  it.  He  said  repeatedly:  "We 
should  bear  in  mind  that  our  present  condition  is  not  attributable  to 
one  party,  but  to  each  successive  administration  in  turn,"  and  that 
the  issue  of  preparedness  was  absolutely,  a  fundamental  one,  that 
should  be  kept  at  all  times  non-partisan.     (Applause.) 

Today  we  recognize  the  service  that  Mr.  Gardner  has  rendered 
the  American  people.  There  was,  however,  a  certain  period  when 
there  was  a. question  as  to  whether  or  not  he  was  correct.  In  those 
days  many  of  the  more  conservative  of  our  people  turned  to  an  ex- 
Cabinet  officer  of  recognized  position  and  queried  him  as  to  his  views 
as  to  the  need  of  preparedness.  The  movement  for  security  took  a 
distinct  leap  forward  when  Mr.  Wickersham  assumed  the  role  of 
adviser,  and  I  want  you  to  hear  from  him,  as  others  have  heard  in 
different  parts  of  the  country,  his  view  of  our  present  situation.  I 
take  pleasure  in  introducing  to  your  ex-Attorney-General  Wicker- 
sham.    (Applause.) 

Address  of  Hon.  George  W.  Wickersham, 

Former  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Wickersham — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  A  mo- 
ment or  two  ago,  as  the  light  faded  away  and  there  appeared  on  that 
screen  the  emblem  of  our  country,  and  we  rose  to  the  strains  of  that 
magnificent  hymn  that  no  American  can  hear  without  a  quickening  of 
his  pulse,  I  could  but  reflect  that  perhaps — oh,  perhaps! — the  merely 
dramatic  side  of  that  invocation  appealed  to  us  more  than  the  true, 

354 


inherent,  underlying  duty  that  it  symbolizes.  All  over  this  land,  in 
every  little  school  house,  in  every  public  building,  almost  every  day 
those  splendid  strains  arise  into  the  air,  and  children  and  adults 
alike  pay  their  lip-service  to  that  symbol  of  our  common  country.  But 
does  it  mean  anything  more  than  lip-service?  Has  it  yet  aroused  in  the 
breasts  of  the  American  people  a  sense  of  the  duty  which  is  ever 
inseparable  from  and  incident  to  all  privilege,  and  that  makes  that 
flag  as  it  floats  over  this  land,  striped  with  crimson  and  white,  the 
emblem  of  the  blood  of  martyrs  as  well  as  the  hope  of  immortality? 

I  had  come  here  tonight  with  a  prepared  essay  on  the  subject  of 
"The  Duty  of  Citizenship."  I  lay  down  my  manuscript.  It  seems  to 
me  that  stereotyped  words  and  prepared  phrases  ill  befit  the  closing 
hours  of  this  gathering,  which  has  met  here  to  quicken  the  impulse 
of  true  patriotic  devotion  to  the  duties  of  citizenship  throughout  this 
land.     (Applause.) 

From  the  foundation  of  this  government  we  have  heard  much  of 
the  rights  of  American  citizens.  Our  ancestors  were  so  anxious,  in 
their  struggle  with  monarchical  institutions,  to  secure  to  posterity  the 
right  to  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  that  they  assumed 
that  the  citizens  of  this  land  would  perform  their  duties  without  any 
coercion  and  without  any  especial  invocation.  And  so  the  constructive 
thought  of  the  great  men  who  founded  this  government  was  largely 
devoted  to  the  establishment  of  institutions  which  should  preserve  the 
rights,  the  privileges,  and  the  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  several 
states  and  of  the  United  States.  And  yet,  before  the  framing  of  this 
great  instrument  under  which  we  have  lived,  and  which  has  been  the 
ark  of  the  covenant  to  the  American  people  for  a  century  or  more, 
General  Washington  himself,  in  agony  and  bloody  sweat,  was  strug- 
gling with  the  same  sources  of  weakness  that  in  every  struggle  in  our 
history  have  arisen  to  claim  the  sacrifice — the  useless,  the  needless, 
the  wicked  sacrifice — of  the  best  blood  of  the  best  men,  of  the  most 
self-sacrificing  young  men  of  our  nation,  to  the  crass,  blind,  selfish 
unwillingness  of  our  people  to  prepare  themselves  for  the  ordinary 
emergencies  of  national  life.  (Great  applause.)  The  question  now  is 
whether  we  are  so  blind  as  a  people  that  we  cannot  read  the  message 
which  is  being  shot  across  the  continent  of  Europe,  shot  half  way 
around  the  world,  from  the  mouths  of  cannon,  from  the  overhead 
bombs   dropped  by   aeroplanes   and   Zeppelins,   from  the  murderous 

355 


assaults  of  under-seas — that  we  cannot  read  that  lesson,  and  that  we 
are  still  prepared  to  send  our  sons  forth,  another  useless  sacrifice  to 
this  same  deliberate  blindness  and  unwillingness  to  face  our  respon* 
sibilities.    (Applause.) 

Is  it  possible,  is  it  possible  that  any  American  today  is  so  blind, 
so  dull  and  so  ignorant  that  he  can  think,  still  less  say,  that  there  is 
no  danger  that  we  will  ever  be  brought  into  conflict  with  a  foreign 
nation?  Are  we  so  lost  to  all  sense  of  anything  but  gain  that  we 
cannot  see  that  when  this  awful  conflict  in  Europe  is  over  there  will 
ensue  the  greatest  struggle  for  commercial  supremacy  through  the 
world  that  has  ever  been  known  in  the  history  of  nations?  What  are 
our  interests?  We  hold  two  of  the  greatest  strategical  points  in  the 
trade  routes  of  the  world — Panama  and  Hawaii.  Eighteen  years  ago 
we  assumed  in  the  Philippine  Islands  an  obligation  that  we  dare  not 
escape  from,  though  we  would.    (Applause.) 

We  have  at  our  doors,  in  Mexico,  a  problem  the  awful  character 
of  which  we  dare  scarcely  acknowledge  to  ourselves.  Who  can  say 
the  time  may  not  be  at  hand  when,  in  the  interests  of  humanity,  we 
shall  be  required  to  intervene  with  force  of  arms  in  that  distracted 
country. 

At  least  a  half  dozen  times  in  the  last  two  years  events  have  oc- 
curred that  might  well  have  precipitated  a  war  between  us  and  one 
one  of  the  warring  nations  of  Europe;  and  yet  here  we  are,  no  better 
prepared  than  we  were  on  the  1st  day  of  August,  1914,  and,  with  the 
exception  of  the  few  splendid  youths  who  have  trained  in  camps  at 
Plattsburg  and  elsewhere,  typified  by  the  gallant  young  Mayor  of  New 
York  here  (applause),  we  are  still — our  people  are  still,  apparently — 
as  far  from  a  recognition  of  the  duty  of  citizenship  as  we  were  then. 
We  have  been  proud  of  our  democracy.  We  have  fondly  thought  that 
we  had  solved  the  problem  of  self-government. 

Back  in  1792  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  with  imperfect 
conception,  but  with  a  recognition  of  the  duty  of  democracy,  passed  the 
general  militia  law,  providing  that  every  able-bodied  citizen  between 
the  ages  of  18  and  40  should  be  enrolled  in  the  militia;  should  provide 
himself  with  equipment;  should  furnish  his  name  to  the  captain  of 
his  district,  and  should  attend  the  annual  muster.  And  then  we 
straightway  abandoned  that  principle,  and  with  each  successive  war, 
instead  of  following  the  democratic  recognition  of  the  duties  of  citi- 

356 


zenship,  we  have  bribed  our  citizens  to  fight  our  battles  by  bounties 
of  money  and  land;  and  here,  fifty  years  after  the  last  important 
struggle  in  which  this  nation  has  been  engaged,  we  are  paying  $160,- 
000,000  a  year  as  pensions,  on  the  theory  that  it  is  not  a  duty  which 
the  republic  can  demand,  not  an  obligation  which  the  citizens  must 
pay,  but  that  it  is  something  which  we  must  buy  with  gold. 

And  so,  my  friends,  it  seems  to  me  that  this  is  a  time  for  a 
searching  of  hearts,  and  I  welcome  this  gathering  here  today,  because 
out  of  these  great  enthusiasms  come  the  great  national  searchings  of 
hearts  that  may  set  this  nation  once  more  upon  the  pathway  that  it 
should  have  trodden  a  century  ago.  (Applause.)  We  know  what  the 
condition  of  our  country  is  today.  We  have  it  in  official  reports.  It 
has  passed  the  realm  of  debate.  You  may  dispute  over  what  will  be 
or  what  should  be,  but  we  know  now  what  it  is ;  we  know  what  a  piti- 
ful, insufficient  army  and  navy  we  now  have.  Shall  we  not  here,  as  the 
result  of  this  Congress,  go  forth  throughout  this  land  with  an  en- 
thusiasm which  will  communicate  itself  to  others,  and  which  will  send 
to  those  gentlemen  sitting  on  the  hill,  under  the  dome  of  the  capitol,  a 
new  message  of  the  duty  of  American  life  and  a  new  conception  of 
the  obligations  of  democracy?    (Applause.) 

The  Chairman — Ladies  and  gentlemen,  we  have  heard  many 
distinguished  speakers  during  the  course  of  our  Congress.  We  ap- 
preciate them  all.  It  is  a  matter  of  congratulation  to  you  that  I  am  able 
with  a  feehng  of  keen — in  fact,  of  deep  reverence,  to  present  to  you 
the  next  speaker,  that  great  citizen  and  that  very  distinguished  states- 
man, the  Honorable  Henry  Cabot  Lodge.  (Great  applause,  the  audi- 
ence rising.) 

ADDRESS  OF  HON.  HENRY  CABOT  LODGE, 

United  States  Senator  from  Massachusetts 

Senator  Lodge — Mr.  Chairman,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  am  deeply 
interested  in  the  purpose  for  which  this  National  Security  League  has 
been  formed.  I  believe  your  meeting  here  can  not  fail  to  do  good  in 
molding  and  making  public  opinion.  But  I  think  you  will  agree  with 
me  that  the  most  important  thing  is  that  this  league  should  so  work 
and  should  use  its  power  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  practical  results  in 
the  shape  of  legislation  for  national  defense.  (Applause.)  Even  were 
I  master  of  eloquence,  I  should  not  attempt  it  tonight.    I  merely  wish 

357 


to  offer  to  you  a  few  practical  suggestions  drawn  from  some  years  of 
observation  in  Washington. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  questions  which  it  is  extremely  difficult  to 
argue.  One  is  where  the  question  is  new,  doubtful,  intricate,  and  com- 
plicated. The  other  is  when  a  question  is  so  simple  that  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  how  there  can  be  any  difference  of  opinion  in  regard  to 
it.  (Laughter.)  The  subject  of  national  defense  belongs,  to  my  mind, 
in  the  latter  class.  (Applause.)  The  proposition,  as  I  should  put  it, 
is  something  like  this :  Every  nation  should  have  sufficient  military  and 
naval  defense  to  maintain  its  own  peace  and  security.  This  Nation 
has  not  such  defense.  Therefore  it  is  the  duty  of  this  Nation  to  look 
to  it  that  such  provision  is  made.  It  appears  to  me  that  this  little 
syllogism  is  so  simple  and  so  obvious  that  almost  anyone  with  the  sight 
of  an  average  mole  could  see  it.  And  yet  I  know  there  is  a  great  deal 
of  opposition,  in  a  certain  way,  to  the  proposition. 

I  quite  agree  that  it  is  not  a  party  question.  I  should  be  sorry 
to  think  that  national  defense  could  be  a  party  question.  But  I  will 
say  this  that  if  those  gentlemen,  of  either  party  or  of  both  parties, 
who  are  now  standing  in  the  way  of  national  defense  do  not  look  to 
themselves  a  party  will  arise  somewhere  which  will  carry  national 
defense  to  completion.  (Applause  and  cheers.)  I  am  not  going  to 
enter  into  details.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  argue  that  little  syllogism 
which  I  just  ventured  on  as  it  might  be  argued.  I  could  easily  keep 
you  here  well  over  Sunday  if  I  should  enter  upon  details  relating  to 
either  branch  of  the  service.  All  I  desire  now  is  to  call  your  attention 
to  certain  facts  vividly  illustrating  what  the  present  condition  is  and 
just  where  you  want  to  go  to  work.  The  first  thing  is  to  know  the 
facts.  There  is,  fortunately,  no  difficulty  in  knowing  the  facts  about 
the  Army.  We  have  a  Secretary  of  War  to  whom  as  an  American  1 
feel  under  great  obligations,  because  he  has  told  us  the  facts.  (Ap- 
plause.) He  has  laid  his  cards  on  the  table.  I  do  not  know  whether 
the  scheme  that  he  proposes,  and  which  is  known  as  his  plan,  is  the 
ideally  perfect  plan  to  his  mind — I  very  much  doubt  it — or  whether, 
like  other  men  charged  with  great  responsibility,  he  is  laboring  for 
the  best  that  he  can  hope  to  get.  (Applause.)  But,  above  all  things, 
he  is  telling  us  all  about  the  War  Department.  And  what  is  it  that 
we  know,  when  all  is  told?  That  we  have  no  Army  sufficient  to  de- 
fend the  United  States.    We  can  not  build  coast  defenses  to  protect 

858 


10,000  ot  12,000  miles  of  coast;  that  is  an  absurdity.  We  can  protect, 
we  have  partially  protected,  perhaps,  some  few  great  ports.  But 
the  defense  of  the  United  States  by  land  must  lie  in  a  large  mobile 
force.  We  have  no  such  force.  I  for  one  believe  that  the  recommenda- 
tion of  Gen.  Leonard  Wood  and  of  the  War  College  experts,  that  we 
should  have  a  Regular  Army  to  start  with  of  210,000  men,  is  right; 
that  that  is  the  least  number.     (Applause.) 

I  believe  that  behind  that  Regular  Army  there  should  be  a  large 
reserve  mobile  force.  Mr.  Putnam  has  told  you,  what  we  all  know, 
I  think,  that  in  one  foreign  country,  at  least,  plans  have  been  made 
with  a  view  to  landing  in  this  country,  and  that  in  40  days  they  could 
land  an  army  of  360,000  men,  thoroughly  equipped.  Now,  the  only 
way  to  meet  such  a  force  is  to  have  a  mobile  army  to  meet  them 
wherever  they  land.  You  can  not,  I  repeat,  have  fortifications  every- 
where. You  must  have  your  mobile  force.  Last  year  our  mobile 
force,  all  Regulars,  was  24,000  men.  You  ought  to  have  an  army  out- 
numbering by  at  least  two  to  one  any  hostile  force  that  can  be  landed. 
How,  as  a  preliminary,  are  you  going  to  find  out  where  the  enemy 
is,  and  where  they  are  going  to  land?  We  have  no  aeroplanes.  How 
are  you  going  to  m.ove  your  men  and  supplies,  once  you  leave  the  rail- 
roads? We  are  deficient  in  field  artillery.  We  have  no  large  reserves 
of  ammunition,  upon  which  success  in  war  now  depends.  You  have 
not  even  got  motor  trucks  in  your  Army.  Above  all,  I  repeat,  you  have 
not  got  the  men.  You  ought  to  have  at  least  a  million  men  who  can  at 
any  moment  be  called  to  the  colors  as  a  reserve.  (Applause.)  Whether 
it  can  best  be  done  by  the  federalization  of  the  militia — a  matter  of 
some  constitutional  difficulty — or  whether,  as  I  believe  it  must  be  event- 
ually done,  by  a  national  force,  it  ought  to  be  done.  Every  citizen  in  a 
democracy  ought  to  have  the  same  rights  and  the  same  duties.  (Ap- 
plause.) We  all  ought  to  bear  the  burdens  equally,  the  burdens  of 
taxation  and  of  military  service. 

The  universal  liability  to  military  service  does  not,  however,  nec- 
essarily mean  that  we  must  carry  out  the  Swiss  system  to  the  fullest 
extent,  and  have  an  army  of  twelve  or  fifteen  millions,  but  with  that 
universal  liability  we  must  have  and  we  can  get  the  million  men  we 
want. 

We  have  not  got  them  now.  We  have  practically  no  military  de- 
fense on  land.    It  is  an  ugly  thing  to  say,  but  we  could  be  conquered 

359 


tomorrow  by  any  nation  able  to  land  on  our  coast  300,000  to  400,000 
men  thoroughly  equipped  in  the  best  modern  way.  We  are  as  brave 
a  people  as  live,  as  the  mayor  of  New  York  so  justly  said,  but  bravery 
unarmed  means  useless  sacrifice  of  the  best  men.  We  are  ready  to 
fight,  but  an  unarmed  people  can  not  fight  a  fully  armed  and  equipped 
body  of  400,000  men.  And  how  are  the  bravest  people  in  the  world 
to  spring  to  arms  when  they  have  no  arms  to  spring  to?  (Applause 
and  laughter.)  That  is  why  I  say  that  we  are  defenseless  by  land, 
and  defense  we  must  have,  and  we  must  have  it  at  once. 

I  now  come  to  the  Navy.  Let  me  repeat  that  I  speak  in  no  party 
sense,  and  that  I  do  not  regard  this  as  a  party  question;  but  I  have 
been  in  Congress  more  years  than  I  am  eager  to  confess,  and  I  think 
that  I  know  Congress  fairly  well,  and  where  the  blame  rests  for  our 
not  being  defended  as  we  ought  to  be  at  this  moment.  Administrations 
come  and  go.  With  scarcely  an  exception  let  me  say  that  every  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  every  Secretary  of  the  Navy  whom  I  have  known  have 
tried — some  more  vigorously,  some  more  successfully,  than  others,  of 
course,  but  they  have  all  tried — to  build  up  the  forces  intrusted  to 
their  charge.  The  responsibility  for  not  being  defended  today  as  we 
ought  to  be  lies  at  the  door  of  Congress.  (Applause.)  I  am  ready  to 
take  my  blame  with  the  rest,  but  I  know  where  the  blame  lies.  It  is 
no  new  thing.  When  Washington  was  on  the  eve  of  final  victory,  just 
before  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  perhaps  you  do  not  recall  what  Congress 
were  proposing  to  do?  They  were  proposing  at  that  moment  to  reduce 
the  Army.  Some  things  change  and  others  do  not.  (Laughter  and 
applause.) 

I  served  some  years  ago  on  the  Naval  Committee  of  the  House  of 
Representatives.  I  am  at  this  moment  a  member  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Naval  Affairs,  and  ever  since  I  have  been  in  Washington 
I  have  tried  to  inform  myself  in  regard  to  the  Navy.  I  do  not  know 
as  much  about  it  as  my  friend,  Mr.  Padgett,  chairman  of  the  House 
Naval  Committee,  who,  I  think,  has  as  thorough  a  knowledge  of  naval 
affairs  as  any  man  in  public  life — more  thorough,  indeed.  (Applause.) 
I  have  had  the  honor  to  serve  with  him  on  conference  committees,  and 
I  know  the  extent  of  his  knowledge.  Yet  even  in  his  presence  I  ven- 
ture to  say  that  I  know  something  about  the  Navy,  but  I  am  far  from 
knowing  it  all,  and  the  country  knows  very  little.  We  see  a  display  of 
naval  ships  in  the  Hudson  River,  and  the  people  go  home  with  a  com- 

360 


fortable  feeling  that  they  have  got  a 'great  and  splendid  Navy,  because 
they  do  not  at  all  understand  what  a  really  complete  and  efficient  navy 
is.  During  the  Spanish  War  there  was  a  New  England  port,  which 
shall  be  nameless,  one  of  many  where  they  felt  that  they  were  in  dan- 
ger of  attack  from  the  Spanish  cruisers.  They  were  not  exceptional, 
because  that  feeling  existed  in  all  Atlantic  ports,  south  as  well  as 
north,  and  in  common  with  many  other  ports  they  wanted  protection. 
I  labored  to  get  them  protection.  I  finally  secured  for  this  particular 
port  an  old  monitor  of  the  Civil  War,  with  one  large  smoothbore  gun. 
It  was  towed  down  to  that  port  with  some  difficulty  and  anchored  in 
the  harbor,  and  they  were  perfectly  satisfied.  (Laughter.)  The  moral 
is  that  a  navy  may  have  some  very  fine  ships  and  yet  be  wholly  inade- 
quate as  a  fighting  force,  and  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  people 
will  understand  the  real  condition  of  the  Navy  unless  it  is  honestly 
explained  to  them. 

The  difficulty  of  obtaining  accurate  knowledge  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  those  who  are  most  immediately  charged  with  the  care  of  the 
Navy  are  guilty  of  mistakes.    The  President  said  in  his  message : 

"If  this  full  program  should  be  carried  out,  we  should  have 
built  or  building  in  1921,  according  to  the  estimates  of  survival 
and  standards  of  classification— 
I  call  your  attention  to  that  language-^ 

"followed  by  the  General  Board  of  the  department,  an  effective 
Navy  consisting  of  27  battleships  of  the  first  line,  6  battle  cruisers, 
and  25  battleships  of  the  second  line." 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  his  annual  report  says: 

"If  this  program  is  carried  out,  accepting  the  General  Board 
estimates  of  survival  for  present  vessels — " 
_    That  is  20  years;  some  say  15,  but  we  will  take  it  at  20  as  the  life 
limit  of  a  modern  battleship — 

"the  Navy  will  be  composed  of  the  following  vessels,  built  or  build- 
ing, in  1921:  Battleships,  first  line,  27;  battle  cruisers,  6;  battle- 
ships, second  line,  25." 

There  can  be  no  mistake  about  the  battle  cruisers,  because  we  have 
none,  and  those  six  are  in  the  President's  program,  and  there  is  no 
item  of  his  program  which  is  better  than  that.  Battleships  of  the 
first  line,  27 — that  includes  17  ships  now  built  or  building,  and  10 
according  to  the  program;  but  the  25  battleships  of  the  second  line 

361 


puzzled  me.  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  asked  him  if 
he  would  give  me  the  names  of  the  battleships  of  the  second  line. 
He  replied,  very  kindly,  that  I  could  find  them  in  the  report  of  the 
General  Board  annexed  to  his  report.  I  wrote  back  to  him  that  I 
had  already  read  that  appendix,  but  that  the  report  of  the  General 
Board  did  not  seem  to  me  to  agree  with  his  statement,  and  that  was 
why  I  asked  for  the  names  of  the  ships.  I  have  had  no  answer  to 
this  last  letter.     (Laughter.) 

But  here  is  what  the  General  Board  said,  to  which  the  Secretary 
referred  me: 

"Dreadnaughts  of  the  first  line,  17." 

Then  there  are  the  10  added  under  the  program,  making  a  total  of 
27;  correct. 

"Dreadnaughts  of  the  second  line — " 

I  am  reading  from  the  report  of  the  General  Board  now — 
"Dreadnaughts  of  the  second  line,  13. 
"Superannuated  dreadnaughts  of  the  third  line — " 

Ships  that  will  then  be  over  20  years  old,  each  one — 

"nine. 

"Harbor-defense  battleships,  3—" 

The  Indiana,  the  Massachusetts,  and  the  Oregon,  authorized  in 
1890,  commissioned  in  1895. 

The  25  of  the  second  line,  as  given  by  the  President  and  the.  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  were  made  up  of  13  put  in  that  line  by  the  General 
Board,  of  9  excluded  from  that  line  by  the  General  Board  because  they 
were  not  in  accordance  with  their  estimates  of  survival,  and  of  3  now 
more  than  20  years  old,  which  the  General  Board  rank  as  only  fit  for 
harbor  defense. 

I  am  merely  calling  attention,  by  giving  you  these  varying  state- 
ments, to  some  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  getting  at  facts. 

Now,  take  the  submarines.  I  could  talk  about  the  submarines  all 
night.  (Laughter.)  One  hundred  and  fifty-seven  in  1921  was  the 
number  given  us  by  the  President  and  the  Secretary.  Dear  old  boats 
some  of  them  will  be  then.  That  157  includes  every  submarine  that 
has  been  built  from  the  beginning  starting  in  1902.  Some  of  them 
are  absolutely  useless  now,  and  everybody  knows  it.  There  is  not 
a  seagoing  submarine  among  those  now  existing.  I  believe  F-4,  which 
sank  in  the  harbor  of  Honolulu,  is  no  longer  carried  on  the  list. 

362 


(Laughter.)     But  it  was  carried  on  the  list  as  late  as  last  August. 

Then  there  is  the  shortage  of  men.  The  Secretary  has  sent  in  the 
report  of  Admiral  Fletcher,  made  on  the  15th  of  August  last,,  and 
in  that  report  he  describes  the  shortage  of  men.  At  the  June  in- 
spection one  division  was  short  1,350  men.  Mine  layers  were  25 
per  cent,  short  in  their  complement.  The  department  has  reduced 
the  complement  of  destroyers  by  25  per  cent.  It  is  reported  that  at 
the  battle-efficiency  inspection  of  the  Utah  a  chief  petty  officer  was 
in  charge  of  one  turret  and  an  ensign  of  1914  in  charge  of  another. 
The  Florida  was  short  29  officers,  the  Utah  28,  the  Michigan  21,  and 
the  South  Carolina  16.  A  pay  clerk  and  a  yeoman  were  in  charge 
of  the  plotting  room,  doing  the  work  which  should  have  been  done 
by  commissioned  officers. 

Admiral  Fletcher,  the  commander-in-chief,  says  that  such  reports 
are  of  frequent  occurrence,  and  in  his  owa  conclusions  points  out 
specifically  that  the  fleet  needs  more  officers  and  more  men;  that 
whatever  be  the  number  of  men  available  for  complements  of  the 
ships  in  the  active  fleet  should  be  kept  full,  and  that  if  ships  can  not 
be  kept  fully  in  commission  with  full  complement  they  should  be 
put  in  reserve. 

He  says,  also,  in  this  same  report,  that  we  need  mine-laying  and 
mine-sweeping  vessels.  He  gives  a  comparison  between  the  Delaware 
and  the  Bellerophon  and  the  Helgoland,  which  I  need  not  go  into, 
as  to  the  number  of  officers.  He  refers  to  the  unsatisfactory  con- 
dition of  the  submarines,  their  limitations  of  mobility,  the  lack  of 
air  craft,  the  lack  of  any  radio  direction  finder,  the  lack  of  mine- 
laying  and  mine-sweeping  vessels. 

I  need  not  go  on.  The  report  is  worthy  your  consideration  if 
you  want  to  get  at  the  facts  and  learn  how  absolutely,  inadequate 
and  far  from  high  efficiency  our  Navy  is.  We  have  no  scouts.  We 
have  no  fast  battle  cruisers.  The  Blucher,  which  was  sunk  in  the 
North  Sea,  was  sunk  because  she  was  the  slowest  of  the  German 
ships.  She  was  faster  than  any  ship  in  our  Navy!  We  need  battle 
cruisers;  we  need  scouts;  we  need  aeroplanes,  and  we  need  speed 
in  supplying  these  deficiencies.     (Great  applause.) 

The  Secretary  said  the  other  day  before  the  House  committee, 
if  he  was  correctly  reported,  that  it  took  three  years  to  build  a 
battleship.     Let  me  ask  your  attention — these  are  dry  facts — to  the 

363 


history  of  the  two  last  superdreadnaughts  authorized,  battleships 
Nos.  43  and  44,  authorized  on  March  3,  1915.  Congress  did  its  duty, 
let  me  say,  as  to  those  two  battleships.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
decided  to  build  these  ships  at  New  York  and  Mare  Island.  It  is  now 
nearly  a  year  since  the  authorization.  The  material  for  No.  43,  to  be 
built  at  the  New  York  Yard,  has  been  ordered,  I  believe,  and  is  in 
process  of  being  assembled.  (Laughter.)  The  California  is  on  the 
ways  at  the  New  York  Navy  Yard,  however,  and  is  not  expected  to  be 
off  the  ways  before  September  or  October.  I  take  the  Secretary's  own 
statement.  Therefore,  No.  43,  authorized  March  3,  1915,  cannot  have 
her  keel  laid  before  that  time — 18  months  after  her  authorization ! 

It  may  be  possible  that  we  can  not  build  a  battleship  in  two  years, 
as  England  and  Germany  do;  but  we  can  build  it  in  three  years,  and 
we  ought  to  be  able  to  get  rid  of  those  18  months  which  make  it  four 
and  a  half  years  for  an  American  battleship. 

No.  44  is  to  be  built  at  Mare  Island.  There  are  ways  there,  but 
they  are  not  large  enough  to  take  a  superdreadnaught,  and  must 
be  extended.  There  is  not  money  enough  to  do  it.  Congress  must 
either  appropriate  money  especially  for  that  purpose  or  authorize 
the  Secretary  to  use  some  of  the  money  appropriated  for  the  ships. 
1  do  not  think  this  authority  has  yet  been  given.  It  may  have  passed 
the  House. 

Representative  Padgett — No,  sir ;  it  is  pending  in  the  House.  It 
has  been  reported  by  the  committee. 

Senator  Lodge — It  is  pending  in  the  House,  then.  The  ship  now 
on  the  ways,  which  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  off  the  ways  before 
the  superdreadnaught  can  be  begun,  will  probably  be  launched  in 
September,.  1916.  If  the  money  is  authorized  for  the  extension  of 
the  ways — and  I  hope  and  believe  it  will  be — that  can  be  accomplished 
before  the  launching  of  the  ship  now  on  the  ways;  but  if  the  money 
is  not  obtained  there  will  be  still  further  delay. 

It  is  said  on  good  authority  that  England  and  Germany  have 
been  building  seagoing  submarines  of  800  or  1,000  tons,  capable  of 
going  around  the  north  of  England,  into  the  Mediterranean,  at  the 
rate  of  one  a  month.  We  then  hear  flourishing  statements  about 
our  great  seagoing  submarines.  Yes;  three  have  been  authorized, 
but  we  have  not  got  them.     I  am  glad  they  are  authorized,  but  I 

364 


want  them  in  the  water,  where  they  can  be  used,  and  not  simply  men- 
tioned in  acts  of  Congress. 

The  Schley  was  the  first  large  submarine  authorized.  It  was  au- 
thorized on  the  30th  of  June,  1914.  The  contract  was  let  the  following 
March — March  of  1915.  In  the  bulletin  of  January  10,  1916,  it  appears 
that  nothing  has  been  done  upon  her  yet. 

How  long  do  you  think  is  the  contract  time  for  the  Schley,  the 
first  of  our  seagoing  submarines?  I  was  astonished  to  find  out. 
Thirtj^-six  months — three  years !  She  is  not  contracted  to  be  delivered 
until  March,  1918;  and  if  we  want  submarines,  we  want  them  now  I 
(Applause.)  As  for  the  two  authorized  last  year,  nearly  a  year  ago — 
60  and  61 — nothing  has  been  done  about  them  at  all.  These  are  all 
mere  illustrations.  But  they  are  the  facts.  Do  not  forget  that  the 
worst  thing  that  can  befall  us  is  to  be  deceived  or  deceive  ourselves  as 
to  our  Navy. 

The  House  Naval  Committee  is  hard  at  work  preparing  its  bill, 
having  the  valuable  hearings  which  it  is  necessary  to  have,  and 
working  as  hard  and  intelligently  on  the  bill  as  it  is  possible,  I  know. 
The  House  Military  Committee,  unless  I  am  misinformed,  is  con- 
sidering a  bill  which  appropriates  for  exactly  the  same  Army  that 
we  have  now.  The  Senate  Military  Committee  is  having  hearings 
and  is  doing  excellent  work.  It  is  having  before  it  Gen.  Wood,  Gen. 
Carter,  and  other  officers  of  the  Army,  who  are  telling  the  committee 
and  telling  the  country  the  exact  truth  and  what  the  country  needs. 
(Applause.)  That  committee  is  preparing  good  work.  The  Senate 
Naval  Committee  is  engaged  in  the  great  and  burning  question  of 
building  an  armor  plant.     (Laughter.) 

Now,  I  recognize  that  perhaps  it  may  be  necessary  by  and  by  to 
have  an  armor  plant.  I  am  very  doubtful  about  it  at  any  time,  but 
I  am  certain  that  we  do  not  want  to  put  ten  millions  into  an  armor 
plant  now.  What  we  want  now  is  ships  and  men  and  submarines 
and  aeroplanes.  (Great  applause.)  I  know  there  is  a  great  argument 
behind  the  armor  plant.  I  know  that  if  the  armor  plant  is  not  built  it 
is  possible — perhaps  probable,  but  certainly  possible — that  some  great 
industrial  plant  in  private  hands  may  make  some  money  out  of  the 
manufacture  of  armor.  Nevertheless  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  more 
"'nportant  to  keep  the  enemy  from  our  shores  than  to  devote  our  atter 
tion  to  preventing  Americans  from  making  money.     (Applause.)     I 

365 


know  well  the  immense  time  and  thought  which  has  been  given  to  that 
question  of  preventing  Americans  from  making  money  (laughter), 
and  I  do  not  underrate  it;  but  I  think  that  at  this  moment  what  we 
want  to  do  is  to  give  the  Navy  the  things  of  which  it  is  in  such  sore 
need.  The  Navy  is  the  first  line  of  defense.  (Great  applause.)  Whilfe 
we  control  the  seas,  the  United  States  is  safe.  We  have  two  great 
coasts  to  defend.  I  do  not  quite  agree  with  my  friend,  Mr.  Putnam, 
about  Chicago's  indifference  to  New  York  and  Boston.  As  an  Ameri- 
can, the  knowledge  that  San  Francisco  or  New  Orleans  or  Chicago  is 
in  danger  from  an  enemy  or  damaged  by  a  foe  comes  just  as  near  home 
to  me  as  if  Boston  were  attacked.     (Great  applause.) 

I  was  born  in  Boston.  I  have  lived  there.  I  love  it.  But  there 
is  something  I  love  more,  and  that  is  the  whole  great  country;  and 
any  enemy  who  touches  any  part  of  that  country  touches  me.  (Great 
applause.) 

Now,  a  word  as  to  the  sources  of  the  opposition  which  you  will 
have  to  meet,  which  you  will  have  to  deal  with,  representing  as  you  do 
the  people,  the  voters  of  this  country.  It  is  of  various  sorts  in  Con- 
gress. There  are  some  who  think  that  the  first  thing  to  be  done  is 
to  put  the  Government  into  business  in  every  direction — into  muni- 
tions, into  armor,  into  everything — resting,  as  I  say,  on  the  great 
principle  that  if  they  do  not  some  private  American  citizen  may 
make  money.  Then  there  are  those  who  want  to  spend  the  people's 
money  elsewhere,  to  scatter  it  through  the  country  in  the  name  of 
good  roads,  to  improve  rivers  and  harbors,  and  to  build  public  build- 
ings. You  will  see  the  newspapers  refer  to  it  in  their  graceful  way 
(laughter)  as  the  "pork  barrel";  and  you  would  supopse,  from  what 
you  read  in  the  newspapers,  that  all  this  was  due  to  the  natural 
depravity  of  Congressmen  and  Senators — that  they  wanted  to  have 
public  buildings  and  river  and  harbor  appropriations  for  unnavi- 
gable  streams  and  impossible  harbors  because  they  themselves  were 
naturally  bad  and  rejoiced  in  evil  for  its  own  sake.  I  assure  you  that 
is  a  very  great  mistake.  The  amount  of  pleasure — even  among  those 
Congressmen  and  Senators  who  are  fond  of  art — the  amount  of  arch- 
itectural pleasure  that  they  get  from  a  post  office  in  a  country  town 
(laughter)  is  not  enough  to  govern  their  votes.  They  want  those 
things  for  the  very  simple  and  human  reason — I  know;  I  have  been 
one  of  them  for  a  long  time — that  they  think  their  constituents  want 

866 


them,  and  they  think  procuring  them  means  votes.  And  just  as  long 
as  Congressmen  and  Senators,  or  any  considerable  number  of  them, 
think  there  are  more  votes  in  river  and  harbor  appropriations  and 
public  buildings  appropriations  than  there  are  in  appropriations  for 
the  national  defense,  they  will  continue  to  give  the  preference  to  the 
former.     (Applause.) 

That  seems  a  harsh  thing  to  say.  The  truth  is  not  infrequently 
both  harsh  and  unpleasant.  I  know  there  are  many  men  in  both 
Houses  who  will  vote  for  great  appropriations  for  national  defense 
without  a  thought  as  to  whether  it  is  going  to  benefit  them  or  not.  (Ap- 
plause.) I  dare  say  there  are  many  men  in  both  Houses  who  would 
vote  for  appropriations  for  rivers  and  harbors  and  public  buildings 
without  a  thought  as  to  whether  it  would  benefit  them  or  not,  although 
I  must  confess  that  that  proposition  is  perhaps  not  quite  so  certain  as 
the  other.  (Laughter.)  But  if  you  would  have  Congress  take  up 
national  defense,  both  for  the  Army  and  for  the  Navy,  as  you  think  it 
ought  to  be  taken  up,  you  will  let  them  understand  that  there  is  a 
great  body  of  voters  in  this  country,  north,  south,  east,  and  west,  who 
are  determined  that  their  country  shall  be  defended! 

I  have  no  doubt  that  the  great  mass  of  the  American  people  wish 
their  country  to  be  put  in  a  state  of  proper  defense.  You  all  believe 
so.  Bring  this  fact  home,  then,  to  those  who  represent  them.  Make 
the  Senators  and  Congressmen  understand  it.  Begin  at  the  primary 
and  go  with  them  to  the  polls  in  support  if  you  can,  in  opposition  if 
you  must,  and  you  will  be  surprised  at  the  rapidity  of  the  educational 
process,  and  you  will  get  plenty  of  support  at  the  Capitol.  (Applause.) 
But  you  must  come  down  to  that  practical  side,  as  every  great  question 
has  to  come  to  it  finally.  You  must  demonstrate  to  the  Representative 
or  Senator  that  the  people  who  send  him  here  want  this  thing  done; 
and  when  the  American  people  make  it  clear  to  the  House  and  Senate 
that  they  are  in  earnest  about  national  defense  you  will  have  it,  and 
you  are  not  likely  to  get  it  much  sooner  in  a  proper  and  sufficient  way. 
(Applause.) 

I  have  taken  much  more  time  than  I  intended,  and  I  only  desire  to 
say  one  word  in  conclusion.  No  one  can  think  that  provision  for  na- 
tional defense  is  more  essential,  more  vital,  than  I  do.  But  there  is  a 
side  to  it  that  goes  even  deeper.  It  has  been  alluded  to  by  the  mayor  of 
New  York,  and  I  can  do  little  more  than  repeat  his  words;  but  they 

367 


are  words  that  can  not  be  too  often  repeated.  In  this  question  of 
national  defense  lies  a  test  of  democracy,  whether  it  is  worthy  to  live, 
whether  it  has  the  foresight,  the  self-control,  the  spirit  of  unity  which 
will  lead  it  to  take  these  precautions  which  it  must  take  if  it  is  to 
survive  at  all  in  a  world  so  uncertain  and  so  perilous  as  this. 

We  seek  no  one's  territory.  We  desire  no  adventures.  We  have 
an  immense  domain  of  our  own,  still  to  be  developed.  We  desire,  if 
we  can,  to  distribute  the  riches  of  our  heritage  so  that  all  shall  benefit 
and  not  merely  a  few.  We  would  fain,  if  we  could,  turn  our  attention 
to  the  needs  of  the  great  classes  of  our  own  people  to  whom  life  is  hard. 
We  would  like  to  do  something  to  help  old  age.  We  would  like  to 
improve  in  every  way  that  we  can  the  condition  of  our  own  people. 
What  is  necessary  for  us  in  order  to  achieve  that  which  we  desire? 
Peace  and  security.  They  speak  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  a  foreign 
policy.  It  is  not  a  foreign  policy,  it  is  a  mere  law  of  self-preservation. 
We  wish  to  be  at  peace  and  we  wish  to  be  secure. 

Now,  these  being  our  desires,  have  we  made  our  acts  and  (5ur 
policies  correspond  with  them?  You  wish  to  have  peace  and  security. 
Have  you  done  what  is  necessary  to  make  sure  that  you  and  those 
who  come  after  you  will  have  peace  and  security?  You  certainly  have 
not  done  it  yet.  You  lie  open  to  the  world,  rich,  tempting,  an  easy  prey 
to  the  armed.  There  are  those  who  say,  "Exhausted  Europe  will  never 
attack  us."  That  is  the  argument  of  the  didn't-know-it-was-loaded 
gentlemen  who  add  so  largely  to  the  bills  of  mortality.  Not  attack  us  I 
There  is  no  nation  on  earth  so  dangerous  as  a  nation  fully  armed  and 
bankrupt  at  home.  (Applause.)  The  only  time  in  our  history  when 
we  were  fully  prepared  was  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War.  We  had  a 
great  veteran  Army.  We  had  the  largest  fleet  in  existence.  We  had  a 
debt  of  $3,000,000,000,  which  looked  enormous  then.  Our  currency 
seemed  to  be  hopelessly  depreciated.  Financially  speaking,  we  were 
bankrupt.  Yet  there  never  was  a  moment  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  when  she  was  so  dangerous  to  her  neighbors  as  in  1865. 

You  can  always  get  money,  apparently,  in  this  world  for  powder 
and  shot.  Peace  in  Europe,  a  nation  armed  to  the  teeth,  crippled 
financially,  with  large  claims  growing  out  of  Mexico;  shall  I  go  on? 
Do  you  think  that  presents  a  safe  condition?  Such  a  condition  is 
highly  dangerous.  No  nation  is  safe  while  the  world  is  as  it  is ;  and 
our  duty  is  to  make  sure  of  our  peace,  our  security,  our  freedom. 

368 


Is  the  ideal  of  democracy  merely  to  accumulate  money,  to  live  in  com- 
fort, to  amuse  ourselves  from  day  to  day?  Is  that  the  ideal  of  democ- 
racy? Not  to  my  mind.  I  believe  that  the  ideal  of  democracy  is  writ- 
ten in  the  American  Revolution  and  in  the  Civil  War;  the  great  ideai 
which  Abraham  Lincoln  typified,  that  life,  that  wealth,  that  everything 
was  as  nothing  compared  to  liberty  and  freedom ;  and  that  this  Nation 
should  be  free  and  remain  free;  that  we  should  be  able  to  continue  the 
democracy  which  we  have  set  up.  And  now,  with  other  democracies 
fighting  for  their  lives,  are  we  to  remain  still  and  do  nothing  to  pre- 
serve our  own? 

In  the  long  vista  of  the  years  to  roll, 
Let  me  not  see  my  country's  honor  fade; 

Oh !  let  me  see  our  land  retain  its  soul ! 

Her  pride  in  Freedom,  and  not  Freedom's  shaae. 
(Great  applause.) 


369 


I 


Officers  of  the  League. 

HON.  JOSEPH  H.  CHOATE,  Honorary  President 

HON.  ALTON  B.  PARKER,  Honorary  Vice-President 

S.  STANWOOD  MENKEN,  President 

ROBERT  BACON,  Chairman  Board  of  Directors 

HERBERT  BARRY,  Secretary 

EDWARD  H.  CLARK,  Treasurer 

HENRY  L.  WEST,  Executive  Secretary 

Executive  Committee. 


LAWRENCE  F.  ABBOTT 
FREDERICK  H.  ALLEN 
VINCENT  ASTOR 
HERBERT  BARRY 
KARL  H.  BEHR 
FRANKLIN   Q.   BROWN 
EDWARD  HARDY  CLARK 
COL.  WM.  C.  CHURCH 
WM.  FREDERICK  DIX 


HAMILTON  FISH,  JR. 
H.  B.  HARRIS 
FRANK  S.  HASTINGS 
CHAS.  E.  LYDECKER 
S.   STANWOOD  MENKEN 
:|||VID  H.  MILLER 
J.   BEAUMONT   SPENCER 
HENRY  L.  STIMSON 
J.  BERNARD  WALKER 


COL.  G.  CREIGHTON  WEBB 


371 


COMMITTEES. 

Managing 
WILLIAM  FRP:DERIC  DIX  HAMILTON  FISH,  JR. 

Chairman  Secretary 

Finance 

FRANKLIN  Q.  BROWN  COURTLANDT  NICOLL 

Chairman  Secretary 

Abmy 

HENRY  L.   STIMSON 

Chairman 

Navy 

J.  BERNARD  WALKER 

Chairman 

Militia 
CHARLES  E.  LYDECKER  COLGATE  HOYT,  JR. 

Chairman  Secretary 

Extension 

WILLIAM  FREDERIC  DIX  J.  BEAUMONT  SPENCER 

Chairman  Secretary 


DEPOSITORY— COLUMBIA  TRUST  COMPANY 


372 


National  Committed. 


JAMES  B.  ANGELL, 

Michigan. 
ROBERT  BACON, 

New  York. 
JAMES  M.  BECK, 

New  York. 
R.  LIVINGSTON  BEECKMAN, 

Governor  of  Rhode  Island. 
A.  J.  DREXEL,  BIDDLE, 

Pennsylvania. 
CHAS.  J.  BONAPARTE, 

Ex-Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Md. 
EMMET  D.  BOYLE, 

Governor  of  Nevada. 
C.  B.  BURR, 

Michigan. 
FRANCIS  M.  BYRNE, 

Governor  of  South  Dakota. 
GEORGE  W.  CLARKE, 

Governor  of  Iowa. 
CHARLES  H.  COLE, 

Adjutant  General  M.  V.  M. 
FREDERIC   R.    COUDERT, 

New  York. 
JAMES  GOOLD  CUTLER, 

New  York. 
CHARLES  L.  DERING, 

Chicago. 
JACOB  M.  DICKINSON, 

Ex-Secretary  of  War,  Chicago. 
THOMAS  A.  EDISON, 

New  Jersey. 
JAMES  E.  FERGUSON, 

Governor  of  Texas. 
DAVID  R.  FRANCIS, 

Ex-Governor  of  Missouri. 
PHILLIPS  LEE  GOLDSBOROUGH, 

Governor  of  Maryland. 
FRANCIS  V.  GREENE, 

Buffalo. 
LUTHER  E.  HALL, 

Governor  of  Louisiana. 
L.  B.  HANNA, 

Governor  of  North  Dakota. 
NAT  E.  HARRIS, 

Governor  of  Georgia. 


ARCHIBALD  C.  HART, 

New  Jersey. 
MYRON  T.  HERRICK, 

Ex-Governor  of  Ohio. 
JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN, 

Pres.  Princeton  University. 
DAVID  JAYNE  HILL, 

New  York. 
MARCUS  H.  HOLCOMB, 

Governor  of  Connecticut. 
GEORGE  W.  P.  HUNT, 

Governor  of  Arizona. 
JOHN  B.  KENDRICK, 

Governor  of  Wyoming. 
PHILANDER  C.  KNOX, 

Ex-Secretary  of  State,  Penn. 
GEORGE  VON  L.  MEYER, 

Massachusetts. 
CHARLES  R.  MILLER, 

Governor  of  Delaware. 

JAMES  B.  Mccreary, 

Governor  of  Kentucky. 

w.  G.  Mcdonald, 

Governor  of  New  Mexico. 
WILLIAM  FELLOWES  MORGAN, 

New  York. 
GUY  MURCHIE, 

Massachusetts. 
GEORGE  WHARTON  PEPPER, 

Philadelphia. 
E.  L.  PHILIPP, 

Governor  of  Wisconsin. 
GEORGE  HAVEN  PUTNAM, 

New  York. 
SAMUEL  V.  STEWART, 

Governor  of  Montana. 
HENRY  L.  STIMSON, 

Ex-Secretary  of  War,  New  York. 
OSCAR  S.  STRAUS, 

New  York. 
HORACE  WHITE, 

New  York. 
JAMES  WITHYCOMBE, 

Governor  of  Oregon. 
LUKE  E.  WRIGHT, 

Ex-Secretary  of  War,  Tennessee. 

873 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 


ARIZONA 
Snowflake 
J.  W.  Clayton 

CALIFORNIA 
Sacramento 

Emmett  Phillips 
Senator  James  D.  Phelan 
Hon.  Chas.  F,  Curry 
Hon.  Julius  Kahn 
Hon.  John  Raker 
Hon.  Wm.  Kent 
Hon.  John  I.  Nolan 

COLORADO 
Colorado   Springs 
William  M,  Randol 
Samuel  L.  Shober 
Henry  Leonard 
William  A.  Otis 


CONNECTICUT 
New    Haven 

Seymour  C.  Loomis 
Stephen  Whitney 
Samuel  H.  Fisher 

Hartford 

Ernest  M.  Price 
H.  Stuart  Hotchkiss 
Edward  N.  Clark 
Osborne  A.  Day 
Frank  S.  Butterworth 
Philip  T.  Kearney 

Watertown 
Henry  W.  Scovill 

Waterbury 

Warren  F.  Kaynor 


Edgar  M.  Hoopes 


DELAWARE 
Wilmington 

John  P.  Nields 
Dover 
Richard  R.  Kenney 

DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA 
Washington 


C.  L.  Hussey 
Major  Alfred  P.  Robbins 
E.  M.  Underwood 
General  Scriven 
Captain  Spencer  Wood 
C.  F.  P.  Richardson 
Dr.  Hamilton  Wright 
Mr.  McClintock 
Mr.  Graff 
John  Biddle 
Gen.  O'Connell 
Gen.  Derve 


C.  H.  Rudolph 

D.  Laughlin 

Lieut.-Commander  Needham 
W.  T.  Bingham 

W.  G.  McMurchy 
Col.  A.  Rodgers 
Rear  Admiral  Logan 
John  A.  Barker 
A.  Howard  Clark 
Frederic  L.  Huidekoper 
C.  Davis  English 
Frank  Conger  Baldwin 


375 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 


DIST 


Hon.  J.  Hampton  Moore 

H.  M.  Southgate 

George  Eustis 

John  Pierce  Miller 

M.  A.  Winter 

Douglas  Putnam  Bivine 

Captain  V.  O.  Chase 

A.  R.  Boyd 

Arthur  C.  Addison 

Irving  Williamson 

Desha  Breckenridge 

Harry  B.  Hunt 

Chas.  P.  Neill 

G.  Beale  Bloomer 

General  Crozier 

J.  T.  Graves 

F.  D.  Roosevelt 

Rear  Admiral  J.  C.  Watson 

Judge  O.  M.  Barber  . 

J.  Van  Rensselaer 

General  Weaver 

E.  M.  Underwood 

Capt.  Spencer  Wood 

C.  F.  P.  Richardson 

Hamilton  Wright 

General  Scrlbner 

Sidney  Ballou 

Dr.  M.  Benjamin 

C.  L.  Boroman 

Alban  B.  Butler 

Arthur  B.  Campbell 

G»o.  F.  Chase 

1.  T.  Chamberlain 

FLORIDA 
St.   Augustine 
J.  Clifford  R.  Foster 

Jacksonville 
Ernest  Metcalf 


RICT   OF   COLUMBIA 
Washington 

Rear  Admiral  C.  M.  Chester 

A.  Howard  Charle 
John  Corrigan,  Jr. 
Chas.  O'H.  Craigie 
Ira  W.  Dennison,  M.  D. 

Rev.  A.  J.  Donlon,  S.  J.  - 

Robert  Craig  Greene 

Chas.  Noble  Gregory 

Arnold  Hague 

William  E.  Harvey 

Charles  Downer  Hazen 

Hand  Hague  Hill 

James  H,  Hopkins 

T.  B.  Harvard 

B.  B.  Johns 
Gus  J.  Karger 
William  Littauer 
Clarke  McCue 
Stewart  A.  Maltman 
Henry  May 

Basil  Miles 

George  Hewitt  Myers 

Richard  B.  Owen 

P.  H.  W.  Ross 

J.  L.  Schwartz 

Earl  Hamilton  Smith 

Thos.  B.  Sweeney 

Geo.  Oakley  Totten,  Jr. 

Rev.  F.  A.  Wales 

Francis  Bradford  Wheaton 

Chauncey  C.  Williams 

M.  A.  Winter 

Gen.  Maxwell  Van  Zandt  Woodhull 

GEORGIA 

Savannah 

Hon.  Wallace  J.  Pierpont,  Mayor 

HAWAIIAN    ISLANDS 

Honolulu 

Hon.  J.  K.  Kalanianaole 


376 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 


ILLINOIS 
Chicago 


J.  Rex  Allen 

H.  W.  Beyers 

Major  Edward  Blttel 

Lester  Curtis,  M.  D. 

J.  Fletcher  Farrel 

Benjamin  A.  Fessenden 

Jacob  Frank 

John  Maynard  Harlan 

M.  Hughitt,  Jr. 

A.  C.  Johnson 

Frank  A.  Mitchell 

Robert  W.  Neunt 

Sidney  Haler 

John  T.  Stockton 

Springfield 

Major  Edward  Bittel 
Bluford  Wilson 
C.  J.  Doyle 
Frank  S.  Dickson 

INDIANA 
La  Fayette 

Rev.  M.  J.  Byrne 

Indianapolis 

John  E.  Hollett 
W.  J.  Ketcham 
Dr.  C.  B.  McCuUoch 
Meredith  Nicholson 

IOWA 
Des   Moines 

E.  T.  Meredith 

Hon.  Lafayette  Young 

H.  H.  Polk 


C.  A.  MacDcnald 
Sidney  Adler 

E.  K.  Van  Dyne 
Shelby  M.  Singleton 
Capt.  Henry  J.  Reilly 
N.  H.  Welch 
William  B.  Austin 
Dabney  H.  Maury 
Dennis  J.   O'Toole 
Geo.  A.  McKinlock 
Aaron  Auerbach 
Samuel  H.  Gunder 

F.  P.  Vose 


Rockford 


Waite  Talcott 

Winnetka 
Henry  J.  Rully 

KANSAS 
Topeka 
Charles  A.  Moore 

KENTUCKY 
Louisville 
Geo.  M.  Mackintosh 

Lexington 
Hon.  James  B.  McCreary 
LOUISIANA 
New  Orleans 
J.  W.  Fairfax 

IVIAINE 
Skowhegan 
Roy  L.  Marston 


377 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 


Tenny  Fell 


Wm.  L.  Burtz 
W.  G.  Bowdoin,  Jr. 
W.  A.  Boykin 
Walter  B.  Brooks 
Wm.  Bullock  Clark 
James  H.  Corrigan 
Valentine  S.  Doebler 
Judge  Henry  Duffy 
H.  Findlay  French 
Robert  Garrett 
Rufus  M.  Glbbs 
Arthur  W.  Grahame 
Dr.  Harry  S.  Greenbaum 
John  Philip  Hill 
Chas.  C.  Homer,  Jr. 


Catonsville 
Frederic  Arnold  Kummer 


MARYLAND 
Annapolis 

Baltimore 


Sigmund  Kann 
Louis  Kann 
Henry  S.  King 
Theodore  G.  Lurman 
J.  Crary  McLanahan 
Robert  C.  Powell 
Charles  R.  Preston 
Major  John  Philip  Hill 
C.  C.  Rutledge 
Dr.  W.  S.  Thayer 
Robert  M.  Van  Sant 
Geo.  W.  F.  Vernon 
Henry  M.  Warfield 
W.  Cahill  Bruce 


Chevy  Chase 

H.  M.  Southgate 
Oakland 
W.  McCulloch  Brown. 


MASSACHUSETTS 
Boston 


J.  W.  Farley 

Adjutant-General  C.  H.  Cole 

Dr.  Harold  W.  Dana 

R.  C.  Robbins 

O.  D.  Permai 

Kenneth  C.  R.  White 

Leon  Strauss 

Wm.  J.  Boardman 

Alfred  W.  Carr 

Frank  A.  Castle 

Chas.  H.  Cohn 

J.  Randolph  Coolidge,  Jr. 

Frederick  S.  Corwerth 

William  Dillon 

F.  A.  Eustis 


Louis  Adams  Frothingham 
Henry  H.  Gardiner 
Joseph  N.  Hannan 
Seward  W.  Jones 
Wm.  B.  Larkin 
John  L.  Laurence 
Col.  Edward  L.  Logan 
Thomas  S.  Perry 
Morton  P.  Prince 
Bertram  G.  Waters 
Bernard  J.  Rothwell 
John  H.  Storer 
Edward  Everett  Williams 
Frederic  L.  Woods 


378 


DELEGATES  TO  THE   NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 


Bingham 
D.  M.  Brown,  C.  C. 

Brookline 
Wm.  E.  Putnam,  Jr. 
Leon  Strauss 
Kenneth  C.  R.  White 

Cambridge 
Charles  R.  Holman 

Dediiam 
Theodore  P.  Burgess 

Dorchester 
Wm.  T.  Loud 

East  Northfield 
Frank  Lewis  Duley 

Framingham 
John  D.  Pearmain 

Hamilton 
Reginald  C.  Robbins 


iVI  ASS  AC  HU  SETTS 

Lexington 

Albert  B.  Tenney 

North  Adams 
Dr.  Laurence  A.  Ladd 
Revere 
Arthur  B.  Curtis 

Springfield 
Clinton  E.  Bell 

Waitham 
George  P.  Drury 

Williamstown 
Percy  A.  Chambers 

Winchester 
Lionel  Norman 

Worcester 
Henry  Harmon  Chamberlain 
George  Crompton 
G.  L  Rockwood 


MISSISSIPPI 
Columbus 

Morris  M.  Green 

MISSOURI 
Kansas  City  St.   Joseph 

Henry  C.  Flower  K.  T.  Forbes 


K.  O.  Klemm 
D.  J.  Haf£ 


Louis  T.  Golding 
N.  H.  King 
J.  G.  Wing 


St.   Louis 


Benjamin  Altheimer 
Ben  Altheimer 
R.  A.  Boyle 
Geo.  M.  Brown 
David  Goldsmith 
Horace  D.  Johns 
Claude  S.  Kennerly 
C.  S.  Kennerly 
A.  B.  Lambert 


Edw.  K.  Love 

Owen  Miller 

Judge  Albert  D.  Norton! 

Judge  Hickman  P.  Rodgers 

Thomas  G.  Rutledge 

Rev.  Martin  S.  Sommer 

Ira  E.  Wight 

R.  E.  Gruner 

Rolla  Wells 

H.  J.  Pettengill 


379 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 


MINNESOTA 

Minneapolis 
John  C.  McGee 
G.  H.  Nelson 
Ell  Torrance 
M.  A.  Potter 

St.  Paul 

Joseph  H.  Beek 

Major  John  Doyle  Carmody 

Fred.  B.  Wood 

Hon.  F.  C.  Stevens 

Ambrose  Tighe 

MICHIGAN 
Ann  Arbor 
Warren  P.  Lombard 
C.  B.  Burr 

Prof.  Wm.  H.  Hobbs 
Prof.  S.  Lawrence  Bigeloe 
Dean  Henry  M.  Bates 
Dr.  Arthur  W.  Shurz 

MONTANA 

Clearwater 
Edward  C.  Potter 

NEBRASKA 
Omaha 
Geo.  H.  Harries 


NEW   HAMPSHIRE 
Concord 
Geo.  H.  Moses 

Manchester 
Eugene  E.  Reed 
Charles  M.  Lloyd 
Hon.  Frank  Knap 
Hon.  Eugene  Reid 
Gordon  Woodbury 

South  Conway 
Thomas  P.  Ivy 

Andover 

Nahun  Bachelder 

Lakeport 
Henry  B.  Quimby 

Petersborough 
Robert  P.  Bass 
James  P.  Brennan 

Rochester 
Samuel  D.  Falkes 

Concord 
Hon.  Frank  S.  Streeter 
Hon.  John  Woodbury 
Keene 
Hon.  Charles  Gale  Shedd 

Tilton 
Hon.  Charles  C.  Tilton 


NEW  JERSEY 


Atlantic  City 

Capt.  James  J.  Sheen 
Jos.  H.  Shinn 
F.  J.  Waldmayer 

Bernardsville 

John  Stevens 


East  Orange 
D.  D.  Byers 
Burton  E.  Emory 
Arthur  A.  Fisher       < 
John  B.  Phillips 
W.  H.  Culbert 
Horace  N.  Montgomery 


380 


DELEGATES  TO  THE 


Elizabeth 
Delozier  Davidson 
Mier  Clementine  Kellog 

Englewood 
John  W.  Loveland 
Wm.  L.  Pierce 
Frank  Depew 

Hackensack 

Wm.  Burr  Gregg 
Wm.  C.  Gregg 
William  Widnall 

Montclair 
John  C.  Barclay 
Wm.  B.  Dickson 
W.  W.  Knight 

Newark 
Arthur  H.  Mackie 
Charles  Bradley 

Paterson 
Warren  Baker 
James  F.  O'Byrne 
Charles  Reynolds 
Augustus  A.  Fischer 


NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 
MEN 

NEW   JERSEY 

Red  Bank 

Sigmund  Eisner 

Rutherford 

O.  T.  Keep 

Summit 
A.  E.  Batchelder 
Guy  Bates 
John  W.  Clift 
Walter  G.  Libby 
Wm.  B.  Miles 
Philip  V.  R.  Van  Wyck 
Trenton 
Henry  W.  Green 
.Robert  C.  Maxwell 

West  Summit 
Robert  S.  Holty 

Plainfield 
C.  E.  Aaron 
Daniel  Runkle 
Hon.  Percy  H.  Stewart 

Morristown 
F.  A.  Henry 

Orange 
Horace  Hill 


Ely  Rosenberg 
M.  L.  Malerinsky 
Robert  F.  Putnam 
Wm.  R.  Corwine 
David  W.  Armstrong,  Jr. 
Douglas  Robinson 
Charles  K.  Smith 
Geo.  W.  Wingate 
Herbert  S.  Connell 
Arthur  Curtiss  James 
Charles  G.  Curtis 
J.  N.  Myers 


NEW  YORK 

New  York  City 

Robert  Adamson 
E.  A.  MacDougall 
Russell  Jones 
John  Henry  Blakes 
J.  C.  Boyd 
Ben  Strong 
Dr.  Jos.  B.  Bissell 
J.  M.  J.  Lee 
Wm.  F.  Schneider 
Norman  Kendall 
J.  Watson  Webb 
W.  H.  Pleasants 


381 


DELEGATES  TO  THE   NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS 

MEN 

NEW  YORK 
New  York  City 

John  J.  O'Rourke 

Dr.  Abraham  L.  Wolbarsh 

B.  Rosenwald 
F.  W.  Clinton 
Irving  M.  Crane 

C.  R.  Corning 
^     John  A.  Sleicher 

Alfred  W.  Wilsky 

Robert  M.  Boyd,  Jr. 

Horace  R.  Steele 
^  R.  A.  C.  Smith 

Thomas  F.  Logan 

General  Remick 

Ernest  Hamlin  Abbott 

C.  F.  Ahlstrom 

Jerome  Alexandre 

Frederick  H.  Allen 

Louis  H.  Ames 
.^Hon.  Robert  Bacon 

Wm.  Henry  Barnum 

Edwin  Beer,  M.  D. 

N.  F.  Behar 

Albert  Bering 

Gordon  Knox  Bell  ^ 

A.  E.  Borie 

Franklin  Q.  Brown 

Wm.  Reynolds  Brown 

Louis  S.  Burdett 

Chas.  Pope  Caldwell 

Ernest  T.  Carter 

Louis  K.  Comstock 

Irving  Coon 

Wm.  A.  Cotter 

Henry  E.  Crampton 

Robt.  M.  Gumming 

James  F.  Curtis 

E.  J.  Deering 

Douglas  Z.  Doty 

Harold  L.  Downey 

Henry  M.  Earle 


James  Laughlin  Phillips 

B.  D.  Caldwell 
S.  Stanwood  Menken 
Philip  Livingston 
Schuyler  Schieffelin 
Hon.  John  Purroy  Mitch  el 
Ira  Barrows 

Chas.  O.  S.  B.  Gumaelins 
John  Ihlder 
David  H.  Morris 

C.  C.  Paulding 

A.  Van  Cortlandt 
William  Hoppin 
W.  I.  Lincoln  Adams 

B.  E.  Smythe 
Walter  C.  Childs 
Alexander  Duane 
Edward  H.  Clark 
Ogden  H.  Hammond 
Samuel  P.  Colt 
Geo.  B.  Dickson 
Chas.  E.  Manierre 
John  B.  Stanchfield 
Felix  Rosen 
H.  Stuart  Hotchkiss 
Henry  W.  Shoemaker 
Samuel  Rosenthal 
Chas.  J.  McDermott 
F.  Treves  Hill 
John  A.  Mason 
Howard  Townsend 
Edw.  J.  Coyne 
R.  A.  Torrey 
L.  T.  Fetzer 
O.  E.  J.  Clare 
L.  Walter  Barker 
John  F.  Mead 
James  S.  Long 
Thomas  F.  Gannon 
F.  A.  Wallis 


382 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 


R.  M.  Easly 
J.  Temple  Gwathmey 
J.  K.  Gwynn 
George  Hahn 
F.  A.  Hannah 
Dr.  John  E.  Hausmann 
John  A.  Hill 
Robert  Hoe 
Rolane  Holt 
Chas.  Bulkley  Hubbell 
Dr.  Woods  Hutchinson 
Dr.  Fred.  M.  Ives 
Sidney  J.  Jennings 
Norman  Kendall 
Charles  E.  Lydecker 
Louis  B.  McCagg 
Farquhar  J.  MacRae 
Drelincourt  Martin 
Harold  C.  Mathews 
John  S.  Melcher 
Ralph  D.  Mershon 
J.  W.  Miller 
Dr.  Lewis  K.  Morris 
Newbold  Morris 
James  F.  Morrissey 
Dean  Nelson 
Wm.  H.  Nichols 
Wm.  Barclay  Parsons 


NEW  YORK 
New  York  City 

Conde  B.  Fallen 
Wm.  R.  Peters 
Samuel  B.  Potter 
Raymond  B.  Price 
E.  P.  V.  Ritter 
Samuel  M.  Rosenstein 
Thomas  B.  Paton 
Robert  H.  Sexton 
Reginald  H.  Sayre 
Chas.  A.  Sherman 
Herbert  Shipman 
Parker  Sloane 
J.  Beaumont  Spencer 
Charles  Burnham  Squire 
E.  P.  Stahel 
Dr.  M.  Allen  Starr 
M.  M.  Sternberger 
J.  B.  Coles  Tappan 
J.  Kennedy  Tod 
Benj.  D.  Traitel 
Col.  C.  S.  Wadsworth 
G.  Creighton  Webb 
Byrd  W.  Wenman 
Peter  Wiernik 
Arnold  Wood 
Eric  Fisher  Wood 
Henry  A.  Wise  Wood 
Herbert  J.  King 


Henry  R.  Cochrane 
C.  D.  Wood 
Geo.  Dressier 
N.   H.   Lewis 
William  M.  Calder 
Chas.  Jerome  Edwards 


Brooklyn 

G.  Herbert  Henshaw 
Chester  Iba 
Edwin  Iba 
Joseph   Iba 
Nathaniel  H.  Levi 
Robert  L.  Pierrepont 
Cornelius  D.  Wood 
Long   Island 


J.  B.  Tesdale 


383 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 


D.  S.  Alexander 
Louis  L.  Babcock 
Wilmer  Brown 
George  S.  Buck 
Dr.  Charles  Gary 
W.  J.  Donovan 
Major  L.  P.  Fuhrmann 
Mayor  L.  P.  Fuhrmann 
Anson  G.  Goodyear 
T.  Hawkee,  M.  D, 
Evan  Hollister 
Lucien  Howe 
Horace  O.  Lanza 
A.  J.  DeLaplante 
Clarence  S.  Sidway 
Wm.  Warren  Smith 
Henry  W.  Sprague 

Utica 
T.  R.  Proctor 
Charles  L.  DeAngelio 
N.  E.  Devereux,  Jr. 
Harold  H.  Murray 
Thomas  R.  Proctor 

Rome 
Hon.  H.  Clayton 
Weston  Jenkins 

New  Rochelle 
Alexander  L.  Anderson 
Robert  T.  Emmet 
Capt.  A.  Calhoun 

Ossining 
John  F.  Jenkins 

Garden   City,   L.    I. 

Wm.   C.  Ferguson 
Russell  C.  Jones 

Niagara  Falls 
General  Lauren  W.  Pettebone 


NEW  YORK 

Buffalo 

Everett  P.  Turner 
Augustus  Underbill 
Reginald  T.  Wheeler 
Wm.  M.  Wheeler 
S.  V.  R.  Spaulding 
P.  Carr 

A.  Gardener 

C.  A.  Thompson 
Thomas  H.  McKee 
Chas.  Van  Burgen 
Capt.  Nelson  T.  Barrett 

B.  Goodyear 
Geo.  C.  Fox 

F.  Park  Lewis 

C.  B.  Hill 

Dr.  M.  Clinton 
C.  E.  Wettlefer 

Rochester 
Kingman  N.  Robins 
George  B.  Sage 
Enoch  Cine  Stoddard 
Andrew  E.  Tuck 
William  T.  Noonan 
Montgomery  E.  Leary,  M.  D. 

B.  H.  Butler 
James  G.  Cutler 

Little   Falls 
Homer  P.  Snyder 

Mamaroneck 
Frank  C.  Littleton 

Mt.  Vernon 
Sherman  L.  Lewis 

Lake  George 
Denny  Brereton 

C.  J.  Nordstrom 

Plattsburg 
W.  B.  Jaques 


384 


DELEGATES  TO  THE 


Flushing 
Edward  O.  Bogert 
Alfred   J.   Kennedy 
Edward  MacDougall 

Canajoharie 
Ben.  T.   Spraker 

Schenectady 
W.  R.  Whitney 
James  A.  Andrews 

Elmira 
H.  H.  Rockwell 
Hon.  Richard  Olney 

Saratoga    Springs 
Israel  Putnam 

New  Suffolk 
Nathaniel  Hathaway 

Catskill 
Charles  V.  Hopkins 

Cincinnati 

Richard  P.  Ernst 
C.  A.  Hinsch 
P.  Lincoln  Mitchell 
W.  C.  Proctor 
Walter  F.  Schmidt 
Constand  Southworth 
George  Harris 
W.  S.  Schmidt 


Elyria 


T.  L.  Moise 


Massillon 


Jacob  S.  Coxey 


Paulding 


W.  H.  Phipps 


NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 

NEW  YORK 

Geneva 
Wm.  Wilson 

Jamestown 
H.  Eugene  Bonsteel 
S.  H.  Chauvenet 

Oswego 
John  M.  Gill 
Luther  W.  Mott 

Peekskill 
Cornelius  A.  Pugsley 
Rye 
J.  Mayhew  Wainwright 

Shinnecock 
C.  Davis  English 

Tuxedo  Park 
James  H.  Benedict 
Philip  Livingston 

West  Sayville,  L.  I. 
Frederick  Ockers 

OHIO 

Cleveland 

Charles  William  Burrows 

Frank  Eichelberger 

James  R.  Garfield 

James  R.  Hatfield 

J.  B.  Zerbe 

E.  M.  Williamson 

Henry  S.  Sherman 

Columbus 

Benson  W.  Hough 
J.  R.  Kilbourne 

Middletown 
Charles  R.  Hook 

Toledo 
Harry  B.  Kirtland 


385 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 


NORTH   DAKOTA 
Fargo 
R.  A.  Beard 
John  W.  Hansel 

Carrington 
T.  F,  McCue 


OKLAHOMA 

Antlers 
Victor  M.  Locke 
P.  J.  Hurley 


Dr. 


Portland 

Henry  Waldo  Coe 


Nathaniel  Hathaway 
Theo.  E.  Wiedersheim 
Philip  Howard  Brice 
Daniel  Morean  Barringer 
Charlton  Garrall 
John  Cadwalader 
Isaac  Roberts 
Dr.  Joseph  Leidy 
Russell  Duane 
James  Pollock 
John  C.  Winston 
Andrew  J.  Carty 
Leon  Wertheimer 
George  Breed 
Edmund  Hayes  Bell 
R.  Dale  Benson,  Jr. 
Charles  Biddle 
William  M.  Boden 


OREGON 

The  Dalles 
Edward  D.  Baldwin 

PENNSYLVANIA 
Philadelphia 

Percy  H.  Clark 
•    Walton  Clark 
George  W.  Carr 
Edmund  J.  W.  Coxe 
Franklin  S.  Edmonds 
William  S.  Ellis 
J.  Campbell  Gilmore 
C.  W.  Hare 
Howe  S.  Hare 
John  F.  Hunekar 
John  H.  Ingvam 
L.  S.  Landreath 
John  F.  Mahee 
Robert  Morris 
J.  King  Ross 
Henry  S.  Spackman 
George  H.  Streaker 
C.  Kilbourne  Tulledge 


Thos.  Patterson  . 
Wm.  S.  Moorehead 
Eric  F.  Wood 
J.  Dilworth  Beggs 
A.  R.  Flinn 
C.  E.  Zortman 
L.  M,  Johnston 
Wm.  A.  Dorkin 


Pittsburgh 

W.  M.  Frew 

William  Flynn 

P.  F.  Burke 

W.  Harry  Brown 

John  P.  Cowan 

General  A.  J.  Logan 

Charles  McKenna  Lynch 


386 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

MEN 


PENNSYLVANIA 


Harrisburg 
Thos.  J.  Stewart 

Surbury 

Charles  M.  Clements 

RHODE   ISLAND 
Newport 
R.  Livingston  Beeckman 

Providence 
Stephen  O.  Metcalf 
Edgar  R.  Barker 
Dr.  G.  Edward  Buxton,  Jr. 
Richard  B.  Comstock 
Walter  S.  Hackney 
Lauriston  H.  Hazard 
Frank  L.  Hinckley 
Thomas  F.  I.  McDonnell 
Henry  Wolcott 
Harry  Cutler 
C.  R.  Weeden 

SOUTH   CAROLINA 
Columbia 
August  Kohn 

SOUTH   DAKOTA 
Aberdeen 
R.  H.  Angell 

Huron 
T.  H.  Null 
R.  O.  Richards 

Rapid  City 
F.  A.  Waterhouse 

TENNESSEE 
Chattanooga 
W.  A.  Dodd 

IVIemphis 
Luke  E.  Wright 


IVIeadville 


Otto  Kohler 


York 


P.  A.  Elsesser 


TEXAS 
Paris 

Richard  H.  Blyth 
J.  J.  Culbertsey 

San  Antonio 

Wm.  Teitelbaum 

VERMONT 
Bennington 
Rev.  Thornton  F.  Turner 

VIRGINIA 

Lexington 

General  E.  W.  Nichols 
Richmond 

Alfred  B.  Williams 
Hon.  R.  Carter  Scott 
Samuel  B.  Love 

WEST  VIRGINIA 
Wheeling 
Right  Rev.  P.  J.  Donahue 

WISCONSIN 
Beloit 
W.  G.  Grinnell 

iVIilwaukee 

Willet  M.  Spooner 

ENGLAND 

Sydney  Brooks 

EMPIRE  CITY,  0.  Z. 
D.  A.  Nolan 


387 


DELEGATES  FROM  BOARDS  OF  TRADE  AND  CHAMBERS 

OF  COMMERCE 

WASHINGTON   CHAMBER   OF 
COMMERCE 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Winfield  Jones 


PLATTSBURG    CHAMBER   OF 

COMMERCE 

Plattsburg 

W.  B.  Jaques 


Albert  Schulteis 

WASHINGTON    BOARD    OF    TRADE 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Gen.  Wm.  E.  Harvey 
E.  J.  Stellwagen 
Gist  Blair 
THE  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE, 
RALEIGH,  N.  C. 
Judge  J.  C.  Biggs 
Francis  A.  Cox 

BUSINESS    MEN'S    ASSOCIATION, 
HERKIMER,  N.  Y. 
Dewey  J.  Carter 
Fred.  Spoor 
BOARD  OF  TRADE  OF  BALTIMORE 

Baltimore,  Md. 
H.  M.  Warfield 
William  A.  Boykin 

CHAMBER   OF   COMMERCE, 
HOUSTON,  TEXAS 
Hon.  Joe  H.  Eagle 
Hon.  Jeff  McLemore 


CHAMBER     OF    COMMERCE, 

DALLAS,   TEXAS 

C.  E.  Hudson 
J.  K.  Hexter 
N.  M.  Baker 
THE    ROCHESTER   CHAMBER   OF 
COMMERCE 
Rochester,  N.   Y. 
Kingman  N.  Robins 

HUNTINGTON    CHAMBER    OF 
COMMERCE 
Huntington,  W.  Va. 
C.  D.  Emmons 

TRENTON    CHAMBER   OF   COM- 
MERCE 
Trenton,    N.  J. 
Hon.  Edward  C.  Stokes 
Hugh  W.  Kelly 
TUSCALOOSA     BOARD    OF    TRADE 

Tuscaloosa,  Ala. 
Hon.  J.  V.  Abercrorobie 


ROCKFORD  CHAMBER   OF  COM-    pjon.  W.  B.  Oliver 


MERGE 
Rockford,    III. 
Major  C.  J.  Sowle 
Waite  Talcott 

CHAMBER   OF  COMMERCE, 
SACRAMENTO,  CAL. 
Hon.  Chas.  F.  Curry 

HAMMOND  CHAMBER  OF  COM- 
MERCE,   HAMMOND,   IND. 
Judge  Lawrence  Becker 

PHILADELPHIA    CHAMBER    OF 
COMMERCE 
Philadelphia,    Pa. 
Powell  Evans 
Charles  P.  Vaughan 


BOARD   OF  TRADE,   NORFOLK,  VA. 

I.  S.  D.  Sauls 

ROME    CHAMBER    OF    COMMERCE 

Rome,  N.  Y. 
Hon.  H.  Clayton  Midlam 
Weston  Jenkins 

LOUISVILLE      CONVENTION      AND 
PUBLICITY    LEAGUE 
Louisville,   Ky. 
Capt.  B.  B.  Davis 
Col.  Charles  B.  Norton 
BOSTON  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE 

Boston,  Mass. 
Bernard  J.  Rothwell 


388 


MAYORS'  DELEGATES 


PASSAIC,  N.  J. 

Gen.  W.  Bird  Spencer 

ATLANTIC  CITY 

Joseph  Shinn 

F.  J.  Waldemayer 

James  M.  Sheen 

LITTLE    FALLS.    N. 
Hon.  Homer  P.  Snyder 

YORK,   PA. 

P.  A.  Elsesser 
John  E.  Baker 


LYNN,  MASS. 

Ralph  S.  Bauer 

MACON,  GA. 
Captain  Robert  C.  Hazlehurst 

BELOIT,  WIS. 

W.  H.  Grinnell 

REVERE,  MASS. 
Hon.  A.  B.  Curtis 

Little  Falls,  N.  Y. 
Hon.  Frank  H.  Shall 


DELEGATES  FROM  COLLEGES 


THE    GEORGE    WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 

,         Washington,   D.  C. 
Gen.  Maxwell  Van  Zandt  WoodhuU 

COE  COLLEGE,  CEDAR  RAPIDS,  lA. 

Hon.  James  W.  Good 

LOYOLA    UNIVERSITY,    NEW 
ORLEANS,   LA. 
Washington,   D.   C. 
Joseph  M.  Rault 

BROOKLYN     COLLEGE,    THE    COL 
LEGE  OF  ST.  FRANCIS  XAVIER 

Rev.  A.  J.  Donlon 


UNIVERSITY   OF  SOUTHERN   CALI- 
FORNIA,   LOS    ANGELES,    CAL. 

Hon.  Wm.  D.  Stephens 

VIRGINIA    MILITARY    INSTITUTE 

,Gen.  E.  W.  Nichols 

CORNELL   COLLEGE,   MOUNT 
VERNON,   IOWA 

Hon.  Cato  Sells 

WHITMAN     COLLEGE,    WALLA 

WALLA,    WASH. 

_Ed.  D.  Baldwin 

UNIVERSITY    OF    MINNESOTA 

Merle  Potter 


389 


DELEGATES  FROM  GOVERNORS 


OHIO 

Columbus 
Hon.  Ralph  D.  Cole 

Yellow  Springs 

Hon.  S.  D.  Fess 

Columbus 
Gen.  B.  W.  Hough 

Cincinnati 

Col.  W.  C.  Proctor 

Cleveland 

Hon.  Myron  T.  Herrlck 

Akron 

Hon.  Charles  Dick 

Springfield 
Gen.  J.  "Warren  Keifer 

Columbus 
Hon.  H.  M.  Dougherty 

Cincinnati 
Hon.  Judson  Harmon 

Canton 
Hon.  Atlee  Pomerene 

INDIANA 
South  Bend 
Charles  A.  Carlisle 
Frank  Hering 

Indianapolis 
Fred  A.  Sims 
John  E.  Hollett 
Carl  G.  Fisher 
Edward  Smith 
A.  M.  Glossbrenner 
W.  A.  Ketcham 
Benj.  Bosse 

La  Fayette 

Clyde  Jones 

MASSACHUSETTS 
Boston 
N.  L.  Norman 


DELAWARE 
Wilmington 
Josiah  Marvel 
Dr.  H.  A.  Cleaver 
L.  Scott  Townsend 
Hon.  Dan  O.  Hastings 
Col.  George  W.  Sparks 
Hon.  John  P.  Nichols 
John  B.  Baird 

B.  M.  Hoopes 

Dover 
Hon.  Richard  R.  Kenny 
Col.  Wm.  D.  Denny 
Capt.  John  P.  LeFevre 
IOWA 
Des  Moines 
Hon.  E.  T.  Meredith 
Hon.  Lafayette  Young 
H.  H.  Polk 

Council  Bluffs 
Leonard  Everett 

Keokuk 
F.  W.  Moorhead 

SOUTH   DAKOTA 
Aberdeen 

R.  H.  Angell 

MICHIGAN 
Hon.  Frank  E.  Doremus 
Hon.  Samuel  W.  Beakes 
Hon.  Patrick  H.  Kelly 
Hon.  Charles  E.  Townsend 

RHODE    ISLAND 

Hon.  R.  Livingston  Beeckman 

COLORADO 
Frank  M.  Taylor 

C.  MacA.  Willcox 
Forrest  L.  Rutherford 

E.  C.  Stimson 
Harold  Kountze 

F.  C.  Goudy 
Wm.  M.  Randol 


590 


DELEGATES  FROM  GOVERNORS 

SOUTH   CAROLINA 


Columbia 
E.  W.  Robertson 
E.  B.  Cantoy 
Gen.  W.  Moore 
G.  A.  Guiguard 

B.  F.  Taylor 

C.  Benet 

J.  S.  Caldwell 

Gen.  H.  T.  Thompson 

Charleston 
P.  H.  Gadsden 
Major  T.  T.  Hyde 
Hon.  R.  G.  Rhett 
Major  C.  V.  Boykin 

Georgetown 
Col.  H.  B.  Springs. 

Barnwell 
H.  D.  Calhoun 

Aiken 
A.  K.  Lorenz 

Anderson 
Gen.  M.  L.  Bonham 

Kershaw 
J.  T.  Stevens 


Spartenburg 
A.  B.  Calvert 
Hon.  John  F.  Floyd 
Dr.  J.  N.  Wallace 
Dr.  J.  H.  Hunter 

Greenville 
Col.  E.  M.  Blythe 
J.  R.  McKissick 
Major  W.  F.  Robertson 
Major  R.  F.  Watson 
Hon.  D.  B.  Traxler 


R.  M.  Cooper 


J.  Evans 


J.  J.  Lawton 


Wisacky 


Florence 


Hartsville 


Bennettsville 
J.  L.  McLaurin 

Greenwood 
Hon.  A.  S.  Hartzoy 
Hon.  A.  B.  Greer 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

WOMEN 


ARIZONA 

Snowflake 
Mrs.  C.  W.  Clayton 

COLORADO 
Colorado  Springs 
Mrs.  Henry  Leonard 


CONNECTICUT 
Litchfield 

Mrs.  John  L.  Buel 

Waterford 
Mrs.  George  M.   Minor 


391 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

WOMEN 


DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA 
Washington 


Mrs.  Larz  Anderson  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Marcus  Benjamin  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Elizabeth  B.  Bliss  Miss 

Miss  Mabel  Boardman  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Denny  Brereton  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Alban  B.  Butler  Miss 

Mrs.  Allyn  K.  Capron  Mrs. 

Miss  Elsie  Cassels  Mrs. 

Mrs.  V.  O.  Chase  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Florence  Adele  Chase  Mrs. 

Mrs.  C.  M.  Chester  Mrs. 

Mrs.  R.  Dickens  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Natalie  B.  Fernald  Mrs. 

Mrs.  John  C.  Fremont  Miss 

Mrs.  Julia  L.  Hall  Miss 

Mrs.  Wm.  F.  Haltzman  Mrs. 

Miss  Marion  Howard  Mrs. 

Mrs.  T.  B.  Howard  Mrs. 

Mrs.  C.  L.  Hussey  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Edith  Kingman  Kern  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Herbert  T.  King  Miss 

Miss  Lay  Mrs. 

Miss  Abbie  B.  McCa'mmon  Mrs. 

Miss  Edith  N.  McCammon  The 

Miss  Clara  A.  Marden  Mrs. 

Mrs.  George  G.  Martin  Mrs. 

Mrs.  C.  D.  Merwin  Mrs. 

Mrs.  John  Oliver  Moque  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Thomas  K.  Noble  Mrs. 

Miss  Lillian  O'Connell  Mrs. 

Miss  Elizabeth  Ellicott  Mrs. 

Miss  Caroline  Ryne  Mrs. 

Miss  Martha  H.  Scott  Mrs. 

Miss  Helen  H.  Squire  Mrs. 

Miss  Louise  N.  Vale  Mrs. 

Mrs.  E.  P.  Wood  Mrs. 

Miss  Julie  M.  Wood  Mrs. 

Mrs.  Boynton  Mrs. 
Miss  Cordelia  Powell  Odenheimer     Mrs. 


A.  R.  Boyd 

Calvert 

Calvert 

Edward  M.  Cobb 

N.  T.  Wilson 

Codman 

Chester 

S.  R.  Rhodes 

E.  J.  Moore 

Bloomer 

Crozier 

G.  Young 

A.  M.  McBlair 

Cassell 

Glynn 

E.  M.  Underwood 

Julia  Janes 

George  D.  Sparks 

Myers 

McCiintock 

McClintock 

Graff 

Howard 

Misses  McCannon 

I.  T.  Mann 

Danforth 

Biddle 

W.   Littauer 

Devoe 

Laughlin 

Henry  Dimock 

Needham 

A.  K.  Capron 

Rodgers 

Leonard 

A.  C.  Janier 

Roosevelt 

Watson 

Van  Rensselaer 


392 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

WOMEN 


DISTRICT   OF   COLUMBIA 
Washington 


Mrs.  Maud  Howell  Smith 
The  Misses  Solomou 
Mrs.  Spencer  Wood 


Mrs.  M.  S.  Bowen 

Mrs.  Weaver 

Mrs.  C.   M.    Underwood 


GEORGIA 

ILLINOIS 

Savannah 

Chicago 

Mrs.  W.  H.  Pleasants 

Mrs.  Lester  Curtis 

MASSACHUSETTS 

MARYLAND 

Mrs.  Gardiner 

Chevy  Chase 

Mrs.  Robbins 

Mrs.  S.  S.  Pascal 

Mrs.  Coolidge 

Miss  Katharine  Gideon   Colt 

Mrs.  Permai 

Miss  Mary  A.  Stowell 

Baltimore 

Miss  Charlotte  Baylies 

Miss  Lydia  Howard 

Mrs.  Walter  Baylies 

Miss  Nancy  De  Ford 

Mrs.  J.  R.  Coolidge 

Miss  Miriam  S.  Donaldson 

Mrs.  A.  J.  George 

Miss  Elizabeth  Hopkins 

Mrs.  Charles  R.  Holman 

Mrs.  John  Howland 

Miss  L.  S.  Howard 

Mrs.  Alfred  Partridge  Klotz 

Mrs.  Sinclair  Kennedy 

Mrs.  Albert  Leonard 

Mrs.  John  D.  Pearmain 

Mrs.  Hallins  McKim 

Mrs.  Reginald  C.  Robbins 

Miss  Mary  Camilla  McKlm 

Mrs.  Henry  H.  Sprague 

Mrs.  N.  L.  Meyer 

Miss  Mary  A.  Stowell 

Miss  Dorothy  B.  Powell 

Mrs.  F.  S.  Watson 

Miss  Ella  Slingluff 

Miss  Priscilla  Webster 

Miss  K.  D.  Slingluff 

Mrs.  Barrett  Wendell 

Miss  Ames  Graeme  Trumbull 

Mrs.  Edward  Everett  William 

MISSOURI 

MONTANA 

Mrs.  Thomas  G.  Rutledge 

Clearwater 

Mrs.  Thomas  S.  Rutledge 

Miss  Dorothy  Potter 

Mrs.  Mark  Salisbury 

Miss  Eleanor  Potter 

NEW  JERSEY 

Vineland 

Rutherford 

Miss  Madeline  C.  Hallowell 

Mrs.  O.  T.  Keep 

Summit 

Elizabeth 

Mrs.  Robert  S.  Holt 

Miss  Clementine  Kellogg 

393 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

WOMEN 


South  Orange 

Miss  Harriett  Spinning 


NEW   JERSEY 

Englewood 

Miss  Alberta  Peters 


Summit 
Mrs.  Guy  Bates 
Mrs.  W.  B.  Miles 


New  York  City  and   Brooklyn 


Mrs.  Wm.  H.  Nichols 

Mrs.  Robert  L.  Pierrepont 

Mrs.  Ernest  R.  Adee 

Miss   Clara  Temple  Boardman 

Mrs.  Lee  C.  Boardman 

Mrs.  Donald  W.  Brown 

Mrs.  Wm.  Reynolds  Brown 

Mrs.  E.  Vandercook  Brown 

Mrs.  Ernest  T.  Carter 

Mrs.  Clarence  Cary 

Mrs.  Charles  L.  E.  de  Gaugue 

Mrs.  George  Hahn 

Mrs.  Robert  Hoe 

Miss  Edith  Kendall 

Mrs.  George  Kerr 

Mrs.  Walter  Kremer 

Miss  Ida  Lowber 

Countess  Spottiswood  Mackin 

Mrs.  Charles  P.  MacLean 

Mrs.  Drelincourt  Martin 

Mrs.  John  S.  Melcher 

Mrs.    S.    Stanwood   Menken 

Mrs.  E.  J.  Moore 

Mrs.  Erna  von  R.  Owen 

Miss  Georgiana  Harriman  Owen 

Miss  C.  B.  Pilkington 

Mrs.  William  C.  Potter 

Mrs.  R.  B.  Price 

Mrs.  Charles  B.  Squier 

Miss  Florence  James  Sullivan 

Mrs.  A.  Van  Cortlandt 

Mrs.  C.  A.  Van  Rennselar 


Mrs.  Eliot  Butler  Whitney 

Mrs.  Charles  Farley  Winch 

Mrs.  William  B.  Wood 

Mrs.  Douglas  Robinson 

Mrs.  William  Henry  Barnum 

Mrs.  T.  H.  Boorman 

Mrs.  Charles  W.  Cooper 

Mrs.  Wm.  Alexander 

Mrs.  William  A.  Bartlett 

Mrs.  AVilliam  Davis 

Mrs.  Franklin  Pelton 

Mrs.  AVm.  Hoppin,  Jr. 

Mrs.  W.  I.  Lincoln  Adams 

Mrs.  Olivia  P.  Hoe 

Mrs.  Anita  Comfort  Brooke 

Mrs.  Winthrop  Barr 

Miss  Julia  S.  Bache 

Mrs.  Marian  Marsh  Welsh 

Mrs.  MacDougall 

Mrs.  Ben  Ali  Haggin 

Miss  Helen  Scott 

Mrs.  Ernest  T.  Carter 

Mrs.  Pirie  MacDonald 

Miss  MacDonald 

Mrs.  Alexandra 

Mrs.  August  Kuhn 

Mrs.  Fred  Ives 

Mrs.  H.  L.  West 

Miss  Marion  West 

Countess  Festetics 

Miss  Harriet  Spinning 

Miss  Cornelia  Knox 


394 


DELEGATES  TO  THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  CONGRESS. 

WOMEN 


NEW  YORK  STATE 
Mt.  Vernon 
Mrs.  Joseph  S.  Wood 

Schenectady 
Mrs.  Andrews 

Blooming  Grove 
Mrs.  Emily  H.  Pindlay 
Flushing 
Mrs.  Henderson  W.  Knott 

Buffalo 
Mrs.  Fi'ank  Bliss 
Mrs.  Everett  P.  Turner 

Utica 
Mrs.  T.  R.  Proctor 

Elizabethtown 
Mrs.  Jabez  Backus 

Stuyvesant-on- Hudson 
Miss  Edith  E.  Chase 

Shinnecock 
Mrs.  C.  Davis  English 

Mamaroneck 
Mrs.  Frank  C.  Littleton 
Flushing 
Mrs.  Edward  A.  MacDougal 
WEST  VIRGINIA 
Wheeling 
Mrs.  George  G.  Martin 


PENNSYLVANIA 
Pittsburg 

Mrs.  W.  Harry  Brown 
Mrs.  H.  Wilfred  DuPuy 
Mrs.  A.  Rex  Flinn 
Mrs.  William  S.  Moorhead 

Philadelphia 
Miss  Florence  Fox 

Swarthmore 
Miss  Frances  L.  Sullivan 
Mrs.  Henry  C.  Marshall 
Pittsburg 
Milton 
Miss  May  T.  Stecker 
Mrs.  J.  Dilworth  Beggs 

TENNESSEE 
Knoxville 
Miss  May  B.  Temple 
Mrs.  George  White  Baxter 

RHODE   ISLAND 
Newport 
Miss  Sarah  C.  Weaver 

VIRGINIA 
Richmond 
Mrs.  Allston  Cabell 

Alexandria 
Mrs.  W.  E.  Rollins 


395 


Cities  Where  Branches 

Alabama 

Birmingham 

Mobile 

Montgomery 
Arizona 

Tucson 
Arkansas 

Little  Rock 
California 

Berkeley 

Los  Angeles 

Sacramento 
Colorado 

Colorado  Springs 

Denver 
Connecticut 

Darien 

Greenwich 

New  Haven 
Cuba 

Havana 
Delaware 

Dover 
Florida 

Jacksonville 

Orange  County, 

Orlando 

Winter   Park 
Georgia 

Atlanta 

Savannah 
Hawaii 

Honolulu 
Illinois 

Chicago 

Joliet 

Springfield 
Indiana 

Indianapolis 
Mississippi 

Jackson  . 


of  the  National  Security  League  Are 
Organized. 


Iowa 
Council  Bluffs 
Des  Moines 
Keokuk 

Kansas 

Lawrence, 
City  Branch 

Lawrence, 

University   of   Kansas 
Branch 

Topeka 
Kentucky 

Louisville 
Louisiana 

New  Orleans 
Massachusetts 

Boston   (State  Branch) 

Worcester 
Michigan 

Ann  Arbor 

Detroit 

Flint 

Grand  Haven 

Iron  Mountain 

Minnesota 
Duluth 
Minneapolis, 

City  Branch 
Minneapolis,    University 

of  Minnesota 
St.  Paul,  City  Branch 
St.  Paul,  Hamline 

University 
St.  Paul, 

St.  Thomas  College 

Missouri 

Kansas  City 

St.  Joseph 

St.  Louis 
North   Dakota 

Fargo 


396 


Cities  Where  Branches  of  the  National  Security  League  Are 

Organized. 


Nebraska 
Lincoln, 

City  Branch 
Lincoln,   University 

Nebraska 
Omaha 

New  Jersey 
East  Orange 
Englewood 
Elizabeth 
Hackensack 
Montclair 
Newark 
Passaic 
Paterson 
Plainfield 
Red   Bank 
Summit 
Rutherford 

New  York 

Brooklyn   and 
Long  Island 
Buffalo 
Elmhurst 
Flushing 
Garden  City 
Hartsdale 
Kingston 

Mamaroneck 
Mt.  "Vernon 
New  Rochelle 
New  York 
Niagara  Falls 
Ossining 
Peekskill 
Port  Chester 
Syracuse 
Utica 
Plattshurg 
Watertown 
White  Plains 


of 


North  Carolina 

Raleigh 

Wilmington 
Ohio 

Akron 

Cincinnati 

Cleveland 

Columbus 

Lorain  County,  Elyria 

Northwestern   Ohio, 
Toledo 
Oklahoma 

Oklahoma  City 

Tulsa 
Pennsylvania 

Altoona 

Carbondale 

Lancaster 

Meadville 

Philadelphia 

Pittsburg 

Scranton 

Swarthmore 

Wilkesbarre 
Rhode   Island 

Providence 

(State  Branch) 
South    Carolina 

Charleston 

Columbia 
South   Dakota 

Aberdeen 
Tennessee 

Chattanooga 

Memphis 

Nashville 
Texas 

Dallas 

San  Antonio 
Virginia 

Charlottesville 

Norfolk 

Richmond 


597 


Citi«8  Where  Branches  of  the  National  Security  League  Are 

Organized. 


Wisconsin 


Appleton 

Eau  Claire 

Green  Bay 

Kenosha 

Madison 

Manitowoc 

Milwauliee 


(State  Branch) 
Neenah 
Racine 

Stevens  Point 
Superior 
Watertown 
Wausau 


States  Where  Citizens'  Committees  on  National  Defense  Have 
Been  Appointed  by  Governors. 

Arizona 
California 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Nevada 
«  New  York 

North  Dakota 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

Rhode  Island 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 


398 


Cities    in   Which    Citizens'    Committees    on    National    Defense 

Have  Been  Appointed  by  Mayors  to  Co-Operate  with 

The  National  Security  League. 


California 

Sacramento 
Connecticut 

New   Haven 

Orange 

Waterbury 
Florida 

Jacksonville 
Hawaii 

Honolulu 
Illinois 

Chicago 

Mattoon 

Moline 

Rockford 
Indiana 

Lafayette 

New  Albany 
Louisiana 

New  Orleans 
Massachusetts 

Beverly 
Michigan 

Marquette 
Mississippi 

Vicksburg 
Missouri 

St.  Joseph 

St.  Louis 
Montana 

Butte 
New  Jersey 

Atlantic  City 

East  Orange 

Jersey  City 

Newark 

Trenton 

West  Orange 
Pennsylvania 

Meadvllle 

Reading 


New  York 

Buffalo 

Dunkirk 

Elmira 

Mt.  Vernon 

New  York  City 

Niagara  Falls 

Norwich 

Ogdensburg 

Ossining 

Port  Chester 

Plattsburgh 

Rochester 

Rome 

Schenectady 

White  Plains 
North  Carolina 

Charlotte 
Ohio 

Portsmouth 
Oklahoma 

Oklahoma  City 
Texas 

Dallas 

Paris 
Utah 

Salt  Lak'e  City 
Virginia 

Roanoke 
Washington 

Everett 
West  Virginia 

Huntington 

Wheeling 
Wisconsin 

Beloit 

Janesville 

Oshkosh 

Racine 
Wyoming 

Cheyenne 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INDEX 


A 

Abbott,  Ernest  Hamlin,  remarks. 327 

Alexander,  Mrs.  William,  remarks 284 

American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers,  resolutions 167 

"An  Adequate  Naval  Policy  for  the  United  States,"  by  Henry  A.  Wise 

Wood 158 

Americanization  as  a  Means  of  Preparedness,"  by  Miss  Frances  A.  Keller.  202 

Amerman,  Col.  L.  W.,  address 241 

Anderson,  Alex.  L.,  remarks 142 

B 

Bacon,  Robert,  address ; 60 

Rem*arks 245 

Harry,  Herbert,  report  Committee  on  Rules 12 

Remarks 56,  74.  236.  238,  239,  285 

Bates,  Mrs.  Lincoln  W..  address 30 

Beek,  J.  H.,  remarks 333 

Boardman.  Miss  Mabel,  address 113 

Brown,  Franklin  Q.,  address 285 

Remarks  285,  298.  304.  316,  325 

c 

Chamberlain,  Senator  George  E.,  address 208 

Chester,  Rear  Admiral  Colby  M 177 

Remarks 330,  332 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  letter 238 

Church,  William  C,  letter 240 

"Coast  Defense."  by  Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  O'Ryan 272 

Committee  on  Resolutions 5.  317 

Committee  on  Rules 12 

Coudert,  Frederic  R..  address 13 

Remarks    55 

Curtis,  Charles  G.,  address 115 

403 


INDEX 

D 

Delegates,  list  of 374  to  392 

"Do  We  Take  the  Navy  Seriously?"  by  Henry  II.  Ward 145 

E 

Edmonds,  Franklin  S.,  remarks 98,  104,  112,  143 

Eighth  Session  (S.  Stanwood  Menken.  Chairman) 335 

Emery,  Prof.  Henry  C,  address 105 

Evans,  Frank  S.,  telegram 112 

F 

nfth  Session  (John  Purroy  Mitchel,  Chairman) 194 

First  Session   ( S.  Stanwood  Menken,  Chairman) 7 

Fortesque,  Capt.  Granville,  address 299 

Fourth  Session  (Henry  H.  Ward,  Chairman) 145 

G 

George,  Mrs.  A.  J.,  address 74 

Gompers,  Samuel,  letter 119 

H 

Hammond,  Mrs.  John  Hays 55 

Hare,  C.  Willing,  resolution   5 ' 

Harries,  Gen.  George  H.,  remarks  324 

Hill,  Dr.  David  Jayne,  address  24 

Remarks 174 

Hollister,  Evan,  remarks 13 

Hopkins,  Archibald,  poem  337 

Howard,  Henry  J 199 

Hubbard,  S.  T.,  remarks 328 

Hubbell,  J.  W.,  remarks  33 

Huidekoper,  Frederic  L.,  address 257 

Hulbert,  Representative  Murray,  address 138 

Hutchinson,  Dr.  Woods,  remarks  174 

I 

"Industrial  Mobilization,"  by  R.  B.  Price 67 

"Inter-Coastal  Waterways  and  National  Defense,'"  by  Hon.  J.  Hauijtton 

Moore   149 

"International  Obligations,"  by  Robert  Bacon 60 

404 


INDEX 


Kellor,  Miss  Frances  A.,  address 202 

Ketchani,  William  A.,  remarks  IV2Q,  326,  327 

Knott,  Mrs.  H.  W.,  remarks 143 


Le  Boeuf,  Kandall  L.,  remarks 32G 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  address  357 

M 

Marbury,  William  L.,  address  220 

"Menace  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  by  William  L.  Marbury 220 

Menken,  S.  Stanwood,  Chairman,  address 7,  335 

Remarks 

33,  55,  193,  316,  321,  324,  325,  326,  327.  328.  330,  333,  348,  354,  357 

Meyer,  George  von  L.,  address  153 

"Military  History  and  Policy,"  by  Frederic  L.  Huidekoper 257 

"Military  Needs,"  by  Luke  E.  Wright 89 

Miller,  Owen,  remarks » 320 

3Iitchel,  John  Purroy,  address   195,  348 

Remarks  202,  207,  219,  227 

Moore,  Representative  J.  Hampton,  address 149 

N 

National  Security  League  Organization 370-371-372,  394-395-396-397 

National  Wholesale  Dry  Goods  Association,  telegram 112 

Nichols,  Gen.  E.  W.,  address  247 


Opening  Address,  Fifth  Session,  Mrs.  William  Cummings  Story 194 

Opening  Address,  Sixth  Session.  Justice  Henry  Stockbridge 236 

Opening  Address,  Fifth  Session,  John  Purroy  Mitchel 195 

Opening  Address,  Seventh  Session,  Franklin  Q.  Brown 285 

Opening  Address,  First  Session,  S.  Stanwood  Menken 7 

Opening  Address,  Eighth  Session,  S.  Stanwood  Menken 335 

Opening  Address,  Second  Session,  Willet  M.  Spooner 56 

O'Ryan,  Major-General  John  F.,  address 272 

"Our  Naval  Inferiority,  etc.,"  by  Chas.  G.  Curtis 115 

"Our  Naval  Requirements,"  by  George  von  L.  Meyer 153 

Owen,  Mrs.  E.  von  R.,  remarks 191 

405 


INDEX 


Padgett,  Lemuel  P..  remarks 364 

Parsons,  William  Barclay,  address 166 

Phelan,  Senator  James  D.,  address  227 

Preface  3 

Price,  R.  B.,  address  67 

Putnam,  George  Haven,  address 337 

R 

Robinson,  Mrs.  Douglas,  remarks 82 

Resolutions 5,  317 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  letter S3 

Root,  Elihu,  letter 245 

Ross,  P.  H.  W.,  address  98 

Remarks 328,  329 

Rothwell,  Bernard  J.,  resolution   5 

Remarks 323 


Scope  of  Congress  6 

Second  Session,  Willet  M.  Spooner,  Chairman 56 

Seventh  Session,  Franklin  Q.  Brown,  Chairman 285 

Sheen,  James  M.,  remarks  141 

Sixth  Session,  Justice  Henry  Stoekbridge,  Chairman -  236 

Sloane,  Parker,  remarks  324,  327 

"Some  Suggestions  on  the  Perils  of  Espionage,"  by  John  B.  Stanchfield . . .     34 

Sons  of  the  American  Revolution,  resolution  174 

Spooner,  Willet  M.,  Chairman,  address   56 

Remarks  60,  66,  74,  82,  88,  329 

Stanchfield,  John  B.,  address  34 

Stimson,  Henry  L.,  address  287 

Stoekbridge,  Justice  Henry,  address  236 

Remarks 241,  245,  247,  256,  271,  284 

.Story,  Mrs.  William  Cummings,  remarks 194 


"The  American  Red  Cross,"  by  Miss  Mabel  Boardman 113 

"The  Development  of  Auxiliary  Forces  of  Reserve  Officers  Drawn  from 

the  Professional  Class,"  by  Wm.  Barclay  Parsons 166 

"The  Economic  Value  of  Universal  Service,"  by  Prof.  Henry  C.  Emery. . .   105 
"The  General  Need  of  Preparedness,"  by  Frederic  R.  Coudert 13 

406 


INDEX 

"The  iDClividual  Duty  Towards  Preparedness."  by  Henry  L.  Stimson 287 

"The  Mercantile  Marine  in  Its  Relation  to  the  Navy  and  Preparedness," 

by  P.  H.  W.  Ross  98 

"The  Swiss  and  Australian  Systems,"  by  Eric  Fisher  Wood 304 

"Tlie  Pacific  Peril,"  by  James  D.  Phelan 227 

"The  Teaching  of  Patriotism  in  Home  and  School,"  by  Mrs.  A.  J.  George. .  74 
"The  Value  of  Navy  Training  in  Schools  and  Colleges,"  by  Gen.   E.  W. 

Nichols   , ; ...  247 

"The  Value   of  Waterways  as   a   Means   of  Defense,"   by  Hon.   Murray 

Hulbert   138 

Third  Session,  Franldin  S.  Edmonds,  Chairman OS 

Torrance,  Eli.  remarks 333 

u 

"United  States  Boy  Scouts,"  by  Col.  L.  W.  Amerman 241 

w 

Ward,  Henry  H.,  address  145 

Remarks 193 

"We  Need  Two  Thousand  Aeroplanes,"  by  Henry  Woodhouse 180 

Wendell,  Mrs.  Barret,  remarks 173 

Wetmore,  Miss  Maude  30 

Wickersham,  George  W.,  address  354 

"Woman's  Duty  to  Preparedness,"  by  Mrs.  Liudon  W.  Bates 30 

Wood,  Eric  Fisher,  address  304 

Remarks 316,  321,  326,  327,  328 

Wood,  Henry  A.  Wise,  address 158 

Woodhouse,  Henry,  address  180 

^V^oodhull,  Gen.  Maxwell  Van  Zandt,  remarks  318,  319 

"World  Politics  as  Affecting  the  United  States,"  by  Dr.  David  Jayne  Hill.     24 

Wright,  Luke  E.,  address   89 

Remarks   316.  318,  319,  324,  326,  328,  330,  331 


407 


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